

Liechtensteinisches Landesgesetzblatt

Jahrgang 2025

Nr. 261

ausgegeben am 8. April 2025

Verordnung

vom 8. April 2025

betreffend die Abänderung der Verordnung über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran

Aufgrund von Art. 2 des Gesetzes vom 10. Dezember 2008 über die Durchsetzung internationaler Sanktionen (ISG), LGBL 2009 Nr. 41, und unter Einbezug der aufgrund des Zollvertrages anwendbaren schweizerischen Rechtsvorschriften sowie der Beschlüsse (GASP) 2024/2894 und (GASP) 2025/690 des Rates der Europäischen Union vom 18. November 2024 und 4. April 2025 verordnet die Regierung:

I.

Abänderung bisherigen Rechts

Die Verordnung vom 19. Januar 2016 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran, LGBL 2016 Nr. 10, in der geltenden Fassung, wird wie folgt abgeändert:

Ingress

Aufgrund von Art. 2 des Gesetzes vom 10. Dezember 2008 über die Durchsetzung internationaler Sanktionen (ISG), LGBL 2009 Nr. 41, unter Einbezug der aufgrund des Zollvertrages anwendbaren schweizerischen Rechtsvorschriften und der Beschlüsse des Rates der Europäischen Union vom 26. Juli 2010 (2010/413/GASP), 12. April 2011 (2011/235/GASP) und 20. Juli 2023 (GASP) 2023/1532 sowie in Ausführung der Resolution 2231

(2015) vom 20. Juli 2015 des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen¹ verordnet die Regierung:

Art. 3a Sachüberschrift und Abs. 1

*Verbote betreffend Güter und Technologie für unbemannte
Luftfahrzeuge und Raketen*

1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Gütern und Technologie für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge und Raketen nach Anhang 1a an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten.

Art. 8

Sperrung von Geldern und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen

1) Gesperrt sind Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen, die sich im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle befinden von:

- a) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6;
- b) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6a;
- c) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 7.

2) Es ist verboten:

- a) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach den Anhängen 6 und 7 Gelder zu überweisen oder Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen sonst wie direkt oder indirekt zur Verfügung zu stellen;
- b) für natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6 spezielle Zahlungsverkehrsdienste zu erbringen, die für den Austausch von Finanzdaten verwendet werden;
- c) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6a Gelder zu überweisen oder Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen sonst wie direkt oder indirekt zur Verfügung zu stellen.

¹ Der Text dieser Resolutionen ist unter www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0 in englischer Sprache abrufbar.

3) Das Verbot nach Abs. 2 gilt nicht, wenn die Überweisung von Geldern oder das Zurverfügungstellen von Geldern oder wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen erforderlich ist zur Durchführung humanitärer Aktivitäten oder für andere Tätigkeiten zur Deckung menschlicher Grundbedürfnisse durch:

- a) die Vereinten Nationen, einschliesslich ihrer Programme, Fonds und sonstiger Einrichtungen und Stellen, sowie ihre Sonderorganisationen und verwandte Organisationen;
- b) internationale Organisationen;
- c) humanitäre Organisationen mit Beobachterstatus in der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen und Mitglieder dieser Organisationen;
- d) bilateral oder multilateral finanzierte nichtstaatliche Organisationen, die sich an den Plänen der Vereinten Nationen für humanitäre Hilfe, an den Plänen für Flüchtlingshilfemassnahmen, an anderen Appellen der Vereinten Nationen oder an vom Amt der Vereinten Nationen für die Koordinierung humanitärer Angelegenheiten (OCHA) koordinierten humanitären Strukturen beteiligen;
- e) öffentliche Stellen oder Unternehmen und Organisationen, die für die Durchführung humanitärer Aktivitäten Beiträge des Landes erhalten;
- f) die Beschäftigten, Beitragsempfänger, Tochtergesellschaften oder Durchführungspartner der in den Bst. a bis e genannten Organisationen, soweit sie in dieser Eigenschaft handeln.

4) Die Regierung kann Zahlungen aus gesperrten Konten, Übertragungen gesperrter Vermögenswerte und die Freigabe gesperrter wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen ausnahmsweise bewilligen zur:

- a) Erfüllung bestehender Verträge;
- b) Erfüllung von Forderungen, die Gegenstand sind:
 - 1. einer bestehenden Entscheidung eines Schiedsgerichts; oder
 - 2. einer Entscheidung einer Verwaltungsstelle oder eines Gerichts, die in einem EWRA-Vertragsstaat, der Schweiz oder im Vereinigten Königreich ergangen ist oder in diesen Staaten vollstreckbar ist;
- c) Umsetzung des JCPOA.

5) Sie kann die Freigabe bestimmter gesperrter Gelder oder wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen oder das Zurverfügungstellen bestimmter Gelder oder wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen an eine natürliche Person, ein Unternehmen oder eine Organisation nach Abs. 1 ausnahmsweise bewilligen zur:

- a) Vermeidung von Härtefällen;
 - b) Erfüllung amtlicher Tätigkeiten diplomatischer oder konsularischer Vertretungen oder internationaler Organisationen, die nach dem Völkerrecht Immunität geniessen;
 - c) Verwendung für humanitäre Zwecke, einschliesslich der Durchführung humanitärer Aktivitäten und der Unterstützung der Zivilbevölkerung im Iran;
 - d) Bezahlung angemessener Honorare und Erstattung von Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der Erbringung juristischer Dienstleistungen;
 - e) Bezahlung von Gebühren oder Dienstleistungskosten für die routinemässige Verwahrung oder Verwaltung gesperrter Gelder oder wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen;
 - f) Wahrung liechtensteinischer Interessen.
- 6) Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.

Art. 8a

Ausnahmen von der Sperrung von Geldern und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen im Bereich des Luftverkehrs

- 1) Die Sperrung nach Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. b und das Verbot nach Art. 8 Abs. 2 Bst. c gelten nicht für Gelder oder wirtschaftliche Ressourcen, die benötigt werden für:
- a) die Durchführung von Flügen zu humanitären Zwecken zur Evakuierung oder Rückbeförderung von Personen oder für Initiativen zur Bereitstellung von Unterstützung für Opfer von Natur- oder Nuklearkatastrophen oder Chemieunfällen;
 - b) die Durchführung von Flügen für die Teilnahme an Sitzungen, die zum Gegenstand haben, eine Lösung für die militärische Unterstützung der russischen Aggression gegen die Ukraine und bewaffneter Gruppen und Organisationen im Nahen Osten und in der Region des Roten Meeres durch den Iran zu finden;
 - c) Notlandungen, Notstarts oder Notüberflüge;
 - d) die Durchführung von Flügen für die amtlichen Tätigkeiten diplomatischer oder konsularischer Vertretungen Liechtensteins, der Schweiz oder internationaler Organisationen, die nach dem Völkerrecht Immunität geniessen.

2) Die Regierung kann Ausnahmen vom Verbot nach Art. 8 Abs. 2 Bst. c für die in Anhang 6a unter Bst. B Ziff. 10 bis 12 genannten Organisationen bewilligen, sofern die Gelder oder wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen für Bodenabfertigungsdienste nach Art. 3 Ziff. 23 der Verordnung (EU) 2018/1139² erforderlich sind.

3) Sie kann Ausnahmen von der Sperrung nach Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. b und vom Verbot nach Art. 8 Abs. 2 Bst. c bewilligen, sofern dies für die Behandlung kritischer Angelegenheiten der Flugsicherheit erforderlich ist.

4) Gesuche um Ausnahmebewilligungen sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.

Art. 8b

Verbot von Transaktionen mit Häfen und Schleusen

1) Es ist verboten, unmittelbar oder mittelbar Transaktionen mit Häfen und Schleusen nach Anhang 8 zu tätigen.

2) Das Verbot nach Abs. 1 gilt nicht für Schiffe, die Hilfe benötigen und aus folgenden Gründen einen Notliegeplatz suchen:

- a) um einen Nothafen aus Gründen der maritimen Sicherheit, zur Rettung von Menschenleben auf See oder für humanitäre Zwecke anzulaufen;
- b) um ein Ereignis, das voraussichtlich schwerwiegende und wesentliche Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit und die Sicherheit von Menschen oder auf die Umwelt haben wird, dringend abzuwenden oder einzudämmen; oder
- c) um eine Naturkatastrophe zu bewältigen.

² Verordnung (EU) 2018/1139 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 4. Juli 2018 zur Festlegung gemeinsamer Vorschriften für die Zivilluftfahrt und zur Errichtung einer Agentur der Europäischen Union für Flugsicherheit sowie zur Änderung der Verordnungen (EG) Nr. 2111/2005, (EG) Nr. 1008/2008, (EU) Nr. 996/2010, (EU) Nr. 376/2014 und der Richtlinien 2014/30/EU und 2014/53/EU des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates, und zur Aufhebung der Verordnungen (EG) Nr. 552/2004 und (EG) Nr. 216/2008 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates und der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 3922/91 des Rates (ABl. L 212 vom 22.8.2018, S. 1)

Art. 9 Abs. 1a

1a) Personen und Institutionen, die nach Art. 8a Abs. 1 natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6a Gelder oder wirtschaftliche Ressourcen zur Verfügung stellen, müssen dies der Stabsstelle FIU unverzüglich melden.

Art. 11

Ein- und Durchreiseverbot

1) Die Einreise nach Liechtenstein und die Durchreise durch Liechtenstein sind den natürlichen Personen nach den Anhängen 6 bis 7 verboten.

2) Die Regierung kann für natürliche Personen nach den Anhängen 6 bis 7 Ausnahmen gewähren:

- a) aus erwiesenen humanitären Gründen;
- b) zwecks Teilnahme an Tagungen internationaler Gremien oder an einem politischen Dialog betreffend den Iran; oder
- c) zur Wahrung liechtensteinischer Interessen.

3) Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen sind beim Ausländer- und Passamt einzureichen.

Art. 12 Bst. b

Es ist verboten, Forderungen der folgenden natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen zu erfüllen, wenn sie auf einen Vertrag oder ein Geschäft zurückzuführen sind, dessen Durchführung direkt oder indirekt durch Massnahmen nach dieser Verordnung, nach der Verordnung vom 1. Februar 2011 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran oder nach der Verordnung vom 13. Februar 2007 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran verhindert oder beeinträchtigt wurden:

- b) natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach den Anhängen 6 bis 7;

Art. 14 Abs. 1

1) Wer gegen Art. 3 bis 8b oder 10 bis 12 verstösst, wird nach Art. 10 ISG bestraft, soweit nicht Strafbestimmungen der in Liechtenstein anwendbaren schweizerischen Kriegsmaterial-, Güterkontroll- und Embargogesetzgebung zur Anwendung gelangen.

Art. 14a und 14b

Aufgehoben

Anhang 5

Aufgehoben

Anhang 6 Artikelverweis

Anhang 6

(Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. a, 2 Bst. a und b, 11 Abs. 1 und 2 sowie 12 Bst. b)

Anhang 6a Artikelverweis

Anhang 6a

(Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. b, 2 Bst. c, 9 Abs. 1a, 11 Abs. 1 und 2 sowie 12 Bst. b)

Anhang 7 Artikelverweis und Bst. A Ziff. 22, 28, 32, 39, 44, 46, 52, 55, 56, 66, 68, 74, 102, 120, 135, 140, 164, 172, 180, 197, 198 und 219

Anhang 7

(Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. c, 2 Bst. a, 11 Abs. 1 und 2 sowie 12 Bst. b)

	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
22.	PIR-ABASSI Abbas	Gender: male Function: Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex; former magistrate of a criminal chamber; former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26	Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex. Former magistrate of a criminal chamber. Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters.
28.	BOZORGNIA Mostafa	Gender: male Function: Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison	Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison, known for being the place of imprisonment of the regime's political prisoners and for its particularly poor detention conditions. He unleashed on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners.
32.	ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI Mahmoud	Gender: male	Member of Parliament from February 2020 to 2024 and Speaker of the Parliament's Committee

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			<p>for National Security and Foreign Affairs who continues to support the Iranian regime, including by justifying the abuses committed by the regime against the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement.</p> <p>Advisor to Iran's High Council for Human Rights until 2019. Former secretary of the High Council for Human Rights. Former Governor of Ilam Province. Former Political Director of the Interior Ministry. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups, he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties.</p> <p>In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mir-Hossein Mousavi - the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organisation. From 2009</p>

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			<p>onwards, he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, and has therefore denied the constitutional right to protest and caused many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention of the right to freedom of assembly.</p> <p>In 2009, he also denied the opposition a permit for a ceremony to mourn people killed in protests over the presidential elections.</p>
39.	HABIBI Mohammad Reza	<p>Gender: male Function: Chief Justice of Isfahan; former Attorney General of Isfahan; former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan; former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd</p>	<p>Chief Justice of Isfahan, former Attorney General of Isfahan, former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan and former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. In his various roles in the judiciaries of Isfahan and Yazd, including in his current role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he has directly participated in and is responsible for the violation of citizens' rights, in particular the right to freedom of speech, the right to protest, the right to life, and the viola-</p>

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			tion of the prohibition on torture. Mohammad Reza Habibi also played a direct role in the suppression and gross violation of the right to protest during the nationwide protests in January 2017 and November 2019. Therefore, in his role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
44.	KAMALIAN Behrouz (a.k.a. Hackers Brain, Behrooz_Ice)	POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1983 Gender: male Function: Head of the "Ashiyaneh" cyber group	Head of the "Ashiyaneh" cyber group linked with the Iranian regime. "Ashiyaneh" Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for intensive cyber-attacks on both domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. Kamalian's "Ashiyaneh" organisation's work has assisted the regime's crackdown against the opposition, which has involved numerous serious human rights violations.

46.	MAHSOULI Sadeq (a.k.a. MAHSULI Sadeq)	POB: Oroumieh (Iran) DOB: 1959/1960 Gender: male Function: Secretary-General (and former Deputy Secretary-General) of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability)	Secretary-General of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) since 2021 and Deputy Secretary-General of the Paydari Front before 2021. The Paydari Front has long been active in state capture practices, infiltrating institutions and indoctrinating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the wake of the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement, launched in September 2022, the Paydari Front, under the leadership of Mahsouli, played a critical role in pushing through the draconian hijab and chastity laws. Mahsouli is a former advisor to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is also a former member of the Expediency Council and former Deputy Chief of the Perseverance Front. He was Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011 and Minister of the Interior until August 2009. As Minister of the
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	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
			Interior, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plain-clothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli's control.
52.	TAMADDON Morteza (a.k.a. TAMADON Morteza)	POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan (Iran) DOB: 1959 Gender: male Function: Board member at Khajeh Nasired-din Tusi University of Technology; former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council; former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province	Politician closely associated with former Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology. Former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as Governor and Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bore overall respon-

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			sibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran Province, including cracking down on political protests since June 2009.
55.	HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz (a.k.a. Aziz Hajmohammadi, Noorollah Azizmohammadi)	POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1948 Gender: male Function: Attorney in Tehran since 2020; former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court	Attorney in Tehran since 2020. Former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Working for the judiciary since 1971, he has been involved in several trials of demonstrators, including that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities. He has a track record of human rights violations, including the issuing of inhumane sentences, death sentences and prison sentences for political prisoners.
56.	BAGHERI Mohammad-Bagher	DOB: 1941 Gender: male Function: Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff	In 2019, Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri was appointed Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff, replacing Mohammad Javad Larijani in this

	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
			position by a decree of Ebrahim Raisi. He was judge at the Supreme court between December 2015 and 2019. Former vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, approximately 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers of those executed being notified. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a high number of death sentences.
66.	Aufgehoben		
68.	FARHADI Ali	Gender: male Function: Head of the Government Penal Organization; former Deputy Head of	In 2024, Ali Farhadi was appointed by the Iranian Minister of Justice as head of the Government Penal Organization, which is an organi-

	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
		Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran; former prosecutor of Karaj	zation lacking impartiality and disrespecting citizens' rights. Former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Former prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty was handed down. There were a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor.
74.	RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf	Gender: male Function: Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons; former head of Evin Prison; former head of Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah	Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons since 2015. Former head of Evin Prison (2012-2015) and Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah. During his tenure, conditions in the prisons deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in Evin Prison in protest at the violation of their rights

	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
			and their violent treatment by prison guards.
102.	VAHIDI Ahmad	<p>POB: Shiraz (Iran) DOB: 27.7.1958 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of Expediency Council; former Minister of Interior</p>	<p>Ahmad Vahidi was appointed member of the Expediency Council for a 5-year term on 22 September 2022. He was the Iranian Minister of Interior from 25 August 2021 until 2024. As such, he was responsible for Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). During his time in office, an unprecedented number of military and security officials were appointed to provincial governorships who continue to play key roles in coordinating crowd-control activities by police special forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Blatant and severe human rights violations by the LEF, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa</p>

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			<p>Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds have been seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Vahidi has also publicly advocated for a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
120.	MOHAMMADIAN Abbas-Ali	<p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Police commander of Greater Tehran; former head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province</p>	<p>Abbas-Ali Mohammadian has been the police commander of Greater Tehran since January 2023. He is the former head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province, a position he held from 2017 to 2023. Alborz (Karaj) is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with exces-</p>

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			<p>sive police violence. Security forces have frequently shot directly at peaceful protestors, leading to many deaths, including of children. As police commander of Greater Tehran, he is responsible for implementing policies violating women's rights.</p> <p>As former head of the LEF in Alborz (Karaj) province and current police commander of Greater Tehran, Abbas-Ali Mohammadian is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
135.	MIRAHMADI Seyyed Majid	<p>POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters; former Deputy Minister of Interior of Iran</p>	<p>Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mirahmadi is head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters - a position traditionally held by members of the security forces. He was Iran's Deputy Minister of Interior until 2024, responsible for overseeing Iran's security and police forces, actors that are involved in serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>

	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
			<p>Iran's security and police forces are violently clamping down on protests, shooting directly at peaceful protesters and arbitrarily arresting people with total disregard for their human rights.</p> <p>In his statements, Mirahmadi refers to the protests as riots that have to end, and criminalises and threatens those participating in peaceful protests. He is also personally white-washing the serious human rights violations committed by forces under his authority, for example, by claiming that 16-year-old protester Nika Shakrami committed suicide. Reports indicate that it is very likely that she died at the hands of security forces.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
140.	KARIMI Mohsen	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Function: Senior Advisor to the	Since May 2024, Brigadier-General Mohsen Karimi is the Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard

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		Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces; former Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Markazi province	Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces. He is the former commander of the IRGC in Markazi province, also known as the Ruhollah Corps. The Ruhollah Corps is a military unit of the IRGC with its headquarters located in Arak and is responsible for commanding and controlling all units of the IRGC and Basij located in Markazi province. He is responsible for the security forces' violent repression of protests in 2022, which led to the death of 19-year-old Mehrshad Shahidi in an IRGC detention centre in Arak. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
164.	Aufgehoben		
172.	MOSTAFAVI Seyed Mojtaba (a.k.a. MORTAZAVI, Mojtaba; MOSTAF, Mojtaba)	DOB: 2.4.1987 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male National ID: No 0080467741 (Iran) Function: Member of Iran's	Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is a member of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder and CEO of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and

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		Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder and CEO of Ravin Academy	recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS. The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents. Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
180.	NESARI Habibollah Jan	POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University; former deputy in charge of training and education for the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)	Brigadier General Habibollah Jan Nesari has been the commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University since the end of 2023. He is the former deputy in charge of training and education for the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), a position he held from 2019 to 2023). Between 2016 and 30 December 2019, he served as a deputy commander of the Special Units of the LEF. In his capacity as deputy commander, he was responsible

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			<p>for supervising the forces in using lethal and non-lethal weapons during the nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the International People's Tribunal on Iran's Atrocities for his role in the crack-down on protesters in his capacity as deputy commander. As part of the security forces, the police forces are found to have designed and implemented a plan to commit crimes against humanity as well as murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence in order to quell the protests and conceal the crimes committed during the November 2019 protests. As deputy commander in charge of training and education for the LEF and as commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer</p>

	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
			<p>Training University, Nesari has been personally responsible for the human rights violations carried out by the LEF. The LEF, which he has trained, took part in the violent crack-down on protestors during the protests that erupted in September 2022, including by the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
197.	SHARIF Ramezan	<p>POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center; former IRGC spokesman</p>	<p>Ramezan Sharif has been the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center since July 2024. He is a former spokesman of the IRGC.</p> <p>The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations. In his role, Sharif is covering up and condoning serious hu-</p>

	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
			<p>man rights violations committed by the IRGC.</p> <p>Therefore, Ramezan Sharif is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
198.	JOMEIRI Fathollah	<p>POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Head of Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Security Unit of the IRGC</p>	<p>Brigadier General Fathollah Jomeiri is the head of the Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also called the Security Unit of the IRGC.</p> <p>This unit is responsible for protecting vital infrastructure and key areas of the country, important individuals, such as regime VIPs, but above all protecting the regime.</p> <p>The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations. In his role, Jomeiri is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.</p>

	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
			Therefore, Fathollah Jomeiri is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
219.	NIKVARZ Mohsen	<p>POB: Iran Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Function: Head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor's Office in Kerman Province; former Public Prosecutor of Sirjan</p>	<p>Mohsen Nikvarz has been the head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor's Office in Kerman Province since January 2024. As the Public Prosecutor of Sirjan, Mohsen Nikvarz was responsible for several arbitrary arrests of lawyers and for securing death sentences in Sirjan during the 2019 protests. In 2023, he was promoted to Head of the Center for Protection and Intelligence of the Judiciary of Kerman province.</p> <p>In the context of the protests that erupted in September 2022, Nikvarz was involved in the Maryam Arvin case, prosecuting her for her activities as a defence lawyer for protesters. Following her arrest, for which Nikvarz carries personal responsibility, Maryam Arvin was</p>

	Name	Identifizierungs- informationen	Gründe
			brutally tortured in prison. Mohsen Nikvarz is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

Anhang 8

Es wird folgender Anhang 8 neu eingefügt:

Anhang 8

(Art. 8b Abs. 1)

Häfen und Schleusen, die Transaktionsverbote unterliegen

1. Amirabad Port, Iran
2. Anzali Port, Iran

II.

Inkrafttreten

Diese Verordnung tritt am Tag der Kundmachung in Kraft.

Fürstliche Regierung:
gez. *Dr. Daniel Risch*
Fürstlicher Regierungschef