

Liechtensteinisches Landesgesetzblatt

Jahrgang 2016

Nr. 10

ausgegeben am 19. Januar 2016

Verordnung vom 19. Januar 2016 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran

Aufgrund von Art. 2 und 14a des Gesetzes vom 10. Dezember 2008 über die Durchsetzung internationaler Sanktionen (ISG), LGBL 2009 Nr. 41, in der Fassung des Gesetzes vom 9. Juni 2017, LGBL 2017 Nr. 203, unter Einbezug der aufgrund des Zollvertrages anwendbaren schweizerischen Rechtsvorschriften und der Beschlüsse des Rates der Europäischen Union vom 26. Juli 2010 (2010/413/GASP), 12. April 2011 (2011/235/GASP) und 18. Oktober 2015 (2015/1863/GASP) sowie in Ausführung der Resolution 2231 (2015) vom 20. Juli 2015 des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen¹ verordnet die Regierung:²

I. Zwangsmassnahmen

Art. 1

Begriffe

In dieser Verordnung bedeuten:

- a) Gelder: finanzielle Vermögenswerte, einschliesslich Bargeld, Schecks, Geldforderungen, Wechsel, Geldanweisungen oder anderer Zahlungsmittel, Guthaben, Schulden und Schuldverpflichtungen, Wertpapieren und Schuldtiteln, Wertpapierzertifikaten, Obligationen, Schuldscheinen, Optionsscheinen, Pfandbriefen, Derivaten; Zinserträge, Dividenden oder andere Einkünfte oder Wertzuwächse aus Vermögenswerten; Kre-

- dite, Rechte auf Verrechnung, Bürgschaften, Vertragserfüllungsgarantien oder andere finanzielle Zusagen; Akkreditive, Konnossemente, Sicherungsübereignungen, Dokumente zur Verbriefung von Anteilen an Fondsvermögen oder anderen Finanzressourcen und jedes andere Finanzierungsinstrument für Exporte;
- b) Sperrung von Geldern: die Verhinderung jeder Handlung, welche die Verwaltung oder die Nutzung von Geldern ermöglicht, mit Ausnahme von normalen Verwaltungshandlungen von Banken und Wertpapierfirmen;
- c) iranische Person oder Organisation:
1. der iranische Staat sowie jede Behörde dieses Staates,
 2. jede natürliche Person mit Aufenthaltsort oder Wohnsitz im Iran, ausgenommen diplomatisches Personal der Schweiz und von Drittstaaten, das in offizieller Funktion im Iran tätig ist,
 3. jede juristische Person oder Organisation mit Sitz im Iran,
 4. jede juristische Person oder Organisation innerhalb oder ausserhalb des Iran, die sich im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle einer oder mehrerer der vorgenannten Personen oder Organisationen befindet;
- d) wirtschaftliche Ressourcen: Vermögenswerte jeder Art, unabhängig davon, ob sie materiell oder immateriell, beweglich oder unbeweglich sind, insbesondere Immobilien und Luxusgüter, mit Ausnahme von Geldern nach Bst. a);
- e) Sperrung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen: die Verhinderung ihrer Verwendung zum Erwerb von Geldern, Waren oder Dienstleistungen, einschliesslich des Verkaufs, des Vermietens oder des Verpfändens solcher Ressourcen.

Art. 2

Vorbehaltenes Recht

Die Bestimmungen der in Liechtenstein anwendbaren schweizerischen Güterkontroll-, Kriegsmaterial- und Embargogesetzgebung bleiben vorbehalten.

II. Beschränkungen des Handels

Art. 3

Verbote betreffend Güter, Technologie und Software für Trägersysteme

1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Gütern, Technologie und Software für Trägersysteme an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten. Die betreffenden Güter sowie die betreffende Technologie und Software sind in Anhang 1 aufgeführt.

2) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen, Beteiligungen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Instandhaltung, der Herstellung oder der Verwendung von Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 1 sind verboten.

3) Die Verbote nach den Abs. 1 und 2 gelten auch für andere Güter, die ganz oder teilweise für die Entwicklung von Trägersystemen für Kernwaffen im Iran bestimmt sein könnten.

4) Die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 1 aus dem Iran sind verboten.

Art. 4

Bewilligungspflicht betreffend Nukleargüter und doppelt verwendbare Güter

1) Bewilligungspflichtig sind:

- a) der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Nukleargütern, doppelt verwendbaren Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran;
- b) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen, Beteiligungen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Instandhaltung, der Herstellung oder

der Verwendung von Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2;

c) die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Nukleargütern, doppelt verwendbaren Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 aus dem Iran.

2) Abs. 1 gilt auch für andere Güter, die ganz oder teilweise für die Aktivitäten des Iran im Bereich der Anreicherung von Uran, der Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen und des Schweren Wassers bestimmt sein könnten, die nicht mit dem Gemeinsamen umfassenden Aktionsplan vom 14. Juli 2015³ zur iranischen Atomfrage und zur Aufhebung der internationalen Sanktionen gegenüber dem Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) vereinbar sind.

3) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO) erteilt die Bewilligung für Güter nach Abs. 2 sowie nach Anhang 2 Teil A und damit zusammenhängende Dienstleistungen gegebenenfalls im Verfahren nach Art. 16 der schweizerischen Güterkontrollverordnung vom 25. Juni 1997 (GKV), wenn:⁴

a) die Anforderungen der Richtlinien vom 13. November 2013 beziehungsweise vom Juni 2013 der Gruppe der Nuklearlieferländer (NSG)⁵ erfüllt sind;

b) der Iran die Rechte zur Prüfung der Endverwendung und des Ortes der Endverwendung jedes gelieferten Gutes erteilt hat und die Rechte wirksam wahrgenommen werden können;

c) die Tätigkeiten mit dem JCPOA vereinbar sind.

4) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO erteilt die Bewilligung für Güter nach Anhang 2 Teil B und damit zusammenhängende Dienstleistungen, wenn kein Grund zur Annahme besteht, dass die Tätigkeit ganz oder teilweise für die Aktivitäten des Iran im Bereich der Anreicherung von Uran, der Wiederaufbereitung von Kernbrennstoffen und des Schweren Wassers oder anderen Aktivitäten im Nuklearbereich beitragen könnte, die nicht mit dem JCPOA vereinbar sind.⁶

5) Von der Bewilligungspflicht nach Abs. 1 Bst. b ausgenommen sind Dienstleistungen für Güter, für welche die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO eine Bewilligung nach Abs. 4 erteilt hat.⁷

6) Sofern dies aufgrund der Resolution 2231 (2015) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen erforderlich ist, holt die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO die Stellungnahme des Sicherheitsrates oder der Gemeinsamen Kommission nach dem JCPOA ein.⁸

7) Die Ausübung einer Tätigkeit nach Abs. 1 ist der Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit dem SECO innerhalb von fünf Arbeitstagen zu melden. Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO meldet die Ausübung dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen und der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde nach Massgabe der Resolution 2231 (2015) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen.⁹

8) Bewilligungsgesuche sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.¹⁰

Art. 5

Verbote betreffend Rüstungsgüter und Güter zur internen Repression

1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Rüstungsgütern jeder Art, einschliesslich Waffen und Munition, Militärfahrzeugen und -ausrüstung, paramilitärischer Ausrüstung, sowie von Zubehör und Ersatzteilen dafür an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten.

2) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Gütern, die zur internen Repression verwendet werden können und die zur Verwendung im Iran bestimmt sind, sind verboten. Die betreffenden Güter sind in Anhang 3 aufgeführt.

3) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Entwicklung, der Herstellung und der Verwendung von Rüstungsgütern und Gütern nach Anhang 3 sind verboten.

4) Die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Rüstungsgütern und Gütern nach Anhang 3 aus dem Iran sind verboten.

5) Von den Verboten nach den Abs. 1 bis 4 ausgenommen sind gepanzerte Fahrzeuge zum Schutz des diplomatischen und konsularischen Personals der Schweiz im Iran sowie die vorübergehende Ausfuhr von Schutzkleidung, einschliesslich kugelsicherer Westen und Helme, zur persönlichen Verwendung durch das Personal der Vereinten Nationen, der Europäischen Union oder der Schweiz, durch Medienvertreter und humanitäres Personal.

6) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO kann Ausnahmen von den Verboten nach den Abs. 1 bis 4 bewilligen für:¹¹

- a) nichtletales militärisches Gerät, das ausschliesslich für humanitäre Zwecke oder Schutzzwecke, für Programme der Vereinten Nationen, der Europäischen Union oder der Schweiz zum Aufbau von Institutionen oder zur Krisenbewältigung bestimmt ist;
- b) Jagd- und Sportwaffen sowie Munition, Zubehör und Ersatzteile dafür.
 - 7) Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.

Art. 6

Verbote betreffend Ausrüstung, Technologie und Software zu Überwachungszwecken

1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Ausrüstung, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 4, die für das Überwachen und Abhören des Internets und des Telefonverkehrs benützt werden können, an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten.

2) Die Erbringung von technischer Hilfe oder von Vermittlungsdiensten sowie die Gewährung von Finanzmitteln im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Herstellung, der Wartung und der Verwendung von Gütern nach Abs. 1 sind verboten.

3) Es ist verboten, für die iranische Regierung, für öffentliche Einrichtungen, Unternehmen und Agenturen des Iran sowie für Personen oder Organisationen, die in deren Namen oder auf deren Anweisung handeln, Dienstleistungen zum Überwachen und Abhören des Internets und des Telefonverkehrs zu erbringen.

4) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO bewilligt Ausnahmen von den Verboten nach den Abs. 1 und 2, sofern sichergestellt ist, dass die betroffenen Güter und Dienstleistungen nicht zum Überwachen und Abhören des Internets und des Telefonverkehrs benützt werden. Entsprechende Gesuche sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.¹²

III. Finanzierungs- und Beteiligungsbeschränkungen

Art. 7

Bewilligungspflicht für Beteiligungen

1) Unternehmen, die mit iranischen Personen oder Organisationen Vereinbarungen über den Erwerb von Beteiligungen oder die Gründung von Joint Ventures abschliessen möchten, benötigen dafür eine Bewilligung, falls sie:

a) im Uranabbau tätig sind; oder

b) folgende Güter, Technologien oder Software entwickeln oder herstellen:

1. Kernmaterialien nach Art. 1 der schweizerischen Kernenergieverordnung vom 10. Dezember 2004 (KEV),
2. Güter, Technologie oder Software nach Anhang 2 Teil 1 der schweizerischen Güterkontrollverordnung vom 25. Juni 1995 (GKV),
3. Güter, Technologie oder Software nach Anhang 2 Ziff. 2.

2) Unternehmen nach Abs. 1 müssen für die Entgegennahme von Darlehen oder Krediten von iranischen Personen oder Organisationen eine Bewilligung einholen.

3) Die Regierung erteilt die Bewilligung, sofern die Tätigkeit mit dem JCPOA vereinbar ist.

4) Sofern dies aufgrund der Resolution 2231 (2015) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen erforderlich ist, holt die Regierung die Stellungnahme des Sicherheitsrates oder der Gemeinsamen Kommission nach dem JCPOA ein.

5) Bewilligungsgesuche sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.

IV. Sperrung von Vermögenswerten und Bereitstellungsverbot

Art. 8

Sperrung von Geldern und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen

1) Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen, die sich im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle von natürlichen Personen,

Unternehmen und Organisationen nach den Anhängen 5 bis 7 befinden, sind gesperrt.

2) Es ist verboten:

- a) den natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Abs. 1 Gelder zu überweisen oder Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen sonst wie direkt oder indirekt zur Verfügung zu stellen;
- b) für natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Abs. 1 spezielle Zahlungsverkehrsdienste zu erbringen, die für den Austausch von Finanzdaten verwendet werden.

3) Die Regierung kann Zahlungen aus gesperrten Konten, Übertragungen gesperrter Vermögenswerte sowie die Freigabe gesperrter wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen ausnahmsweise bewilligen zur:

- a) Vermeidung von Härtefällen;
- b) Erfüllung bestehender Verträge;
- c) Erfüllung von Forderungen, die Gegenstand einer bestehenden Entscheidung eines Gerichts, einer Verwaltungsstelle oder eines Schiedsgerichts sind;
- d) Erfüllung der amtlichen Tätigkeit iranischer diplomatischer oder konsularischer Vertretungen;
- e) Bezahlung angemessener Honorare und Erstattung von Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der Erbringung juristischer Dienstleistungen;¹³
- f) Bezahlung von Gebühren oder Dienstleistungskosten für die routinemässige Verwahrung oder Verwaltung gesperrter Gelder oder wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen;¹⁴
- g) Umsetzung des JCPOA; oder¹⁵
- h) Wahrung liechtensteinischer Interessen.¹⁶

4) Die Regierung bewilligt Ausnahmen nach Abs. 3 gemäss den massgeblichen Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen, falls diese anwendbar sind.

5) Gesuche um Ausnahmebewilligungen sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.

Art. 9

Meldepflicht für gesperrte Vermögenswerte

1) Personen und Institutionen, die Gelder halten oder verwalten oder von wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen wissen, von denen anzunehmen ist, dass

sie unter die Sperrung nach Art. 8 Abs. 1 fallen, müssen dies der Stabsstelle FIU unverzüglich melden.

2) Die Meldungen müssen die Namen der Begünstigten sowie Gegenstand und Wert der Gelder und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen enthalten.

V. Weitere Beschränkungen

Art. 10

Verbote betreffend iranische Frachtflugzeuge

1) Es ist verboten, technische Dienste oder Wartungsdienste für Frachtflugzeuge zu erbringen, die im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle von iranischen Personen oder Organisationen stehen, falls der Leistungserbringer weiss oder vermutet, dass das Frachtflugzeug Waren befördert, deren Lieferung, Verkauf, Aus- oder Durchfuhr nach dieser Verordnung verboten ist.

2) Das Verbot nach Abs. 1 gilt, bis die Ladung überprüft und, falls erforderlich, beschlagnahmt oder entsorgt ist.

3) Das Verbot nach Abs. 1 gilt nicht, falls die Erbringung der Dienste für humanitäre Zwecke oder aus Sicherheitsgründen erforderlich ist.

4) Die durch die Beschlagnahme und Entsorgung entstehenden Kosten können dem Importeur auferlegt oder bei jeder anderen Person oder Organisation, die für die versuchte illegale Lieferung, den versuchten illegalen Verkauf oder die versuchte illegale Aus- oder Durchfuhr verantwortlich ist, eingefordert werden.

Art. 11

Ein- und Durchreiseverbot

1) Die Einreise nach Liechtenstein oder die Durchreise durch Liechtenstein ist den in den Anhängen 5 bis 7 aufgeführten natürlichen Personen verboten.

2) Die Regierung kann in Übereinstimmung mit den Beschlüssen des zuständigen Ausschusses des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen Ausnahmen für natürliche Personen nach Anhang 5 gewähren.

3) Sie kann für natürliche Personen nach Anhang 6 und 7 Ausnahmen gewähren:

- a) aus erwiesenen humanitären Gründen;
 - b) zwecks Teilnahme an Tagungen internationaler Gremien oder an einem politischen Dialog betreffend den Iran; oder
 - c) zur Wahrung liechtensteinischer Interessen.
- 4) Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen sind beim Ausländer- und Passamt einzureichen.

Art. 12

Verbot der Erfüllung bestimmter Forderungen

Es ist verboten, Forderungen der folgenden natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen zu erfüllen, wenn sie auf einen Vertrag oder ein Geschäft zurückzuführen sind, dessen Durchführung direkt oder indirekt durch Massnahmen nach dieser Verordnung, nach der Verordnung vom 1. Februar 2011 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran oder nach der Verordnung vom 13. Februar 2007 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran verhindert oder beeinträchtigt wurden:

- a) iranische Personen oder Organisationen;
- b) natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach den Anhängen 5 bis 7;
- c) natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen, die im Auftrag oder zugunsten von Personen oder Organisationen nach Bst. a oder b handeln.

VI. Vollzug und Strafbestimmungen

Art. 13

Kontrolle und Vollzug

1) Die Stabsstelle FIU vollzieht vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit der Regierung die Art. 3 bis 10 und 12. Sie prüft insbesondere Bewilligungsgesuche und Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen und leitet sie - erforderlichenfalls nach Konsultation weiterer betroffener Stellen - mit ihrer Empfehlung an die Regierung weiter.

2) Das Ausländer- und Passamt vollzieht Art. 11. Es prüft insbesondere die Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen und leitet sie - erforderlichenfalls

nach Konsultation weiterer betroffener Stellen - mit seiner Empfehlung an die Regierung weiter.

3) Die zuständigen liechtensteinischen Behörden ergreifen die für die Sperrung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen notwendigen Massnahmen wie die Anmerkung einer Verfügungssperre im Grundbuch oder die Pfändung oder Versiegelung von Luxusgütern.

4) Die Zuständigkeit der schweizerischen Behörden bleibt vorbehalten.

Art. 14

Strafbestimmungen

1) Wer gegen Art. 3 bis 8 oder 10 bis 12 verstösst, wird nach Art. 10 ISG bestraft, soweit nicht Strafbestimmungen der in Liechtenstein anwendbaren schweizerischen Kriegsmaterial-, Güterkontroll- und Embargogesetzgebung zur Anwendung gelangen.

2) Wer gegen Art. 9 verstösst, wird nach Art. 11 ISG bestraft.

VII. Schlussbestimmungen

Art. 14a¹⁷

Automatische Übernahme von Listen der natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen, die Gegenstand von Massnahmen sind

Die Listen, die der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen betreffend natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen erlassen oder aktualisiert hat (Anhang 5), werden automatisch übernommen.

Art. 14b¹⁸

Anträge auf Aufnahme oder Streichung in die bzw. aus der UNO-Liste

1) Die Regierung kann nach Konsultation weiterer betroffener Stellen dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen Anträge auf Aufnahme oder Streichung von Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen mit Bezug zu dem Nuklearprogramm der Islamischen Republik Iran oder zu anderen nach dieser Verordnung verbotenen Aktivitäten in die bzw. aus der UNO-Liste (Anhang 5) vorlegen.

2) Die Kriterien für die Aufnahme und Streichung sowie die Verfahren nach Abs. 1 richten sich nach den massgeblichen Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen, insbesondere der Resolution 2231 (2015).

3) Die Regierung regelt das Nähere, insbesondere die Zuständigkeiten, die Kriterien und das Verfahren, in einer Weisung. Die Stabsstelle FIU veröffentlicht die Weisung auf ihrer Internetseite¹⁹.

Art. 15

Aufhebung bisherigen Rechts

Die Verordnung vom 1. Februar 2011 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran, LGBL 2011 Nr. 55, in der geltenden Fassung, wird aufgehoben.

Art. 16

Inkrafttreten

Diese Verordnung tritt am 19. Januar 2016 um 18.00 Uhr in Kraft.

Fürstliche Regierung:
gez. *Adrian Hasler*
Fürstlicher Regierungschef

Anhang 1

(Art. 3 Abs. 1)

Güter, Technologie und Software, die unter die Verbote nach Art. 3 fallen

Güter, Technologie und Software

1. Vollständige Raketen- und unbemannte Luftfahrzeugsysteme, einschliesslich vollständiger Subsysteme hierfür.
2. Güter nach Anhang 2 Teil 2 GKV mit den Kontrollregime-Codes 101 bis 199.
3. Alle übrigen Güter, die im Zusammenhang mit Raketen- und unbemannten Luftfahrzeugsystemen verwendet werden können und die von Anhang 2 Teil 2 GKV, Anhang 3 GKV oder Anhang 1 der schweizerischen Kriegsmaterialverordnung vom 25. Februar 1998 (KMV) erfasst werden.

Anhang 2

(Art. 4 Abs. 1)

Güter, Technologie und Software, die unter die Bewilligungspflicht nach Art. 4 fallen

A. Güter, Technologie und Software

1. Kernmaterialien nach Art. 1 KEV.
2. Güter, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 Teil 1 GKV.
3. Güter, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 GKV mit den Kontrollregime-Codes 201 bis 299.

B. Sonstige Güter

| Nummer der EU | Beschreibung | Referenznummer in Anhang 2 GKV |
|---|---|--------------------------------|
| <i>A0. Kerntechnische Materialien, Anlagen und Ausrüstung</i> | | |
| II.A0.001 | Hohlkathodenlampen wie folgt: a) Jod-Hohlkathodenlampen mit Fenstern aus reinem Silizium oder Quarz; b) Uran-Hohlkathodenlampen. | |
| II.A0.002 | Faraday-Isolatoren im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm. | |
| II.A0.003 | Optische Gitter im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm. | |
| II.A0.004 | Optische Fasern im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm, mit Antireflexschichten im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm überzogen und mit einem Kerndurchmesser grösser als 0,4 mm und kleiner/gleich 2 mm. | |
| II.A0.005 | Bestandteile eines Kernreaktors und Prüfgeräte, soweit nicht in Nummer 0A001 erfasst, wie folgt: 1. Plomben; 2. innenliegende Bestandteile; 3. Ausrüstung für das Verschliessen sowie für das Prüfen und Messen der Verschlüsse. | 0A001 |
| II.A0.006 | Nukleare Nachweissysteme zum Nachweis, zur Identifizierung und zur Quantifizierung radio- | 0A001j 1A004c |

| | | |
|-----------|---|-------------------|
| | aktiver Stoffe oder von Kernstrahlung und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, soweit nicht in den Unternummern 0A001j und 1A004c erfasst. | |
| II.A0.007 | Faltenbalgventile aus Aluminiumlegierungen oder rostfreiem Stahl vom Typ 304, 304L oder 316L. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Faltenbalgventile, erfasst in Unternummer 0B001c6 und Nummer 2A226. | 0B001c6 2A226 |
| II.A0.008 | Laserspiegel, soweit nicht in Unternummer 6A005e erfasst, aus Substraten mit einem thermischen Ausdehnungskoeffizienten von kleiner/gleich 10^{-6}K^{-1} bei $20\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ (z.B. Quarzglas oder Saphir). <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht optische Systeme, die speziell für astronomische Anwendungen entwickelt wurden, sofern die Spiegel kein geschmolzenes Quarz enthalten. | 0B001g5 6A005e |
| II.A0.009 | Laserlinsen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 6A005e2 erfasst, aus Substraten mit einem thermischen Ausdehnungskoeffizienten von kleiner/gleich 10^{-6}K^{-1} bei $20\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ (z.B. Quarzglas). | 0B001g 6A005e2 |
| II.A0.010 | Rohre, Verrohrungen, Flansche und Anschlussstücke (Fittings), bestehend aus oder beschichtet mit Nickel oder Nickellegierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350h1 erfasst. | 2B350 |
| II.A0.011 | Vakuumpumpen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 0B002f2 oder Nummer 2B231 erfasst, wie folgt: Turbomolekularpumpen mit einer Förderleistung grösser/gleich 400 l/s, Wälzkolben(Roots-)vakuumpumpen mit einer volumetrischen Ansaugleistung grösser als $200\text{ m}^3/\text{h}$. Faltenbalggedichtete Schraubenkompressoren und faltenbalggedichtete Schraubenvakuumpumpen. | 0B002f2 2B231 |
| II.A0.012 | Abgeschirmte Gehäuse für den Umgang mit, die Aufbewahrung oder die Handhabung von radioaktiven Stoffen (Heisse Zellen). | 0B006 |
| II.A0.013 | "Natürliches Uran", "abgereichertes Uran" oder Thorium als Metall, Legierung, chemische Verbindung oder Konzentrat sowie jedes andere Material, das einen oder mehrere der vorstehend | 0C001 |

genannten Stoffe enthält, soweit nicht in Nummer 0C001 erfasst.

| | | |
|-----------|--|-----------------|
| II.A0.014 | Detonationskammern mit einer Absorptions-Kapazität von über 2,5 kg TNT-Äquivalent. | |
| II.A0.015 | "Handschuhfächer", besonders konstruiert für radioaktive Isotope, Strahlenquellen oder Radionuklide. Technische <i>Anmerkung</i> : "Handschuhfach" bezeichnet ein Gerät, das der Person, die das Gerät von aussen bedient, Schutz vor gefährlichen Dämpfen, Partikeln oder Strahlen bietet, die von den Materialien erzeugt werden, die die Person mittels in das Gerät integrierter Griffe oder Handschuhe innerhalb des Geräts behandelt oder bearbeitet. | 0B006 |
| II.A0.016 | Systeme zur Überwachung toxischer Gase, ausgelegt für den Dauerbetrieb und zur Feststellung von Schwefelwasserstoff, und besonders konstruierte Detektoren hierfür. | 0A001 0B001c |
| II.A0.017 | Heliumleckdetektoren. | 0A001 0B001c |

A1. Werkstoffe, Chemikalien, "Mikroorganismen" und "Toxine"

| | | |
|-----------|---|--|
| II.A1.001 | Lösungsmittel Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phosphorsäure (HDEHP oder D2HPA) (Nummer im Register des Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) 298-07-7), in beliebiger Menge, mit einer Reinheit grösser als 90 Gew.-%. | |
| II.A1.002 | Fluorgas - CAS-Nr. 7782-41-4 - mit einer Reinheit grösser als 95 Gew.-%. | |
| II.A1.003 | Ringförmige Dichtungen und Verschlüsse mit einem Innendurchmesser von kleiner/gleich 400 mm, bestehend aus einem der folgenden Materialien: a) Copolymere des Vinylidenfluorids, die ungereckt zu mindestens 75 % eine beta-kristalline Struktur aufweisen; b) fluorierte Polyimide, die mindestens 10 Gew.-% gebundenes Fluor enthalten; c) fluorierte Phosphazene-Elastomere, die mindestens 30 Gew.-% gebundenes Fluor enthalten; d) Polychlortrifluorethylen (PCTFE, z.B. Kel-F®); e) Fluorelastomere (z.B. Viton®, Tecnoflon®); f) Polytetrafluorethylen (PTFE). | |

| | | |
|-----------|---|--------------------------------------|
| II.A1.004 | <p>Persönliche Ausrüstung für den Nachweis von Kernstrahlung, einschliesslich Personen-Dosimeter.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Kernstrahlungsnachweissysteme, erfasst in Unternummer 1A004c.</p> | 1A004c |
| II.A1.005 | <p>Elektrolytische Zellen für die Erzeugung von Fluor mit einer Fertigungskapazität von mehr als 100 g Fluor je Stunde.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht elektrolytische Zellen, erfasst in Nummer 1B225.</p> | 1B225 |
| II.A1.006 | <p>Katalysatoren, soweit nicht nach Nummer 1A225 verboten, die Platin, Palladium oder Rhodium enthalten, verwendbar zur Förderung der Wasserstoffaustauschreaktion zwischen Wasserstoff und Wasser zur Tritiumrückgewinnung aus Schwerem Wasser oder zur Schwerwasserproduktion.</p> | 1B231 1A225 |
| II.A1.007 | <p>Aluminium und Aluminiumlegierungen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 1C002b4 oder 1C202a erfasst, in Roh- oder Halbzeugform mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>a) erreichbare Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 460 MPa bei 293 K (20 °C); oder</p> <p>b) mit einer Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 415 MPa bei 298 K (25 °C).</p> | 1C002b4 1C202a |
| II.A1.008 | <p>Magnetische Metalle aller Typen und in jeder Form mit einer Anfangsrelativpermeabilität (initial relative permeability) grösser/gleich 120 000 und einer Dicke grösser/gleich 0,05 mm und kleiner/gleich 0,1 mm.</p> | 1C003a |
| II.A1.009 | <p>"Faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" oder Prepregs wie folgt:</p> <p><i>ANMERKUNG:</i> SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A1.1019.a.</p> <p>a) "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff oder Aramid mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "spezifischer Modul" grösser als 10×10^6 m; oder 2. "spezifische Zugfestigkeit" grösser als 17×10^4 m; <p>b) "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" aus Glas mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "spezifischer Modul" grösser als $3,18 \times 10^6$ m, oder | 1C010a 1C010b 1C210a 1C210b |

2. "spezifische Zugfestigkeit" grösser als $76,2 \times 10^3$ m;

c) mit warmaushärtendem Harz imprägnierte endlose "Garne", "Faserbündel" (rovings), "Seile" oder "Bänder" mit einer Breite kleiner/gleich 15 mm (wenn Prepregs) aus "faser- oder fadenförmigen Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff oder Glas, soweit nicht in Unternummer II.A1.010.a oder b erfasst.

Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien", erfasst in den Unternummern 1C010a, 1C010b, 1C210a und 1C210b.

| | | |
|-----------|---|-----------------|
| II.A1.010 | <p>Harzprägnierte oder pechimprägnierte Fasern (Prepregs), metall- oder kohlenstoffbeschichtete Fasern (Preforms) oder "Kohlenstofffaser-Preforms" wie folgt:</p> <p>a) hergestellt aus in Nummer II.A1.009 erfassten "faser- oder fadenförmigen Materialien";</p> <p>b) kohlenstoffbeschichtete "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" in Epoxidharz-"Matrix" (prepregs), erfasst in den Unternummern 1C010a, 1C010b und 1C010c, für die Reparatur von Luftfahrzeug-Strukturen oder Laminaten, bei denen die Grösse der Einzelmatten nicht grösser ist als 50 cm x 90 cm;</p> <p>c) Prepregs, erfasst in Unternummer 1C010a, 1C010b oder 1C010c, die mit Phenol- oder Epoxydharzen imprägniert sind, mit einer Glasübergangstemperatur (T_g) kleiner als 433 K (160 °C) und deren Aushärtungstemperatur kleiner als die Glasübergangstemperatur ist.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien", erfasst in Unternummer 1C010e.</p> | 1C010e 1C210 |
| II.A1.011 | <p>Verstärkte Siliziumkarbid-Keramik-Verbundwerkstoffe, geeignet für Bugspitzen, Wiedereintrittskörper, Strahlruder, verwendbar für "Flugkörper", soweit nicht in Nummer 1C107 erfasst.</p> | 1C107 |
| II.A1.012 | <p>Martensitaushärtender Stahl (maraging Steel), soweit nicht in den Nummern 1C116 oder 1C216 erfasst, geeignet für eine Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 2050 MPa bei 293 K (20 °C).</p> <p><i>TechnischeAnmerkung:</i> Martensitaushärtender Stahl geeignet für umfasst martensitaushärtenden Stahl vor und nach einer Wärmebehandlung.</p> | 1C216 |
| II.A1.013 | <p>Wolfram, Tantal, Wolframkarbid, Tantalkarbid und Legierungen mit beiden folgenden Eigenschaften;</p> | 1C226 |

| | |
|-----------|---|
| | <p>a) in Formen mit hohlzylindrischer oder sphärischer Symmetrie (einschliesslich Zylindersegmente) mit einem Innendurchmesser grösser/gleich 50 mm und kleiner/gleich 300 mm; und</p> <p>b) einer Masse über 5 kg.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Wolfram, Wolframkarbid und Legierungen, erfasst in Nummer 1C226.</p> |
| II.A1.014 | <p>Elementpulver aus Kobalt, Neodym oder Samarium oder Legierungen oder Mischungen daraus, die mindestens 20 Gew.-% Kobalt, Neodym oder Samarium enthalten, mit einer Partikelgrösse von kleiner 200 µm.</p> |
| II.A1.015 | <p>Reines Tributylphosphat (TBP) (CAS-Nr. 126-73-8) oder Mischungen mit einem Gehalt an TBP von über 5 Gew.-%.</p> |
| II.A1.016 | <p>Martensitaushärtender Stahl (maraging Steel), soweit nicht nach den Nummern 1C116, 1C216 oder II.A1.012 verboten.</p> <p><i>TechnischeAnmerkung:</i> Martensitaushärtende Stähle sind Eisenlegierungen, die im Allgemeinen gekennzeichnet sind durch einen hohen Nickel- und sehr geringen Kohlenstoffgehalt sowie die Verwendung von Substitutions- oder Ausscheidungselementen zur Festigkeitssteigerung und Ausscheidungshärtung der Legierung.</p> |
| II.A1.017 | <p>Metall, Metallpulver und -material wie folgt:</p> <p>a) Wolfram und Wolframlegierungen, soweit nicht nach Nummer 1C117 verboten, in Form einheitlich kugelförmiger oder staubförmiger Partikel mit einer Partikelgrösse kleiner/gleich 500 µm und einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 97 Gew.-%;</p> <p>b) Molybdän und Molybdänlegierungen, soweit nicht nach Nummer 1C117 verboten, in Form einheitlich kugelförmiger oder staubförmiger Partikel mit einer Partikelgrösse kleiner/gleich 500 µm und einem Gehalt an Molybdän von grösser/gleich 97 Gew.-%;</p> <p>c) Wolframmaterialien in fester Form, soweit nicht nach den Nummern 1C226 oder II.A1.013 verboten, mit einer Materialzusammensetzung wie folgt:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Wolfram und Legierungen mit einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 97 Gew.-%; 2. mit Kupfer infiltriertes Wolfram mit einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 80 Gew.-%; oder |

| | | |
|-----------|---|----------------|
| | 3. mit Silber infiltriertes Wolfram mit einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 80 Gew.-%. | |
| 11.A1.018 | Weichmagnetische Legierungen mit einer chemischen Zusammensetzung wie folgt: a) Gehalt an Eisen zwischen 30 % und 60 %; und b) Gehalt an Kobalt zwischen 40 % und 60 %. | |
| II.A1.019 | "Faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" oder Prepregs, die nicht nach Anhang 2 (Nummer II.A1.009 oder II.A1.010) der vorliegenden Verordnung verboten oder nicht in Anhang 2 GKV aufgeführt sind, wie folgt: a) "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff; Anmerkung: Unternummer II.A1.019.a erfasst keine Webwaren. b) mit warmaushärtendem Harz imprägnierte endlose "Garne", "Faserbündel" (rovings), "Seile" oder "Bänder" aus "faser- oder fadenförmigen Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff; c) endlose "Garne", "Faserbündel" (rovings), "Seile" oder "Bänder" aus Polyacrylnitril (PAN). | |
| II.A1.020 | Stahllegierungen als Stahlblech oder Stahlplatten mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften: a) Stahllegierungen geeignet für eine Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 1 200 MPa bei 293K (20 °C); oder b) Stickstoffstabilisierter Duplexstahl. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Der Ausdruck Legierungen geeignet für erfasst Legierungen vor und nach einer Wärmebehandlung. <i>TechnischeAnmerkung:</i> "Stickstoffstabilisierter Duplexstahl" besitzt eine Zweiphasen-Mikrostruktur bestehend aus Körnern ferritischen und austenitischen Stahls unter Zusatz von Stickstoff zur Stabilisierung der Mikrostruktur | 1C116 1C216 |
| II.A1.021 | Kohlenstoff/Kohlenstoff-Verbundwerkstoffe. | 1A002b1 |
| II.A1.022 | Nickellegierungen in Roh- oder Halbzeugform, mit mindestens 60 Gew.-% Nickel. | 1C002c1a |
| II.A1.023 | Titanlegierungen in Form von Titanblech oder Titanplatte geeignet für eine Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 900 MPa bei 293 K (20 °C). <i>Anmerkung:</i> Der Ausdruck Legierungen geeignet für erfasst Legierungen vor und nach einer Wärmebehandlung. | 1C002b3 |

| | | |
|-----------|---|--------|
| II.A1.024 | Treibstoffe und chemische Bestandteile für Treibstoffe, wie folgt: a) Toluoldiisocyanat (TDI) b) Methylendiphenyldiisocyanat (MDI) c) Isophorondiisocyanat (IPDI) d) Natriumperchlorat e) Xylidin f) hydroxyterminierter Polyether (HTPE) g) hydroxyterminiertes Caprolactonether (HTCE) <i>TechnischeAnmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer bezieht sich auf den Reinstoff und jede Mischung, die zu mindestens 50 % aus den oben genannten Chemikalien besteht. | 1C111 |
| II.A1.025 | "Schmiermittel", die als Hauptbestandteil eine der folgenden Verbindungen oder einen der folgenden Stoffe enthalten: a) Perfluoroalkylether, (CAS 60164-51-4); b) Perfluoropolyalkylether, PFPE, (CAS 6991-67-9). "Schmiermittel" bedeutet Öle und Flüssigkeiten. | 1C006 |
| II.A1.026 | Beryllium-Kupfer- oder Kupfer-Beryllium-Legierungen in Form von Platten, Blechen, Streifen oder gewalzten Stangen, bestehend grösstenteils aus Kupfer und aus anderen Elementen mit weniger als 2 Gew.-% Beryllium. | 1C002b |

A2. Werkstoffbearbeitung

| | | |
|-----------|--|-------|
| II.A2.001 | Vibrationsprüfsysteme, Ausrüstung und Bestandteile hierfür, soweit nicht in Nummer 2B116 erfasst: a) Vibrationsprüfsysteme mit Rückkopplungs- oder Closed-Loop-Technik mit integrierter digitaler Steuerung, geeignet für Vibrationsbeanspruchungen des Prüflings mit einer Beschleunigung grösser/gleich 0,1 g rms zwischen 0,1 Hz und 2 kHz und bei Übertragungskräften grösser/gleich 50 kN, gemessen am "Prüf-tisch"; b) digitale Steuerungen in Verbindung mit besonders für Vibrationsprüfung entwickelter "Software", mit einer Echtzeit-Bandbreite grösser/gleich 5 kHz und konstruiert zum Einsatz in den in Unternummer a erfassten Systemen; c) Schwingerreger (Shaker units) mit oder ohne zugehörige Verstärker, geeignet für Übertragungskräfte von grösser/gleich 50 kN, gemessen am "Prüftisch", und geeignet für die in Unternummer a erfassten Systeme; | 2B116 |
|-----------|--|-------|

d) Prüflingshaltevorrichtungen und Elektronik-einheiten, konstruiert, um mehrere Schwingererger zu einem Schwingerregersystem, das Übertragungskräfte grösser/gleich 50 kN, gemessen am "Prüftisch", erzeugen kann, zusammenzufassen, und geeignet für die in Unternummer a erfassten Systeme.

TechnischeAnmerkung: Ein "Prüftisch" ist ein flacher Tisch oder eine flache Oberfläche ohne Aufnahmen oder Halterungen.

| | | |
|-----------|---|------------------|
| II.A2.002 | <p>Werkzeugmaschinen und Bestandteile und Steuerungen für Werkzeugmaschinen wie folgt:</p> <p>a) Werkzeugmaschinen für Schleifbearbeitung mit einer Positioniergenauigkeit mit "allen verfügbaren Kompensationen" von kleiner (besser)/gleich 15 µm nach ISO 230/2 (1988) (1) oder entsprechenden nationalen Normen entlang einer Linearachse;</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Werkzeugmaschinen für Schleifbearbeitung, erfasst in den Unternummern 2B201b und 2B001c.</p> <p>b) Bestandteile und Steuerungen, besonders konstruiert für Werkzeugmaschinen, erfasst in Nummer 2B001 oder 2B201 oder in Unternummer a.</p> | 2B201b 2B001c |
| II.A2.003 | <p>Auswuchtmaschinen und zugehörige Ausrüstung wie folgt:</p> <p>a) Auswuchtmaschinen, konstruiert oder geändert für zahnmedizinische oder andere medizinische Ausrüstung, mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. nicht geeignet zum Auswuchten von Rotoren/Baugruppen mit einer Masse grösser als 3 kg, 2. geeignet zum Auswuchten von Rotoren/Baugruppen bei Drehzahlen grösser als 12 500 U/min, 3. geeignet zur Korrektur von Unwuchten in zwei oder mehr Ebenen; und 4. geeignet zum Auswuchten bis zu einer spezifischen Restunwucht von 0,2 g mm/kg der Rotormasse; <p>b) Messgeräte (indicator heads), konstruiert oder geändert für den Einsatz in Maschinen, erfasst in Unternummer a.</p> <p><i>TechnischeAnmerkung:</i> Indicator heads werden auch als balancing instrumentation bezeichnet.</p> | 2B119 |
| II.A2.004 | <p>Fernlenk-Manipulatoren, die für ferngesteuerte Tätigkeiten bei radiochemischen Trennprozessen oder in Heissen Zellen eingesetzt werden</p> | 2B225 |

| | | |
|-----------|--|----------------|
| | <p>können, soweit nicht in Nummer 2B225 erfasst, mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>a) Eignung zur Durchdringung der Wand einer Heissen Zelle mit einer Dicke grösser/gleich 0,3 m (Durch-die-Wand-Modifikation); oder</p> <p>b) Eignung zur Überbrückung der Wand einer Heissen Zelle mit einer Dicke grösser/gleich 0,3 m (Über-die-Wand-Modifikation).</p> | |
| II.A2.006 | <p>Öfen, geeignet für Betriebstemperaturen grösser als 400 °C, wie folgt:</p> <p>a) Oxydationsöfen;</p> <p>b) Mit kontrollierter Atmosphäre betriebene Wärmebehandlungsöfen.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Tunnelöfen mit Rollenbahn oder Wagen, Tunnelöfen mit Förderband, Durchschuböfen oder Herdwagenöfen, die für die Herstellung von Glas, Tischgeschirr aus Keramik oder Strukturkeramik konstruiert wurden.</p> | 2B226 2B227 |
| II.A2.007 | <p>"Druckmessgeräte", soweit nicht in Nummer 2B230 erfasst, geeignet zum Messen von Absolutdrücken im Bereich von 0 bis 200 kPa, mit beiden folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>a) Drucksensoren, hergestellt aus oder geschützt durch "gegen Korrosion durch Uranhexafluorid (UF 6)-resistente Werkstoffe"; und</p> <p>b) mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>1. Messbereich kleiner als 200 kPa und "Messgenauigkeit" kleiner (besser) als ± 1 % vom Skalenendwert; oder</p> <p>2. Messbereich grösser/gleich 200 kPa und "Messgenauigkeit" kleiner (besser) als 2 kPa.</p> | 2B230 |
| II.A2.008 | <p>Flüssig-flüssig Kontakt-Ausrüstung (Mischer-Abscheider, Pulsationskolonnen und Zentrifugalextraktoren) und Flüssigkeitsverteiler, Dampfverteiler oder Flüssigkeitssammler, konstruiert für solche Ausrüstung, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:</p> <p><i>ANMERKUNG:</i> SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.014.</p> <p>1. rostfreier Stahl.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Für rostfreien Stahl mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom siehe Nummer II.A2.014.a</p> | 2B350e |
| II.A2.009 | <p>Industrielle Geräte und Bestandteile, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350d erfasst, wie folgt:</p> <p><i>ANMERKUNG:</i> SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.015</p> | 2B350d |

Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren mit einer Wärmeaustauschfläche grösser als 0,05 m² und kleiner als 30 m² sowie für solche Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren konstruierte Rohre, Platten, Coils oder Blöcke, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:

1. rostfreier Stahl.

Anmerkung 1: Für rostfreien Stahl mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom siehe Nummer II.A2.015.a

Anmerkung 2: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Fahrzeugkühler.

Technische Anmerkung: Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus des Wärmetauschers.

 II.A2.010

Pumpen mit Mehrfachdichtung und dichtungslöse Pumpen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350i erfasst, geeignet für korrodierende Flüssigkeiten, mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 0,6 m³/h oder Vakuumpumpen mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 5 m³/h (jeweils unter Standard-Bedingungen von 273 K (0 °C) und 101,3 kPa) sowie für solche Pumpen konstruierte Pumpengehäuse, vorgeformte Gehäuseauskleidungen, Laufräder, Rotoren oder Strahlpumpendüsen, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus den folgenden Materialien bestehen:
ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.016.

2B350i

1. rostfreier Stahl.

Anmerkung: Für rostfreien Stahl mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom siehe Nummer II.A2.016.a

Technische Anmerkung: Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus der Pumpe.

 II.A2.011

Zentrifugalseparatoren, geeignet zur kontinuierlichen Trennung ohne Aerosolfreisetzung und hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe:
1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;
2. Fluorpolymeren;
3. Glas oder Email;
4. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew. % Nickel;

2B352c

| | | |
|------------|--|--------|
| | <p>5. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen; 6. Titan oder Titanlegierungen; oder 7. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Zentrifugalseparatoren, erfasst in Unternummer 2B352c.</p> | |
| II.A.2.012 | <p>Filter aus gesintertem Metall, aus Nickel oder Nickellegierungen mit 40 Gew.-% Nickel oder mehr. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Filter, erfasst in Unternummer 2B352d.</p> | 2B352d |
| II.A.2.013 | <p>Drück- und Fließdruckmaschinen, soweit nicht in Nummer 2B009, 2B109 oder 2B209 erfasst, mit einer Supportkraft grösser als 60 kN und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür. <i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Im Sinne von Nummer II.A.2.013 werden Maschinen mit kombinierter Drück- und Fließdruckfunktion als Fließdruckmaschinen betrachtet.</p> | |
| II.A.2.014 | <p>Flüssig-flüssig-Kontakt-Ausrüstung (Mischer-Abscheider, Pulsationskolonnen und Zentrifugalextraktoren) und Flüssigkeitsverteiler, Dampfverteiler oder Flüssigkeitssammler, konstruiert für solche Ausrüstung, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen: ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A.2.008. a) hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Materialien: 1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom; 2. Fluorpolymeren; 3. Glas oder Email; 4. Grafit oder "Carbon-Grafit"; 5. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel; 6. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen; 7. Titan oder Titanlegierungen; oder 8. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen; oder b) aus Edelstahl und einem oder mehreren in II.A.2.014.a erfassten Materialien. <i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> "Carbon-Grafit" besteht aus amorphem Kohlenstoff und Grafit, wobei der Grafitgehalt 8 Gew.-% oder mehr beträgt.</p> | 2B350e |
| II.A.2.015 | <p>Industrielle Geräte und Bestandteile, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350d erfasst, wie folgt: ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A.2.009.</p> | 2B350d |

Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren mit einer Wärmeaustauschfläche grösser als $0,05 \text{ m}^2$ und kleiner als 30 m^2 sowie für solche Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren konstruierte Rohre, Platten, Coils oder Blöcke, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:

- a) hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Materialien:
1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;
 2. Fluorpolymeren;
 3. Glas oder Email;
 4. Grafit oder "Carbon-Grafit";
 5. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel;
 6. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen;
 7. Titan oder Titanlegierungen;
 8. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen;
 9. Siliziumkarbid; oder
 10. Titankarbid; oder
- b) aus Edelstahl und einem oder mehreren in II.A2.015.a erfassten Materialien.

Anmerkung: Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Fahrzeugkühler.

Technische Anmerkung: Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus des Wärmetauschers.

II.A2.016

Pumpen mit Mehrfachdichtung und dichtungsfreie Pumpen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350i erfasst, geeignet für korrodierende Flüssigkeiten, mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als $0,6 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$ oder Vakuumpumpen mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als $5 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$ (jeweils unter Standard-Bedingungen von 273 K (0°C) und $101,3 \text{ kPa}$); sowie für solche Pumpen konstruierte Pumpengehäuse, vorgeformte Gehäuseauskleidungen, Laufräder, Rotoren oder Strahlpumpendüsen, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Materialien bestehen:
ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.010.

2B350i

- a) hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Materialien:
1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;
 2. Keramik;
 3. Ferrosiliziumguss;

| | | |
|-----------|--|------------------|
| | <p>4. Fluorpolymeren; 5. Glas oder Email; 6. Grafit oder "Carbon-Grafit"; 7. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel; 8. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen; 9. Titan oder Titanlegierungen; 10. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen; 11. Niob (Columbium) oder Niob-"Legierungen"; oder 12. Aluminiumlegierungen; oder b) aus Edelstahl und einem oder mehreren in II.A2.016.a. erfassten Materialien.</p> <p><i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus der Pumpe.</p> | |
| II.A2.017 | <p>Funkenerodiermaschinen (EDM) zum Entfernen oder Schneiden von Metallen, Keramiken oder "Verbundwerkstoffen", wie folgt, und besondere konstruierte Ramm-, Senk- oder Drahtelektroden hierfür: a) Funkenerodiermaschinen mit Ramm- oder Senkelektroden; b) Funkenerodiermaschinen mit Drahtelektroden.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Funkenerodiermaschinen werden auch als Drahterodiermaschinen bezeichnet.</p> | 2B001d |
| II.A2.018 | <p>Rechnergesteuerte oder "numerisch gesteuerte" Koordinatenmessmaschinen (CMM) mit einer dreidimensionalen (volumetrischen) Längenmessabweichung (MPPE) an einem Punkt innerhalb des Arbeitsbereiches der Maschine (d.h. innerhalb der Achslängen) kleiner (besser)/gleich $(3 + L/1000) \mu\text{m}$ (L ist die Messlänge in mm), geprüft nach ISO 10360-2 (2001), und hierfür konstruierte Messsonden.</p> | 2B006a 2B206a |
| II.A2.019 | <p>Rechnergesteuerte oder "rechnergestützte" Elektronenstrahlschweißmaschinen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.</p> | 2B001e1b |
| II.A2.020 | <p>Rechnergesteuerte oder "rechnergestützte" Laserschweiß- und Laserschneidmaschinen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.</p> | 2B001e1c |
| II.A2.021 | <p>Rechnergesteuerte oder "rechnergestützte" Plasmaschneidmaschinen und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.</p> | 2B001e1 |

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| II.A2.022 | Vibrationsprüfgeräte besonders konstruiert für Rotoren oder rotierende Ausrüstungen und Maschinen, geeignet zum Messen von Frequenzen zwischen 600 und 2000 Hz. | 2B116 |
| II.A2.023 | Flüssigringvakuumpumpen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür. | 2B231 2B350i |
| II.A2.024 | Drehschiebervakuumpumpen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür. <i>Anmerkung 1:</i> Nummer II.A2.024 erfasst nicht Drehschiebervakuumpumpen, die für andere spezifische Ausrüstungen besonders konstruiert sind. <i>Anmerkung 2:</i> Die Erfassung von Drehschiebervakuumpumpen, besonders entwickelt für andere Geräte, richtet sich nach der Erfassung der anderen Geräte. | 2B231 2B235i 0B002f |
| II.A2.025 | Luftfilter, wie folgt, mit einem Durchmesser von mehr als 1000 mm: a) HEPA-Filter (High Efficiency Particulate Air filters); b) ULPA-Filter (Ultra Low Penetration Air filters). <i>Anmerkung:</i> Die Nummer II.A2.025 erfasst nicht für medizinische Ausrüstung besonders konstruierte Luftfilter | 2B352d |
| <i>A3. Allgemeine Elektronik</i> | | |
| II.A3.001 | Hochspannungs-Gleichstromversorgungsgeräte mit beiden folgenden Eigenschaften: a) Erzeugung von 10 kV oder mehr im Dauerbetrieb über einen Zeitraum von acht Stunden mit einer Ausgangsleistung grösser/gleich 5 kW, auch mit sweeping; und b) Strom- oder Spannungsregelung besser als 0,1 % über einen Zeitraum von vier Stunden <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Stromversorgungsgeräte, erfasst in Unternummer 0B001j5 und Nummer 3A227. | 3A227 |
| II.A3.002 | Massenspektrometer, soweit nicht in Nummer 3A233 oder Unternummer 0B002g erfasst, für die Messung von Ionen einer Atommasse grösser/gleich 200 amu (atomic mass units) mit einer Auflösung besser als 2 amu bei 200 amu oder grösser, und Ionenquellen hierfür wie folgt: a) induktiv gekoppelte Plasma-Massenspektrometer (ICP/MS); b) Glühentladungs-Massenspektrometer (GDMS); | 3A233 |

| | | |
|-----------|--|-------------------|
| | <p>c) Thermoionisations-Massenspektrometer (TIMS);</p> <p>d) Elektronenstoss-Massenspektrometer mit einer Quellenkammer, hergestellt aus "Uranhexafluorid (UF₆)-resistenten Werkstoffen", damit ausgekleidet oder plattiert;</p> <p>e) Molekularstrahl-Massenspektrometer mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. mit einer Quellenkammer, hergestellt aus rostfreiem Stahl oder Molybdän, damit ausgekleidet oder plattiert, und mit einer Kühlfalle, die auf 193 K (-80 °C) oder weniger kühlen kann; oder 2. mit einer Quellenkammer, hergestellt aus "Uranhexafluorid (UF₆)-resistenten Werkstoffen", damit ausgekleidet oder plattiert; <p>f) Massenspektrometer, ausgestattet mit einer Mikrofluorierungs-Ionenquelle, konstruiert für Aktinide oder Aktinidenfluoride.</p> | |
| II.A3.003 | Spektrometer oder Diffraktometer, konstruiert für den indikativen Test oder die quantitative Analyse der Elementzusammensetzung von Metallen oder Legierungen ohne chemisches Aufschliessen des Materials | |
| II.A3.004 | <p>Frequenzumwandler oder Generatoren, die nicht nach Nummer 0B001 oder 3A225 verboten sind, mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile und entworfene Software hierfür:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Mehrphasenausgang mit einer Leistung grösser/gleich 10 W; b) Betriebsfrequenz von 600 Hz oder mehr; und c) Frequenzstabilisierung besser (kleiner) als 0,2 %. <p><i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Frequenzumwandler werden auch als Konverter oder Inverter bezeichnet.</p> <p><i>Anmerkungen:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Nummer II.A3.004 erfasst nicht Frequenzumwandler, die mit Kommunikationsprotokollen oder Schnittstellen für spezifische Industriemaschinen (wie Werkzeugmaschinen, Spinnmaschinen, Leiterplattenmaschinen) ausgestattet sind, so dass die Frequenzumwandler bei Erfüllung der oben genannten Leistungsmerkmale nicht zu anderen Zwecken verwendet werden können. 2. Nummer II.A3.004 erfasst nicht für Fahrzeuge besonders konstruierte Frequenzumwandler mit einer zwischen Frequenzumwandler und Fahr- | 3A225 0B001b13 |

zeugkontrolleinheit gegenseitig kommunizierten
Kontrollsequenz.

A6. Sensoren und Laser

| | | |
|-----------|---|-------------------|
| II.A6.001 | Stäbe aus Yttrium-Aluminium-Granat (YAG). | |
| II.A6.002 | Optische Ausrüstung und Bestandteile, soweit nicht in Nummer 6A002 oder Unternummer 6A004b erfasst, wie folgt: Infraroptiken im Wellenlängenbereich grösser/gleich 9000 nm und kleiner/gleich 17000 nm und Bestandteile hierfür, einschliesslich Bestandteilen aus Cadmiumtellurid (CdTe). | 6A002 6A004b |
| II.A6.003 | Wellenfrontkorrektursysteme für die Verwendung mit einem Laserstrahl mit einem Durchmesser grösser als 4 mm und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, einschliesslich Steuersysteme und Phasenfront-Erkennungssysteme und "verformbare Spiegel" einschliesslich bimorphen Spiegeln. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Spiegel, erfasst in den Unternummern 6A004a, 6A005e und 6A005f. | 6A003 |
| II.A6.004 | Argonionen-"Laser" mit einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser/gleich 5 W. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Argonionen-"Laser", erfasst in Unternummer 0B001g5, Nummer 6A005 und Unternummer 6A205a. | 6A005a6 6A205a |
| II.A6.005 | Halbleiter-"Laser" und Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt: a) einzelne Halbleiter-"Laser" mit einer jeweiligen Ausgangsleistung grösser als 200 mW, in Mengen grösser als 100; b) Halbleiter-"Laser"-Arrays mit einer Ausgangsleistung grösser als 20 W. <i>Anmerkungen:</i> 1. Halbleiter-"Laser" werden gewöhnlich als "Laser"-Dioden bezeichnet. 2. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "Laser", erfasst in den Unternummern 0B001g5, 0B001h6 und 6A005. 3. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "Laser"-Dioden mit einer Wellenlänge im Bereich 1200 nm-2000 nm. | 6A005b |
| II.A6.006 | Abstimmbare Halbleiter-"Laser" und abstimmbare Halbleiter-"Laser"-Arrays mit einer Wellenlänge grösser/gleich 9 µm und kleiner/gleich 17 µm sowie Stacks aus Halbleiter-"Lasern", die | 6A005b |

| | | |
|-----------|---|----------|
| | wenigstens ein abstimmbares Halbleiter-"Laser"-Array mit einer solchen Wellenlänge enthalten. <i>Anmerkungen:</i> 1. Halbleiter-"Laser" werden gewöhnlich als "Laser"-Dioden bezeichnet. 2. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Halbleiter-"Laser", erfasst in den Unternummern 0B001h6 und 6A005b. | |
| II.A6.007 | "Abstimmbare" Festkörper-"Laser" und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt: a) Titan-Saphir-Laser; b) Alexandrit-Laser. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Titan-Saphir- und Alexandrit-Laser, erfasst in den Unternummern 0B001g5, 0B001h6 und 6A005c1. | 6A005c1 |
| II.A6.008 | Neodym-dotierte (andere als Glas-) "Laser" mit einer Ausgangswellenlänge grösser als 1000 nm und kleiner/gleich 1100 nm und einer Ausgangsenergie je Puls grösser als 10 J. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Neodym-dotierte (andere als Glas-) "Laser", erfasst in Unternummer 6A005c2b. | 6A005c2 |
| II.A6.009 | Akustooptische Bestandteile wie folgt: a) Aufnahmeröhren und Halbleiter-Bildsensoren, die eine Bildwiederholungsfrequenz grösser/gleich 1 kHz erlauben; b) die Bildwiederholungsfrequenz bestimmendes Zubehör; c) Pockels-Zellen. | 6A203b4c |
| II.A6.010 | Strahlungsfeste Kameras oder Linsen hierfür, soweit nicht in Unternummer 6A203c erfasst, besonders konstruiert oder ausgelegt als unempfindlich gegen Strahlungsbelastungen grösser als 50×10^3 Gy (Silizium) (5×10^6 Rad (Silizium)) ohne betriebsbedingten Qualitätsverlust. <i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Der Ausdruck Gy (Silizium) bezieht sich auf die in Joule pro Kilogramm ausgedrückte Energie, die von einer ionisierender Strahlung ausgesetzten Probe von nicht abgeschirmtem Silizium absorbiert wird. | 6A203c |
| II.A6.011 | Abstimmbare, gepulste Farbstoff-(Dye-) Laserverstärker und -Oszillatoren mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften: 1. einer Betriebswellenlänge grösser/gleich 300 nm und kleiner/gleich 800 nm; | 6A205c |

| | | |
|-----------|---|--------|
| | <p>2. einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser als 10 W und kleiner/gleich 30 W;</p> <p>3. Pulsfrequenz grösser als 1 kHz; und</p> <p>4. einer Pulsdauer kleiner als 100 ns.</p> <p><i>Anmerkungen:</i></p> <p>1. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Single-Mode-Oszillatoren</p> <p>2. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht abstimmbare, gepulste Farbstoff-(Dye-) Laserverstärker und -Oszillatoren, erfasst in den Unternummern 6A205c und 0B001g5 sowie in Nummer 6A005.</p> | |
| II.A6.012 | <p>Gepulste CO₂ - "Laser" mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>1. einer Betriebswellenlänge grösser/gleich 9000 nm und kleiner/gleich 11 000 nm;</p> <p>2. einer Pulsfrequenz grösser als 250 Hz;</p> <p>3. einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser als 100 W und kleiner/gleich 500 W; und</p> <p>4. einer Pulsdauer kleiner als 200 ns.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht gepulste CO₂ - Laserverstärker und -Oszillatoren, erfasst in den Unternummern 6A205d, 0B001h5 und 6A005d.</p> | 6A205d |
| II.A6.013 | <p>Kupferdampf- "Laser" mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften</p> <p>1. Ausgangswellenlänge grösser/gleich 500 nm und kleiner/gleich 600 nm; und</p> <p>2. einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser/gleich 15 W.</p> | 6A005b |
| II.A6.014 | <p>Gepulste CO- "Laser" mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften</p> <p>1. Ausgangswellenlänge grösser/gleich 5000 nm und kleiner/gleich 6000 nm;</p> <p>2. Pulsfrequenz grösser als 250 Hz;</p> <p>3. mittlere Ausgangsleistung grösser als 100 W; und</p> <p>4. Pulsdauer kleiner als 200 ns.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht industrielle Hochleistungs-CO-Laser (typischerweise 1-5 kW) für Anwendungen wie Schneiden und Schweißen, da es sich bei solchen Lasern um Dauerstrich-Laser oder um Laser handelt, deren Pulsdauer grösser ist als 200 ns.</p> | |
| II.A6.015 | <p>"Vakuum-Druckmesser" mit elektrischem Antrieb und eine Messgenauigkeit von 5 % oder weniger (besser).</p> | 0B001b |

"Vakuum-Druckmesser" umfasst Pirani-Sensoren, Penning-Sensoren und Kapazitätsmanometer

| | | |
|-----------|--|----|
| II.A6.016 | <p>Mikroskope und zugehörige Ausrüstungen und Detektoren, wie folgt:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Rasterelektronenmikroskope; b) Raster-Augur-Mikroskope; c) Durchstrahlungs-Elektronenmikroskope; d) Atomkraftmikroskope; e) Rasterkraftmikroskope; f) Ausrüstung und Detektoren, besonders konstruiert zur Verwendung mit den in II.A6.013 a bis e erfassten Mikroskopen, für den Einsatz in der Werkstoffanalyse unter Verwendung folgender Techniken: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Röntgenphotoelektronenspektroskopie (XPS); 2. energiedispersive Röntgenspektroskopie (EDX,EDS); oder 3. Elektronenspektroskopie für die chemische Analyse (ESCA). | 6B |
|-----------|--|----|

A7. Navigation und Luftfahrtelektronik

| | | |
|-----------|--|----------------|
| II.A7.001 | <p>Trägheitsnavigationssysteme und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt:</p> <p>I. Trägheitsnavigationssysteme, die für den Einsatz in "zivilen Luftfahrzeugen" von einer Zivilluftfahrtbehörde in einem Mitgliedstaat des Wassenaar-Arrangements zugelassen sind, und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile wie folgt:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Trägheitsnavigationssysteme (INS) (kardanisch oder strapdown) und Trägheitsgeräte, konstruiert für Lageregelung, Lenkung oder Steuerung von "Luftfahrzeugen", (Über- oder Unterwasser-) Schiffen, Land- oder "Raumfahrzeugen", mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Navigationsfehler (trägheitsfrei) kleiner (besser)/gleich 0,8 nautische Meilen/h "Circular Error Probable" (CEP) nach normaler Ausrichtung; oder 2. spezifiziert zum Betrieb bei linearen Beschleunigungswerten grösser als 10 g; b) Hybride Trägheitsnavigationssysteme mit einem integrierten weltweiten Satelliten-Navigationssystem (GNSS) oder "Datenbankgestützten Navigationssystem" ("DBRN") zur Lageregelung, Lenkung oder Steuerung, nach normaler Ausrichtung, mit einer Positionsgenauigkeit des INS, nach Ausfall des GNSS oder des "DBRN" von bis zu vier Minuten Dauer, von kleiner | 7A003 7A103 |
|-----------|--|----------------|

(besser) als 10 m "Circular Error Probable" (CEP);

c) Trägheitsgeräte für Azimut, Kurs oder Nordweisung mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür:

1. konstruiert für eine Azimut-, Kurs- oder Nordweisungsgenauigkeit kleiner (besser)/gleich 6 Bogenminuten (rms) bei 45 Grad geografischer Breite; oder

2. konstruiert für Nicht-Betriebs-Schockwerte (non- operating shock level) von grösser/gleich 900 g über eine Zeitdauer von grösser/gleich 1 ms.

Anmerkung: Die in den Unternummern I.a und I.b genannten Parameter müssen unter einer der folgenden Umgebungsbedingungen eingehalten werden:

1. Zufallsverteilte Vibration (input random Vibration) mit einer Gesamtstärke von 7,7 g rms in der ersten halben Stunde und einer Gesamttestzeit von 1,5 Stunden in allen drei Achsen mit folgenden Schwingungseigenschaften:

a) spektrale Leistungsdichte (power spectral density, PSD) von $0,04 \text{ g}^2/\text{Hz}$ im Frequenzbereich 15 Hz bis 1000 Hz; und

b) spektrale Leistungsdichte von $0,04 \text{ g}^2/\text{Hz}$ bei 1000 Hz auf $0,01 \text{ g}^2/\text{Hz}$ bei 2000 Hz abfallend;

2. Roll- und Gierrate grösser/gleich $+2,62 \text{ rad/s}$ ($150^\circ/\text{s}$); oder

3. Nationale Prüfbedingungen äquivalent den in den Unternummern 1 und 2 beschriebenen Bedingungen.

Technische Anmerkungen.

1. Unternummer I.b bezieht sich auf Systeme, in denen ein INS und andere unabhängige Hilfsnavigationseinrichtungen in eine Einheit integriert sind, um eine Leistungssteigerung zu erreichen.

2. "Circular Error Probable" (CEP) bezeichnet innerhalb einer kreisförmigen Normalverteilung den Radius des Kreises, der 50 % der einzelnen durchgeführten Messungen enthält, oder den Radius des Kreises, in dem eine 50 %-Wahrscheinlichkeit des Vorhandenseins besteht.

II. Theodolitensysteme mit eingebauten Trägheitsgeräten, die besonders konstruiert sind für zivile Überwachungszwecke und konstruiert für eine Azimut-, Kurs- oder Nordweisungsgenauigkeit kleiner (besser)/gleich 6 Bogenminuten (rms) bei 45 Grad geografischer Breite, und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür.

III. Trägheitsgeräte oder sonstige Geräte, die in Nummer 7A001 oder 7A101 erfasste Beschleunigungsmesser enthalten, sofern diese Beschleunigungsmesser für Arbeiten an Bohrlöchern bestimmt und als MWD-(Measurement While Drilling-) Sensoren zur Messung während des Bohrvorgangs besonders konstruiert sind.

| | | |
|-----------|---|-------|
| II.A7.002 | Beschleunigungsmesser mit piezoelektrischem Keramikmesswandler, mit einer Empfindlichkeit von 1000 mV/g oder besser (höher) | 7A001 |
|-----------|---|-------|

A9. Luftfahrt, Raumfahrt und Antriebe

| | | |
|-----------|--------------|--|
| II.A9.001 | Sprengbolzen | |
|-----------|--------------|--|

| | | |
|-----------|---|-------|
| II.A9.002 | "Kraftmessdosen", geeignet zum Messen der Schubkraft von Raketentriebwerken, mit einer Messkapazität von mehr als 30 kN. <i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> "Kraftmessdosen" bezeichnet Geräte und Wandler zum Messen von Spann- und Kompressionskraft. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Die Nummer II.A9.002 erfasst nicht Ausrüstung, Geräte oder Wandler, besonders konstruiert zum Wiegen von Fahrzeugen, z. B. Brückenwaagen. | 9B117 |
|-----------|---|-------|

| | | |
|-----------|--|-------|
| II.A9.003 | Gasturbinen zur Stromerzeugung, Bauteile und zugehörige Ausrüstung wie folgt: | 9A001 |
| | a) Gasturbinen besonders konstruiert zur Stromerzeugung mit einer Leistung von mehr als 200 MW; | 9A002 |
| | b) Schaufeln, Statoren, Brennkammern und Einspritzdüsen, besonders konstruiert für von Nummer II.A9.003.a erfasste Gasturbinen zur Stromerzeugung; | 9A003 |
| | c) Ausrüstung besonders konstruiert für die "Entwicklung" und "Herstellung" von von Nummer II.A9.003.a erfassten Gasturbinen zur Stromerzeugung. | 9B001 |
| | | 9B003 |
| | | 9B004 |

C. Sonstige Technologie und Software

| Nummer der EU | Beschreibung | Referenznummer in Anhang 2 GKV |
|---------------|---|--------------------------------|
| II.B.001 | Technologie und Software, die für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der in diesem Anhang aufgeführten Güter erforderlich sind. | |

Anhang 3

(Art. 5 Abs. 2 bis 4)

Güter, die zur internen Repression verwendet werden können

- 1 Bomben und Granaten, die nicht von Anhang 1 KMV und nicht von Anhang 3 GKV erfasst werden.
- 2 Fahrzeuge, ausgenommen für die Brandbekämpfung besonders konstruierte Fahrzeuge, wie folgt:
 - 2.1 mit einem Wasserwerfer ausgerüstete Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für die Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen;
 - 2.2 Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für die Abgabe von Stromstössen zur Abwehr von Angreifern;
 - 2.3 Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für die Beseitigung von Barrikaden;
 - 2.4 Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert für den Transport oder die Überstellung von Strafgefangenen und/oder inhaftierten Personen;
 - 2.5 Fahrzeuge und Anhänger, besonders konstruiert für die Errichtung mobiler Absperrungen;
 - 2.6 Bestandteile der in den Ziff. 2.1 bis 2.5 aufgeführten Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert für die Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen.
- 3 Explosivstoffe und dazugehörige Ausrüstung, die nicht von Anhang 1 KMV und nicht von Anhang 3 GKV erfasst werden, wie folgt:
 - 3.1 Geräte und Ausrüstung, besonders konstruiert zum Auslösen von Explosionen durch elektrische oder nichtelektrische Mittel, einschliesslich Zündvorrichtungen, Sprengkapseln, Zündern, Zündverstärkern, Sprengschnüren, sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür.

Ausgenommen sind Geräte und Ausrüstung, die in industriellen Produkten zur Anwendung kommen, zum Beispiel Anzünder für Airbags.
 - 3.2 Andere Explosivstoffe und dazugehörige Stoffe wie folgt:
 - a) Amatol;

- b) Nitrocellulose (mit mehr als 12,5 % Stickstoff);
 - c) Nitroglykol;
 - d) Pentaerythrittetrinitrat (PETN);
 - e) Pikrylchlorid;
 - f) 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluol (TNT).
- 4 Schutzausrüstung, die weder von Nummer ML 13 Anhang 3 GKV erfasst noch besonders konstruiert ist für den Sport oder als Arbeitsschutz, wie folgt:
- 4.1 Körperpanzer mit ballistischem Schutz und/oder Stichschutz;
 - 4.2 Helme mit ballistischem Schutz und/oder Splitterschutz, Schutzhelme, Schutzschilde und ballistische Schutzschilde.
- 5 Andere Simulatoren als die von Nummer ML 14 Anhang 3 GKV erfassten, für das Training im Gebrauch von Feuerwaffen, und besonders entwickelte Software hierfür.
- 6 Andere Nachtsicht- und Wärmebildausrüstung sowie Bildverstärkerröhren als die von den Anhängen 3 und 5 GKV erfassten.
- 7 Bandstacheldraht.
- 8 Militärmesser, Kampfmesser und Bajonette mit einer Klingenlänge von mehr als 10 cm, die nicht von Ziff. 1 des Anhangs 5 GKV erfasst werden.
- 9 Güter, die für die Hinrichtung von Menschen konstruiert sind, wie folgt:
- 9.1 Galgen und Fallbeile;
 - 9.2 elektrische Stühle;
 - 9.3 hermetisch verschliessbare Kammern, zum Beispiel hergestellt aus Stahl oder Glas, konstruiert zur Hinrichtung von Menschen durch Verabreichung von tödlichen Gasen oder Substanzen;
 - 9.4 automatische Injektionssysteme, konstruiert zur Hinrichtung von Menschen durch Verabreichung einer letalen chemischen Substanz.
- 10 Elektroschock-Gürtel, konstruiert, um durch Abgabe von Elektroschocks mit einer Leerlaufspannung von mehr als 10 000 Volt auf Menschen Zwang auszuüben.
- 11 Güter, konstruiert zur Fesselung von Menschen, wie folgt:
- 11.1 Zwangsstühle und Fesselungsbretter. Nicht erfasst sind Stühle, die für behinderte Personen konstruiert sind.
 - 11.2 Fusseisen, Mehrpersonen-Fesseln, Fesseln und Einzelschellen oder Fesselarmbänder. Nicht erfasst sind Handschellen, deren Gesamtlänge einschliesslich Kette, gemessen im geschlossenen Zustand vom Aussenrand einer Schelle zum Aussenrand der anderen Schelle, zwischen

150 und 280 mm beträgt und die nicht verändert wurden, um körperliche Schmerzen oder Leiden zu verursachen.

11.3 Daumenschellen und Daumenschrauben, einschliesslich gezackter Daumenschellen.

12 Tragbare Elektroschockgeräte, einschliesslich Elektroschock-Schlagstöcken, Elektroschock-Schilden, Elektroschockern (Paralyser) und Elektroschock- Pfeilwaffen, die eine Leerlaufspannung von mehr als 10 000 Volt haben und die nicht von Ziff. 1 des Anhangs 5 GKV erfasst werden.

Nicht erfasst sind einzelne Elektroschockgeräte, wenn diese zum persönlichen Schutz mitgeführt werden.

13 Substanzen zur Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen oder zum Selbstschutz sowie dazugehörige tragbare Ausbringungs-ausrüstung, wie folgt:

13.1 Tragbare Geräte zur Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen oder zum Selbstschutz durch Verabreichung oder Verbreitung einer handlungsunfähig machenden chemischen Substanz, die nicht von Ziff. 1 des Anhangs 5 GKV erfasst werden.

Nicht erfasst sind einzelne tragbare Geräte mit oder ohne chemische Substanz, wenn diese zum persönlichen Schutz mitgeführt werden;

13.2 Pelargonsäurevanillylamid (Nonivamid, PAVA) (CAS-Nr. 2444-46-4);

13.3 Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) (CAS-Nr. 8023-77-6).

14 Ausrüstung, besonders konstruiert für die Herstellung der in dieser Liste aufgeführten Güter.

15 Spezifische Technologie zur Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der in dieser Liste aufgeführten Güter.

Anhang 4

(Art. 6 Abs. 1)

Ausrüstung, Technologie oder Software zu Überwachungszwecken

1. Ausrüstungen

- Ausrüstung für tiefe Paketinspektion
- Netzüberwachungsausrüstung einschliesslich Abhörmanagementausrüs-
tung (IMS) und Intelligence-Ausrüstung für Datenverbindungs-vorrats-
speicherung
- Funkfrequenz-Überwachungsausrüstung
- Ausrüstung zum Stören von Funknetzen und der Satellitenkommunika-
tion
- Ausrüstung für die Ferneinbringung von Computerviren
- Sprechererkennungs- und Sprecherverarbeitungsausrüstung
- Ausrüstung zum Überwachen und Abhören von:

IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity): Eindeutiger Identifizierungscode für jedes Mobilfunkgerät, der fest in der SIM-Karte integriert ist und die Identifizierung der SIM-Karte über GSM- und UMTS-Netze ermöglicht.

MSISDN (Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number): Nummer zur eindeutigen Identifizierung eines GSM- oder UMTS-Netzteilnehmers. Dies ist die Telefonnummer, die der SIM-Karte eines Mobiltelefons zugeordnet ist und daher - genauso wie eine IMSI - die Identifizierung eines Mobilfunkteilnehmers ermöglicht, aber auch der Anrufvermittlung an den Teilnehmer dient.

IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity): In der Regel eindeutige Nummer zur Identifizierung von GSM-, WCDMA- und IDEN-Mobiltelefonen sowie einiger Satellitentelefone. Die Nummer ist zumeist im Batteriefach des Telefons aufgedruckt. Die Überwachung (Abhören) kann mit Hilfe der IMEI-Nummer sowie der IMSI und MSISDN erfolgen.

TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity): Kennung, die in der Regel zwischen dem Mobilfunkgerät und dem Netz übertragen wird.

- Taktische Ausrüstung zum Überwachen und Abhören von SMS (Short Message System), GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications), GPS (Global Positioning System), GPRS (General Package Radio Service), UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System), CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), PSTN (Public Switch Telephone Networks)
 - Ausrüstung zum Überwachen und Abhören von DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol), SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) und GTP (GPRS Tunneling Protocol)
 - Ausrüstung für die Mustererkennung und die Erstellung von Musterprofilen
 - Ferngesteuerte Forensikausrüstung
 - Ausrüstung für die semantische Verarbeitung
 - Entschlüsselungsausrüstung für WEP- und WPA-Schlüssel
 - Abhörausrüstung für geschützte und standardisierte Protokolle für die Sprachübermittlung über das Internet (VoIP)
2. Software für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der Ausrüstung nach Ziff. 1
3. Technologie für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der Ausrüstung nach Ziff. 1

Ausrüstung, Technologie und Software, die unter diese Kategorien fällt, ist nur insoweit Gegenstand des vorliegenden Anhangs, als sie von der allgemeinen Beschreibung für "Systeme für das Abhören und die Überwachung des Internets, des Telefonverkehrs und der Satellitenkommunikation" erfasst wird.

Für die Zwecke dieses Anhangs bezeichnet "Überwachung" die Erfassung, Extrahierung, Entschlüsselung, Aufzeichnung, Verarbeitung, Analyse und Archivierung von Gesprächsinhalten oder Netzdaten.

4. Ausnahmen

Ausgenommen von den Ziff. 1 bis 3 ist:

- a) Software, die dazu entwickelt ist, um vom Benutzer ohne umfangreiche Unterstützung durch den Lieferanten installiert zu werden, und die frei erhältlich ist und im Einzelhandel ohne Einschränkungen mittels einer der folgenden Geschäftspraktiken verkauft wird:
1. Barverkauf,
 2. Versandverkauf,
 3. Verkauf über elektronische Medien, oder
 4. Telefonverkauf; oder

b) Software, die allgemein zugänglich ist.

Anhang 5²⁰

Art. 8 Abs. 1, 11 Abs. 1 und 2, 12 Bst. b sowie 14a)

Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (UNO-Liste)

Anmerkung

Dieser Anhang entspricht der Liste der vom Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen bezeichneten natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen.²¹

Anhang 6²²

(Art. 8 Abs. 1, 11 Abs. 1 und 3 sowie 12 Bst. b)

Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (Beschluss 2010/413/GASP)**A. Natürliche Personen**

1. **Name:** Al Yasin Javad
Justification: Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact, also known as METFAZ. **Relation:** Head of Research Centre for Explosion and Impact
2. **Name:** Davoud BABAEI
Justification: The current head of security for the Ministry Of Defence Armed Forces Logistics' research institute the Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi. The IAEA have identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme over which Iran refuses to cooperate. As head of security, Babaei is responsible for preventing the disclosure of information, including to the IAEA.
3. Aufgehoben
4. **Sayed Shamsuddin BORBORUDI**
(a.k.a. Seyed Shamseddin BORBOROUDI) DOB: 21/9/1969 **Justification:** Former Deputy Head of UN designated Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, where he was subordinate to UN designated Feridun Abbasi Davani. Has been involved in the Iranian nuclear programme since at least 2002, including as the former head of procurement and logistics at AMAD, where he was responsible for using front companies such as Kimia Madan to procure equipment and material for Iran's nuclear weapons programme.
5. **Name:** Kamran DANESHJOO
(a.k.a. DANESHJOU)
Justification: Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology. As project manager of the 111th section of the AMAD Plan, he has provided support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
6. **Name:** IRGC Brigadier-General Javad DARVISH-VAND
Justification: Former Deputy Minister of Defence and Inspector General of MODAFL.
7. **Name:** Rear Admiral Ali FADAVI
Justification: Deputy Commander-General of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Former Commander of IRGC Navy.

8. **Name:** IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi FARAHI
Justification: Deputy Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Support since 2021. Previously Deputy Minister of Defence and Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, head of the Defence Industries and Aerospace Organizations of the Ministry of Defence, as well as commander of the Armed Forces Personnel Training Camp. Former head of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and former managing director of the UN-designated Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Member of the IRGC.
9. **Name:** Parviz FATAH
DOB: Born in 1961
Justification: Former member of the IRGC. Former Minister of Energy. Since July 2019, head of the "Mostazafan Foundation", former member of the Board of Trustees of the Imam Khomeini Foundation.
10. **Name:** Haeri Mojtaba
Justification: Engineer; MODAFL Deputy for Industry. Supervisory role over AIO and DIO. **Relation:** Deputy at Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
11. **Name:** Hoseynitash Ali
Justification: IRGC Brigadier-General; Member of the IRGC. Member of the Supreme National Security Council and involved in formulating policy on nuclear issues.
12. **Name:** Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)
DOB: 20.9.1974
Justification: An Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to UN designated SHIG front companies. Delivered goods to SHIG between January and November 2010. Payments for some of the goods were made at the central branch of EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) in Tehran after November 2010.
13. **Name:** Mohammad Ali JAFARI
Justification: Former Commander of the IRGC. Currently head of the Hazrat Baqiatollah al-Azam Cultural and Social Headquarters.
14. **Name:** Karimian Ali
Justification: An Iranian national supplying goods, mostly carbon fibre to UN-designated SHIG and SBIG.
15. **Name:** Khansari Majid
Justification: Managing Director of UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company.
Relation: Managing Director of Kala-Electric (E.37.A.3.)
16. **Name:** Ebrahim MAHMUDZADEH
Justification: Head of the Management Board of Iran Telecommunications; former Managing Director of Iran Electronic Industries (see Part B, No 20). Director general of the Armed Forces Social Security Organization until September 2020. Iranian Deputy Defense Minister until December 2020.
17. **Name:** Mohammadi Mohammad
Justification: Managing Director of MATSA. **Relation:** Managing director of MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company)
18. **Name:** Mohammadlu Beik

- Justification:** Brigadier-General; MODAFL Deputy for Supplies and Logistics.
Relation: Deputy for Supplies and Logistics of Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
19. **Name:** Mohammad Reza MOVASAGHNI
Justification: Former head of Samen Al A'Emmeh Industries Group (SAIG), also known as the Cruise Missile Industry Group. This organisation was designated under UNSCR 1747 and listed in Annex I to Common Position 2007/140/CFSP.
20. **Name:** Anis NACCACHE
Justification: Former administrator of Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies; his company has attempted to procure sensitive goods for entities designated under Resolution 1737 (2006).
21. **Name:** Naderi Mohammad
Justification: Brigadier-General; Head of Iran's Aviation Industries Organisation (IAIO). Former Head of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). AIO has taken part in sensitive Iranian programmes.
22. **Name:** IRGC Brigadier-General Mostafa Mohammad NAJJAR
Justification: Former Minister for the Interior and former Minister of MODAFL, responsible for all military programmes, including ballistic missiles programmes. Since September 2013, Senior Advisor to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces on Knowledge and Technology Industry. Member of the IRGC.
23. **Name:** IRGC Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza NAQDI
POB: Nadjaf, Iraq **DOB:** 1953 **Justification:** Deputy Coordinator of the IRGC. Former Deputy Commander of IRGC for Cultural and Social Affairs. Former Commander of Basij Resistance Force.
24. **Name:** Naseri Mohammad Sadegh
Justification: Head of the Physics Research Institute (formerly known as the Institute of Applied Physics). **Relation:** Head of Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
25. Aufgehoben
26. **Name:** Rostam QASEMI
(a.k.a. Rostam Qassemi; Rostam GHASEMI)
DOB: Born in 1961
Justification: Since 25 August 2021, Minister for Road and Urban Development. Former Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya.
27. **Name:** IRGC Brigadier-General Hossein SALAMI
Justification: Commander of the IRGC.
28. **Name:** Rear Admiral Mohammad SHAFI'I RUDSARI (a.k.a. ROODSARI, Mohammad, Hossein, Shafiei; ROODSARI, Mohammad, Shafi'I; ROODSARI, Mohammad, Shafiei; RUDSARI, Mohammad, Hossein, Shafiei; RUDSARI, Mohammad, Shafi'I; RUDSARI, Mohammad, Shafiei)
Justification: Former MODAFL Deputy for Coordination (see Part B, n°29).
29. **Name:** Shams Abolghassem Mozaffari
Justification: Former head of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.
30. **Name:** IRGC Brigadier-General Ali SHAMSHIRI

Justification: Member of the IRGC. Advisor to the director of the Defence Science and Education Research Institute. Has held senior roles in MODAFL.

31. **Name:** Abdollah SOLAT SANA (a.k.a. Solatsana Solat Sanna; Sowlat Senna; Sovlat Thana)
Justification: Managing Director of the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan. This is the facility that produces the feed material (UF6) for the enrichment facilities at Natanz. On 27 August 2006, Solat Sana received a special award from President Ahmadinejad for his role.
32. **Name:** Soltani Hamid
Justification: Managing Director of the EU-designated Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA).
33. **Name:** IRGC Brigadier-General Ahmad VAHIDI
Justification: Since 25 August 2021, Minister of Interior. Former President of the Supreme National Defence University and former Minister of MODAFL.
34. **Name:** Ali Ashraf NOURI
Justification: Head of the Basij Islamic Revolution Art Educational and Research Complex. Formerly IRGC Deputy Commander, IRGC Political Bureau Chief.
35. **Name:** Hojatoleslam Ali SAIDI (a.k.a. Hojjat- al-Eslam Ali Saidi or Saeedi)
Justification: Since March 2017, head of the ideological and political bureau of the Supreme Leader in his role as Commander-in-chief. Previously representative of the Supreme Leader to the IRGC.
36. **Name:** Zadeh Amir Ali Haji
Good quality a.k.a.: Hajizadeh Amir Ali **Justification:** IRGC Air Force Commander, Brigadier General. **Relation:** Commander of IRGC Air Force

B. Unternehmen und Organisationen

1. **Name:** Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO
Address:a) AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, Iran b) Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** AIO oversees Iran's production of missiles, including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group and Fajr Industrial Group, which were all designated under UNSCR 1737 (2006). The head of AIO and two other senior officials were also designated under UNSCR 1737 (2006).
2. **Name:** Aran Modern Devices (AMD)
Justification: Affiliate of Modern Technologies FZC (MTFZC) network. **Relation:** Affiliated to Modern Technologies FZC (MTFZC)
3. **Name:** Aras Farayande
Address: Unit 12, No 35 Kooshesh Street, Tehran **Justification:** Involved in procurement of materials for Iran Centrifuge Technology Company.
4. **Name:** Aria Nikan
Good quality a.k.a.: Pergas Aria Movalled Ltd **Address:** Suite 1, 59 Azadi Ali North Sohrevardi Avenue, Tehran, 1576935561 **Justification:** Known to procure for designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) Commercial Department. They have made efforts to procure designated materials, including goods from the EU, which have applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.

5. **Name:** Armed Forces Geographical Organisation
Justification: A subsidiary of MODAFL assessed to provide geospatial data for the Ballistic Missile programme.
6. **Name:** Ashtian Tablo
Address: Ashtian Tablo, No 67, Ghods Mirheydari St, Yoosefabad, Tehran
Justification: A manufacturer of electrical equipment (switchgear) involved in the construction of the Fordow (Qom) facility, built without being declared to the IAEA.
7. **Name:** Bals Alman
Justification: A manufacturer of electrical equipment (switchgear) involved in the ongoing construction of the Fordow (Qom) facility built without being declared to the IAEA.
8. Aufgehoben
9. Aufgehoben
10. **Name:** Bargh Azaraksh
Good quality a.k.a.: Barghe Azerakhsh Sakht **Address:** No 599, Stage 3, Ata Al Malek Blvd, Emam Khomeini Street, Esfahan
Justification: Company that has been contracted to work at the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow on the electricity and piping works. It was in charge of designing, procuring and installing electrical control equipment at Natanz in 2010.
11. **Name:** Electronic Components Industries (ECI)
Address: Hossain Abad Avenue, Shiraz, Iran
Justification: Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries. **Relation:** Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (including all branches and subsidiaries)
12. **Name:** ESNICO (Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation)
Address: No 1, 37th Avenue, Asadabadi Street, Tehran, Iran
Justification: Procures industrial goods, specifically for the nuclear programme activities carried out by AEOI, Novin Energy and Kalaye Electric Company (all designated under UNSCR 1737). ESNICO's Director is Haleh Bakhtiar (designated in UNSCR 1803).
13. **Name:** Etemad Amin Invest Co Mobin
(a.k.a.: Etemad Amin Investment Company Mobin; Etemad-e Mobin; Etemad Amin Invest Company Mobin; Etemad Mobin Co.; Etemad Mobin Trust Co.; Etemade Mobin Company; Mobin Trust Consortium; Etemad-e Mobin Consortium)
Address: Pasadaran Av. Tehran, Iran
Justification: A company owned or controlled by IRGC that contributes to financing the strategic interests of the regime.
14. **Name:** Eyvaz Technic
Address: No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran
Justification: Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011 it supplied pressure transducers to UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company.
15. **Name:** Fajr Aviation Composite Industries

Address: Mehrabad Airport, PO Box 13445-885, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** A subsidiary of the IAIO within MODAFL both designated by the EU which primarily produces composite materials for the aircraft industry.

16. **Name:** Ghani Sazi Uranium Company
Good quality a.k.a.: Iran Uranium Enrichment Company **Address:** 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Teheran **Justification:** Subordinate to the UN-designated TAMAS. It has production contracts with UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company and EU-designated TESA.
17. **Name:** Hirbod Co
Address: Hirbod Co, Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran, 14316 **Justification:** A company that has procured goods and equipment destined for Iran's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile programmes for the UN-sanctioned Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).
18. **Name:** Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
Justification: Conducts research into military applications of Iranian nuclear programme.
19. **Name:** Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI)
Justification: A subsidiary of the IAIO within MODAFL. Manufactures, repairs, and conducts overhauls of airplanes and aircraft engines and procures aviation related parts often of USorigin typically via foreign intermediaries. IACI and its subsidiaries have also been detected using a worldwide network of brokers seeking to procure aviation-related goods. **Relation:** Subsidiary of Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO)
20. **Name:** Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company
Good quality a.k.a.:a) HESA b) HESA Trade Center c) HTC d) IAMCO e) IAMI f) Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company g) Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries h) Karkhanejate Sanaye Havapaymaie Iran i) Hava Peyma Sazi-e Iran j) Hava-peyma Sazhran k) Havapeyma Sazi Iran, l) Hevapeimasazi **Address:**a) 28 km Esfahan - Tehran Freeway, Shahin Shahr, P.O.Box 83145-311, Esfahan, Iran b) No. 27 Ahahamat Ave., Vallie Asr Square, P.O.Box 14155-5568, Tehran, 15946, Iran c) P.O.Box 81465-935, Esfahan, Iran d) Shahih Shar Industrial Zone, Isfahan e) No. 107 Sepahbod Gharany Ave., P.O.Box 8140, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of; MODAFL. **Relation:** Owned or controlled by Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
21. **Name:** Iran Centrifuge Technology Company
Good quality a.k.a.:a) TSA b) TESA **Address:** 156 Golestan Street, Saradr-e Jangal, Tehran **Justification:** Iran Centrifuge Technology Company has taken over the activities of Farayand Technique (designated under UNSCR 1737). It manufactures uranium enrichment centrifuge parts, and is directly supporting proliferation sensitive activity that Iran is required to suspend by UNSCRs. Carries out work for Kalaye Electric Company (designated under UNSCR 1737).
22. **Name:** Iran Communications Industries (ICI)
(a.k.a. Sanaye Mokhaberat Iran; Iran Communication Industries; Iran Communications Industries Group; Iran Communications Industries Co.)
Address: PO Box 19295-4731, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Alternative address: PO Box 19575-131, 34 Apadana Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Alternative address: Shahid Langary Street, Nobonyad Square Ave, Pasdaran, Tehran

Justification: Iran Communications Industries, a subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (listed by the EU), produces various items including communication systems, avionics, optics and electro-optics devices, micro-electronics, information technology, test and measurement, telecommunication security, electronic warfare, radar tube manufacture and refurbishment, and missile launchers. ICI procured sensitive material through Hoda Trading, its Hong Kong based subsidiary.

23. **Name:** Iran Electronics Industries (including all branches) and subsidiaries:
Address: P. O. Box 18575-365, Tehran, Iran
Justification: Wholly-owned subsidiary of MODAFL (and therefore a sister-organisation to AIO, AvIO and DIO). Its role is to manufacture electronic components for Iranian weapons systems.
24. **Name:** Isfahan Optics
Address:a) Kaveh Ave., P.O.Box 81465-313, Isfahan, Iran b) P.O.Box 81465-117, Isfahan, Iran **Justification:** Owned, controlled by, or acts on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries. **Relation:** Owned or Controlled or acting on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries (including all branches and subsidiaries)
25. **Name:** Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO)
Address:a) Ave. Sepahbod Gharani, P.O.Box 15815/1775, Tehran, Iran b) Ave. Sepahbod Gharani, P.O.Box 15815/3446, Tehran, Iran c) 107 Sepahbod Gharani Avenue, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** A MODAFL organisation responsible for planning and managing Iran's military aviation industry. **Relation:** Organisation of Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
26. **Name:** Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA)
Address: Sadra Building No. 3, Shafagh St., Poonak Khavari Blvd., Shahrak Ghods, P.O.Box 14669-56491, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Effectively controlled by Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Engineering Company, which is designated by the EU as an IRGC company. Provides support to the Government of Iran through its involvement in the Iranian energy sector including in the South Pars Gas field. **Relation:** Owned or controlled by Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) (E.29.II.7.)
27. **Name:** Iran Pooya
Good quality a.k.a.: Iran Pouya **Justification:** A government owned company that operated the biggest extruder of aluminium in Iran and supplied material for use in the production of casings for the IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges. A major manufacturer of aluminium cylinders for centrifuges whose customers include the UN-designated AEOI and EU-designated TESA.
28. **Name:** Javedan Mehr Toos
Justification: Engineering firm that procures for the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran which was designated under UNSCR 1737.
29. **Name:** Karanir
Good quality a.k.a.: Karanir Sanat, Moaser; Tajhizat Sanat
Address: 1139/1 Unit 104 Gol Building, Gol Alley, North Side of Sae, Vali Asr Avenue. PO Box 19395-6439, Tehran
Justification: Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.

30. **Name:** Khala Afarin Pars
(a.k.a. PISHRO KHALA AFARIN COMPANY)
Address: Last address known: Unit 5, 2nd Floor, No 75, Mehran Afrand St, Sattarkhan St, Tehran. **Justification:** Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
31. **Name:** MAAA Synergy
Address: Malaysia **Justification:** Involved in procurement of components for Iranian fighter planes.
32. **Name:** MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic
Address: Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla, Istanbul, 34930 **Justification:** Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to UN designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. **Relation:** Run by Jafari Milad
33. **Name:** Marine Industries
Address: Pasdaran Av., P.O.Box 19585/ 777, Tehran
Justification: A subsidiary of the DIO. **Relation:** Subsidiary of Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) (E.37.A.6.)
34. **Name:** Marou Sanat
Good quality a.k.a.: Mohandesi Tarh Va Toseh Maro Sanat Company **Address:** 9, Ground Floor, Zohre Street, Mofateh Street, Tehran **Justification:** Procurement firm that has acted for Mesbah Energy which was designated under UNSCR 1737.
35. **Name:** MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company)
Address: 90, Fathi Shaghghi Street, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Iranian company contracted to UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. Most recently has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.
36. **Name:** Mechanic Industries Group
Good quality a.k.a.: Mechanic Industries Organisation; Mechanical Industries Complex; Mechanical Industries Group; Sanaye Mechanic
Justification: Took part in the production of components for the ballistics programme.
37. **Name:** Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics b) MODAFL c) MODSAF **Address:** Located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran **Justification:** Responsible for Iran's defence research, development and manufacturing programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes.
38. **Name:** Mobin Sanjesh
Address: Entry 3, No 11, 12th Street, Miremad Alley, Abbas Abad, Tehran **Justification:** Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
39. **Name:** Modern Technologies FZC (MTFZC)
Address: P.O.Box 8032, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates **Justification:** Involved in procurement of components for Iranian nuclear programme.
40. **Name:** Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi

- Justification:** Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to UN designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. **Relation:** Run by Jafari Milad
41. Aufgehoben
42. Aufgehoben
43. **Name:** Noavaran Pooyamoj
Address: No 15, Eighth Street, Pakistan Avenue, Shahid Beheshti Avenue, Tehran
Justification: Involved in procurement of materials that are controlled and have direct application in the manufacture of centrifuges for Iran's uranium enrichment programme.
44. **Name:** Parchin Chemical Industries
Justification: Worked on propulsion techniques for the Iranian ballistics programme.
45. **Name:** Parto Sanat Co.
Address: No. 1281 Valiasr Ave., Next to 14th St., Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Manufacturer of frequency changers and it is capable of developing/modifying imported foreign frequency changers in a way that makes them usable in gas centrifuge enrichment. It is deemed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities.
46. **Name:** Passive Defense Organization
Justification: Responsible for the selection and construction of strategic facilities, including - according to Iranian statements - the uranium enrichment site at Fordow (Qom) built without being declared to the IAEA contrary to Iran's obligations (affirmed in a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors). Brigadier General Gholam-Reza Jalali, former IRGC is PDO's chairman.
47. **Name:** Paya Parto
Good quality a.k.a.: Paya Partov **Justification:** Subsidiary of Novin Energy, which was sanctioned under UNSCR 1747, involved in laser welding.
48. **Name:** Raad Iran
(a.k.a. Raad Automation Company; Middle East Raad Automation; RAAD Automation Co.; Raad Iran Automation Co.; RAADIRAN; Middle East RAAD Automation Co.; Automasion RAAD Khavar Mianeh; Automation Raad Khavar Mianeh Nabbet Co)
Address: Unit 1, No 35, Bouali Sina Sharghi, Chehel Sotoun Street, Fatemi Square, Tehran
Justification: A company involved in procurement of inverters for Iran's prescribed enrichment programme. Raad Iran was established to produce and design controlling systems and provides the sale and installation of inverters and programmable Logic Controllers.
49. **Name:** Raka
Justification: A department of Kalaye Electric Company (designated under UNSCR 1737). Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom). **Relation:** Part of Kala-Electric (E.37.A.3.)
50. **Name:** Research Centre for Explosion and Impact
Good quality a.k.a.: METFAZ **Address:** 44, 180th Street West, Tehran, 16539-75751
Justification: Subordinate to the designated Malek Ashtar University, it oversees

activity linked to the Possible Military Dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme upon which Iran is not cooperating with the IAEA. **Relation:** Subordinate to Malek Ashtar University (E.29.I.9.)

51. **Name:** Saman Nasb Zayنده Rood
Good quality a.k.a.: Saman Nasbzainde Rood **Address:** Unit 7, 3rd Floor Mehdi Building, Kahorz Blvd, Esfahan, Iran **Justification:** Construction contractor that has installed piping and associated support equipment at the uranium enrichment site at Natanz. It has dealt specifically with centrifuge piping.
52. **Name:** Saman Tose'e Asia (SATA)
Justification: Engineering firm involved in supporting a range of large scale industrial projects including Iran's uranium enrichment programme, including undeclared work at the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
53. **Name:** Samen Industries
Good quality a.k.a.: Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
Address: 2nd km of Khalaj Road End of Seyyedi St., P.O.Box 91735-549, 91735 Mashhad, Iran, Tel.: +98 511 3853008, +98 511 3870225
Justification: Shell name for UN-designated Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG).
54. **Name:** Schiller Novin
Good quality a.k.a.: Schiler Novin Co.; Schiller Novin Co.; Shiller Novin
Address: Gheyariyeh Avenue - no 153 - 3rd Floor - PO BOX 17665/153 6 19389 Tehran
Justification: Acting on behalf of Defense Industries Organisation (DIO).
55. **Name:** Sepanir Oil and Gas Energy Engineering Company
Good quality a.k.a.: Sepah Nir **Justification:** A subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbya Construction Headquarters which was designated under UNSCR 1929. Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering Company is participating in Iran's South Pars offshore Phase 15-16 gas field development project. **Relation:** Subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) (E.29.II.7.)
56. **Name:** Shahid Ahmad Kazemi Industrial Group (SAKIG)
Justification: Entity subordinate to Iran's Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). SAKIG develops and produces surface-to-air missiles systems for Iran's military. It maintains military, missile, and air defense projects and procures goods from Russia, Belarus, and North Korea.
57. **Name:** Shahid Beheshti University
Address: Daneshju Blvd., Yaman St., Chamran Blvd., P.O.Box 19839-63113, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Shahid Beheshti University is a public entity which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Carries out scientific research relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. **Relation:** Owned or controlled by Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
58. **Name:** Shakhese Behbud Sanat
Justification: Involved in the production of equipment and parts for the nuclear fuel cycle.
59. **Name:** Shiraz Electronics Industries

- Address:** Mirzaie Shirazi, P.O.Box 71365-1589, Shiraz, Iran **Justification:** Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries. **Relation:** Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (including all branches and subsidiaries)
60. **Name:** State Purchasing Organisation (SPO, a.k.a. State Purchasing Office; State Purchasing Organization)
Justification: The SPO appears to facilitate the import of whole weapons. It appears to be a subsidiary of MODAFL.
61. **Name:** STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.
Address: 79/2 Tuzla, Istanbul, 34940, Turkey **Justification:** Company run by Milad Jafari, who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to UN designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies. **Relation:** Run by Jafari Milad
62. **Name:** Sun Middle East FZ Company
Justification: A company that procures sensitive goods for the Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company (SUREH). Sun Middle East uses intermediaries based outside of Iran to source goods SUREH requires. Sun Middle East provides these intermediaries with false end user details for when the goods are sent to Iran, thereby seeking to circumvent the relevant country's customs regime.
63. **Name:** SURENA
Good quality a.k.a.: Sakhd Va Rah-An-Da-Zi **Justification:** Company for Construction and Commissioning of Nuclear Power Plants. Controlled by the UN designated Novin Energy Company.
64. **Name:** TABA (Iran Cutting Tools Manufacturing company - Taba Towlid Abzar Boreshi Iran; a.k.a. Iran Centrifuge Technology Co.; Iran's Centrifuge Technology Company; Sherkate Technology Centrifuge Iran, TESA, TSA)
Address: 12 Ferdowsi, Avenue Sakhaee, avenue 30 Tir (sud), nr 66 - Tehran
Justification: Owned or controlled by EU-sanctioned TESA, Involved in manufacturing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
65. **Name:** Taghtiran
Justification: Engineering firm that procures equipment for Iran's IR-40 heavy water research reactor.
66. **Name:** Tajhiz Sanat Shayan (TSS)
Address: Unit 7, No. 40, Yazdanpanah, Afriqa Blvd, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Involved in procurement of components for Iranian nuclear programme.
67. **Name:** Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President's Office
Good quality a.k.a.: Center for Innovation and Technology (CIITC) **Address:** Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Responsible for Iran's technological advancement through relevant foreign procurement and training links. Supports the nuclear and missile programmes.
68. **Name:** Test Tafsir
Address: No 11, Tawhid 6 Street, Moj Street, Darya Blvd, Shahrak Gharb, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Company produces and has supplied UF6 specific containers to the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/ Fordow.
69. **Name:** Tosse Silooha
Good quality a.k.a.: Tosseh Jahad E Silo **Justification:** Involved in the Iranian nuclear programme at the Natanz, Qom and Arak facilities.

70. Aufgehoben
71. **Name:** Yarsanat
Good quality a.k.a.:a) Yar Sanat **b)** Yarestan Vacuumi **Address:a)** No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, Tehran, 14157 **b)** No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, Tehran, 15337 **Justification:** Procurement company for UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme. It has attempted the procurement of vacuum products and pressure transducers.
72. **Name:** Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
Justification: Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.
73. **Name:** Arfa Paint Company
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
74. **Name:** Arfeh Company
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
75. **Name:** Farasepehr Engineering Company
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
76. **Name:** Hosseini Nejad Trading Co.
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
77. **Name:** Iran Saffron Company
Good quality a.k.a.: Iransaffron Co. **Justification:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
78. **Name:** Shetab G.
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
79. **Name:** Shetab Gaman
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
80. **Name:** Shetab Trading
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
81. **Name:** Y.A.S. Co. Ltd
Justification: Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
82. **Name:** Tidewater
Good quality a.k.a.:a) Tidewater Middle East Co. **b)** Faraz Royal Qeshm Company LLC **Address:** No. 80, Tidewater Building, Vozara Street, Next to Saie Park, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Owned or controlled by IRGC **Relation:** Owned or controlled by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
83. **Name:** Turbine Engineering Manufacturing (TEM)

- Good quality a.k.a.:** T.E.M. Co. **Address:** Shishesh Mina Street, Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Used as a front company by designated Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI) for covert procurement activities.
84. **Name:** Rosmachin
Address: Haftom Tir Square, South Mofte Avenue, Tour Line No; 3/1, P.O.Box 1584864813, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Front company of Sad Export Import Company. Involved in illicit arms transfer aboard M/V Monchgorsk. **Relation:** Front company of Sad Export Import Company (I.AC.50.20.12.12.(2))
85. **Name:** Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Address: Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Responsible for Iran's nuclear programme. Has operational control for Iran's ballistic missile programme. Has undertaken procurement attempts to support Iran's ballistic missiles and nuclear programmes.
86. **Name:** Ansar Bank
Good quality a.k.a.:a) Ansar Finance and Credit Fund b) Ansar Financial and Credit Institute c) Ansa Institute d) Ansar al-Mojahedin No-Interest Loan Institute e) Ansar Saving and Interest Free-Loans Fund **Address:** No. 539, North Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran; Ansar Building, North Khaje Nasir Street, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Bonyad Taavon Sepah created Ansar Bank to provide financial and credit services to IRGC personnel. Initially, Ansar Bank operated as a credit union and transitioned into a fully fledged bank in mid 2009, upon receiving a licence from Iran's Central bank. Ansar Bank, formerly known as Ansar al Mojahedin, has been linked to the IRGC for over 20 years. IRGC members received their salaries through Ansar bank. In addition, Ansar bank provided special benefits to IRGC personnel, including reduced rates for home furnishings and free, or reduced-cost, health care.
87. **Name:** Bonyad Taavon Sepah
Good quality a.k.a.:a) IRGC Cooperative Foundation b) Bonyad-e Ta'avon-Sepah c) Sepah Cooperative Foundation **Address:** Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Bonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, was formed by the Commanders of the IRGC to structure the IRGC's investments. It is controlled by the IRGC. Bonyad Taavon Sepah's Board of Trustees is composed of nine members, of whom eight are IRGC members. These officers include the IRGC's Commander in Chief, who is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the Supreme Leader's representative to the IRGC, the Basij commander, the IRGC Ground Forces commander, the IRGC Air Force commander, the IRGC Navy commander, the head of the IRGC Information Security Organization, a senior IRGC officer from the Armed Forces General Staff, and a senior IRGC officer from MODAFL. **Relation:** Controlled by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
88. **Name:** IRGC Air Force
Justification: Operates Iran's inventory of short and medium range ballistic missiles. The head of the IRGC air force was designated by UNSCR 1737 (2006).
89. **Name:** IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command
Justification: The IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command is a specific element within the IRGC Air Force that has been working with SBIG (designated under UNSCR 1737) with the FATEH 110, short range ballistic missile as well as the Ashura medium range ballistic missile. This command appears to be the entity

that actually has the operational control of the missiles. **Relation:** Part of IRGC Air Force

90. **Name:** IRGC Qods Force
Address: Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force is responsible for operations outside Iran and is Tehran's principal foreign policy tool for special operations and support to terrorists and Islamic militants abroad. Hizballah used Qods Force-supplied rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), manportable air defense systems (MANPADS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 2006 conflict with Israel and benefited from Qods Force training on these systems, according to press reporting. According to a variety of reports, the Qods Force continues to resupply and train Hizballah on advanced weaponry, anti-aircraft missiles, and long-range rockets. The Qods Force continues to provide limited lethal support, training, and funding to Taliban fighters in southern and western Afghanistan including small arms, ammunition, mortars, and short-range battlefield rockets. Commander has been sanctioned under UNSCR 1747.
91. **Name:** Mehr Bank
(a.k.a. Mehr Finance and Credit Institute; Mehr Interest-Free Bank)
Address: No 182, Shahid Tohidi St, 4th Golsetan, Pasdaran Ave, Tehran 1666943, Iran
Justification: Mehr Bank is controlled by Bonyad Taavon Sepah and the IRGC. Mehr Bank provides financial services to the IRGC. According to an open source interview with the then head of Bonyad Taavon Sepah, Parviz Fatah, Bonyad Taavon Sepah created Mehr Bank to serve the Basij (paramilitary arm of the IRGC).
92. **Name:** Naserin Vahid
Justification: Naserin Vahid produces weapons parts on behalf of the IRGC. An IRGC front company. **Relation:** Front company of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
93. **Name:** Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company
Postal address: Ziba Building, 10th Floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran
Justification: Involved in the shipment of arms on behalf of the IRGC.
94. Aufgehoben
95. Aufgehoben
96. Aufgehoben
97. Aufgehoben
98. **Name:** Iran Composites Institute
Address: Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran, Telephone: 98 217 3912858 Fax: 98 217 7491206 E-mail: ici@iust.ac.ir Website: www.irancomposites.org
Justification: Iranian Composites Institute (ICI, aka Composite Institute of Iran) is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of 2011 ICI had been contracted to provide EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.
99. **Name:** Jelvesazan Company

Address: 22 Bahman St., Bozorgmehr Ave, 84155666, Esfahan, Iran Tel: 98 0311 2658311 15 Fax: 98 0311 2679097 **Justification:** Jelvesazan Company is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2012 Jelvesazan intended to supply controlled vacuum pumps to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).

100. **Name:** Iran Aluminium Company
Address: Arak Road Km 5, Tehran Road, 38189-8116, Arak, Iran Tel: 98 861 4130430 Fax: 98 861 413023 Website: www.iralco.net **Justification:** The Iran Aluminium Company (aka IRALCO, Iranian Aluminium Company) is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of mid-2012 IRALCO had a contract to supply aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
101. **Name:** Simatec Development Company
Justification: Simatec Development Company is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2010 Simatec was contracted by UN-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to procure Vacon inverters to power uranium enrichment centrifuges. As of mid-2012 Simatec was attempting to procure EU-controlled inverters.
102. **Name:** Aluminat
Address: 1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory) 2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran Tel: 98 212 2049216 / 22049928 / 22045237 Fax: 98 21 22057127 Website: www.aluminat.com
Justification: Aluminat is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. In early 2012 Aluminat had a contract to supply 6061-T6 aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
103. **Name:** Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND)
Justification: The Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) directly supports Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The IAEA has identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran's nuclear programme. SPND was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi and is part of the Ministry of Defence For Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) designated by the EU.
104. Aufgehoben
105. **Name:** Sharif University of Technology
Address: Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, Iran, Tel. +98 21 66 161 Email: info@sharif.ir
Justification: Sharif University of Technology (SUT) has a number of cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations which are designated by the UN and/or the EU and which operate in military or military-related fields, particularly in the field of ballistic missile production and procurement. This includes: an agreement with the EU-designated Aerospace Industries Organisation for, inter alia, the production of satellites; cooperating with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on smart boat competitions; a broader agreement with the IRGC Air Force which covers deve-

loping and strengthening the University's relations, organisational and strategic cooperation.

Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitutes support to the Government of Iran.

Anhang 7²³

(Art. 8 Abs. 1, 11 Abs. 1 und 3 sowie 12 Bst. b)

Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (Beschluss 2011/235/GASP)

A. Natürliche Personen

| | Name | Identifizierungs- informationen | Gründe |
|----|--------------------------------|---|---|
| 1. | AHMADI-MOQ- ADDAM Esmail | POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1961 Gender: male | Director of the University and the Higher National Defence Research Institute since 20 September 2021. Former Senior Advisor for Security Affairs to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. Chief of Iran's National Police from 2005 until early 2015. Also Head of the Iranian Cyber Police (EU-listed) from January 2011 until early 2015. Forces under his command led brutal attacks on peaceful protests and a violent night-time attack on the dormitories of Tehran University on 15 June 2009. Former head of Iran's Headquarters in support of the Yemeni People. |
| 2. | ALLAHKARAM Hos- sein | POB: Najafabad (Iran) DOB: 1945 Gender: male | Head of Ansar-e Hezbollah Coordination Council and former general in the IRGC. He co-founded Ansar-e Hezbollah. This paramilitary force was responsible for extreme violence during crackdown against students and universities in 1999, 2002 and 2009. He maintains his senior role in an organisation which is ready to commit human rights violations against the public, including promoting aggression against women for their choice of clothing. |

| | | | |
|----|---|--|--|
| 3. | ARAGHI (ERAGHI) Abdollah | Gender: male Title: Brigadier-General | Brigadier-General in the IRGC. Head of the Security Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Former Deputy Head of IRGC's Ground Forces. He had a direct and personal responsibility in the crackdown of protests all through the summer of 2009. |
| 4. | FAZLI Ali | Gender: male Title: Brigadier-General | Former Chief of the Imam Hossein Cadet College (2018-June 2020). Former deputy Commander of the Basij (2009-2018), Head of the IRGC's Seyyed al-Shohada Corps, Tehran Province (until February 2010). The Seyyed al-Shohada Corps is in charge of security in Tehran province and played a key role in the brutal repression of protesters in 2009. |
| 5. | JAFARI Mohammad-Ali (a.k.a. "Aziz Jafari") | POB: Yazd (Iran) DOB: 1.9.1957 Gender: male | Director of the Hazrat-e Baqiatollah Social and Cultural Base. Former Commander of the IRGC (September 2007 - April 2019). IRGC and the Sarollah Base commanded by General Mohammad-Ali (Aziz) Jafari have played a key role in illegally interfering with the 2009 Presidential Elections, arresting and detaining political activists, as well as clashing with protestors in the streets. |
| 6. | KHALILI Ali | Gender: male | IRGC General, in a senior role within the Sarollah Base. He signed a letter sent to the Ministry of Health June 26, 2009 forbidding the submission of documents or medical records to anyone injured or hospitalized during post-elections events. |
| 7. | MOTLAGH Bahram Hosseini | Gender: male | Member of the teaching staff of Imam Hossein University (Guardians of the Revolution). Former Head of the Army Command and General Staff College (DAFOOS). Former Head of the IRGC's Seyyed al-Shohada Corps, Tehran Province. The Seyyed al-Shohada Corps played a key role in organising the repression of protests in 2009. |

| | | | |
|-----|-------------------------|--|---|
| 8. | NAQDI Mohammad-Reza | POB: Najaf (Iraq) DOB: Circa 1952 Gender: male Title: Brigadier- General | Deputy Coordinator of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Former Deputy Chief of the IRGC for cultural and social affairs. Former Commander of the Basij (2009-2016). As commander of the IRGC's Basij Forces, Naqdi was responsible for or complicit in Basij abuses occurring in late 2009, including the violent response to the December 2009 Ashura Day protests, which resulted in up to 15 deaths and the arrests of hundreds of protesters. Prior to his appointment as commander of the Basij in October 2009, Naqdi was the head of the intelligence unit of the Basij responsible for interrogating those arrested during the post-election crackdown. |
| 9. | RADAN Ahmad-Reza | POB: Isfahan (Iran) DOB: 1963 Gender: male | Head of the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Iranian Law Enforcement Force, a body linked to the National Police. Deputy Chief of Iran's National Police until June 2014. As Deputy Chief of National Police from 2008, Radan was responsible for beatings, murder, and arbitrary arrests and detentions against protesters that were committed by the police forces. Currently IRGC commander in charge of training Iraqi "anti-terrorist" forces. |
| 10. | RAJABZADEH Azizollah | Gender: male | Commander of the Urban Order Headquarters since 2014. Former Head of Tehran Disaster Mitigation Organisation (2010-2013). As Head of Tehran Police until January 2010, he was responsible for violent police attacks on protesters and students. As Commander of the Law Enforcement Forces in the Greater Tehran, he was the highest ranking accused in the case of abuses in Kahrizak Detention Centre in December 2009. |
| 11. | SAJEDI-NIA Hossein | Gender: male | Police Operations Deputy Commander. Former head of Tehran Police, former Deputy Chief of Iran's National Police responsible for Police Operations. He is in charge of coordinating, for the Ministry of Interior, |

| | | | |
|-----|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| | | | repression operations in the Iranian capital. |
| 12. | TAEB Hossein | POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1963 Gender: male | Head of the IRGC intelligence organisation since October 2009. His responsibilities were expanded in May 2019 with the merging the Office of the Deputy of Strategic Intelligence of the IRGC and the IRGC's Intelligence Organization. Commander of the Basij until October 2009. Forces under his command participated in mass beatings, murders, detentions and tortures of peaceful protestors. |
| 13. | SHARIATI Seyed Hassan | Gender: male | Advisor and Member of the 28th Section of the Supreme Court. Head of Mashhad Judiciary until September 2014. Trials under his supervision have been conducted summarily and inside closed sessions, without adherence to basic rights of the accused, and with reliance on confessions extracted under pressure and torture. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures. |
| 14. | DORRI-NADJAFABADI Ghorban-Ali | POB: Najafabad (Iran) DOB: 3.12.1950 Gender: male | Member of the Assembly of Experts and representative of the Supreme Leader in Markazi ("Central") Province and Head of the Supreme Administrative Court. Prosecutor General of Iran until September 2009, as well as former Intelligence Minister under Khatami presidency. As Prosecutor General of Iran, he ordered and supervised the show trials following the first post-election protests, where the accused were denied their rights and access to an attorney. |
| 15. | Aufgehoben | | |
| 16. | SOLTANI Hodjatoleslam Seyed Mohammad | Gender: male | Head of the Organisation for Islamic Propaganda in the province of Khorasan-Razavi. Judge, Mashhad Revolutionary Court until 2013. Trials under his jurisdiction have been conducted summarily and inside closed session, without adherence to basic |

| | | | |
|-----|---|---|--|
| | | | rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures. |
| 17. | HEYDARIFAR Ali-Akbar | Gender: male | Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court. He participated in protesters trials. He was questioned by the judiciary about Kahrizak abuses. He was instrumental in issuing detention orders to consign detainees to Kahrizak Detention Centre in 2009. In November 2014, his role in the deaths of detainees was officially recognised by the Iranian authorities. |
| 18. | JAFARI-DOLATABADI Abbas | POB: Yazd (Iran) DOB: 1953 Gender: male | Advisor to the Supreme Disciplinary Court of judges since 29 April 2019. Former Prosecutor General of Tehran (August 2009-April 2019). Dolatabadi's office indicted a large number of protesters, including individuals who took part in the December 2009 Ashura Day protests. He ordered the closure of Karroubi's office in September 2009 and the arrest of several reformist politicians, and he banned two reformist political parties in June 2010. His office charged protesters with 'Muharebeh', or 'enmity against God', which carries the death penalty, and denied due process to those facing the death penalty. His office also targeted and arrested reformists, human rights activists and members of the media, as part of a broad crackdown on the political opposition. In October 2018 he announced to the media that four detained Iranian environmental activists were to be charged with 'sowing corruption on earth', a charge which carries the death penalty. |
| 19. | MOGHISSEH Mohammad (a.k.a. NAS-SERIAN) | Gender: male | Judge at the Supreme Court since November 2020. Former head of Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 28. Also considered responsible for condemnations of members of the Baha'i community. He has dealt with post-election cases. He issued long |

| | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|
| | | | prison sentences during unfair trials of social and political activists and journalists, and several death sentences for protesters and social and political activists. |
| 20. | MOHSENI-EJEI Gholam-Hossein | POB: Ejiyeh (Iran) DOB: circa 1956 Gender: male | Chief of Justice since July 2021. Member of the Expediency Council. Prosecutor General of Iran from September 2009 until 2014. Former Deputy Head of the Judiciary (2014 until July 2021) and spokesperson of the Judiciary (2010-2019). Intelligence Minister from 2005 until 2009. While he was Intelligence Minister during the 2009 elections, intelligence agents under his command were responsible for the detention and torture of, and the extraction of false confessions under pressure from, hundreds of activists, journalists, dissidents and reformist politicians. In addition, political figures were coerced into making false confessions under unbearable interrogation, which included torture, abuse, blackmail and the threatening of family members. |
| 21. | MORTAZAVI Said (a.k.a. MORTAZAVI Saeed) | POB: Meybod, Yazd (Iran) DOB: 1967 Gender: male | Head of the Welfare System from 2011 to 2013. Prosecutor General of Tehran until August 2009. As Prosecutor General of Tehran, he issued a blanket order used for the detention of hundreds of activists, journalists and students. In January 2010, a parliamentary investigation held him directly responsible for the detention of three prisoners who subsequently died in custody. He was suspended from office in August 2010 after an investigation by the Iranian judiciary into his role in the deaths of the three men detained on his orders following the election. In November 2014, his role in the deaths of detainees was officially recognised by the Iranian authorities. He was acquitted by an Iranian Court on 19 August 2015, on charges connected to the torture and deaths of three young men at the Kahrizak detention centre in 2009. Sentenced |

| | | | |
|-----|---|--------------|---|
| | | | to prison in 2017 and released in September 2019. In August 2021, Iran's Supreme Court issued a ruling in full support of Said Mortazavi, overturning his earlier two-year jail sentence. |
| 22. | PIR-ABASSI Abbas | Gender: male | Magistrate of a Criminal chamber. Former Judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters. |
| 23. | MORTAZAVI Amir | Gender: male | Deputy head of the Unit for Social Affairs and Crime Prevention at the judiciary in the province of Khorasan-Razavi. Deputy Prosecutor of Mashhad until at least 2015. Trials under his prosecution have been conducted summarily and inside closed session, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures. |
| 24. | SALAVATI Abdolghassem | Gender: male | Judge of the Special Court for Financial Crimes, branch 4 since 2019. Former Head of Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 15. Committing Judge in the Tehran Tribunal. In charge of the post-election cases, he was the Judge presiding over the 'show trials' in summer 2009, he condemned to death two monarchists that appeared in the show trials. He has sentenced more than a hundred political prisoners, human rights activists and demonstrators to lengthy prison sentences. In 2018, reports showed that he continued to hand down similar sentences without proper observance of fair hearing procedures. |
| 25. | SHARIFI Malek Adjar (aka: SHARIFI Malek Ajdar) | Gender: male | Judge at the Supreme Court, head of the 43rd section. Former Head of East Azerbaidjan Judiciary. He was |

| | | | |
|-----|---|--------------|---|
| | | | responsible for Sakineh Mohammadi-Ashtiani's trial. |
| 26. | Aufgehoben | | |
| 27. | YASAGHI Ali-Akbar | Gender: male | Judge at the Supreme Court, head of the 13th section. Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Setad-e Dieh Foundation. Chief Judge, Mashhad Revolutionary Court (2001-2011). Trials under his jurisdiction have been conducted summarily and in closed sessions, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse (up to 550 between summer 2009 and summer 2011), death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures. |
| 28. | BOZORGNIA Mostafa | Gender: male | Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison. He unleashed on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners. |
| 29. | ESMAILI Gholam-Hossein (a.k.a. ESMAILI Gholam Hossein) | Gender: male | Chief of Staff of Iranian President Raisi since August 2021. Judiciary spokesman from April 2019 until July 2021. Former head of the Tehran Judiciary. Former Head of Iran's Prisons Organisation. In this capacity, he was complicit in the massive detention of political protesters and covering up of abuses performed in the jailing system. |
| 30. | SEDAQAT (a.k.a. Sedaghat) Farajollah | Gender: male | Assistant Secretary of the General Prison Administration in Tehran. Head of Evin's prison, Tehran until October 2010 during which time torture took place. He was warden, and threatened and exerted pressure on prisoners numerous times. |
| 31. | ZANJIREI Mohammad-Ali | Gender: male | As Senior advisor to Head, and Deputy Head of Iran's Prisons Organisation, responsible for serious human rights violations against prisoners. Administered a system in which prisoners suffered abuse, torture and inhuman/degrading treatment and were accommodated in very poor living conditions. |

| | | | |
|-----|-----------------------------|--------------|--|
| 32. | ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI Mahmoud | Gender: male | <p>Member of Parliament (since February 2020) and Speaker of the Parliament's Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs. Former Advisor to Iran's High Council for Human Rights (until 2019). Former secretary of the High Council for Human Rights. Former Governor of Ilam Province. Former Political Director of the Interior Ministry. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups, he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties.</p> <p>In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mousavi - the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organisation. From 2009 onwards, he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, therefore denying a constitutional right to protest and leading to many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention of the right to freedom of assembly.</p> <p>In 2009, he also denied the opposition a permit for a ceremony to mourn people killed in protests over the Presidential elections.</p> |
| 33. | AKBARSHAHI Ali-Reza | Gender: male | <p>Former Director-General of Iran's Drug Control Headquarters (a.k.a. Anti-Narcotics Headquarters). Former Commander of Tehran Police. Under his leadership, the police force was responsible for the use of extrajudicial force on suspects during arrest and pre-trial detention. The Tehran police were also implicated in raids on Tehran university dorms in June 2009 when, according to an Iranian Majlis commission, more than 100 students were injured by the police and Basiji. Until 2018, head of the railway police.</p> |
| 34. | AKHARIAN Hassan | Gender: male | <p>Head of Ward 5 and in charge of solitary confinement in EU-listed Rajae</p> |

| | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|
| | | | Shahr Prison since 2015; formerly Keeper of Ward 1 of Rajae Shahr Prison, Karadj until July 2010. Several former detainees have denounced his use of torture, as well as orders he gave to prevent inmates receiving medical assistance. According to a transcript of one reported detainee in the Rajae Shahr Prison, wardens all beat him severely, with Akharian's full knowledge. There is also at least one reported case of ill treatment and the death of a detainee, Mohsen Beikvand, under Akharian's wardenship. Beikvand died in September 2010. Other prisoners claim credibly that he was killed on the instructions of Hassan Akharian. |
| 35. | AVAE Seyyed Ali-Reza (a.k.a. AVAE Seyyed Alireza, AVAIE Alireza) | POB: Dezful (Iran) DOB: 20.5.1956 Gender: male | Minister of Justice until 25 August 2021. Former Director of the special investigations office. Deputy Minister of the Interior and Head of the Public Register until July 2016. Advisor to the Disciplinary Court for Judges in April 2014. Former President of the Tehran Judiciary. As President of the Tehran Judiciary, he has been responsible for human rights violations, arbitrary arrests, denials of prisoners' rights and a high number of executions. |
| 36. | BANESHI Jaber | Gender: male | Head of Branch 22 of the Appeals Court of Shiraz from November 2011. Prosecutor of Shiraz until October 2011. Prosecutor during the Shiraz bombing case in 2008, which was used by the regime to sentence to death other unconnected persons. He has pursued capital charges and other severe penalties against minorities, such as to constitute, inter alia, a violation of their human rights to fair trial and freedom from arbitrary detention. |
| 37. | Aufgehoben | | |
| 38. | GANJI Mostafa Barzegar | Gender: male | General Director of Inspection Supervision and Performance Evaluation of Courts since June 2020. Former Prosecutor General of Qom |

| | | | |
|-----|----------------------|--|---|
| | | | (2008-2017) and former Head of the Directorate-General for prisons. He was responsible for the arbitrary detention and maltreatment of dozens of offenders in Qom. He was complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to the excessive and increasing use of the death penalty and a sharp increase in executions in 2009/2010. |
| 39. | HABIBI Mohammad Reza | Gender: male | Chief Justice of Isfahan. Former Attorney General of Isfahan. Former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. Former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan. Complicit in proceedings denying defendants a fair trial - such as Abdollah Fathi, executed in May 2011 after his right to be heard and mental health issues were ignored by Habibi during his trial in March 2010. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a sharp increase in executions in 2011. |
| 40. | Aufgehoben | | |
| 41. | JAVANI Yadollah | Gender: male | IRGC deputy commander for political affairs. Has made numerous attempts to suppress free speech and free discourse through his public statements supporting the arrest and punishment of protesters and dissenters. One of the first high-ranking officials to demand in 2009 Moussavi, Karroubi and Khatami's arrest. Has supported the use of techniques that breach rights to a fair trial including public confessions and he has released the contents of interrogations before trial. Evidence also indicates that he has condoned the use of violence against protesters and as an integral member of the IRGC he is highly likely to have been aware of the use of harsh interrogation techniques to force confessions. |
| 42. | JAZAYERI Massoud | Gender: male Title: Brigadier-General | Cultural advisor to the Joint Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces since April 2018. Within the joint military staff of Iran's Armed Forces, |

| | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|
| | | | <p>Brigadier-General Massoud Jazayeri was the Deputy Chief of Staff for cultural and media affairs (a.k.a. State Defence Publicity HQ). He actively collaborated in the repression of 2009 protests as Deputy Chief of Staff. He warned in a Kayhan interview that many protesters inside and outside Iran had been identified and would be dealt with at the right time. He has openly called for the suppression of foreign mass media outlets and the Iranian opposition. In 2010, he asked the government to pass tougher laws against Iranians who cooperate with foreign media sources.</p> |
| 43. | JOKAR Mohammad Saleh | <p>POB: Yazd (Iran) DOB: 1957 Gender: male</p> | <p>Member of Parliament for the Province of Yazd. Former Deputy for Parliamentary Affairs of the Revolutionary Guards. From 2011 to 2016, parliamentary deputy for the Province of Yazd and Member of the Parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy. Former Commander of Student Basij Forces. In this role, he was actively involved in suppressing protests and indoctrinating children and young people with a view to continuing suppression of free speech and dissent. As Member of the Parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy, he publically supported the suppression of opposition to the government.</p> |
| 44. | KAMALIAN Behrouz (a.k.a. Hackers Brain, Behrooz_Ice) | <p>POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1983 Gender: male</p> | <p>Head of the 'Ashiyaneh' cyber group linked with the Iranian regime. The 'Ashiyaneh' Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for intensive cyber attacks both on domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. Kamalian's 'Ashiyaneh' organisation's work has assisted the regime's crackdown against the opposition, which has involved numerous serious human rights violations in 2009. Both Kamalian and the 'Ashiyaneh' cyber group</p> |

| | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|
| | | | have continued their activities until at least December 2021. |
| 45. | KHALILOLLAHI Mousa (a.k.a. KHALILOLLAHI Mousa, ELAHI Mousa Khalil) | POB: Tabriz (Iran) DOB: 1963 Gender: male | Chief of Justice of East Azerbaijan province. Former prosecutor of Tabriz from 2010 to 2019. He was involved in Sakineh Mohammadi-Ashtiani's case and is complicit in grave violations of the right to due process. |
| 46. | MAHSOULI Sadeq (a.k.a. MAHSULI Sadeq) | POB: Oroumieh (Iran) DOB: 1959/1960 Gender: male | Deputy Secretary-General of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability). Former Advisor to Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former member of the Expediency Council and former Deputy Chief of the Perseverance Front. Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011. Minister of the Interior until August 2009. As Minister of the Interior, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plain-clothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli's control. |
| 47. | MALEKI Mojtaba | Gender: male | Deputy head of the Ministry of Justice in the Khorasan Razavi province. Former prosecutor of Kermanshah. Has played a role in the high number of death sentences being passed in Iran, including prosecuting the cases of seven prisoners convicted of drug trafficking who were hanged on the same day on 3 January 2010 in Kermanshah's central prison. |
| 48. | OMIDI Mehrdad (aka: Reza; OMIDI Reza) | Gender: male | Head of section VI of the police, investigation department. Former Head of the Intelligence Services within the Iranian Police. Former Head of the Computer Crimes Unit of the Iranian Police. He was respon- |

| | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| | | | sible for thousands of investigations and indictments of reformists and political opponents using the Internet. He was thus responsible for grave human rights violations in the repression of persons who speak out in defence of their legitimate rights, including freedom of expression during and after the 2009 Green Movement. |
| 49. | SALARKIA Mahmoud | Gender: male Former director of Tehran Football Club "Persepolis" | Former Head of the Petrol and Transport commission of the City of Tehran. Deputy to the Prosecutor-General of Tehran for Prison Affairs during the crackdown of 2009. As Deputy to the Prosecutor-General of Tehran for Prison Affairs he was directly responsible for many of the arrest warrants against innocent, peaceful protesters and activists. Many reports from human rights defenders show that virtually all those arrested were, on his instruction, held incommunicado without access to their lawyer or families, and without charge, for varying lengths of time, often in conditions amounting to enforced disappearance. Their families have often not been notified of the arrest. He is currently working as a lawyer. |
| 50. | KHODAEI SOURI Hojatollah | POB: Selseleh (Iran) DOB: 1964 Gender: male | Member of the National Security and Foreign policy Committee. Parliamentary deputy for Lorestan Province. Member of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign and Security Policy. Head of Evin prison until 2012. Torture was a common practice in Evin prison while Sourì was its head. In Ward 209, many activists were held for their peaceful activities in opposition to the ruling government. |
| 51. | TALA Hossein (a.k.a. TALA Hosseyn) | POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1969 Gender: male | Mayor of Eslamshahr until 2020. Former Iranian MP. Former Governor-General ('Farmandar') of Tehran Province until September 2010, he was responsible for the intervention of police forces and therefore for the repression of demons- |

| | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|
| | | | trations. He received a prize in December 2010 for his role in the post-election repression. |
| 52. | TAMADDON Morteza (a.k.a. TAMADON Morteza) | POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan (Iran) DOB: 1959 Gender: male | Former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as Governor and Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bore overall responsibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran Province, including cracking down on political protests since June 2009. Currently board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology. |
| 53. | ZEBHI Hossein | Gender: male | First Deputy Advisor to the Judiciary and Judge of the Supreme Court (head of Branch 41 of the Supreme Court, dealing in particular with security offences and drugs). Deputy to the Prosecutor-General of Iran (2007-2015). In this role, he was responsible for judicial cases brought after the post-election protests in 2009, which were conducted in contravention of human rights. Also in this role, he has condoned excessive punishments for drug offences. |
| 54. | BAHRAMI Mohammad-Kazem | Gender: male | Head of the administrative justice court until April 2021. He was complicit in the repression of peaceful demonstrators in 2009 as head of the judiciary branch of the armed forces. |
| 55. | HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz (a.k.a. Aziz Hajmohammadi, Noorollah Azizmohammadi) | POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1948 Gender: male | Judge at the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Working for the judiciary since 1971, he was involved in several trials of demonstrators, inter alia, that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities. |
| 56. | BAGHERI Mohammad-Bagher | Gender: male | Judge at the Supreme court since December 2015. Former vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June |

| | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|
| | | | 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, about 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers being notified. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a high number of death sentences. |
| 57. | BAKHTIARI Seyyed Morteza | POB: Mashhad (Iran) DOB: 1952 Gender: male | President of the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (since July 2019). Former deputy custodian of Imam Reza shrine. Former Official of the Special Clerical Tribunal. Former Minister of Justice from 2009 to 2013. During his time as Minister of Justice, prison conditions within Iran fell well below accepted international standards, and there was widespread mistreatment of prisoners. In addition, he played a key role in threatening and harassing the Iranian diaspora by announcing the establishment of a special court to deal specifically with Iranians who live outside the country. He also oversaw a sharp increase in the number of executions in Iran, including secret executions not announced by the government, and executions for drug-related offences. |
| 58. | HOSSEINI Dr Mohammad (a.k.a. HOSSEYNI Dr Seyyed Mohammad; Seyyed, Sayyed and Sayyid) | POB: Rafsanjan, Kerman (Iran) DOB: 23.7.1961 Gender: male | Vice-president for parliamentary affairs under President Raisi since August 2021. Former advisor to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and spokesperson for YEKTA, a hard-line political faction. Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (2009-2013). Ex-IRGC, he was complicit in the repression of journalists. |
| 59. | MOSLEHI Heydar (Aka: MOSLEHI Heidar; MOSLEHI Haidar) | POB: Isfahan (Iran) DOB: 1956 Gender: male | Representative of the Ideological-Political Bureau of the Commander in Chief of Iran's Armed Forces (since 2018). Former advisor of Supreme Jurisprudence in the IRGC. Head of the organisation for publications on the role of the clergy at war. Former Minister of Intelligence |

| | | | |
|-----|------------------------|---|--|
| | | | (2009-2013). Under his leadership, the Ministry of Intelligence continued the practices of widespread arbitrary detention and persecution of protesters and dissidents. The Ministry of Intelligence runs Ward 209 of Evin Prison, where many activists have been held on account of their peaceful activities in opposition to the government in power. Interrogators from the Ministry of Intelligence have subjected prisoners in Ward 209 to beatings and mental and sexual abuse. |
| 60. | ZARGHAMI Ezzatollah | POB: Dezful (Iran) DOB: 22.7.1959 Gender: male | Minister of Culture, Crafts and Tourism since 25 August 2021. Member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council and Cultural Revolution Council since 2014. Former Head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) until November 2014. Under his tenure at IRIB, He was responsible for all programming decisions. IRIB has broadcast forced confessions of detainees and a series of 'show trials' in August 2009 and December 2011. These constitute a clear violation of international provisions on fair trial and the right to due process. |
| 61. | TAGHIPOUR Reza | POB: Maragheh (Iran) DOB: 1957 Gender: male | Member of the 11th Iranian parliament (Tehran constituency). Member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council. Former Member of the City Council of Teheran. Former Minister for Information and Communications (2009-2012). As Minister for Information, he was one of the top officials in charge of censorship and control of internet activities and also all types of communications (in particular mobile phones). During interrogations of political detainees, the interrogators make use of the detainees' personal data, mail and communications. On several occasions following the 2009 presidential election and during street demonstrations, mobile lines and text messaging were blocked, satellite TV channels were jammed and the |

| | | | |
|-----|----------------|---|--|
| | | | internet locally suspended or at least slowed down. |
| 62. | KAZEMI Toraj | Gender: male | Chief of the Greater Tehran division of the EU-designated Cyber Police until June 2020. In this capacity, he announced a campaign for the recruitment of government hackers in order to achieve better control of information on the internet and attack 'dangerous' sites. |
| 63. | LARIJANI Sadeq | POB: Najaf (Iraq) DOB: 1960 or August 1961 Gender: male | Head of the Expediency Council since 29 December 2018. Former member of the Guardian Council (until September 2021). Former Head of the Judiciary (2009-2019). The Head of the Judiciary is required to consent to and sign off every qisas (retribution), hodoud (crimes against God) and ta'zirat (crimes against the state) punishment. This includes sentences carrying the death penalty, floggings and amputations. In this regard, he has personally signed off numerous death penalty sentences, contravening international standards, including stoning, executions by suspension strangulation, execution of juveniles, and public executions such as those where prisoners have been hanged from bridges in front of crowds of thousands. Therefore, he has contributed to a high number of executions. He has also permitted corporal punishment sentences such as amputations and the dripping of acid into the eyes of the convicted. Since Sadeq Larijani took office, arbitrary arrests of political prisoners, human rights defenders and minorities have increased markedly. Sadeq Larijani also bears responsibility for systemic failures in the Iranian judicial process with respect to the right to a fair trial. |
| 64. | MIRHEJAZI Ali | Gender: male | Part of the Supreme Leader's inner circle, one of those responsible for planning the suppression of protests, which has been implemented since 2009, and associated with those responsible for suppressing the protests. |

| | | | |
|-----|------------------------|--|--|
| | | | He was also responsible for planning the suppression of public unrest in December 2017/2018 and November 2019. |
| 65. | SAEEDI Ali | Gender: male | Head of the Supreme Leader's political ideology bureau. Former representative of the Supreme Leader for the Pasdaran (1995-2020) after spending his whole career within the institution of the military, and specifically in the Pasdaran intelligence service. This official role made him the key figure in the transmission of orders emanating from the Office of the Supreme Leader to the Pasdaran's repression apparatus. |
| 66. | RAMIN Mohammad-Ali | POB: Dezful (Iran) DOB: 1954 Gender: male | Secretary-general of the World Holocaust Foundation, established at the International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust in 2006, which Ramin was responsible for organising on behalf of the Iranian Government. Main figure responsible for censorship as Vice-Minister in charge of the Press up to December 2013, being directly responsible for the closure of many reforming newspapers (Etemad, Etemad-e Melli, Shargh, etc.), closure of the Independent Press Syndicate and the intimidation or arrest of journalists. |
| 67. | MORTAZAVI Seyyed Solat | POB: Farsan, Tchar Mahal-o-Bakhtiari (South) - (Iran) DOB: 1967 Gender: male | Since 5 September 2021, Vice-President for Executive Affairs of Iran and Head of the Presidential Office. Head of the real estate branch of the Mostazafan Foundation, which was directly run by Supreme Leader Khamenei from 16 September 2019 until September 2021. Until November 2019, Director of the Tehran branch of the Foundation Astan Qods Razavi. Former mayor of the second largest city of Iran, Mashhad, where public executions are regularly carried out. Former Deputy Interior Minister for Political Affairs, appointed in 2009. In that capacity, he was responsible for directing the repression of persons who spoke up |

| | | | |
|-----|--------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| | | | in defence of their legitimate rights, including freedom of expression. Later appointed as Head of the Iranian Election Committee for the parliamentary elections in 2012 and for the presidential elections in 2013. |
| 68. | FARHADI Ali | Gender: male | Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Former prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty was handed down. There were a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor. |
| 69. | REZVANMA-NESH Ali | Gender: male | Deputy prosecutor in the province of Karaj, region of Alborz in the period 2010-2016. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including involvement in the execution of a juvenile. |
| 70. | RAMEZANI Gholam-hosseini | Gender: male | Since 2011 Chief of the Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence; from November 2009 to March 2011: Commander of Intelligence of the Pasdaran; from March 2008 to November 2009: Deputy Commander of Intelligence of the Pasdaran; from April 2006 to March 2008: Head of Protection and Intelligence of the Pasdaran. Involved in the suppression of freedom of expression, including by being associated with those responsible for the arrests of bloggers/journalists in 2004, and reported to have had a role in the suppression of the post-election protests in 2009. |
| 71. | SADEGHI Mohamed | Gender: male | Colonel and Deputy of IRGC technical and cyber intelligence and in charge of the centre of analysis and fight against organised crime within the Pasdaran. Responsible for the arrests and torture of bloggers/journalists. |
| 72. | JAFARI Reza | DOB: 1967 Gender: male | Advisor to the Disciplinary Court for Judges since 2012. Member of the |

| | | | |
|-----|------------------------------|--------------|--|
| | | | "Committee for Determining Criminal Web Content", a body responsible for web sites and social media censorship. Former Head of special prosecution of cyber crime between 2007 and 2012. Was responsible for the repression of freedom of expression, including through the arrest, detention and prosecution of bloggers and journalists. Persons arrested on suspicion of cyber crime were mistreated and the subject of an unfair judicial process. |
| 73. | RESHTE-AHMADI Bahram | Gender: male | Judge of an ordinary court of northern Tehran. Former Supervisor of Public Prosecution Office in Tehran. Deputy Head of the Office of Prison Affairs of Tehran Province. Former Deputy Prosecutor in Tehran until 2013. He ran Evin prosecution centre. Was responsible for the denial of rights, including visits and other prisoner's rights, to human rights defenders and political prisoners. |
| 74. | RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf | Gender: male | Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education of Tehran Prisons. Former head of Evin Prison (2012-2015). During his tenure, conditions in the prison deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in protest of the violation of their rights and violent treatment by prison guards. |
| 75. | KIASATI Morteza | Gender: male | Judge of branch 54 of the Revolutionary Court of Tehran and of the Ahwaz Revolutionary Court, Branch 4; imposed death sentences on four Arab political prisoners, Taha Heidarian, Abbas Heidarian, Abd al-Rahman Heidarian (three brothers) and Ali Sharifi. They were arrested, tortured and hanged without due process. These cases and the lack of due process were referenced in a report dated 13 September 2012 by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, the UN |

| | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|
| | | | Secretary General's report on Iran of 22 August 2012. |
| 76. | MOUSSAVI Seyed Mohammad Bagher | Gender: male | Ahwaz Revolutionary Court judge, Branch 2, imposed death sentences on five Ahwazi Arabs, Mohammad Ali Amouri, Hashem Sha'bani Amouri, Hadi Rashedi, Sayed Jaber Alboshoka, Sayed Mokhtar Alboshoka, on 17 March 2012 for "activities against national security" and "enmity against God". The sentences were upheld by Iran's Supreme Court on 9 January 2013. The five were arrested without charge for over a year, tortured and sentenced without due process. |
| 77. | SARAFRAZ Mohammad (Dr.) (a.k.a. Haj-agma Sarafraz) | POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: circa 1963 Place of residence: Tehran Gender: male | Former member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council. Former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) (2014-2016). Former Head of IRIB World Service and Press TV, responsible for all programming decisions. Closely associated with the state security apparatus. Under his direction, Press TV, along with IRIB, has worked with the Iranian security services and prosecutors to broadcast forced confessions of detainees, including that of Iranian-Canadian journalist and filmmaker Maziar Bahari, in the weekly programme 'Iran Today'. Independent broadcast regulator OFCOM fined Press TV in the UK GBP 100 000 for broadcasting Bahari's confession in 2011, which was filmed in prison whilst Bahari was under duress. Sarafraz is therefore associated with violating the right to due process and fair trial. |
| 78. | JAFARI Asadollah | Gender: male | Currently Attorney General in Isfahan. In this position, he ordered violent reactions against protesters who took to the streets in November 2021 to protest against water shortages. According to some reports, Jafari has announced the formation of a special office to investigate the arrested protesters. |

| | | | |
|-----|--|---|--|
| | | | As former Prosecutor of Mazandaran Province, Jafari recommended the imposition of the death penalty in cases he has prosecuted, which has resulted in many executions including public executions, and in circumstances where the imposition of the death penalty is contrary to international human rights, including by being disproportionate and excessive punishment. Jafari has also been responsible for illegal arrests and violations of the rights of Baha'i detainees from initial arrest to keeping them in solitary confinement in the Intelligence Detention Centre. |
| 79. | EMADI Hamid Reza (a.k.a. Hamidreza Emadi) | POB: Hamedan (Iran) DOB: circa 1973 Place of residence: Tehran Place of work: Press TV HQ, Tehran Gender: male | Press TV Newsroom Director. Former Press TV Senior Producer. Responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists and persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process. Independent broadcast regulator OFCOM fined Press TV in the UK GBP 100 000 for broadcasting the forced confession of Iranian-Canadian journalist and film-maker Maziar Bahari in 2011, which was filmed in prison whilst Bahari was under duress. NGOs have reported further instances of forced televised confessions by Press TV. Emadi is therefore associated with violating the right to due process and fair trial. |
| 80. | HAMLEBAR Rahim | Gender: male | Judge of Branch 1 of Tabriz Revolutionary Court. Responsible for heavy sentences against Azeri ethnic minority and workers' rights activists, accusing them of spying, acts against national security, propaganda against the Iranian regime and insulting the leader of Iran. A high profile case involved 20 volunteer earthquake relief workers (following an earthquake in Iran in August 2012) to whom he gave prison sentences for their attempts to assist earthquake |

| | | | |
|-----|-----------------------------|--|---|
| | | | victims. The court found the workers guilty of "collaboration in assembly and collusion to commit crimes against national security." |
| 81. | MUSAVI-TABAR Seyyed Reza | POB: Jahrom (Iran) DOB: 1964 Gender: male | Former head of the Revolutionary Prosecution of Shiraz. Responsible for illegal arrests and ill treatment of political activists, journalists, human rights defenders, Baha'is and prisoners of conscience, who were harassed, tortured, interrogated and denied access to lawyers and due process. Musavi-Tabar signed judicial orders in the notorious No 100 Detention Centre (a male prison), including an order to detain female Baha'i prisoner Raha Sabet for three years in solitary confinement. |
| 82. | KHORAMABADI Abdolsamad | Gender: male | Deputy Director for Judicial Oversight (since 13 October 2018). Former head of the 'Commission to Determine the Instances of Criminal Content', a governmental organisation in charge of online censorship and cyber crime. Under his leadership, the Commission defined 'cyber crime' by a number of vague categories that criminalise creation and publication of content deemed inappropriate by the regime. He was responsible for repression and the blocking of numerous opposition sites, electronic newspapers, blogs, sites of human rights NGOs and of Google and Gmail since September 2012. He and the Commission actively contributed to the death in detention of the blogger Sattar Beheshti in November 2012. Thus the Commission he was heading is directly responsible for systemic violations of human rights, in particular by banning and filtering websites to the general public, and occasionally disabling internet access altogether. |
| 83. | SOLEIMANI Gholamreza | POB: Farsan (Iran) DOB: 1343 (Iranian Hijri | Gholamreza Soleimani is the Head of the Basij Organisation. The Basij Organisation used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and inju- |

| | | | |
|-----|--|---|--|
| | | calendar), 1964 or 1965 (Gregorian calendar) Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Head of the Basij Organisation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) | ries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As Head of the Basij Organisation, Gholamreza Soleimani bears responsibility for the violent suppression of the protests and serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 84. | SALAMI Hossein (a.k.a. SALAMI Hussain) | POB: Vaneshan, Golpayegan (Iran) DOB: 1339 (Iranian Hijri calendar) 1960 or 1961 (Gregorian calendar) Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Rank: Major General | Hossein Salami has been the Commander in Chief of the IRGC since April 2019, which includes the Basij militia, and is a member of the National Security Council. The IRGC's regular forces and the Basij militia used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As a member of the National Security Council, Hossein Salami took part in the sessions that resulted in the orders to use lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests. Hossein Salami therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 85. | KARAMI Hassan | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Commander of the Special Units of the Iranian police force | Hassan Karami is the Commander of the Special Units of the Iranian police force. The Special Units used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As the Commander of the Special Units, which have caused the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians, Hassan Karami bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran. |

| | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|
| 86. | PAKPOUR Mohammad (a.k.a. PAKPUR Mohammad) | POB: Arak (Iran) DOB: 1340 (Iranian Hijri calendar), 1961 (Gregorian calendar) Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolution- ary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Rank: Brigadier General | Mohammad Pakpour has been Com- mander in Chief of the IRGC Ground Forces since March 2010. The IRGC's Ground Forces used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, cau- sing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civi- lians in many cities across the country. As Commander in Chief of the IRGC's Ground Forces, which have used lethal force against unarmed protesters and other civi- lians, Mohammad Pakpour bears res- ponsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 87. | ASHTARI Hossein | POB: Isfahan (a.k.a. Esfahan, Ispahan) Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Com- mander in Chief of the Iranian police force | Hossein Ashtari has been the Com- mander in Chief of the Iranian police force since March 2015 and is a member of the National Security Council. The police force includes the Emdad Units and the Special Units. Iran's ordinary police force, the Emdad Units and the Special Units used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civi- lians in many cities across the country. As a member of the National Security Council, Hossein Ashtari took part in the sessions that resulted in the orders to use lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests. Hossein Ashtari therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 88. | ZIAEI Gholamreza | Gender: male Position: Former Director of Evin Prison; former Director of other detention cen- tres | Between July 2019 and June 2020, Gholamreza Ziaei was the Director of Evin Prison, where already harsh conditions for detainees further dete- riorated during his tenure. Female prisoners were denied phone contact with their children. Political priso- ners were denied weekly visits by relatives, which were only allowed |

| | | | |
|-----|--|---|---|
| | | | every two months. During the 2009 protests, Ziaei was in charge of the Kahrizak Detention Center, where at least five detainees, who had been arrested in connection with Tehran's 2009 mass street protests, died after being tortured. From 2017 to 2019, before taking charge of Evin Prison in Tehran, Ziaei was the director of Rajaei Shahr Prison in Karaj, west of Tehran, where there have been numerous protests by political prisoners against abuse and inhumane living conditions. |
| 89. | SHAHVARPOUR Hassan | POB: Safi Abad, south of Dezful, Khuzestan (Iran) Gender: male Passport number: 2001624001 (national ID number) Position: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Com- mander of Khu- zestan Province Vali Asr Corps Rank: Brigadier General | As the Commander of the IRGC in Khuzestan since 2009, Hassan Shahvarpour is responsible for commanding the forces which used machine guns against protesters and other civilians in the city of Mahshahr during the November 2019 protests. Under his command, 148 people were killed by the IRGC by heavy machine gun fire from armoured vehicles encircling fleeing protesters hiding in nearby marshes. |
| 90. | VASEGHI Leyla (a.k.a. VASEQI Layla, VASEGHI Leila, VASEGHI Layla) | POB: Sari, Mazandaran Province (Iran) DOB: 1352 (Iranian Hijri calendar), 1972 or 1973 (Grego- rian calendar) Gender: female Position: Former governor of Shahr-e Qods and Head of the City Security Council | As the governor of Shahr-e Qods and Head of the City Security Council from September 2019 until November 2021, Leyla Vaseghi ordered the police and other armed forces to use lethal means during the November 2019 protests, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians. As the governor of Shahr-e Qods and Head of the City Security Council, Leyla Vaseghi bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran. |

| | | | |
|-----|--|--|---|
| 91. | <p>ROSTAMI CHESHMEH GACHI Mohammed (a.k.a. ROSTAMI Mohammad)</p> | <p>POB: Kerm- anshah (Iran) DOB: 1976 or 1977 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male National ID No.: 111936 (Iran) Identification No.: 13821 (Iran) Position: Head of Iran's Mora- lity Police</p> | <p>Mohammad Rostami Cheshmeh Gachi is the head of Iran's Morality Police. He was head of the Kerm-anshah Public Security Police from early 2014 until early 2019 and held senior positions in the Iranian intelligence police. The Morality Police is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, excessive violence and torture. On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an 'educational and orientation class'. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented. As head of Iran's Morality Police, Rostami is responsible for the Morality Police's actions. He therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 92. | <p>RAHIMI Hossein</p> | <p>POB: Dodhak village, Mahalat, Central province (Iran) DOB: 1964 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Position: Head of Iran's Law</p> | <p>Brigadier General Hossein Rahimi has been the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Tehran since 7 August 2017. The LEF's response to the September 2022 protests in Tehran was particularly harsh. The LEF's excessive use of violence to repress those protests resulted in the deaths of multiple people. As head of the LEF in Tehran, Rahimi is therefore responsible for</p> |

| | | | |
|-----|---|--|---|
| | | Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Tehran | serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 93. | ABDI Abbas | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Position: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Divandarreh | Colonel Abbas Abdi is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the district of Divandarreh. The LEF's response to the September 2022 protests in Divandarreh was particularly harsh. The LEF's excessive use of violence to repress those protests resulted in the deaths of multiple people. As head of the LEF in Divandarreh, Abdi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 94. | MIRZAEI Haj Ahmad (a.k.a. MIRZAEI Hajahmad; MIRZAYI Hajj Ahmad) | POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 9 February 1957 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Identification No.: 4268935215 (Iran) Rank: Colonel Position: Head of Iran's Morality Police in Tehran | Colonel Haj Ahmed Mirzaei has been the head of the Tehran branch of Iran's Morality Police since 2018. The Morality Police is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, excessive violence and torture. On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an 'educational and orientation class'. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented. As head of the Morality Police in Tehran, Mirzaei is responsible for the Morality Police's actions in Tehran, including in its headquarters where |

| | | | |
|-----|--------------------------|---|---|
| | | | Amini was beaten and mistreated. He therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 95. | ZAREPOUR Issa | <p>POB: Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province (Iran)</p> <p>DOB: 1980</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Minister of Information and Communications Technology</p> | <p>Issa Zarepour has been the Iranian Minister of Information and Communications Technology since 25 August 2021.</p> <p>In his position, he played a key role in the Iranian government's decision to systematically violate the Iranian people's freedom of opinion and expression by imposing restrictions on internet access during the protests that followed the death of 22-year old Mahsa Amini on 16 September 2022. That action further diminished the already very limited space for civil society actors in Iran, including human rights defenders, to gather objective information and communicate, both amongst themselves and with the outside world.</p> <p>The internet blackout had negative consequences for the enjoyment of human rights in Iran, both directly (namely the impact on freedom of opinion and expression and availability of objective information) and indirectly (namely the increased chance of human rights violations not being documented thereby negatively impacting accountability for human rights violations).</p> <p>As Minister of Information and Communications Technology, Zarepour is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 96. | SEPEHR Mohammad-Hosseini | <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Position: Commander of the Iranian Central Training Base of the General Staff of the Armed Forces</p> | <p>Mohammad-Hosseini Sepehr is the Commander of the Central Training Base of the General Staff of the Armed Forces in Tehran. He is a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij Resistance Force (a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the IRGC with branches throughout Iran).</p> |

| | | | |
|-----|---|---|--|
| | | | <p>Sepehr oversees anti-protest training for Iranian security forces and supports a repressive line towards protesters.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 97. | SAFARI Sayd Ali | <p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Position: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Saqqez</p> | <p>Colonel Sayd Ali Safari is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Saqqez.</p> <p>The LEF's response to the September 2022 protests in Saqqez was particularly harsh. The LEF's excessive use of violence to repress the protests resulted in the deaths of multiple people.</p> <p>As head of the LEF in Saqqez, Safari is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 98. | ADYANI Seyed Alireza (a.k.a. ADIANI Hojjat al-Islam Seyyed Alireza) | <p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Head of the ideological-political office of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)</p> | <p>Seyed Alireza Adyani is the head of the ideological-political office of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).</p> <p>Adyani is responsible for defining and implementing rules of engagement for police forces. He stated that the LEF needs to be 'practical' and 'effective' when dealing with adversaries and cheered the Morality Police for doing its job 'intensely'.</p> <p>The LEF has used massive brutality against protesters, including those protesting after Mahsa Amini's death. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 99. | AZADI Ali | <p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Second Brigadier General Function: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Kurdistan</p> | <p>Second Brigadier General Ali Azadi has been the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Kurdistan since 2019.</p> <p>During the repression of the September 2022 protests, forces under his command in Kurdistan shot protesters and killed and injured multiple people.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |

| | | | |
|------|----------------------------|---|--|
| 100. | SHALIKAR Mohammed Zaman | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Babol, Mazan- daran | Colonel Mohammed Zaman Shalikar has been the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Babol, Mazandaran since 2021. During demonstrations following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, forces under his command shot, injured and killed protesters in Babol, Mazandaran. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 101. | HEIDARI Salman | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Bukan | Colonel Salman Heidari is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Bukan. The LEF's response to the September 2022 protests in Bukan was particularly harsh. The LEF's excessive use of violence to repress the protests resulted in the death of at least one child and in injuries to multiple people. As head of the LEF in Bukan, Heidari is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 102. | VAHIDI Ahmad | POB: Shiraz (Iran) DOB: 27 July 1958 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Minister of Interior | Ahmad Vahidi has been the Iranian Minister of Interior since 25 August 2021. As such, he is responsible for Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). Since he took office, an unprecedented number of military and security officials have been appointed to provincial governorships who play key roles in coordinating crowd-control activities by police special forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Blatant and severe human rights violations by the LEF, such as the indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters died and hundreds were seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, |

| | | | |
|------|-------------------------------------|--|---|
| | | | <p>police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Vahidi has also publicly advocated for a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 103. | ABNOUSH Salar | <p>DOB: 2.5.1962 POB: Hamedan, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Deputy Commander of the Basij Resistance Force</p> | <p>Salar Abnoush is the Deputy Commander of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed).</p> <p>The Basij is a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the IRGC with branches throughout Iran. It is charged with channelling popular support for the Iranian regime.</p> <p>The Basij is notorious for its recruitment of volunteers, many of them teenage children, and for human wave attacks during the Iran-Iraq war.</p> <p>After the contested 2009 Iranian presidential elections, the Basij brutally quashed protests and attacked student dormitories. The Basij has two missions: to provide defensive military training to protect the regime against foreign invasion, and to suppress domestic anti-regime activity through street violence and intimidation.</p> <p>The Basij is one of the forces ordered by the government to quell the September/October 2022 protests. It injured and killed several protesters. Sources indicate that Basij members under Salar Abnoush's command have committed serious human rights violations in Iran. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 104. | REZAEI Qasem (a.k.a. REZAEI Ghasem) | <p>DOB: 27.9.1961 POB: Abhar, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male</p> | <p>Qasem Rezaei is the Deputy Commander of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).</p> <p>He directly supervised acts of violence against detainees, including torture and beatings. He justified the actions of the security forces in the wake of the deadly use of force</p> |

| | | | |
|------|---|--|--|
| | | National ID No: D10005996 (Iran) Function: Deputy Commander of the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) | against Iranian protesters and called for continued violence against protesters in May 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 105. | AMANOLLAHI Manouchehr (a.k.a. AMANOLLAHI BAHARVAND Manouchehr) | DOB: March 1965 or 1966 POB: Khorramabad, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Commander of the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in the province of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari | Manouchehr Amanollahi is the Commander of the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in the province of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari. During his tenure, the LEF suppressed protests in 2021 in the province in response to a lack of water, and in 2022 in response to food rationing. LEF units under Amanollahi's command used live ammunition against protestors when suppressing the protests, resulting in multiple deaths. As an advisor to LEF leadership, Amanollahi was also involved in the LEF's response to nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 106. | HEIDARI Kiyumars (a.k.a. HEYDARI Kioumars, HEYDARI Amir Kyomarth) | DOB: 1964 POB: Kermanshah, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Function: Commander of the Iranian Army Ground Forces | Brigadier-General Kiyumars Heidari is the Commander of the Iranian Army's Ground Forces and directly reports to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He has publicly admitted to his and his force's involvement in the violent response to the November 2019 protests, which led to the death of hundreds of protesters. Blatant and severe human rights violations by the forces, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters - including children - have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa |

| | | | |
|------|---|--|---|
| | | | <p>Amini started mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters died and hundreds were seriously injured. Army Ground Forces, which are under the control of Heidari, have been involved in suppressing the protests and have killed at least one person. Heidari himself stated that his forces have been used to deal with the 2022 protests.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 107. | MAJID Vahid Mohammad Naser | <p>DOB: 15.8.1964 POB: Isfahan, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male National ID No: 3874409929 (Iran) Function: Head of the Iranian Cyber Police</p> | <p>Vahid Mohammad Naser Majid is head of the Iranian Cyber Police (EU-listed).</p> <p>The Iranian Cyber Police influences and restricts internet access in Iran and arbitrarily arrests people for expressing online criticism of the Iranian regime. The Cyber Police is engaged in a nationwide series of arrests and prosecutions. It lends support to the Iranian regime in its violent response to nationwide protests against people who speak up in defence of their legitimate rights.</p> <p>In his function as Head of the Iranian Cyber Police, Vahid Mohammad Naser Majid is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 108. | NEJAT Hossein (a.k.a. ZIBAYINEJAD Mohammad-Hossein) | <p>DOB: 1955 POB: Shiraz, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Function: Deputy Commander of Sarallah (a.k.a. Tharullah, Thar-Allah, Tharallah, Thar-allollah)</p> | <p>Brigadier-General Hossein Nejat has been the Deputy Commander of Sarallah, an IRGC-linked, Tehran-based dedicated security apparatus of the Iranian state since 21 June 2020.</p> <p>Sarallah is essential to Tehran's security, as the headquarters is responsible for protecting the capital and governmental institutions against any threats such as coups or anti-government protests.</p> <p>Sarallah troops under the direct command of Nejat are tasked with quelling anti-government protests, including the violent suppressing of peaceful protests in 2022.</p> |

| | | | |
|------|-----------------|--|--|
| | | | He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 109. | MAROUFI Hossein | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: General Function: Deputy Head of Mobilisation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Sistan and Baluchestan province | General Sardar Hossein Maroufi is the Deputy Head of Mobilisation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Sistan and Baluchestan province. As such, he is a leading IRGC member in this province. The Sistan and Baluchestan province has seen some of the most violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including IRGC forces, during the 2022 protest wave. On 30 September 2022, the province capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday", when security forces opened fire on a protest forming around Friday prayer. It is estimated that at least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against participants in later protests has continued. Sardar Hossein Maroufi is among those responsible for the IRGC's violence against protestors in Sistan and Baluchestan province, in particular around "bloody Friday". He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 110. | ABSALAN Parviz | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: General Function: Deputy Head of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province | General Parviz Absalan is the Deputy Head of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province. The IRGC is a central element of the Iranian security forces in that province, where it is also called the "Salman army". The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province have been using brutal violence against peaceful protestors in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children. As Deputy Head of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province, Parviz Absalan is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |

| | | | |
|------|--|--|--|
| 111. | SHAFABI Ahmad (a.k.a. SHAFAI Ahmad) | DOB: 21.5.1968 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: commander and public relations officer of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province | Brigadier General Ahmad Shafahi is a commander of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province, and is responsible for public relations. The IRGC is a central element of the Iranian security forces in that province, where it is also called the "Salman army". The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province have been using brutal violence against peaceful protesters in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children. As commander of the IRGC in the Sistan and Baluchestan Province, Sardar Ahmed Shafahi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 112. | KOCHZAEI Ebrahim (a.k.a. KOCHZAI Ebrahim, KOUCHAK-ZAEI Ebrahim) | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Chabahar in Sistan and Baluchestan province | Colonel Ebrahim Kochzaei is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Chabahar in Sistan and Baluchestan province. The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province, including in Chabahar, have been using brutal violence against peaceful protesters in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children. Kochzaei is also named as the perpetrator of the rape of a 15-year old girl in September 2022, who was held in police custody in Chabahar. Ebrahim Kochzaei is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 113. | TAHERI Ahmad | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Sistan and Baluchestan province | Brigadier-General Ahmed Taheri is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the Sistan and Baluchestan province of Iran. The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province have been using brutal violence against peaceful protesters in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children. As the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Sistan and Baluchestan province, Ahmed Taheri |

| | | | |
|------|-----------------------------|---|---|
| | | | is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 114. | HOSSEINI Seyed Sadegh | DOB: 1963 or 1964 POB: Dehloran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: General Function: head of the IRGC in Kurdistan province | General Seyed Sadegh Hosseini is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Kurdistan province. Kurdistan province has seen severe violence by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, against the 2022 protest wave. Moreover, the IRGC uses Kurdistan province as a base to conduct military operations against Iraqi Kurdistan, which led to the death of more than a dozen non-combatants. Seyed Sadegh Hosseini is among those responsible for the IRGC violence against protestors in Kurdistan province. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 115. | RAJABPOUR Sereng Hossein | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: commander of the Beit al-Maqdis force (IRGC in Kurdistan) in the city of Sanandaj | Colonel Sereng Hossein Rajabpour is the commander of the Beit al-Maqdis force (IRGC in Kurdistan) in the city of Sanandaj in the province of Kurdistan. Kurdistan province has seen severe violence by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, against the 2022 protest wave, especially in the city of Sanandaj. Sereng Hossein Rajabpour is among those responsible for the violence against protestors in Kurdistan province. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 116. | ASL Gholamhossein Mohammadi | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: head of the IRGC in Ardabil province | Gholamhossein Mohammadi Asl is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Ardabil province - a province with an Azeri ethnic minority. Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, committed serious human rights violations in Ardabil province during the 2022 protests. Reports show that an Iranian schoolgirl named Asra Panahi was beaten to death by security forces for refusing to sing the pro-regime anthem. |

| | | | |
|------|---|---|---|
| | | | Gholamhossein Mohammadi Asl is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 117. | ABDI Shakar | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: deputy head of the IRGC in Ardabil province | Colonel Shakar Abdi is the deputy head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Ardabil province - a province with an Azeri ethnic minority. Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, committed serious human rights violations in Ardabil province during the 2022 protests. Reports show that an Iranian schoolgirl named Asra Panahi was beaten to death by security forces for refusing to sing the pro-regime anthem. Shakar Abdi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 118. | HASSANZADEH Hasan | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: head of the IRGC in Tehran province | Brigadier General Hasan Hassanzadeh is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Tehran province. Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, committed serious human rights violations in Tehran province during the 2022 protests. Hasan Hassanzadeh is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 119. | AGHAEI Morteza Mir (a.k.a. MIRAGHAEI Morteza) | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: head of the Basij in the city of Sanandaj | Colonel Morteza Mir Aghaei is the head of the Basij in the city of Sanandaj in the province of Kurdistan. Iranian security forces, including the IRGC and its Basij, committed serious human rights violations in Sanandaj during the 2022 protests. Morteza Mir Aghaei is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 120. | MOHAMMADIAN Abbas-Ali | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province | Abbas-Ali Mohammadian has been the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province since 2017. Alborz (Karaj) is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence. Security forces have |

| | | | |
|------|-----------------------|--|--|
| | | | frequently shot directly at peaceful protestors, leading to many deaths, including of children. As head of the LEF in Alborz (Karaj) province, Abbas-Ali Mohammadian is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 121. | JAHANBAKHSH Rahim | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in West Azerbaijan province | Brigadier-General Rahim Jahanbakhsh is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in West Azerbaijan province. West Azerbaijan is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 122. | SHEIKHNEJAD Hassan | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Urumeh (a.k.a. Ouroumieh), the capital of West Azerbaijan province. | Colonel Hassan Sheikhnejad is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Urumeh, the capital of West Azerbaijan province. In Urumeh, Iranian security forces committed serious human rights violations during the 2022 protests. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 123. | SAADATI Mahmoud | Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province | Colonel Mahmoud Saadati is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province. In Zahedan, Iranian security forces committed serious human rights violations during the 2022 protests. Mahmoud Saadati is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 124. | MIRZAI Morteza | POB: Khorram Abad, Iran | Brigadier-General Morteza Mirzai is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement |

| | | | |
|------|------------------|---|--|
| | | <p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Mazandaran province.</p> | <p>Forces (LEF) in Mazandaran province. In Mazandaran province, Iranian security forces committed serious human rights violations during the 2022 protests. Morteza Mirzai is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 125. | MALIKI Azizullah | <p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: General Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Gilan province</p> | <p>General Azizullah Maliki is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Gilan province. In 2022, Azizullah Maliki directed the violent crackdown against the protests in Gilan province. He was vocal in the media, vehemently defending the violent reaction of the security forces to the protests in September and October 2022. As head of the LEF in Gilan province, Azizullah Maliki is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 126. | MORADI Ali-Reza | <p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Sanandaj</p> | <p>Ali-Reza Moradi has been the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Sanandaj in Kurdistan province since December 2018. In that position, Ali-Reza Moradi reports to the general staff of the armed forces in Iran, directly under the authority of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moradi has been responsible for the mass arrest of protesters and ordered the use of lethal weapons against unarmed protesters during the November 2019 nationwide protests in Sanandaj, which resulted in the death of at least two protesters. Blatant and severe human rights violations by the police forces in Sanandaj, such as the indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters -including children, have been documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started mid-September 2022.</p> |

| | | | |
|------|--------------------|--|--|
| | | | <p>Moradi has also publicly advocated a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations. Since the beginning of the 2022 demonstrations, police forces have arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Ali-Reza Moradi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 127. | RAFIEI Enayatollah | <p>DOB: 1970 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Captain Function: commander of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini</p> | <p>Captain Enayatollah Rafiei is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). He is the commander of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.</p> <p>On 13 September 2022, Rafiei and three other members of his squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented.</p> <p>As commander of the squad, Captain Enayatollah Rafiei is responsible for Amini's death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 128. | KHOSHNAMEVAND Ali | <p>DOB: 1995 POB: Khoshnamvand, (Khoshnamvand) in the Kouhdasht district of Lorestan province in western Iran Nationality: Iranian</p> | <p>Sergeant Ali Khoshnamvand is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). He is one of the officers in the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.</p> <p>On 13 September 2022, Khoshnamvand and three other members of a squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was</p> |

| | | | |
|------|--------------------------|--|---|
| | | <p>Gender: male Rank: Sergeant Function: Member of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini</p> | <p>subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented.</p> <p>As one of the officers who arrested Amini, Sergeant Ali Khoshnamvand is responsible for Amini's death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 129. | GHORBAN-HOSSEINI Fatemeh | <p>DOB: 1995 POB: Teheran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: female Function: Member of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini</p> | <p>Fatemeh Ghorban-Hosseini is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). She is one of the officers in the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.</p> <p>On 13 September 2022, Ghorban-Hosseini and three other members of a squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented.</p> <p>As one of the officers who arrested Amini, Fatemeh Ghorban-Hosseini is responsible for Amini's death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 130. | SAFARI Parastou | <p>DOB: 1986 POB: Kermanshah, Iran Nationality: Iranian</p> | <p>Parastou Safari is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). She is one of the officers in the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.</p> |

| | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| | | <p>Gender: female Function: Member of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini</p> | <p>On 13 September 2022, Safari and three other members of a squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented.</p> <p>As one of the officers who arrested Amini, Parastou Safari is responsible for Amini's death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
|--|--|---|--|

B. Unternehmen und Organisationen

| | Name | Identifizierungsinformation |
|----|--------------|---|
| 1. | Cyber Police | <p>Location: Tehran (Iran) Website: www.cyberpolice.ir</p> <p>The Iranian Cyber Police, founded in January 2011, is a unit of the Islamic Republic of Iran Police, headed by Vahid Majid. From the time of its inception until early 2015 it was headed by Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam (listed). Ahmadi-Moqaddam underlined that the Cyber Police would take on anti-revolutionary and dissident groups who used internet-based social networks in 2009 to trigger protests against the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In January 2012, the Cyber Police issued new guidelines for internet cafés, requiring users to provide personal information that would be kept by café owners for six months, as well as a record of the websites they visited. The rules also require café owners to install closed-circuit television cameras and maintain the recordings for six months. These new rules may create a logbook that authorities can use to track down activists or whoever is deemed a threat to national security. In June 2012, Iranian media reported that the Cyber Police would be launching a crackdown on virtual private networks (VPNs). On 30 October 2012, the Cyber Police arrested the blogger Sattar Beheshti without a warrant for 'actions against national security on social networks and Facebook'. Beheshti</p> |

| | | |
|----|--|---|
| | | had criticised the Iranian government in his blog. Beheshti was found dead in his prison cell on 3 November 2012, and is believed to have been tortured to death by the Cyber Police authorities. The Cyber Police is responsible for many arrests of Telegram Group Administrators in connection with the nationwide protests of November 2019. |
| 2. | Evin Prison | Address: Tehran Province, Tehran, District 2, Dasht-e Behesht (Iran) Evin Prison is a detention centre where political prisoners have been held and severe human rights abuses, including torture, have repeatedly taken place over the past years and decades. November 2019 protesters were, and at least to some extent still are, detained in Evin Prison as political prisoners. Prisoners in Evin Prison are being deprived of basic procedural rights, and are sometimes held in solitary confinement or overcrowded cells with poor hygienic conditions. There are detailed reports of physical and psychological torture. Detainees are denied contact with family and lawyers as well as adequate health treatment. |
| 3. | Fashafouyeh Prison (a.k.a. Greater Tehran Central Penitentiary, Hasanabad-e Qom Prison, Greater Tehran Prison) | Address: Tehran Province, Hasanabad, Bijin Industrial Zone, Tehran, Qom Old Road (Iran) Telephone: +98 21 5625 8050 Fashafouyeh Prison is a detention centre designated originally to detain offenders of drug-related crimes, recently also holding political prisoners and, in some cases, forcing them to share cells with drug addicts. The living and hygienic conditions are very poor, lacking basic needs like clean drinking water. During the November 2019 protests, several protesters were detained in Fashafouyeh Prison, including minors. Reports indicate that November 2019 protesters were subjected to torture and inhumane treatment at Fashafouyeh Prison, e.g. by deliberately wounding them with boiling water and through denial of medical treatment. According to an Amnesty International report on the crackdown of the November 2019 protests, children as young as 15 have been detained alongside adults in Fashafouyeh Prison. Three November 2019 protesters who are currently being held in Fashafouyeh Prison were sentenced to death by a court in Tehran. |
| 4. | Rajae Shahr Prison (a.k.a. Rajai Shahr Prison, Rajaishahr, Raja'i Shahr, Reja'i Shahr, Rajayi Shahr, Gorhardasht Prison, Gohar Dasht Prison) | Address: Alborz Province, Karaj, Gohardasht, Moazzen Blvd (Iran) Telephone: +98 26 3448 9826 Rajae Shahr Prison has been known for the deprivation of human rights, including severe physical and psychological torture of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience as well as mass executions without fair trial, ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Hundreds of detainees, including children, were severely mistreated in Rajae Shahr Prison in the aftermath of the November 2019 protests. There are |

| | | |
|----|--|--|
| | | credible reports about numerous cases of torture and other forms of cruel punishment, including cases involving minors. |
| 5. | Iran's Morality Police (a.k.a. Gasht-e-Ershad; Islamic Guidance Patrol; Guidance Patrols) | Address: Vozara Street, corner of 25th Street, District 6, Tehran (Iran) The Morality Police is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, excessive violence and torture. On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an 'educational and orientation class'. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented. The Morality Police is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 6. | Basij Resistance Force (a.k.a. Basij-e Mostazafan) | The Basij Resistance Force is a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with branches throughout Iran. The security forces' response to the September 2022 protests in Iran was particularly harsh, resulting in the deaths of multiple people. The Basij Resistance Force was one of the forces ordered by the government to quell those protests. It injured and killed several protesters. The Basij Resistance Force is directly responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 7. | Cyber Defence Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (CDC) | Address: Tehran (Iran) Telephone: +98 26 3448 9826 The Cyber Defence Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (CDC) monitors websites, e-mails and online activities of individuals deemed to be political opponents. During the September 2022 protests in Iran, the CDC took an active role in the Iranian government's repressive policies, including by identifying and arresting protesters. The CDC is directly responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. |
| 8. | Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA) | Address: Tehran (Iran) The Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) is a uniformed police force. The LEF's blatant and severe human rights violations, such as the indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started |

| | | |
|-----|---|---|
| | | <p>in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds were seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists.</p> <p>The LEF is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 9. | The Basij Cooperative Foundation (a.k.a. Bonyad-eh Ta'avon-eh Basij) | <p>Address: Tehran, Iran Type of entity: Foundation/Corporation Network Other associated entities: IRGC, Basij Resistance Force The Basij Cooperative Foundation (BCF) is one of the affiliates of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed). The BCF was established in 1996 and its mission includes promoting and supporting the Basij. The activities of the BCF include the funding of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed). Therefore, the BCF is associated with the Basij Resistance Force, an entity responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 10. | Press TV | <p>Address: 4 East 2nd St., Farhang Blvd., Saadat Abad, 19977-66411 Tehran, Iran Telephone number: Tel. +98 21 230 66 660 Email: Presstv@presstv.ir Type of entity: State Television Broadcaster Press TV is responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists, persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process. Therefore, Press TV is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p> |
| 11. | Arvan Cloud (a.k.a. Abr Arvan; Noyan Abr Arvan Co.; Arwan Company; Arvan-cloud) | <p>Address: Zafar St. Africa Blvd., Tehran, Iran Type of entity: Private Company Other associated entities: IRGC, Iranian Ministry of Information and Communications Technology Arvan Cloud is an Iranian IT company supporting the Iranian government's efforts to control access to the Iranian intranet. Since 2020, it is a major partner in the project of the Iranian government, in general, and the Iranian Minister of Information and Communications Technology, in particular, to set up a separate, Iranian version of the internet. Such a national intranet with connecting points to the global internet will help to control the flow of information between the Iranian intranet and the global internet. As such, Arvan Cloud is involved in censorship and efforts of the Iranian government to shut down the internet in response to recent protests in Iran. Arvan Cloud is also associated with persons responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran, notably the EU-listed Iranian Minister of Information and Communications Technology.</p> |

-
- 1 Der Text dieser Resolution ist in englischer Sprache unter www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0 abrufbar.
-
- 2 Ingress abgeändert durch [LGBL 2020 Nr. 209](#).
-
- 3 Der Text des Gemeinsamen umfassenden Aktionsplans ist in Anhang A der UN-Resolution 2231 (2015) enthalten.
-
- 4 Art. 4 Abs. 3 abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 206](#).
-
- 5 Die Richtlinien der Gruppe der Nuklearlieferländer sind im Internet unter folgender Adresse einsehbar: www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org > Richtlinien.
-
- 6 Art. 4 Abs. 4 abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 206](#).
-
- 7 Art. 4 Abs. 5 abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 206](#).
-
- 8 Art. 4 Abs. 6 abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 206](#).
-
- 9 Art. 4 Abs. 7 eingefügt durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 206](#).
-
- 10 Art. 4 Abs. 8 eingefügt durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 206](#).
-
- 11 Art. 5 Abs. 6 Einleitungssatz abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 206](#).
-
- 12 Art. 6 Abs. 4 abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 206](#).
-
- 13 Art. 8 Abs. 3 Bst. e abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 24](#).
-
- 14 Art. 8 Abs. 3 Bst. f abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 24](#).
-
- 15 Art. 8 Abs. 3 Bst. g eingefügt durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 24](#).
-
- 16 Art. 8 Abs. 3 Bst. h eingefügt durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 24](#).
-
- 17 Art. 14a eingefügt durch [LGBL 2017 Nr. 259](#).
-
- 18 Art. 14b eingefügt durch [LGBL 2021 Nr. 248](#).
-
- 19 Die Weisung ist im Internet unter folgender Adresse abrufbar: www.llv.li/inhalt/118924/amtstellen/internationale-und-eu-sanktionen.
-
- 20 Anhang 5 abgeändert durch [LGBL 2020 Nr. 209](#) und [LGBL 2021 Nr. 248](#).
-
- 21 Die Liste ist im Internet unter folgender Adresse abrufbar: <https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/iran.xsl> (sollte richtigerweise lauten: <https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=iran>).
-
- 22 Anhang 6 abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 24](#), [LGBL 2016 Nr. 70](#), [LGBL 2016 Nr. 179](#), [LGBL 2016 Nr. 369](#), [LGBL 2017 Nr. 14](#), [LGBL 2019 Nr. 154](#), [LGBL 2020 Nr. 209](#), [LGBL 2020 Nr. 353](#), [LGBL 2021 Nr. 250](#) und [LGBL 2022 Nr. 201](#).
-
- 23 Anhang 7 abgeändert durch [LGBL 2016 Nr. 141](#), [LGBL 2017 Nr. 109](#), [LGBL 2018 Nr. 76](#), [LGBL 2019 Nr. 92](#), [LGBL 2020 Nr. 146](#), [LGBL 2021 Nr. 137](#), [LGBL 2022 Nr. 127](#), [LGBL 2022 Nr. 286](#) und [LGBL 2022 Nr. 323](#).