

# Liechtensteinisches Landesgesetzblatt

Jahrgang 2016

Nr. 10

ausgegeben am 19. Januar 2016

---

## Verordnung vom 19. Januar 2016 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran

Aufgrund von Art. 2 und 14a des Gesetzes vom 10. Dezember 2008 über die Durchsetzung internationaler Sanktionen (ISG), LGBL 2009 Nr. 41, in der Fassung des Gesetzes vom 9. Juni 2017, LGBL 2017 Nr. 203, unter Einbezug der aufgrund des Zollvertrages anwendbaren schweizerischen Rechtsvorschriften und der Beschlüsse des Rates der Europäischen Union vom 26. Juli 2010 (2010/413/GASP), 12. April 2011 (2011/235/GASP) und 20. Juli 2023 (GASP) 2023/1532 sowie in Ausführung der Resolution 2231 (2015) vom 20. Juli 2015 des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen<sup>1</sup> verordnet die Regierung:<sup>2</sup>

### I. Zwangsmassnahmen

#### Art. 1

##### *Begriffsbestimmungen und Bezeichnungen<sup>3</sup>*

- 1) In dieser Verordnung bedeuten:
- a) Gelder: finanzielle Vermögenswerte, einschliesslich Bargeld, Schecks, Geldforderungen, Wechsel, Geldanweisungen oder anderer Zahlungsmittel, Guthaben, Schulden und Schuldverpflichtungen, Wertpapieren und Schuldtiteln, Wertpapierzertifikaten, Obligationen, Schuldscheinen, Optionsscheinen, Pfandbriefen, Derivaten; Zinserträge, Dividenden oder andere Einkünfte oder Wertzuwächse aus Vermögenswerten; Kre-

- dite, Rechte auf Verrechnung, Bürgschaften, Vertragserfüllungsgarantien oder andere finanzielle Zusagen; Akkreditive, Konnossemente, Sicherungsübereignungen, Dokumente zur Verbriefung von Anteilen an Fondsvermögen oder anderen Finanzressourcen und jedes andere Finanzierungsinstrument für Exporte;
- b) Sperrung von Geldern: die Verhinderung jeder Handlung, welche die Verwaltung oder die Nutzung von Geldern ermöglicht, mit Ausnahme von normalen Verwaltungshandlungen von Banken und Wertpapierfirmen;
- c) iranische Person oder Organisation:
1. der iranische Staat sowie jede Behörde dieses Staates,
  2. jede natürliche Person mit Aufenthaltsort oder Wohnsitz im Iran, ausgenommen diplomatisches Personal der Schweiz und von Drittstaaten, das in offizieller Funktion im Iran tätig ist,
  3. jede juristische Person oder Organisation mit Sitz im Iran,
  4. jede juristische Person oder Organisation innerhalb oder ausserhalb des Iran, die sich im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle einer oder mehrerer der vorgenannten Personen oder Organisationen befindet;
- d) wirtschaftliche Ressourcen: Vermögenswerte jeder Art, unabhängig davon, ob sie materiell oder immateriell, beweglich oder unbeweglich sind, insbesondere Immobilien und Luxusgüter, mit Ausnahme von Geldern nach Bst. a);
- e) Sperrung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen: die Verhinderung ihrer Verwendung zum Erwerb von Geldern, Waren oder Dienstleistungen, einschliesslich des Verkaufs, des Vermietens oder des Verpfändens solcher Ressourcen.
- 2) Unter den in dieser Verordnung verwendeten Personenbezeichnungen sind alle Personen unabhängig ihres Geschlechts zu verstehen, sofern sich die Personenbezeichnungen nicht ausdrücklich auf ein bestimmtes Geschlecht beziehen.<sup>4</sup>

## Art. 2

### *Vorbehaltenes Recht*

Die Bestimmungen der in Liechtenstein anwendbaren schweizerischen Güterkontroll-, Kriegsmaterial- und Embargogesetzgebung bleiben vorbehalten.

## II. Beschränkungen des Handels

### Art. 3

#### *Verbote betreffend Güter, Technologie und Software für Trägersysteme*

1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Gütern, Technologie und Software für Trägersysteme an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten. Die betreffenden Güter sowie die betreffende Technologie und Software sind in Anhang 1 aufgeführt.

2) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen, Beteiligungen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Instandhaltung, der Herstellung oder der Verwendung von Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 1 sind verboten.

3) Die Verbote nach den Abs. 1 und 2 gelten auch für andere Güter, die ganz oder teilweise für die Entwicklung von Trägersystemen für Kernwaffen im Iran bestimmt sein könnten.

4) Die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 1 aus dem Iran sind verboten.

### Art. 3a<sup>5</sup>

#### *Verbote betreffend Güter und Technologie für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge und Raketen<sup>6</sup>*

1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Gütern und Technologie für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge und Raketen nach Anhang 1a an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten.<sup>7</sup>

2) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen, Beteiligungen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Instandhaltung, der Herstellung oder der Verwendung von Gütern und Technologie nach Anhang 1a sind verboten.

3) Die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Gütern und Technologie nach Anhang 1a aus dem Iran sind verboten.

4) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO) kann den Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Weitergabe, die Durchfuhr oder die Ausfuhr von Gütern und Technologien nach Anhang 1a oder die damit verbundene Bereitstellung von technischer und finanzieller Hilfe für nichtmilitärische Zwecke und für nichtmilitärische Endnutzer bewilligen, wenn die Güter oder Technologien oder die damit verbundene technische oder finanzielle Hilfe erforderlich sind für:

- a) medizinische oder pharmazeutische Zwecke;
- b) humanitäre Zwecke, gesundheitliche Notlagen, die dringende Abwendung oder Eindämmung eines Ereignisses, das voraussichtlich schwerwiegende und weitreichende Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit und Sicherheit von Menschen oder auf die Umwelt haben wird, oder die Bewältigung von Naturkatastrophen.

5) Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen sind vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit des SECO bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.

#### Art. 4

#### *Bewilligungspflicht betreffend Nukleargüter und doppelt verwendbare Güter*

1) Bewilligungspflichtig sind:

- a) der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Nukleargütern, doppelt verwendbaren Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran;
- b) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen, Beteiligungen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Bereitstellung, der Instandhaltung, der Herstellung oder der Verwendung von Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2;
- c) die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Nukleargütern, doppelt verwendbaren Gütern, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 aus dem Iran.

2) Abs. 1 gilt auch für andere Güter, die ganz oder teilweise für die Aktivitäten des Iran im Bereich der Anreicherung von Uran, der Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen und des Schweren Wassers bestimmt sein könnten, die nicht mit dem Gemeinsamen umfassenden Aktionsplan vom 14. Juli 2015<sup>8</sup> zur iranischen Atomfrage und zur Aufhebung der internationalen Sanktionen gegenüber dem Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) vereinbar sind.

3) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO erteilt die Bewilligung für Güter nach Abs. 2 sowie nach Anhang 2 Teil A und damit zusammenhängende Dienstleistungen gegebenenfalls im Verfahren nach Art. 16 der schweizerischen Güterkontrollverordnung vom 25. Juni 1997 (GKV), wenn:<sup>9,10</sup>

- a) die Anforderungen der Richtlinien vom 13. November 2013 beziehungsweise vom Juni 2013 der Gruppe der Nuklearlieferländer (NSG)<sup>11</sup> erfüllt sind;
- b) der Iran die Rechte zur Prüfung der Endverwendung und des Ortes der Endverwendung jedes gelieferten Gutes erteilt hat und die Rechte wirksam wahrgenommen werden können;
- c) die Tätigkeiten mit dem JCPOA vereinbar sind.

4) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO erteilt die Bewilligung für Güter nach Anhang 2 Teil B und damit zusammenhängende Dienstleistungen, wenn kein Grund zur Annahme besteht, dass die Tätigkeit ganz oder teilweise für die Aktivitäten des Iran im Bereich der Anreicherung von Uran, der Wiederaufbereitung von Kernbrennstoffen und des Schweren Wassers oder anderen Aktivitäten im Nuklearbereich beitragen könnte, die nicht mit dem JCPOA vereinbar sind.<sup>12</sup>

5) Von der Bewilligungspflicht nach Abs. 1 Bst. b ausgenommen sind Dienstleistungen für Güter, für welche die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO eine Bewilligung nach Abs. 4 erteilt hat.<sup>13</sup>

6) Sofern dies aufgrund der Resolution 2231 (2015) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen erforderlich ist, holt die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO die Stellungnahme des Sicherheitsrates oder der Gemeinsamen Kommission nach dem JCPOA ein.<sup>14</sup>

7) Die Ausübung einer Tätigkeit nach Abs. 1 ist der Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit dem SECO innerhalb von fünf Arbeitstagen zu melden. Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO meldet die Ausübung dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen und der

Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde nach Massgabe der Resolution 2231 (2015) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen.<sup>15</sup>

8) Bewilligungsgesuche sind vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit des SECO bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.<sup>16</sup>

#### Art. 5

##### *Verbote betreffend Rüstungsgüter und Güter zur internen Repression*

1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Rüstungsgütern jeder Art, einschliesslich Waffen und Munition, Militärfahrzeugen und -ausrüstung, paramilitärischer Ausrüstung, sowie von Zubehör und Ersatzteilen dafür an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten.

2) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchfuhr von Gütern, die zur internen Repression verwendet werden können und die zur Verwendung im Iran bestimmt sind, sind verboten. Die betreffenden Güter sind in Anhang 3 aufgeführt.

3) Dienstleistungen jeder Art, einschliesslich Finanzdienstleistungen, Vermittlungsdiensten und technischer Beratung, der Gewährung von Finanzmitteln sowie Investitionen und Joint Ventures, im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchfuhr, der Entwicklung, der Herstellung und der Verwendung von Rüstungsgütern und Gütern nach Anhang 3 sind verboten.

4) Die Beschaffung, die Einfuhr, die Durchfuhr, die Beförderung und die Vermittlung von Rüstungsgütern und Gütern nach Anhang 3 aus dem Iran sind verboten.

5) Von den Verboten nach den Abs. 1 bis 4 ausgenommen sind gepanzerte Fahrzeuge zum Schutz des diplomatischen und konsularischen Personals der Schweiz im Iran sowie die vorübergehende Ausfuhr von Schutzkleidung, einschliesslich kugelsicherer Westen und Helme, zur persönlichen Verwendung durch das Personal der Vereinten Nationen, der Europäischen Union oder der Schweiz, durch Medienvertreter und humanitäres Personal.

6) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO kann Ausnahmen von den Verboten nach den Abs. 1 bis 4 bewilligen für:<sup>17</sup>

a) nichtletales militärisches Gerät, das ausschliesslich für humanitäre Zwecke oder Schutzzwecke, für Programme der Vereinten Nationen, der Europäischen Union oder der Schweiz zum Aufbau von Institutionen oder zur Krisenbewältigung bestimmt ist;

b) Jagd- und Sportwaffen sowie Munition, Zubehör und Ersatzteile dafür.

7) Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen sind vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit des SECO bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.<sup>18</sup>

#### Art. 6

##### *Verbote betreffend Ausrüstung, Technologie und Software zu Überwachungszwecken*

1) Der Verkauf, die Lieferung, die Ausfuhr und die Durchführung von Ausrüstung, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 4, die für das Überwachen und Abhören des Internets und des Telefonverkehrs benützt werden können, an iranische Personen oder Organisationen oder zur Verwendung im Iran sind verboten.

2) Die Erbringung von technischer Hilfe oder von Vermittlungsdiensten sowie die Gewährung von Finanzmitteln im Zusammenhang mit dem Verkauf, der Lieferung, der Ausfuhr, der Durchführung, der Bereitstellung, der Herstellung, der Wartung und der Verwendung von Gütern nach Abs. 1 sind verboten.

3) Es ist verboten, für die iranische Regierung, für öffentliche Einrichtungen, Unternehmen und Agenturen des Iran sowie für Personen oder Organisationen, die in deren Namen oder auf deren Anweisung handeln, Dienstleistungen zum Überwachen und Abhören des Internets und des Telefonverkehrs zu erbringen.

4) Die Regierung oder im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit das SECO bewilligt Ausnahmen von den Verboten nach den Abs. 1 und 2, sofern sichergestellt ist, dass die betroffenen Güter und Dienstleistungen nicht zum Überwachen und Abhören des Internets und des Telefonverkehrs benützt werden. Entsprechende Gesuche sind vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit des SECO bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.<sup>19</sup>

### III. Finanzierungs- und Beteiligungsbeschränkungen

#### Art. 7

##### *Bewilligungspflicht für Beteiligungen*

1) Unternehmen, die mit iranischen Personen oder Organisationen Vereinbarungen über den Erwerb von Beteiligungen oder die Gründung von

Joint Ventures abschliessen möchten, benötigen dafür eine Bewilligung, falls sie:

- a) im Uranabbau tätig sind; oder
- b) folgende Güter, Technologien oder Software entwickeln oder herstellen:
  1. Kernmaterialien nach Art. 1 der schweizerischen Kernenergieverordnung vom 10. Dezember 2004 (KEV),
  2. Güter, Technologie oder Software nach Anhang 2 Teil 1 der schweizerischen Güterkontrollverordnung vom 25. Juni 1995 (GKV),
  3. Güter, Technologie oder Software nach Anhang 2 Ziff. 2.
- 2) Unternehmen nach Abs. 1 müssen für die Entgegennahme von Darlehen oder Krediten von iranischen Personen oder Organisationen eine Bewilligung einholen.
- 3) Die Regierung erteilt die Bewilligung, sofern die Tätigkeit mit dem JCPOA vereinbar ist.
- 4) Sofern dies aufgrund der Resolution 2231 (2015) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen erforderlich ist, holt die Regierung die Stellungnahme des Sicherheitsrates oder der Gemeinsamen Kommission nach dem JCPOA ein.
- 5) Bewilligungsgesuche sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.

## IV. Finanzielle Beschränkungen<sup>20</sup>

### Art. 8<sup>21</sup>

#### *Sperrung von Geldern und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen*

- 1) Gesperrt sind Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen, die sich im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle befinden von:<sup>22</sup>
  - a) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 5;
  - b) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6;
  - c) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6a;
  - d) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 7.
- 2) Es ist verboten:
  - a) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach den Anhängen 5, 6 und 7 Gelder zu überweisen oder Gelder und wirt-

schaftliche Ressourcen sonst wie direkt oder indirekt zur Verfügung zu stellen;<sup>23</sup>

- b) für natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6 spezielle Zahlungsverkehrsdienste zu erbringen, die für den Austausch von Finanzdaten verwendet werden;
- c) natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6a Gelder zu überweisen oder Gelder und wirtschaftliche Ressourcen sonst wie direkt oder indirekt zur Verfügung zu stellen.

3) Das Verbot nach Abs. 2 gilt nicht, wenn die Überweisung von Geldern oder das Zurverfügungstellen von Geldern oder wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen erforderlich ist zur Durchführung humanitärer Aktivitäten oder für andere Tätigkeiten zur Deckung menschlicher Grundbedürfnisse durch:

- a) die Vereinten Nationen, einschliesslich ihrer Programme, Fonds und sonstiger Einrichtungen und Stellen, sowie ihre Sonderorganisationen und verwandte Organisationen;
- b) internationale Organisationen;
- c) humanitäre Organisationen mit Beobachterstatus in der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen und Mitglieder dieser Organisationen;
- d) bilateral oder multilateral finanzierte nichtstaatliche Organisationen, die sich an den Plänen der Vereinten Nationen für humanitäre Hilfe, an den Plänen für Flüchtlingshilfemassnahmen, an anderen Appellen der Vereinten Nationen oder an vom Amt der Vereinten Nationen für die Koordinierung humanitärer Angelegenheiten (OCHA) koordinierten humanitären Strukturen beteiligen;
- e) öffentliche Stellen oder Unternehmen und Organisationen, die für die Durchführung humanitärer Aktivitäten Beiträge des Landes erhalten;
- f) die Beschäftigten, Beitragsempfänger, Tochtergesellschaften oder Durchführungspartner der in den Bst. a bis e genannten Organisationen, soweit sie in dieser Eigenschaft handeln.

3a) Sofern die gutgeschriebenen Beträge ebenfalls gesperrt werden, gilt das Verbot nach Abs. 2 nicht für die Gutschrift auf gesperrte Konten von:<sup>24</sup>

- a) Zinsen und sonstigen Erträgen dieser Konten;
- b) Zahlungen aufgrund von bestehenden Verträgen;
- c) Zahlungen aufgrund von schiedsgerichtlichen Entscheidungen oder von in dem Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum, der Schweiz oder dem Verei-

nigten Königreich ergangenen oder darin vollstreckbaren gerichtlichen oder behördlichen Entscheidungen.

3b) Gelder, die von Dritten an natürliche Personen, Unternehmen oder Organisationen nach Abs. 1 überwiesen werden, dürfen gesperrten Konten gutgeschrieben werden, sofern die auf diesen Konten gutgeschriebenen Beträge ebenfalls gesperrt werden.<sup>25</sup>

4) Die Regierung kann Zahlungen aus gesperrten Konten, Übertragungen gesperrter Vermögenswerte und die Freigabe gesperrter wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen ausnahmsweise bewilligen zur:

a) Erfüllung bestehender Verträge;

b) Erfüllung von Forderungen, die Gegenstand sind:

1. einer bestehenden Entscheidung eines Schiedsgerichts; oder

2. einer Entscheidung einer Verwaltungsstelle oder eines Gerichts, die in einem EWRA-Vertragsstaat, der Schweiz oder im Vereinigten Königreich ergangen ist oder in diesen Staaten vollstreckbar ist.

c) Aufgehoben<sup>26</sup>

5) Sie kann die Freigabe bestimmter gesperrter Gelder oder wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen oder das Zurverfügungstellen bestimmter Gelder oder wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen an eine natürliche Person, ein Unternehmen oder eine Organisation nach Abs. 1 ausnahmsweise bewilligen zur:

a) Vermeidung von Härtefällen;

b) Erfüllung amtlicher Tätigkeiten diplomatischer oder konsularischer Vertretungen oder internationaler Organisationen, die nach dem Völkerrecht Immunität geniessen;

c) Verwendung für humanitäre Zwecke, einschliesslich der Durchführung humanitärer Aktivitäten und der Unterstützung der Zivilbevölkerung im Iran;

d) Bezahlung angemessener Honorare und Erstattung von Kosten im Zusammenhang mit der Erbringung juristischer Dienstleistungen;

e) Bezahlung von Gebühren oder Dienstleistungskosten für die routinemässige Verwahrung oder Verwaltung gesperrter Gelder oder wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen;

f) Wahrung liechtensteinischer Interessen.

5a) Sie bewilligt Ausnahmen nach Abs. 4 und 5 in Übereinstimmung mit den massgeblichen Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten

Nationen und, falls anwendbar, nach vorhergehender Genehmigung durch den zuständigen Ausschuss des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen.<sup>27</sup>

6) Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.

#### Art. 8a<sup>28</sup>

##### *Ausnahmen von der Sperrung von Geldern und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen im Bereich des Luftverkehrs*

1) Die Sperrung nach Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. c und das Verbot nach Art. 8 Abs. 2 Bst. c gelten nicht für Gelder oder wirtschaftliche Ressourcen, die benötigt werden für:<sup>29</sup>

- a) die Durchführung von Flügen zu humanitären Zwecken zur Evakuierung oder Rückbeförderung von Personen oder für Initiativen zur Bereitstellung von Unterstützung für Opfer von Natur- oder Nuklearkatastrophen oder Chemieunfällen;
- b) die Durchführung von Flügen für die Teilnahme an Sitzungen, die zum Gegenstand haben, eine Lösung für die militärische Unterstützung der russischen Aggression gegen die Ukraine und bewaffneter Gruppen und Organisationen im Nahen Osten und in der Region des Roten Meeres durch den Iran zu finden;
- c) Notlandungen, Notstarts oder Notüberflüge;
- d) die Durchführung von Flügen für die amtlichen Tätigkeiten diplomatischer oder konsularischer Vertretungen Liechtensteins, der Schweiz oder internationaler Organisationen, die nach dem Völkerrecht Immunität genießen.

2) Die Regierung kann Ausnahmen vom Verbot nach Art. 8 Abs. 2 Bst. c für die in Anhang 6a unter Bst. B Ziff. 10 bis 12 genannten Organisationen bewilligen, sofern die Gelder oder wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen für Bodenabfertigungsdienste nach Art. 3 Ziff. 23 der Verordnung (EU) 2018/1139<sup>30</sup> erforderlich sind.

3) Sie kann Ausnahmen von der Sperrung nach Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. c und vom Verbot nach Art. 8 Abs. 2 Bst. c bewilligen, sofern dies für die Behandlung kritischer Angelegenheiten der Flugsicherheit erforderlich ist.<sup>31</sup>

4) Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen sind bei der Stabsstelle FIU einzureichen.

Art. 8b<sup>32</sup>*Verbot von Transaktionen mit Häfen und Schleusen*

- 1) Es ist verboten, unmittelbar oder mittelbar Transaktionen mit Häfen und Schleusen nach Anhang 8 zu tätigen.
- 2) Das Verbot nach Abs. 1 gilt nicht für Schiffe, die Hilfe benötigen und aus folgenden Gründen einen Notliegeplatz suchen:
  - a) um einen Nothafen aus Gründen der maritimen Sicherheit, zur Rettung von Menschenleben auf See oder für humanitäre Zwecke anzulaufen;
  - b) um ein Ereignis, das voraussichtlich schwerwiegende und wesentliche Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit und die Sicherheit von Menschen oder auf die Umwelt haben wird, dringend abzuwenden oder einzudämmen; oder
  - c) um eine Naturkatastrophe zu bewältigen.

Art. 9<sup>33</sup>*Meldepflichten für gesperrte Vermögenswerte*

- 1) Personen und Organisationen, die Gelder halten oder verwalten oder von Geldern oder wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen wissen, von denen anzunehmen ist, dass sie unter die Sperrung nach Art. 8 Abs. 1 fallen, müssen dies der Stabsstelle FIU unverzüglich melden.
- 2) Banken und Wertpapierfirmen, die der Stabsstelle FIU nach Abs. 1 von ihnen gehaltene oder verwaltete Gelder gemeldet haben, müssen der Stabsstelle FIU jährlich bis zum 15. Februar die Beträge per 31. Dezember des Vorjahres übermitteln.
- 3) Gutschriften nach Art. 8 Abs. 3b müssen der Stabsstelle FIU unverzüglich gemeldet werden.
- 4) Personen und Organisationen, die nach Art. 8a Abs. 1 Personen und Organisationen nach Anhang 6a Gelder oder wirtschaftliche Ressourcen zur Verfügung stellen, müssen dies der Stabsstelle FIU unverzüglich melden.
- 5) Die Meldungen müssen die Namen der Begünstigten, Gegenstand und Wert der gesperrten Gelder und wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen sowie bei Gutschriften die Namen der Aussteller enthalten.

## V. Weitere Beschränkungen

### Art. 10

#### *Verbote betreffend iranische Frachtflugzeuge*

1) Es ist verboten, technische Dienste oder Wartungsdienste für Frachtflugzeuge zu erbringen, die im Eigentum oder unter der direkten oder indirekten Kontrolle von iranischen Personen oder Organisationen stehen, falls der Leistungserbringer weiss oder vermutet, dass das Frachtflugzeug Waren befördert, deren Lieferung, Verkauf, Aus- oder Durchfuhr nach dieser Verordnung verboten ist.

2) Das Verbot nach Abs. 1 gilt, bis die Ladung überprüft und, falls erforderlich, beschlagnahmt oder entsorgt ist.

3) Das Verbot nach Abs. 1 gilt nicht, falls die Erbringung der Dienste für humanitäre Zwecke oder aus Sicherheitsgründen erforderlich ist.

4) Die durch die Beschlagnahme und Entsorgung entstehenden Kosten können dem Importeur auferlegt oder bei jeder anderen Person oder Organisation, die für die versuchte illegale Lieferung, den versuchten illegalen Verkauf oder die versuchte illegale Aus- oder Durchfuhr verantwortlich ist, eingefordert werden.

### Art. 11<sup>34</sup>

#### *Ein- und Durchreiseverbot*

1) Die Einreise nach Liechtenstein und die Durchreise durch Liechtenstein sind den natürlichen Personen nach den Anhängen 5 bis 7 verboten.<sup>35</sup>

1a) Die Regierung kann in Übereinstimmung mit den Beschlüssen des zuständigen Ausschusses des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen oder zur Wahrung liechtensteinischer Interessen Ausnahmen für natürliche Personen nach Anhang 5 gewähren.<sup>36</sup>

2) Die Regierung kann für natürliche Personen nach den Anhängen 6 bis 7 Ausnahmen gewähren:

- a) aus erwiesenen humanitären Gründen;
- b) zwecks Teilnahme an Tagungen internationaler Gremien oder an einem politischen Dialog betreffend den Iran; oder
- c) zur Wahrung liechtensteinischer Interessen.

3) Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen sind beim Ausländer- und Passamt einzureichen.

## Art. 12

### *Verbot der Erfüllung bestimmter Forderungen*

1) Es ist verboten, Forderungen der folgenden natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen zu erfüllen, wenn sie auf einen Vertrag oder ein Geschäft zurückzuführen sind, dessen Durchführung direkt oder indirekt durch Massnahmen nach dieser Verordnung, nach der Verordnung vom 1. Februar 2011 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran oder nach der Verordnung vom 13. Februar 2007 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran verhindert oder beeinträchtigt wurden:

- a) iranische Personen oder Organisationen;
- b) natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen nach den Anhängen 5 bis 7;<sup>37</sup>
- c) natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen, die im Auftrag oder zugunsten von Personen oder Organisationen nach Bst. a oder b handeln.

2) In Verfahren zur Durchsetzung einer Forderung trägt die natürliche Person, das Unternehmen oder die Organisation, die den Anspruch geltend macht, die Beweislast dafür, dass die Erfüllung des Anspruchs nicht nach Abs. 1 verboten ist.<sup>38</sup>

## VI. Vollzug und Strafbestimmungen

### Art. 13

#### *Kontrolle und Vollzug*

1) Die Stabsstelle FIU vollzieht vorbehaltlich der Zuständigkeit der Regierung die Art. 3 bis 10 und 12. Sie prüft insbesondere Bewilligungsgesuche und Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen und leitet sie - erforderlichenfalls nach Konsultation weiterer betroffener Stellen - mit ihrer Empfehlung an die Regierung weiter.

2) Das Ausländer- und Passamt vollzieht Art. 11. Es prüft insbesondere die Gesuche um Ausnahmegewilligungen und leitet sie - erforderlichenfalls

nach Konsultation weiterer betroffener Stellen - mit seiner Empfehlung an die Regierung weiter.

3) Die zuständigen liechtensteinischen Behörden ergreifen die für die Sperrung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen notwendigen Massnahmen wie die Anmerkung einer Verfügungssperre im Grundbuch oder die Pfändung oder Versiegelung von Luxusgütern.

4) Die Zuständigkeit der schweizerischen Behörden bleibt vorbehalten.

#### Art. 14

##### *Strafbestimmungen*

1) Wer gegen Art. 3 bis 8, 8b oder 10 bis 12 verstösst, wird nach Art. 10 ISG bestraft, soweit nicht Strafbestimmungen der in Liechtenstein anwendbaren schweizerischen Kriegsmaterial-, Güterkontroll- und Embargoge-  
setzung zur Anwendung gelangen.<sup>39</sup>

2) Wer gegen Art. 9 verstösst, wird nach Art. 11 ISG bestraft.

## VII. Schlussbestimmungen

#### Art. 14a<sup>40</sup>

##### *Automatische Übernahme von Listen der natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen, die Gegenstand von Massnahmen sind*

Die Listen, die der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen betreffend natürliche Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen erlassen oder aktualisiert hat (Anhang 5), werden automatisch übernommen.

#### Art. 14b<sup>41</sup>

##### *Anträge auf Aufnahme oder Streichung in die bzw. aus der UNO-Liste*

1) Die Regierung kann nach Konsultation weiterer betroffener Stellen dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen Anträge auf Aufnahme oder Streichung von Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen mit Bezug zu dem Nuklearprogramm der Islamischen Republik Iran oder zu anderen nach dieser Verordnung verbotenen Aktivitäten in die bzw. aus der UNO-Liste (Anhang 5) vorlegen.

2) Die Kriterien für die Aufnahme und Streichung sowie die Verfahren nach Abs. 1 richten sich nach den massgeblichen Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen, insbesondere der Resolution 2231 (2015).

3) Die Regierung regelt das Nähere, insbesondere die Zuständigkeiten, die Kriterien und das Verfahren, in einer Weisung. Die Stabsstelle FIU veröffentlicht die Weisung auf ihrer Internetseite.

#### Art. 15

##### *Aufhebung bisherigen Rechts*

Die Verordnung vom 1. Februar 2011 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran, LGBL 2011 Nr. 55, in der geltenden Fassung, wird aufgehoben.

#### Art. 15a<sup>42</sup>

##### *Übergangsbestimmung zur Änderung vom 3. Oktober 2023*

Für Güter und Technologien nach Anhang 1a gelten die Verbote nach Art. 3a Abs. 1 bis 3 bis zum 27. Oktober 2023 nicht für Verpflichtungen aus vor dem 3. Oktober 2023 geschlossenen Verträgen.

#### Art. 16

##### *Inkrafttreten*

Diese Verordnung tritt am 19. Januar 2016 um 18.00 Uhr in Kraft.

Fürstliche Regierung:  
gez. *Adrian Hasler*  
Fürstlicher Regierungschef

**Anhang 1<sup>43</sup>**

(Art. 3 Abs. 1, 2 und 4)

**Güter, Technologie und Software für Trägersysteme, die unter die  
Verbote nach Art. 3 fallen****Güter, Technologie und Software**

1. Vollständige Raketen- und unbemannte Luftfahrzeugsysteme, einschliesslich vollständiger Subsysteme hierfür.
2. Güter nach Anhang 2 Teil 2 GKV mit den Kontrollregime-Codes 101 bis 199.
3. Alle übrigen Güter, die im Zusammenhang mit Raketen- und unbemannten Luftfahrzeugsystemen verwendet werden können und die von Anhang 2 Teil 2 GKV, Anhang 3 GKV oder Anhang 1 der schweizerischen Kriegsmaterialverordnung vom 25. Februar 1998 (KMV) erfasst werden.

**Anhang 1a<sup>44</sup>**

(Art. 3a Abs. 1 bis 4 und Art. 15a)

**Güter und Technologie, die unter die Verbote nach Art. 3a fallen****A. Begriffe**

In diesem Anhang bedeuten:

- a) Luftfahrzeug: Fluggerät mit feststehenden, schwenkbaren oder rotierenden Tragflächen, mit Kipprotoren oder Kippflügeln;
- b) monolithisch integrierte Mikrowellenschaltung (MMIC): monolithisch integrierte Schaltung, die bei Frequenzen im Mikrowellen- oder Millimeterbereich arbeitet;
- c) Primärzelle: Zelle, die nicht durch irgendeine andere Quelle aufgeladen werden kann;
- d) Satellitennavigationssystem: System zur Berechnung der Standorte von Empfangsgeräten auf der Grundlage der von den Satelliten empfangenen Signale, einschliesslich globale Satellitennavigationssysteme (GNSS) und regionale Satellitennavigationssysteme (RNSS);
- e) unbemanntes Luftfahrzeug (UAV): Luftfahrzeug, das in der Lage ist, ohne Anwesenheit einer Person an Bord einen Flug zu beginnen, einen kontrollierten Flug beizubehalten und die Navigation durchzuführen.

**B. Kategorie 1 - Besondere Werkstoffe und Materialien und zugehörige Ausrüstung**

HS-Code	Beschreibung
	Energetische Materialien wie folgt und Mischungen daraus:
ex 2812 90	Difluorammin (CAS-Nr. 10405-27-3)
ex 2850 00 ex 2908 99 ex 3602 00	Bleiazid (CAS-Nr. 13424-46-9), normales Bleistypnrat (CASNr. 15245440) und basisches Bleistypnrat (CASNr. 12403826) und sonstige Anzündler, die Azide oder komplexe Azide enthalten
ex 2904 20	Trinitronaphthalin (CUS-Nr. 90003)
ex 2904 20	Tetranitronaphthalin
ex 2904 20	Trinitroxylol
ex 2904 20	2,4,6-Trinitrotoluol (TNT) (CAS-Nr. 118-96-7)
ex 2905 59	2,2-Dinitropropanol (CAS-Nr. 918-52-5)
ex 2908 99	Ammoniumpikrat (CAS-Nr. 131-74-8)

ex 2909 30	Trinitroanisol (CAS-Nr. 606-35-9)
ex 2916 12	Ethylhexylacrylat (CAS-Nr. 103-11-7)
ex 2917 19	Diocylmaleat (CAS-Nr. 142-16-5)
ex 2920 90	Nitroglycerin (oder Glycerinnitrat) (NG) (CASNr. 55630)
ex 2920 90	Ethylendiamindinitrat (EDDN) (CAS-Nr. 20829-66-7)
ex 2920 90	Pentaerythritetranitrat (PETN) (CAS-Nr. 78-11-5)
ex 2921 44	4-Nitrodiphenylamin (4-NDPA) (CAS-Nr. 836-30-6)
ex 2921 44	Hexanitrodiphenylamin (CAS-Nr. 131-73-7)
ex 2924 21	Diethyldiphenylharnstoff (CAS-Nr. 85-98-3), Dimethyldiphenylharnstoff (CASNr. 611927), Methylethyldiphenylharnstoff
ex 2924 21	N,N-Diphenylharnstoff (unsymmetrischer Diphenylharnstoff) (CASNr. 603543)
ex 2924 21	Methyl-N,N-Diphenylharnstoff (unsymmetrischer Methyldiphenylharnstoff) (CASNr. 13114722)
ex 2924 21	Ethyl-N,N-Diphenylharnstoff (unsymmetrischer Ethyldiphenylharnstoff) (CASNr. 64544714)
ex 2931 90	Triethylaluminium (TEA) (CAS-Nr. 97-93-8), Trimethylaluminium (TMA) (CASNr. 75241) und sonstige pyrophore Metallalkyle der Elemente Lithium, Natrium, Magnesium, Zink und Bor sowie Metallaryle derselben Elemente
ex 2933 79	N-Methyl-2-pyrrolidon, 1-Methyl-2-pyrrolidinon (CASNr. 872504)
ex 3505 10	Nitrostärke
ex 3601 00	Schwarzpulver
3912 20	Nitrozellulose (CAS-Nr. 9004-70-0)
ex 5402 11 ex	Faser- und fadenförmige Materialien, nicht von Anhang 2 Teil 2 Ziff. 1C010
5501 11 ex	oder 1C210 GKV erfasst, zur Verwendung in Verbundwerkstoff-Strukturen
5503 11 ex	und mit einem spezifischen Modul von grösser/gleich $3,18 \times 106$ m und
6815 11 ex	einer spezifischen Zugfestigkeit von grösser/gleich $7,62 \times 104$ m
6815 12 ex	
6815 19 ex	
7019 19	
ex 2805 30 ex	Nanomaterialien wie folgt:
2846 10 ex	a) Halbleiter-Nanomaterialien;
2846 90 ex	b) Nanoverbundmaterialien; oder
5402 11 ex	c) die folgenden Kohlenstoff-Nanomaterialien:
5501 11 ex	1. Kohlenstoff-Nanoröhren,
5503 11 ex	2. Kohlenstoff-Nanofasern,
6815 11 ex	3. Fullerene,
6815 12 ex	4. Graphene, oder
6815 13 ex	5. Kohlenstoffzwiebeln.
6815 19 ex	<i>Anmerkungen</i>

7019 12 ex	<i>Für den vorliegenden Zweck sind Nanomaterialien Materialien, die mindestens eines der folgenden Kriterien erfüllen:</i>
7019 19	<i>1.Sie bestehen aus Partikeln mit einem oder mehreren Aussenmassen im Bereich von 1-100 nm bei mehr als 1 % in der Anzahlgrößenverteilung.</i>
	<i>2.Sie haben in einer oder mehreren Dimensionen interne Oberflächenstrukturen im Bereich von 1-100 nm.</i>
	<i>3.Sie weisen ein spezifisches Oberflächen-Volumen-Verhältnis von grösser als 60 m<sup>2</sup>/cm<sup>3</sup> auf, mit Ausnahme von Materialien, die aus Partikeln mit einer Grösse von weniger als 1 nm bestehen.</i>
ex 2849 90 ex	Wolfram, Wolframcarbid und Legierungen, nicht erfasst von Anhang 2 Teil
8101 10 ex	2 Ziff. 1C117 und 1C226 GKV und von Anhang 2 Teil B Ziff. II.A1.013
8101 94 ex	oder II.A1.017 der vorliegenden Verordnung mit mehr als 90 Gew.%
8101 97 ex	Wolfram.
8101 99	<i>Anmerkung 1</i>
	<i>Für den vorliegenden Zweck ist Draht ausgenommen.</i>
	<i>Anmerkung 2</i>
	<i>Für den vorliegenden Zweck sind chirurgische und medizinische Instrumente ausgenommen.</i>
ex 3901 20 ex	Ultra-hochmolekulares Polyethylen (UHMWPE), nicht von Anhang 2 Teil
5402 39 ex	2 Ziff. 1C010 oder 1C210 GKV erfasst, in einer der folgenden Formen:
5402 49 ex	a) Primärformen;
5402 59 ex	b) Filamentgarne oder Einzelfäden;
5402 69 ex	c) Kabel aus Filamenten;
5404 90 ex	d) Filamentstränge (Rovings);
5407 20 ex	e) Stapelfasern oder geschnittene Fasern;
5501 90 ex	f) Gewebe (Stoffe);
5503 90 ex	g) Pulpe oder Flock.
5506 90 ex	
5601 30	

## C. Kategorie 2 - Werkstoffbearbeitung

HS-Code	Beschreibung
ex 8482 10 ex	Lager und Lagersysteme, die nicht von Anhang 2 Teil 2 Ziff. 2A001 und
8482 20 ex	2A101 GKV erfasst werden:
8482 30 ex	a) Kugellager oder Festlager mit vom Hersteller spezifizierten Toleranzen
8482 40 ex	gemäss ABEC 7, ABEC 7P oder ABEC 7T oder besser (oder gleichwertiger)
8482 50 ex	ISO-Norm Klasse 4 oder besser und mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:
8482 80 ex	
8482 91	1. hergestellt zur Verwendung bei Betriebstemperaturen über 573 K (300 °C), entweder unter Verwendung besonderer Werkstoffe oder durch besondere Wärmebehandlung, oder
	2. mit Schmierelementen oder Änderungen an Bestandteilen, die gemäss den Spezifikationen des Herstellers besonders konstruiert sind, um den Betrieb der Lager bei Geschwindigkeiten von mehr als 2,3 Mio. DN zu ermöglichen;
	b) feste Kegelrollenlager mit vom Hersteller spezifizierten Toleranzen gemäss ANSI/ABMA Klasse 00 (Zoll) oder Klasse A (metrischer Wert) oder besser (oder gemäss gleichwertigen Normen) und mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:

1. mit Schmierelementen oder Änderungen an Bestandteilen, die gemäss den Spezifikationen des Herstellers besonders konstruiert sind, um den Betrieb der Lager bei Geschwindigkeiten von mehr als 2,3 Mio. DN zu ermöglichen, oder
2. hergestellt zur Verwendung bei Betriebstemperaturen unter 219 K (-54 °C) oder über 423 K (150 °C),
- c) Folienluftlager, hergestellt zur Verwendung bei Betriebstemperaturen von 561 K (288 °C) oder höher und einer spezifischen Belastbarkeit von über 1 MPa;
- d) aktive Magnetlagersysteme;
- e) selbsteinstellende Lager mit Gewebeeinlage oder Gleitlager mit Gewebeeinlage, hergestellt zur Verwendung bei Betriebstemperaturen unter 219 K (-54 °C) oder über 423 K (150 °C).
- Technische Anmerkungen*
1. DN ist das Produkt aus dem Durchmesser der Lagerbohrung in mm und der Drehgeschwindigkeit der Lager in U/min.
2. Betriebstemperaturen umfassen die Temperaturen, die bei Abschaltung eines Gasturbinenmotors nach dem Betrieb erreicht werden.
- ex 8482 10 ex Ausrüstung zur Detektion verborgener Gegenstände, die im Frequenzbereich von 30 GHz bis 3 000 GHz betrieben werden und eine räumliche Auflösung von 0,1 mrad (Milliradian) bis einschliesslich 1 mrad (Milliradian) bei einem Sicherheitsabstand von 100 m aufweisen, und andere als von der GKV erfasste Bestandteile hierfür.
- 8526 10 ex
- 8526 92
- Anmerkung: Ausrüstung zur Detektion verborgener Gegenstände umfasst Ausrüstung u. a. zur Kontrolle von Personen, Dokumenten, Gepäck, anderen persönlichen Gegenständen, Fracht oder Post.*
- Technische Anmerkung:*
- Der Frequenzbereich erstreckt sich über die Bereiche, die generell als Millimeterwellen, Submillimeterwellen und Terahertzstrahlung eingestuft werden.*
- ex 8456 30 ex Andere als von der GKV erfasste numerische Steuerungen für Werkzeugmaschinen und numerisch gesteuerte Werkzeugmaschinen:
- 8457 10 ex a) numerische Steuerungen für Werkzeugmaschinen:
- 8457 20 ex
- 8457 30 ex 1. mit vier interpolierenden Achsen zur simultanen Bahnsteuerung,
- 8458 11 ex 2. mit zwei oder mehr Achsen zur simultanen Bahnsteuerung und mit einer kleinsten programmierbaren Eingabefeinheit, die besser (kleiner) als 0,001 mm ist, oder
- 8458 91 ex
- 8459 10 ex 3. numerische Steuerungen für Werkzeugmaschinen mit zwei, drei oder vier interpolierenden Achsen zur simultanen Bahnsteuerung und einer Rechnerchnittstelle (online) zum direkten Empfang von CAD-Daten (CAD=Computer Aided Design) und zur internen Verarbeitung dieser Daten zur Erzeugung von Maschinenbefehlen;
- 8459 31 ex
- 8459 51 ex b) Baugruppen zur Bahnsteuerung, besonders konstruiert für Werkzeugmaschinen und mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:
- 8459 61 ex
- 8460 12 ex 1. Interpolation für mehr als vier Achsen,
- 8460 22 ex 2. Echtzeitverarbeitung von Daten, um während der Bearbeitung die Werkzeugbahn, den Vorschub oder die Hauptspindelwerte zu verändern durch:
- 8460 23 ex - automatische Erzeugung und Veränderung von Teileprogrammen für die Bearbeitung in zwei oder mehr Achsen mithilfe von Messzyklen und Zugriff zu Teileprogramm-Quelldaten oder
- 8460 24 ex - adaptive Steuerung mit mehr als einer gemessenen physikalischen und mithilfe eines Kennfeldes (Strategie) verarbeiteten Variablen zur Optimierung
- 8537 10

des Bearbeitungsprozesses durch Veränderung eines Maschinenbefehls oder mehrerer Maschinenbefehle, oder

3. Rechnerschnittstelle (online) zum direkten Empfang von CADDaten und zur internen Verarbeitung dieser Daten zur Erzeugung von Maschinenbefehlen;

c) numerisch gesteuerte Werkzeugmaschinen, die gemäss den technischen Spezifikationen des Herstellers mit elektronischen Geräten zur simultanen Bahnsteuerung in zwei oder mehr Achsen ausgerüstet werden können und die beiden folgenden Merkmale aufweisen:

1. zwei oder mehr Achsen zur simultanen Bahnsteuerung,  
2. eine Positioniergenauigkeit nach ISO 230/2 (2006) mit allen verfügbaren Kompensationen:

- besser als 15 µm entlang einer Linearachse (Gesamtpositionierung) bei Schleifmaschinen

- besser als 15 µm entlang einer Linearachse (Gesamtpositionierung) bei Fräsmaschinen

- besser als 15 µm entlang einer Linearachse (Gesamtpositionierung) bei Drehmaschinen; oder

d) Werkzeugmaschinen, wie folgt, für das Abtragen oder Schneiden von Metallen, Keramiken oder Verbundwerkstoffen, die gemäss den technischen Spezifikationen des Herstellers mit elektronischen Geräten zur simultanen Bahnsteuerung in zwei oder mehr Achsen ausgerüstet werden können:

1. Werkzeugmaschinen, wie folgt, für das Abtragen oder Schneiden von Metallen, Keramiken oder Verbundwerkstoffen, die gemäss den technischen Spezifikationen des Herstellers mit elektronischen Geräten zur simultanen Bahnsteuerung in zwei oder mehr Achsen ausgerüstet werden können:

- eine oder mehrere bahnsteuerungsfähige Schwenkspindeln

*Anmerkung: Dies gilt nur für Schleif- oder Fräsmaschinen.*

- Planlaufabweichung bei einer Umdrehung der Spindel kleiner (besser) 0,0006 mm Gesamtmessuhrausschlag (TIR)

*Anmerkung: Dies gilt nur für Drehmaschinen.*

- Rundlaufabweichung bei einer Umdrehung der Spindel kleiner (besser) 0,0006 mm Gesamtmessuhrausschlag (TIR) oder

- Rundlaufabweichung bei einer Umdrehung der Spindel kleiner (besser) 0,0006 mm Gesamtmessuhrausschlag (TIR), oder

2. Funkenerosionsmaschinen (EDM) - Drahterodiermaschinen - mit fünf oder mehr Achsen, die für eine Bahnsteuerung simultan koordiniert werden können.

ex 8207 19 ex	Baugruppen, Schaltungen oder Einsätze, besonders konstruiert für Werkzeugmaschinen, die in von diesem Anhang erfasst werden:
8207 20 ex	
8207 50 ex	a) Spindel-Baugruppen, die mindestens aus Spindeln und Lagern bestehen,
8207 60 ex	mit einer Rundlaufabweichung oder Planlaufabweichung bei einer Spindel-
8207 90 ex	umdrehung kleiner (besser) 0,0006 mm Gesamtmessuhrausschlag (TIR);
8466 10 ex	b) einschneidige Diamantwerkzeugeinsätze mit folgenden Merkmalen:
8466 20 ex	1. Schneidkante riss- und riefenfrei in allen Richtungen bei 400facher Ver-
8466 30 ex	grösserung,
8466 93 ex	2. Schneidenradius zwischen 0,1 mm und 5 mm, und
8537 10 ex	3. Unrundheit des Schneidenradius kleiner (besser) 0,002 mm Gesamtmess-
8538 90	uhrausschlag (TIR);
	c) besonders konstruierte gedruckte Schaltungen mit montierten Bestand-
	teilen, die gemäss den Spezifikationen des Herstellers numerische Steue-

rungen, Werkzeugmaschinen oder Positions-Rückmeldeeinrichtungen auf oder über das in diesem Anhang angegebene Niveau verbessern können.

*Technische Anmerkung*

*Dieser Eintrag erfasst keine Laser-Interferometermesssysteme ohne Rückmeldetechniken zur Messung der Verfahrwegungsfehler von Werkzeugmaschinen, Messmaschinen oder ähnlicher Ausrüstung.*

Software, besonders entwickelt für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der von diesem Anhang erfassten Werkzeugmaschinen

ex 8456	Digital kontrollierte Werkzeugmaschinen mit einer oder mehreren Line-
ex 8457	arachsen mit einem Verfahrweg grösser als 8 000 mm.
ex 8458	
ex 8459	
ex 8460	

### D. Kategorie 3 - Allgemeine Elektronik

HS-Code	Beschreibung
ex 2827 39 ex	Chemikalien und Materialien der bei der Herstellung von gedruckten Schaltungen verwendeten Art wie folgt:
2833 40 ex	
3824 99 ex	a) Druckschaltungs-Verbund-Substrate aus Glasfaser oder Baumwolle (z. B. FR4, FR2, FR6, CEM1, G10);
3919 10 ex	b) mehrschichtige Druckschaltungs-Substrate, die mindestens eine Schicht aus einem der folgenden Materialien enthalten:
3919 90 ex	
3921 90 ex	1. Aluminium,
7410 11 ex	2. Polytetrafluorethylen (PTFE), oder
7410 21 ex	3. keramische Werkstoffe (z. B. Aluminiumoxid);
8534 00	c) Ätzchemikalien:
	1. Eisenchlorid (CAS-Nr. 7705-08-0),
	2. Kupferchlorid (CAS-Nr. 7447-39-4),
	3. Ammoniumpersulfat (CAS-Nr. 7727-54-0),
	4. Natriumpersulfat (CAS-Nr. 7775-27-1), oder
	5. chemische Zubereitungen, besonders konzipiert zum Ätzen und eine der von den Nummern 1-4 erfassten Chemikalien enthaltend;
	<i>Anmerkung</i>
	<i>Nicht erfasst sind für den vorliegenden Zweck Mischungen von Chemikalien, die eine oder mehrere der in dieser Unternummer erfassten Chemikalien enthalten und in denen keine der einzeln erfassten Chemikalien zu mehr als 10 Gew.% in der Mischung enthalten ist.</i>
	d) Kupferfolie mit einer Mindestreinheit von 95 % und einer Dicke von weniger als 100 µm;
	e) polymere Stoffe und Folien daraus mit einer Dicke von weniger als 0,5 mm, wie folgt:
	1. aromatische Polyimide,
	2. Parylene,
	3. Benzocyclobuten (BCB), oder
	4. Polybenzoxazole.
	Software, besonders entwickelt für die Prüfung, Entwicklung oder Herstellung von gedruckten Schaltungen.

- ex 8517 62 ex Funkfrequenzsysteme und -ausrüstungen, die nicht von der GKV erfasst  
 8517 71 ex werden, Bestandteile und Zubehör, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für  
 8517 79 ex eine der folgenden Funktionen:  
 8525 50 ex a) Steuerung unbemannter Luftfahrzeuge (UAV);  
 8526 92 ex b) vorsätzliche und selektive Überlagerung, Zurückweisung, Blockierung,  
 8529 10 ex Beeinträchtigung oder Irreführung von Funkfrequenzsignalen für die Steue-  
 8543 70 rung unbemannter Luftfahrzeuge (UAV);  
 c) Verwendung der spezifischen Merkmale des von Drohnen verwendeten  
 Funkfrequenzprotokolls, um deren Betrieb zu stören.
- ex 8420 10 ex Ausrüstung für die Fertigung von gedruckten Schaltungen (PCB) sowie  
 8424 89 ex besonders konstruierte Bestandteile und besonders konstruiertes Zubehör  
 8479 89 ex hierfür, wie folgt:  
 8479 90 ex a) Filmherstellungsausrüstung;  
 8486 40 ex b) Lötmasken-Beschichtungsanlagen;  
 8543 30 c) Fotoplotter-Ausrüstung;  
 d) Beschichtungs- oder Galvanisierungsanlagen;  
 e) Vakuumkammern und -pressen;  
 f) Rollenlaminatoren;  
 g) Justierausrüstung; oder  
 h) Ätzausrüstung.
- 8532 21 Tantalkondensatoren
- 8532 22 Aluminium-Elektrolytkondensatoren
- 8532 24 Mehrschichtige Keramikcondensatoren
- ex 8536 69 ex Elektrische Stecker, Verbindungselemente, Buchsen, Jumper, Anschlüsse,  
 8536 90 Sockel oder Adapter mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:  
 a) ausgelegt für eine Betriebstemperatur über 398 K (125 °C);  
 b) ausgelegt für eine Betriebstemperatur unter 218 K (-55 °C); oder  
 c) ausgelegt für einen Betriebstemperaturbereich von 218 K (-55 °C) bis 398  
 K (125 °C).
- ex 8541 10 ex Halbleiterbauelemente, die den Militärstandard MIL-STD-750D oder einen  
 8541 21 ex anderen gleichwertigen Standard erfüllen.  
 8541 29 ex *Technische Anmerkung*  
 8541 30 ex *Für den vorliegenden Zweck sind Halbleiterbauelemente elektronische Bauteile, die*  
 8541 49 ex *auf die elektronischen Eigenschaften eines Halbleitermaterials angewiesen sind, wie*  
 8541 51 ex *Dioden, Transducer, lichtempfindliche Halbleiterbauelemente, Thyristoren, Diacs,*  
 8541 59 *Triacs oder Transistoren, einschliesslich Feldeffekttransistoren in MOS-Technik*  
*(MOSFET), FETs, FinFETs, IGBT.*
- 8541 60 Gefasste oder montierte piezoelektrische Kristalle
- ex 8542 31 ex Integrierte Schaltungen wie folgt: anwenderprogrammierbares Logikgatter  
 8542 39 (Field Programmable Gate Array, FPGA), Mikrocontroller, Mikroprozessoren,  
 Signalprozessoren, Signalanalytoren, Analog-Digital-Wandler  
 (ADC), Spannungsregler, Video-Encoder und Gleichstrom-Gleichstrom-  
 Wandler
- ex 8542 32 Speicherschaltungen wie folgt:  
 a) elektrisch programmierbare und löschbare Festwertspeicher (EEPROM)  
 mit Speicherkapazität von:

	1. mehr als 16 Mbit pro Paket für Flash-Speicher-Typen, oder
	2. mehr als einem der folgenden Grenzwerte für alle anderen EEPROM-Typen:
	- mehr als 1 Mbit pro Paket, oder
	- mehr als 256 kbit pro Paket und maximale Zugriffszeit kleiner als 80 ns;
	b) statische Schreib-Lese-Speicher (SRAM) mit einer Speicherkapazität von:
	1. mehr als 1 Mbit pro Paket, oder
	2. mehr als 256 kbit pro Paket und maximale Zugriffszeit kleiner als 25 ns.
ex 8542 33 ex 8543 70	MMIC-Verstärker und -Geräte
ex 8548 00	HF- oder EMI-Abschirmung gegen elektromagnetische Interferenzen, geeignet für Luftfahrzeuge
ex 9030 31 ex 9030 32 ex 9030 33 ex 9030 39 ex 9030 84 ex 9030 89 ex 9031 49 ex 9031 80	Automatische optische Prüfausrüstung zum Testen von gedruckten Schaltungen (PCB) auf der Grundlage optischer oder elektrischer Sensoren, die Qualitätsmängel hinsichtlich einer der folgenden Punkte erkennen können: a) Abstände, Fläche, Volumen oder Höhe; b) Billboarding; c) Bauteile (vorhanden, nicht vorhanden, gedreht, versetzt, Polarität, schief); d) Lot (Lötbrückenbildung, mangelhafte Lötungen); e) Verbindungen (unzureichende Paste, Abheben); f) Tombstoning; oder g) elektrischer Test (Kurzschlüsse, geöffnete Kontakte, Widerstand, Kapazität, Leistung, Netzleistung).

#### E. Kategorie 4 - Rechner

HS-Code	Beschreibung
ex 8471	Elektronische Rechner und verwandte Geräte sowie elektronische Baugruppen und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, ausgelegt für den Betrieb bei Umgebungstemperaturen oberhalb 343 K (70 °C)
ex 8471	Digitalrechner, einschliesslich Geräten zur Signaldatenverarbeitung oder Bildverarbeitung, mit einer angepassten Spitzenleistung (APP) grösser/gleich 0,0128 gewichtete TeraFLOPS (WT)
ex 8471	Hybridrechner und elektronische Baugruppen sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, die Analog-Digital-Wandler enthalten und folgende Eigenschaften aufweisen: a) 32 oder mehr Kanäle; und b) Auflösung grösser/gleich 14 bit (ohne Vorzeichen) bei Wandlungsraten grösser/gleich 200 000 Hz.

#### F. Kategorie 5 - Telekommunikation und Informationssicherheit

HS-Code	Beschreibung
ex 8517 62 ex 8517 69	Telekommunikationsapparate, -geräte oder -anlagen für Luftfahrzeuge

#### G. Kategorie 6 - Sensoren und Laser

HS-Code	Beschreibung
---------	--------------

- ex 8506 Primärzellen oder Batterien mit einer Energiedichte, die grösser oder gleich 150 Wh/kg bei 293 K (20 °C) ist
- 8525 83 Nachtsichtkameras
- ex 8525 89 ex 9006 30 Kameras, die die Kriterien von Anhang 2 Teil 2 Ziff. 6A003 Bst. b Ziff. 4 GKV erfüllen
- ex 8529 90 ex 8542 39 ex 9006 91 ex 9013 80 ex 9025 80 ex 9025 90 ex 9026 80 ex 9026 90 ex 9027 50 ex 9032 10 Optische Sensoren wie folgt:  
 a) Bildverstärkerröhren und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt:  
 1. Bildverstärkerröhren mit folgenden Eigenschaften:  
 - Spitzenempfindlichkeit innerhalb des Wellenlängenbereichs grösser als 400 nm und kleiner/gleich 1 050 nm  
 - Mikrokanalplatte zur elektronischen Bildverstärkung mit einem Lochabstand (Lochmitte zu Lochmitte) kleiner als 25 µm; und  
 - mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:  
 1. eine S-20-, S-25- oder multialkalische Fotokathode  
 2. eine GaAs- oder GaInAs-Fotokathode,  
 2. besonders konstruierte Mikrokanalplatten mit folgenden Eigenschaften:  
 - 15 000 oder mehr Röhrrchen je Platte und  
 - Lochabstand (Lochmitte zu Lochmitte) kleiner als 25 µm;  
 b) Ausrüstung zur direkten Bildgebung für das sichtbare oder Infrarot-Spektrum mit Bildverstärkerröhren mit den Eigenschaften der Bildverstärkerröhren, die in dieser Erfassung enthalten sind.
- ex 9006 30 Luftbild-Überwachungskameras
- ex 9013 20 ex 9013 80 ex 9013 90 ex 9015 10 ex 9015 80 ex 9015 90 ex 9031 80 ex 9031 90 ex 9033 Luftgestützte Laser-Entfernungsmesser
- ex 8506 Primärzellen oder Batterien und Komponenten mit einer Energiedichte grösser/gleich 150 Wh/kg bei 293 K (20 °C)  
*Technische Anmerkungen*  
 1. Für den vorliegenden Zweck wird die Energiedichte (Wh/kg) berechnet aus der Nominalspannung multipliziert mit der nominellen Kapazität (in Amperestunden [Ah]) geteilt durch die Masse (in Kilogramm). Falls die nominelle Kapazität nicht angegeben ist, wird die Energiedichte berechnet aus der quadrierten Nominalspannung multipliziert mit der Entladedauer (in Stunden), dividiert durch die Entladelast (in Obm) und die Masse (in Kilogramm).  
 2. Für den vorliegenden Zweck wird Zelle definiert als ein elektrochemisches Bauelement, das über positive und negative Elektroden sowie über einen Elektrolyten verfügt und eine Quelle für elektrische Energie ist. Sie ist die Grundeinheit einer Batterie.  
 3. Für den vorliegenden Zweck wird Primärzelle definiert als eine Zelle, die nicht durch irgendeine andere Quelle aufgeladen werden kann.

- ex 8526 10 ex Andere als von der GKV erfasste Radarsysteme, -geräte und wichtige  
8529 90 ex Bestandteile sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, wie folgt:  
9015 10 ex a) andere als von der GKV erfasste Luftfahrzeug- Bordradarsysteme und  
90 besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür;  
b) weltraumgeeignetes Laser- oder Lidar (LIDAR, Light Detection And Ranging), besonders konstruiert für die Landvermessung oder für meteorologische Beobachtung;  
c) Millimeterwellen-Enhanced-Vision-Bildgebungssysteme für Radar, besonders konstruiert für Luftfahrzeuge mit rotierenden Tragflächen und mit folgenden Eigenschaften:  
1. Betriebsfrequenz 94 GHz,  
2. mittlere Ausgangsleistung kleiner als 20 mW,  
3. Radarbündelbreite 1 Grad, und  
4. Betriebsbereich grösser/gleich 1 500 m.
- ex 9015 80 ex Magnetometer, supraleitende elektromagnetische Sensoren und besonders  
9031 80 konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, wie folgt:  
a) andere als von der GKV erfasste Magnetometer mit einer Empfindlichkeit kleiner (besser) als 1,0 nT (rms)/√Hz;  
*Technische Anmerkung: Für den vorliegenden Zweck bezeichnet Empfindlichkeit (Rauschpegel) den quadratischen Mittelwert des geräteseitig begrenzten Grundrauschens, bei dem es sich um das kleinste messbare Signal handelt.*  
b) supraleitende elektromagnetische Sensoren, Bestandteile aus supraleitenden Werkstoffen oder Materialien:  
1. konstruiert zum Betrieb mindestens eines ihrer supraleitenden Bestandteile bei Temperaturen unterhalb der kritischen Temperatur (einschliesslich Josephson-Elementen und SQUIDS [superconductive quantum interference devices]),  
2. konstruiert zum Erkennen von Änderungen des elektromagnetischen Felds bei Frequenzen kleiner/gleich 1 kHz, sowie  
3. mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:  
- mit Dünnsfilm-SQUIDS, deren kleinste Strukturabmessung kleiner ist als 2 µm, und mit zugehörigen Ein- und Ausgangskopplungsschaltungen  
- konstruiert zum Betrieb mit einer Magnetfeldänderungsgeschwindigkeit von mehr als  $1 \times 10^6$  magnetischen Flussquanten pro Sekunde  
- konstruiert zum Betrieb ohne magnetische Abschirmung innerhalb des Erdmagnetfelds oder  
- mit einem Temperaturkoeffizienten kleiner (weniger) als 0,1 magnetische Flussquanten/K.
- ex 9015 80 Andere als von der GKV erfasste Schwerkraftmesser (Gravimeter) konstruiert oder geändert für die Verwendung an Land, wie folgt:  
a) mit einer statischen Genauigkeit kleiner (besser) als 100 µGal; oder  
b) solche mit Quarzelement (Worden-Prinzip).
- Andere als von der GKV erfasste Software, besonders entwickelt für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung von Gütern, die von Anhang 2 Teil 2 Ziff. 6A002 und 6A003 GKV erfasst werden, sowie Radare, Magnetometer und Schwerkraftmesser, die in die Kategorie 6 der vorliegenden Verordnung fallen.

## H. Kategorie 7 - Luftfahrtelektronik und Navigation

HS-Code	Beschreibung
---------	--------------

ex 8517 61 ex	Fernsteuerungsgeräte für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge (UAV)
8526 92 ex	
8537 10 ex	
8543 70 90	
ex 8807 30	
ex 8517 62 ex	Telekommunikationsapparate, -geräte oder -anlagen für Luftfahrzeuge
8517 69	
ex 8517 71 ex	Antennen und Antennenreflektoren für Luftfahrzeuge
8529 10	
ex 8517 71 ex	Ausrüstung für Satellitennavigationssysteme, einschliesslich für den Empfang von GNSS-Signalen geeigneter Antennen
8526 10 ex	
8526 91 ex	
8526 92 ex	
8529 10 ex	
8529 90	
ex 8526 10 ex	Radargeräte für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge (UAV) und speziell konzipierte Komponenten hierfür, namentlich folgende Radargeräte: Lichtradar (LIDAR), Funkmessvisier (Airborne Intercept, AI), Zielverfolgungsradar (Target Tracking, TT), Flugabwehrartillerie (Anti-aircraft Artillery, AAA), Zielerfassungsradar (Target Acquisition, TA), luftgestützte Frühwarnung (Airborne Early Warning, AEW)
8529 90	
ex 8526 91 ex	Funknavigationsgeräte für Luftfahrzeuge und speziell konzipierte Komponenten hierfür
8529 90	
ex 8537 10 ex	Flugsteuerorgane (FCU) für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge (UAV)
8807 30	
ex 8543 70	Digitale Flugdatenschreiber <i>Anmerkung: Umfasst nicht Flugdatenschreiber mit folgenden Eigenschaften:</i> <i>a) zugelassen von den zivilen Luftfahrtbehörden eines oder mehrerer EU-Mitgliedstaaten oder Teilnehmerstaaten des Wassenaar-Arrangements; und</i> <i>b) bestimmt für ein nichtmilitärisches Luftfahrzeug, für das eines der folgenden Dokumente von einem oder mehreren EUMitgliedstaaten oder Teilnehmerstaaten des Wassenaar-Arrangements für ein Luftfahrzeug mit diesem speziellen Triebwerkstyp ausgestellt wurde:</i> <i>1. eine zivile Musterzulassung, oder</i> <i>2. ein gleichwertiges, von der Internationalen Zivilluftfahrt-Organisation (ICAO) anerkanntes Dokument.</i>
ex 9014 20 ex	Trägheitsnavigationssysteme, Trägheitsplattformen (IMU), Beschleunigungsmesser oder Kreisel
9014 80 ex	
9014 90	

## I. Kategorie 9 - Luftfahrt, Raumfahrt und Antriebe

HS-Code	Beschreibung
8407 10	Hubkolben- oder Kreiskolbenmotoren mit Funkenzündung (Verbrennungsmotoren) für Luftfahrzeuge

- ex 8408 90 Kolbenmotoren mit Kompressionszündung (Diesel- oder Halbdieselmotoren) für Luftfahrzeuge
- 8409 10 Teile, erkennbar ausschliesslich oder hauptsächlich für Motoren für Luftfahrzeuge bestimmt
- ex 8411 11 ex Turbostrahltriebwerke und Turbopropellertriebwerke für Luftfahrzeuge  
8411 12 ex sowie Teile dafür  
8411 21 ex  
8411 22 ex  
8411 91
- ex 8526 92 ex Systeme für die Flugbeendigung und speziell konstruierte Komponenten.  
8529 90 *Anmerkung: Für den vorliegenden Zweck werden digitale und analoge Kommunikationsstandards für Flugbeendigungssysteme, einschliesslich verschlüsselter Betriebsarten, erfasst.*  
*Technische Anmerkungen*  
*1.Für den vorliegenden Zweck kann die Flugbeendigung einen kontrollierten Sinkflug, eine Selbsterstörung oder eine Detonation der Gefechtsköpfe zur Minimierung des Risikos von Kollateralschäden umfassen.*  
*2.Für den vorliegenden Zweck sind Komponenten Boden- und Bordausrüstung, Befehlsauslöser, Codierer, Verstärker-Kontroller, Empfänger zur Befehlsüberprüfung, Verstärker, Sender, Decoder und Empfänger.*
- ex 8805 10 Bodendienstgeräte für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge (UAV)
- ex 8501 Servomotoren für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge (UAV)  
ex 8807 30
- ex 8805 10 ex Startapparate und -vorrichtungen für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge (UAV)  
8807 30
- 8806 21 8806 Unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge (UAV) und Teile davon, ausgenommen solche  
22 8806 23 für die Beförderung von Fluggästen  
8806 24 8806  
29 8806 91  
8806 92 8806  
93 8806 94  
8806 99  
ex 8807 30
- ex 8807 30 Bodendienstgeräte für unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge (UAV)
- ex 9031 20 ex Andere als von der GKV erfasste Prüfausrüstung für Luftfahrt, Raumfahrt  
9031 80 und Antriebe und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür.  
*Anmerkung: Für den vorliegenden Zweck werden die folgenden Güter und die zugehörige Software erfasst:*  
*-Prüfstand für den Lastenabwurf und andere Einrichtungen zur Simulation einer sicheren Trennung vom Luftfahrzeug oder Startsystem;*  
*-Salznebelkammern für Temperatur- und Feuchtigkeitsbereiche zur Durchführung von Oxidationstests;*  
*-Kammern zur Durchführung von Fungustests;*  
*-Einrichtungen für Beschleunigungs-, Stoss- und Transportstossprüfungen;*  
*-Vibrationskammern mit Höhen-, Temperatur- und Feuchtigkeitsbereichen;*  
*-Kammern zur Prüfung bei explosiver Dekompression;*

- Kammern für Temperatur-, Feuchtigkeits- und Sonnenstrahlungsprüfungen;*
- Geräte zur Schätzung der erfassten Sonneneinstrahlung für Sonneneinstrahlungsprüfungen;*
- Schwingungserreger für Sinus-, Rausch- und Schockprüfungen, kombinierbar mit Höhen-, Temperatur- und Feuchtigkeitsprüfungen;*
- Rütteltisch für Längs- und Querprüfungen in Kombination mit Temperaturkammern;*
- Überdruckkammern.*

## **J. Kategorie 10 - Technologie**

Technologie, die für die Erprobung, Entwicklung oder Herstellung der vorstehend aufgeführten Ausrüstung konzipiert oder speziell angepasst wurde.

## Anhang 2

(Art. 4 Abs. 1)

### Güter, Technologie und Software, die unter die Bewilligungspflicht nach Art. 4 fallen

#### A. Güter, Technologie und Software

1. Kernmaterialien nach Art. 1 KEV.
2. Güter, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 Teil 1 GKV.
3. Güter, Technologie und Software nach Anhang 2 GKV mit den Kontrollregime-Codes 201 bis 299.

#### B. Sonstige Güter

Nummer der EU	Beschreibung	Referenz- nummer in Anhang 2 GKV
<i>A0. Kerntechnische Materialien, Anlagen und Ausrüstung</i>		
II.A.0.001	Hohlkathodenlampen wie folgt: a) Jod-Hohlkathodenlampen mit Fenstern aus einem Silizium oder Quarz; b) Uran-Hohlkathodenlampen.	
II.A.0.002	Faraday-Isolatoren im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm.	
II.A.0.003	Optische Gitter im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm.	
II.A.0.004	Optische Fasern im Wellenlängenbereich 500-650 nm, mit Antireflexschichten im Wellen- längenbereich 500-650 nm überzogen und mit einem Kerndurchmesser grösser als 0,4 mm und kleiner/gleich 2 mm.	
II.A.0.005	Bestandteile eines Kernreaktors und Prüfgeräte, soweit nicht in Nummer 0A001 erfasst, wie folgt: 1. Plomben; 2. innenliegende Bestandteile; 3. Ausrüstung für das Verschliessen sowie für das Prüfen und Messen der Verschlüsse.	0A001
II.A.0.006	Nukleare Nachweissysteme zum Nachweis, zur Identifizierung und zur Quantifizierung radio-	0A001j 1A004c

	aktiver Stoffe oder von Kernstrahlung und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, soweit nicht in den Unternummern 0A001j und 1A004c erfasst.	
II.A0.007	Faltenbalgventile aus Aluminiumlegierungen oder rostfreiem Stahl vom Typ 304, 304L oder 316L. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Faltenbalgventile, erfasst in Unternummer 0B001c6 und Nummer 2A226.	0B001c6 2A226
II.A0.008	Laserspiegel, soweit nicht in Unternummer 6A005e erfasst, aus Substraten mit einem thermischen Ausdehnungskoeffizienten von kleiner/gleich $10^{-6}K^{-1}$ bei 20 °C (z.B. Quarzglas oder Saphir). <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht optische Systeme, die speziell für astronomische Anwendungen entwickelt wurden, sofern die Spiegel kein geschmolzenes Quarz enthalten.	0B001g5 6A005e
II.A0.009	Laserlinsen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 6A005e2 erfasst, aus Substraten mit einem thermischen Ausdehnungskoeffizienten von kleiner/gleich $10^{-6}K^{-1}$ bei 20 °C (z.B. Quarzglas).	0B001g 6A005e2
II.A0.010	Rohre, Verrohrungen, Flansche und Anschlussstücke (Fittings), bestehend aus oder beschichtet mit Nickel oder Nickellegierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350h1 erfasst.	2B350
II.A0.011	Vakuumpumpen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 0B002f2 oder Nummer 2B231 erfasst, wie folgt: Turbomolekularpumpen mit einer Förderleistung grösser/gleich 400 l/s, Wälzkolben(Roots-)vakuumpumpen mit einer volumetrischen Ansaugleistung grösser als 200 m <sup>3</sup> /h. Faltenbalggedichtete Schraubenkompressoren und faltenbalggedichtete Schraubenvakuumpumpen.	0B002f2 2B231
II.A0.012	Abgeschirmte Gehäuse für den Umgang mit, die Aufbewahrung oder die Handhabung von radioaktiven Stoffen (Heisse Zellen).	0B006
II.A0.013	"Natürliches Uran", "abgereichertes Uran" oder Thorium als Metall, Legierung, chemische Verbindung oder Konzentrat sowie jedes andere Material, das einen oder mehrere der vorstehend genannten Stoffe enthält, soweit nicht in Nummer 0C001 erfasst.	0C001

II.A0.014	Detonationskammern mit einer Absorptions-Kapazität von über 2,5 kg TNT-Äquivalent.	
II.A0.015	"Handschuhfächer", besonders konstruiert für radioaktive Isotope, Strahlenquellen oder Radionuklide. Technische <i>Anmerkung</i> : "Handschuhfach" bezeichnet ein Gerät, das der Person, die das Gerät von aussen bedient, Schutz vor gefährlichen Dämpfen, Partikeln oder Strahlen bietet, die von den Materialien erzeugt werden, die die Person mittels in das Gerät integrierter Griffe oder Handschuhe innerhalb des Geräts behandelt oder bearbeitet.	0B006
II.A0.016	Systeme zur Überwachung toxischer Gase, ausgelegt für den Dauerbetrieb und zur Feststellung von Schwefelwasserstoff, und besonders konstruierte Detektoren hierfür.	0A001 0B001c
II.A0.017	Heliumleckdetektoren.	0A001 0B001c
<i>A1. Werkstoffe, Chemikalien, "Mikroorganismen" und "Toxine"</i>		
II.A1.001	Lösungsmittel Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phosphorsäure (HDEHP oder D2HPA) (Nummer im Register des Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) 298-07-7), in beliebiger Menge, mit einer Reinheit grösser als 90 Gew.-%.	
II.A1.002	Fluorgas - CAS-Nr. 7782-41-4 - mit einer Reinheit grösser als 95 Gew.-%.	
II.A1.003	Ringförmige Dichtungen und Verschlüsse mit einem Innendurchmesser von kleiner/gleich 400 mm, bestehend aus einem der folgenden Materialien: a) Copolymere des Vinylidenfluorids, die ungereckt zu mindestens 75 % eine beta-kristalline Struktur aufweisen; b) fluorierte Polyimide, die mindestens 10 Gew.-% gebundenes Fluor enthalten; c) fluorierte Phosphazen-Elastomere, die mindestens 30 Gew.-% gebundenes Fluor enthalten; d) Polychlortrifluorethylen (PCTFE, z.B. Kel-F®); e) Fluorelastomere (z.B. Viton®, Tecnoflon®); f) Polytetrafluorethylen (PTFE).	
II.A1.004	Persönliche Ausrüstung für den Nachweis von Kernstrahlung, einschliesslich Personen-Dosimeter.	1A004c

	<i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Kernstrahlungsnachweissysteme, erfasst in Unternummer 1A004c.	
II.A1.005	Elektrolytische Zellen für die Erzeugung von Fluor mit einer Fertigungskapazität von mehr als 100 g Fluor je Stunde. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht elektrolytische Zellen, erfasst in Nummer 1B225.	1B225
II.A1.006	Katalysatoren, soweit nicht nach Nummer 1A225 verboten, die Platin, Palladium oder Rhodium enthalten, verwendbar zur Förderung der Wasserstoffaustauschreaktion zwischen Wasserstoff und Wasser zur Tritiumrückgewinnung aus Schwerem Wasser oder zur Schwerwasserproduktion.	1B231 1A225
II.A1.007	Aluminium und Aluminiumlegierungen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 1C002b4 oder 1C202a erfasst, in Roh- oder Halbzeugform mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften: a) erreichbare Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 460 MPa bei 293 K (20 °C); oder b) mit einer Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 415 MPa bei 298 K (25 °C).	1C002b4 1C202a
II.A1.008	Magnetische Metalle aller Typen und in jeder Form mit einer Anfangsrelativpermeabilität (initial relative permeability) grösser/gleich 120 000 und einer Dicke grösser/gleich 0,05 mm und kleiner/gleich 0,1 mm.	1C003a
II.A1.009	"Faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" oder Prepregs wie folgt: <i>ANMERKUNG:</i> SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A1.1019.a. a) "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff oder Aramid mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften: 1. "spezifischer Modul" grösser als $10 \times 10^6$ m; oder 2. "spezifische Zugfestigkeit" grösser als $17 \times 10^4$ m; b) "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" aus Glas mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften: 1. "spezifischer Modul" grösser als $3,18 \times 10^6$ m, oder 2. "spezifische Zugfestigkeit" grösser als $76,2 \times 10^3$ m; c) mit warmhärtendem Harz imprägnierte endlose "Garne", "Faserbündel" (rovings), "Seile" oder "Bänder" mit einer Breite kleiner/	1C010a 1C010b 1C210a 1C210b

	gleich 15 mm (wenn Prepregs) aus "faser- oder fadenförmigen Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff oder Glas, soweit nicht in Unternummer II.A1.010.a oder b erfasst. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien", erfasst in den Unternummern 1C010a, 1C010b, 1C210a und 1C210b.	
II.A1.010	<p>Harzimprägnierte oder pechimprägnierte Fasern (Prepregs), metall- oder kohlenstoffbeschichtete Fasern (Preforms) oder "Kohlenstofffaser-Preforms" wie folgt:</p> <p>a) hergestellt aus in Nummer II.A1.009 erfassten "faser- oder fadenförmigen Materialien";</p> <p>b) kohlenstoffbeschichtete "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" in Epoxidharz-"Matrix" (prepregs), erfasst in den Unternummern 1C010a, 1C010b und 1C010c, für die Reparatur von Luftfahrzeug-Strukturen oder Laminaten, bei denen die Grösse der Einzelmatten nicht grösser ist als 50 cm x 90 cm;</p> <p>c) Prepregs, erfasst in Unternummer 1C010a, 1C010b oder 1C010c, die mit Phenol- oder Epoxydharzen imprägniert sind, mit einer Glasübergangstemperatur (T<sub>g</sub>) kleiner als 433 K (160 °C) und deren Aushärtungstemperatur kleiner als die Glasübergangstemperatur ist.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien", erfasst in Unternummer 1C010e.</p>	1C010e 1C210
II.A1.011	Verstärkte Siliziumkarbid-Keramik-Verbundwerkstoffe, geeignet für Bugspitzen, Wiedereintrittskörper, Strahlruder, verwendbar für "Flugkörper", soweit nicht in Nummer 1C107 erfasst.	1C107
II.A1.012	<p>Martensitaushärtender Stahl (maraging Steel), soweit nicht in den Nummern 1C116 oder 1C216 erfasst, geeignet für eine Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 2050 MPa bei 293 K (20 °C).</p> <p><i>TechnischeAnmerkung:</i> Martensitaushärtender Stahl geeignet für umfasst martensitaushärtenden Stahl vor und nach einer Wärmebehandlung.</p>	1C216
II.A1.013	<p>Wolfram, Tantal, Wolframkarbid, Tantalkarbid und Legierungen mit beiden folgenden Eigenschaften;</p> <p>a) in Formen mit hohlzylindrischer oder sphärischer Symmetrie (einschliesslich Zylindersegmente) mit einem Innendurchmesser grösser/gleich 50 mm und kleiner/gleich 300 mm; und</p> <p>b) einer Masse über 5 kg.</p>	1C226

- Anmerkung:* Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Wolfram, Wolframkarbid und Legierungen, erfasst in Nummer 1C226.
- II.A1.014 Elementpulver aus Kobalt, Neodym oder Samarium oder Legierungen oder Mischungen daraus, die mindestens 20 Gew.-% Kobalt, Neodym oder Samarium enthalten, mit einer Partikelgrösse von kleiner 200 µm.
- II.A1.015 Reines Tributylphosphat (TBP) (CAS-Nr. 126-73-8) oder Mischungen mit einem Gehalt an TBP von über 5 Gew.-%.
- II.A1.016 Martensitahärtender Stahl (maraging Steel), soweit nicht nach den Nummern 1C116, 1C216 oder II.A1.012 verboten.  
*TechnischeAnmerkung:* Martensitahärtende Stähle sind Eisenlegierungen, die im Allgemeinen gekennzeichnet sind durch einen hohen Nickel- und sehr geringen Kohlenstoffgehalt sowie die Verwendung von Substitutions- oder Ausscheidungselementen zur Festigkeitssteigerung und Ausscheidungshärtung der Legierung.
- II.A1.017 Metall, Metallpulver und -material wie folgt:  
a) Wolfram und Wolframlegierungen, soweit nicht nach Nummer 1C117 verboten, in Form einheitlich kugelförmiger oder staubförmiger Partikel mit einer Partikelgrösse kleiner/gleich 500 µm und einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 97 Gew.-%;  
b) Molybdän und Molybdänlegierungen, soweit nicht nach Nummer 1C117 verboten, in Form einheitlich kugelförmiger oder staubförmiger Partikel mit einer Partikelgrösse kleiner/gleich 500 µm und einem Gehalt an Molybdän von grösser/gleich 97 Gew.-%;  
c) Wolframmaterialien in fester Form, soweit nicht nach den Nummern 1C226 oder II.A1.013 verboten, mit einer Materialzusammensetzung wie folgt:  
1. Wolfram und Legierungen mit einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 97 Gew.-%;  
2. mit Kupfer infiltriertes Wolfram mit einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 80 Gew.-%; oder  
3. mit Silber infiltriertes Wolfram mit einem Gehalt an Wolfram von grösser/gleich 80 Gew.-%.
- 11.A1.018 Weichmagnetische Legierungen mit einer chemischen Zusammensetzung wie folgt:

	a) Gehalt an Eisen zwischen 30 % und 60 %; und b) Gehalt an Kobalt zwischen 40 % und 60 %.	
II.A1.019	"Faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" oder Prepregs, die nicht nach Anhang 2 (Nummer II.A1.009 oder II.A1.010) der vorliegenden Verordnung verboten oder nicht in Anhang 2 GKV aufgeführt sind, wie folgt: a) "faser- oder fadenförmige Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff; Anmerkung: Unternummer II.A1.019.a erfasst keine Webwaren. b) mit warmushärtendem Harz imprägnierte endlose "Garne", "Faserbündel" (rovings), "Seile" oder "Bänder" aus "faser- oder fadenförmigen Materialien" aus Kohlenstoff; c) endlose "Garne", "Faserbündel" (rovings), "Seile" oder "Bänder" aus Polyacrylnitril (PAN).	
II.A1.020	Stahllegierungen als Stahlblech oder Stahlplatten mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften: a) Stahllegierungen geeignet für eine Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 1 200 MPa bei 293K (20 °C); oder b) Stickstoffstabilisierter Duplexstahl. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Der Ausdruck Legierungen geeignet für erfasst Legierungen vor und nach einer Wärmebehandlung. <i>TechnischeAnmerkung:</i> "Stickstoffstabilisierter Duplexstahl" besitzt eine Zweiphasen-Mikrostruktur bestehend aus Körnern ferritischen und austenitischen Stahls unter Zusatz von Stickstoff zur Stabilisierung der Mikrostruktur	1C116 1C216
II.A1.021	Kohlenstoff/Kohlenstoff-Verbundwerkstoffe.	1A002b1
II.A1.022	Nickellegierungen in Roh- oder Halbzeugform, mit mindestens 60 Gew.-% Nickel.	1C002c1a
II.A1.023	Titanlegierungen in Form von Titanblech oder Titanplatte geeignet für eine Zugfestigkeit grösser/gleich 900 MPa bei 293 K (20 °C). <i>Anmerkung:</i> Der Ausdruck Legierungen geeignet für erfasst Legierungen vor und nach einer Wärmebehandlung.	1C002b3
II.A1.024	Treibstoffe und chemische Bestandteile für Treibstoffe, wie folgt: a) Toluoldiisocyanat (TDI) b) Methylendiphenyldiisocyanat (MDI) c) Isophorondiisocyanat (IPDI) d) Natriumperchlorat e) Xylidin	1C111

f) hydroxyterminierter Polyether (HTPE)

g) hydroxyterminiertes Caprolactonether (HTCE)

*Technische Anmerkung:* Diese Nummer bezieht sich auf den Reinstoff und jede Mischung, die zu mindestens 50 % aus den oben genannten Chemikalien besteht.

II.A1.025	"Schmiermittel", die als Hauptbestandteil eine der folgenden Verbindungen oder einen der folgenden Stoffe enthalten: a) Perfluoroalkylether, (CAS 60164-51-4); b) Perfluoropolyalkylether, PFPE, (CAS 6991-67-9). "Schmiermittel" bedeutet Öle und Flüssigkeiten.	1C006
II.A1.026	Beryllium-Kupfer- oder Kupfer-Beryllium-Legierungen in Form von Platten, Blechen, Streifen oder gewalzten Stangen, bestehend grösstenteils aus Kupfer und aus anderen Elementen mit weniger als 2 Gew.-% Beryllium.	1C002b

*A2. Werkstoffbearbeitung*

II.A2.001	Vibrationsprüfsysteme, Ausrüstung und Bestandteile hierfür, soweit nicht in Nummer 2B116 erfasst: a) Vibrationsprüfsysteme mit Rückkopplungs- oder Closed-Loop-Technik mit integrierter digitaler Steuerung, geeignet für Vibrationsbeanspruchungen des Prüflings mit einer Beschleunigung grösser/gleich 0,1 g rms zwischen 0,1 Hz und 2 kHz und bei Übertragungskräften grösser/gleich 50 kN, gemessen am "Prüf-tisch"; b) digitale Steuerungen in Verbindung mit besonders für Vibrationsprüfung entwickelter "Software", mit einer Echtzeit-Bandbreite grösser/gleich 5 kHz und konstruiert zum Einsatz in den in Unternummer a erfassten Systemen; c) Schwingerreger (Shaker units) mit oder ohne zugehörige Verstärker, geeignet für Übertragungskräfte von grösser/gleich 50 kN, gemessen am "Prüftisch", und geeignet für die in Unternummer a erfassten Systeme; d) Prüflingshaltevorrichtungen und Elektronik-einheiten, konstruiert, um mehrere Schwingerreger zu einem Schwingerregersystem, das Übertragungskräfte grösser/gleich 50 kN, gemessen am "Prüftisch", erzeugen kann, zusammenzufassen, und geeignet für die in Unternummer a erfassten Systeme.	2B116
-----------	--	-------

	<i>TechnischeAnmerkung:</i> Ein "Prüftisch" ist ein flacher Tisch oder eine flache Oberfläche ohne Aufnahmen oder Halterungen.	
II.A2.002	<p>Werkzeugmaschinen und Bestandteile und Steuerungen für Werkzeugmaschinen wie folgt:</p> <p>a) Werkzeugmaschinen für Schleifbearbeitung mit einer Positioniergenauigkeit mit "allen verfügbaren Kompensationen" von kleiner (besser)/gleich 15 µm nach ISO 230/2 (1988) (1) oder entsprechenden nationalen Normen entlang einer Linearachse;</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Werkzeugmaschinen für Schleifbearbeitung, erfasst in den Unternummern 2B201b und 2B001c.</p> <p>b) Bestandteile und Steuerungen, besonders konstruiert für Werkzeugmaschinen, erfasst in Nummer 2B001 oder 2B201 oder in Unter- nummer a.</p>	2B201b 2B001c
II.A2.003	<p>Auswuchtmaschinen und zugehörige Ausrüstung wie folgt:</p> <p>a) Auswuchtmaschinen, konstruiert oder geändert für zahnmedizinische oder andere medizinische Ausrüstung, mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. nicht geeignet zum Auswuchten von Rotoren/Baugruppen mit einer Masse grösser als 3 kg,</li> <li>2. geeignet zum Auswuchten von Rotoren/Baugruppen bei Drehzahlen grösser als 12 500 U/min,</li> <li>3. geeignet zur Korrektur von Unwuchten in zwei oder mehr Ebenen; und</li> <li>4. geeignet zum Auswuchten bis zu einer spezifischen Restunwucht von 0,2 g mm/kg der Rotormasse;</li> </ol> <p>b) Messgeräte (indicator heads), konstruiert oder geändert für den Einsatz in Maschinen, erfasst in Unter- nummer a.</p> <p><i>TechnischeAnmerkung:</i> Indicator heads werden auch als balancing instrumentation bezeichnet.</p>	2B119
II.A2.004	<p>Fernlenk-Manipulatoren, die für ferngesteuerte Tätigkeiten bei radiochemischen Trennprozessen oder in Heissen Zellen eingesetzt werden können, soweit nicht in Nummer 2B225 erfasst, mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>a) Eignung zur Durchdringung der Wand einer Heissen Zelle mit einer Dicke grösser/gleich 0,3 m (Durch-die-Wand-Modifikation); oder</p> <p>b) Eignung zur Überbrückung der Wand einer Heissen Zelle mit einer Dicke grösser/gleich 0,3 m (Über-die-Wand-Modifikation).</p>	2B225

II.A2.006	<p>Öfen, geeignet für Betriebstemperaturen grösser als 400 °C, wie folgt:</p> <p>a) Oxydationsöfen;</p> <p>b) Mit kontrollierter Atmosphäre betriebene Wärmebehandlungsöfen.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Tunnelöfen mit Rollenbahn oder Wagen, Tunnelöfen mit Förderband, Durchschuböfen oder Herdwagenöfen, die für die Herstellung von Glas, Tischgeschirr aus Keramik oder Strukturkeramik konstruiert wurden.</p>	2B226 2B227
II.A2.007	<p>"Druckmessgeräte", soweit nicht in Nummer 2B230 erfasst, geeignet zum Messen von Absolutdrücken im Bereich von 0 bis 200 kPa, mit beiden folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>a) Drucksensoren, hergestellt aus oder geschützt durch "gegen Korrosion durch Uranhexafluorid (UF<sub>6</sub>)-resistente Werkstoffe"; und</p> <p>b) mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>1. Messbereich kleiner als 200 kPa und "Messgenauigkeit" kleiner (besser) als ± 1 % vom Skalenendwert; oder</p> <p>2. Messbereich grösser/gleich 200 kPa und "Messgenauigkeit" kleiner (besser) als 2 kPa.</p>	2B230
II.A2.008	<p>Flüssig-flüssig Kontakt-Ausrüstung (Mischer-Abscheider, Pulsationskolonnen und Zentrifugalextraktoren) und Flüssigkeitsverteiler, Dampfverteiler oder Flüssigkeitssammler, konstruiert für solche Ausrüstung, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:</p> <p><i>ANMERKUNG:</i> SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.014.</p> <p>1. rostfreier Stahl.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Für rostfreien Stahl mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom siehe Nummer II.A2.014.a</p>	2B350e
II.A2.009	<p>Industrielle Geräte und Bestandteile, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350d erfasst, wie folgt:</p> <p><i>ANMERKUNG:</i> SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.015</p> <p>Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren mit einer Wärmeaustauschfläche grösser als 0,05 m<sup>2</sup> und kleiner als 30 m<sup>2</sup> sowie für solche Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren konstruierte Rohre, Platten, Coils oder Blöcke, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:</p> <p>1. rostfreier Stahl.</p>	2B350d

	<p><i>Anmerkung 1:</i> Für rostfreien Stahl mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom siehe Nummer II.A2.015.a</p> <p><i>Anmerkung 2:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Fahrzeugkühler.</p> <p><i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus des Wärmetauschers.</p>	
II.A2.010	<p>Pumpen mit Mehrfachdichtung und dichtungslöse Pumpen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350i erfasst, geeignet für korrodierende Flüssigkeiten, mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 0,6 m<sup>3</sup>/h oder Vakuumpumpen mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 5 m<sup>3</sup>/h (jeweils unter Standard-Bedingungen von 273 K (0 °C) und 101,3 kPa) sowie für solche Pumpen konstruierte Pumpengehäuse, vorgeformte Gehäuseauskleidungen, Laufräder, Rotoren oder Strahlpumpendüsen, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus den folgenden Materialien bestehen: ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.016.</p> <p>1. rostfreier Stahl.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Für rostfreien Stahl mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom siehe Nummer II.A2.016.a</p> <p><i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus der Pumpe.</p>	2B350i
II.A2.011	<p>Zentrifugalseparatoren, geeignet zur kontinuierlichen Trennung ohne Aerosolfreisetzung und hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;</li> <li>2. Fluorpolymeren;</li> <li>3. Glas oder Email;</li> <li>4. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew. % Nickel;</li> <li>5. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen;</li> <li>6. Titan oder Titanlegierungen; oder</li> <li>7. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen.</li> </ol> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Zentrifugalseparatoren, erfasst in Unternummer 2B352c.</p>	2B352c

II.A2.012	<p>Filter aus gesintertem Metall, aus Nickel oder Nickellegierungen mit 40 Gew.-% Nickel oder mehr.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Filter, erfasst in Unternummer 2B352d.</p>	2B352d
II.A2.013	<p>Drück- und Fließdruckmaschinen, soweit nicht in Nummer 2B009, 2B109 oder 2B209 erfasst, mit einer Supportkraft grösser als 60 kN und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür.</p> <p><i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Im Sinne von Nummer II.A2.013 werden Maschinen mit kombinierter Drück- und Fließdruckfunktion als Fließdruckmaschinen betrachtet.</p>	
II.A2.014	<p>Flüssig-flüssig-Kontakt-Ausrüstung (Mischer-Abscheider, Pulsationskolonnen und Zentrifugalextraktoren) und Flüssigkeitsverteiler, Dampfverteiler oder Flüssigkeitssammler, konstruiert für solche Ausrüstung, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:</p> <p>ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.008.</p> <p>a) hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Materialien:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;</li> <li>2. Fluorpolymeren;</li> <li>3. Glas oder Email;</li> <li>4. Grafit oder "Carbon-Grafit";</li> <li>5. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel;</li> <li>6. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen;</li> <li>7. Titan oder Titanlegierungen;</li> <li>8. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen; oder</li> </ol> <p>b) aus Edelstahl und einem oder mehreren in II.A2.014.a erfassten Materialien.</p> <p><i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> "Carbon-Grafit" besteht aus amorphem Kohlenstoff und Grafit, wobei der Grafitgehalt 8 Gew.-% oder mehr beträgt.</p>	2B350e
II.A2.015	<p>Industrielle Geräte und Bestandteile, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350d erfasst, wie folgt:</p> <p>ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER II.A2.009.</p> <p>Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren mit einer Wärmeaustauschfläche grösser als 0,05 m<sup>2</sup> und kleiner als 30 m<sup>2</sup> sowie für solche Wärmetauscher oder Kondensatoren konstruierte Rohre, Platten, Coils oder Blöcke, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Werkstoffe bestehen:</p>	2B350d

a) hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Materialien:

1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;
2. Fluorpolymeren;
3. Glas oder Email;
4. Grafit oder "Carbon-Grafit";
5. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel;
6. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen;
7. Titan oder Titanlegierungen;
8. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen;
9. Siliziumkarbid; oder
10. Titankarbid; oder

b) aus Edelstahl und einem oder mehreren in II.A2.015.a erfassten Materialien.

*Anmerkung:* Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Fahrzeugkühler.

*Technische Anmerkung:* Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus des Wärmetauschers.

II.A2.016

Pumpen mit Mehrfachdichtung und dichtungslöse Pumpen, soweit nicht in Unternummer 2B350i erfasst, geeignet für korrodierende Flüssigkeiten, mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 0,6 m<sup>3</sup>/h oder Vakuumpumpen mit einer vom Hersteller angegebenen maximalen Förderleistung grösser als 5 m<sup>3</sup>/h (jeweils unter Standard-Bedingungen von 273 K (0 °C) und 101,3 kPa); sowie für solche Pumpen konstruierte Pumpengehäuse, vorgeformte Gehäuseauskleidungen, Laufräder, Rotoren oder Strahlpumpendüsen, bei denen die medienberührenden Flächen ganz aus einem der folgenden Materialien bestehen:

ANMERKUNG: SIEHE AUCH ZIFFER

II.A2.010.

a) hergestellt aus einem der folgenden Materialien:

1. Legierungen mit mehr als 25 Gew.-% Nickel und 20 Gew.-% Chrom;
2. Keramik;
3. Ferrosiliziumguss;
4. Fluorpolymeren;
5. Glas oder Email;
6. Grafit oder "Carbon-Grafit";
7. Nickel oder Nickel-Legierungen mit mehr als 40 Gew.-% Nickel;
8. Tantal oder Tantallegierungen;
9. Titan oder Titanlegierungen;

2B350i

	10. Zirkonium oder Zirkoniumlegierungen; 11. Niob (Columbium) oder Niob-"Legierungen"; oder 12. Aluminiumlegierungen; oder b) aus Edelstahl und einem oder mehreren in II.A2.016.a. erfassten Materialien. <i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Die für Dichtungen und Verschlüsse und weitere Verschlussfunktionen verwendeten Materialien bestimmen nicht den Kontrollstatus der Pumpe.	
II.A2.017	Funkenerodiermaschinen (EDM) zum Entfernen oder Schneiden von Metallen, Keramiken oder "Verbundwerkstoffen", wie folgt, und besondere konstruierte Ramm-, Senk- oder Drahtelektroden hierfür: a) Funkenerodiermaschinen mit Ramm- oder Senkelektroden; b) Funkenerodiermaschinen mit Drahtelektroden. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Funkenerodiermaschinen werden auch als Drahterodiermaschinen bezeichnet.	2B001d
II.A2.018	Rechnergesteuerte oder "numerisch gesteuerte" Koordinatenmessmaschinen (CMM) mit einer dreidimensionalen (volumetrischen) Längenmessabweichung (MPPE) an einem Punkt innerhalb des Arbeitsbereiches der Maschine (d.h. innerhalb der Achslängen) kleiner (besser)/gleich $(3 + L/1000) \mu\text{m}$ (L ist die Messlänge in mm), geprüft nach ISO 10360-2 (2001), und hierfür konstruierte Messsonden.	2B006a 2B206a
II.A2.019	Rechnergesteuerte oder "rechnergestützte" Elektronenstrahlschweissmaschinen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.	2B001e1b
II.A2.020	Rechnergesteuerte oder "rechnergestützte" Laserschweiss- und Laserschneidmaschinen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.	2B001e1c
II.A2.021	Rechnergesteuerte oder "rechnergestützte" Plasmaschneidmaschinen und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.	2B001e1
II.A2.022	Vibrationsprüfgeräte besonders konstruiert für Rotoren oder rotierende Ausrüstungen und Maschinen, geeignet zum Messen von Frequenzen zwischen 600 und 2000 Hz.	2B116
II.A2.023	Flüssigringvakuumpumpen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.	2B231 2B350i
II.A2.024	Drehschiebervakuumpumpen, und besonders konstruierte Bauteile hierfür.	2B231 2B235i

	<p><i>Anmerkung 1:</i> Nummer II.A2.024 erfasst nicht Drehschiebervakuumpumpen, die für andere spezifische Ausrüstungen besonders konstruiert sind.</p> <p><i>Anmerkung 2:</i> Die Erfassung von Drehschiebervakuumpumpen, besonders entwickelt für andere Geräte, richtet sich nach der Erfassung der anderen Geräte.</p>	0B002f
II.A2.025	<p>Luftfilter, wie folgt, mit einem Durchmesser von mehr als 1000 mm:</p> <p>a) HEPA-Filter (High Efficiency Particulate Air filters);</p> <p>b) ULPA-Filter (Ultra Low Penetration Air filters).</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Die Nummer II.A2.025 erfasst nicht für medizinische Ausrüstung besonders konstruierte Luftfilter</p>	2B352d
<i>A3. Allgemeine Elektronik</i>		
II.A3.001	<p>Hochspannungs-Gleichstromversorgungsgeräte mit beiden folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>a) Erzeugung von 10 kV oder mehr im Dauerbetrieb über einen Zeitraum von acht Stunden mit einer Ausgangsleistung grösser/gleich 5 kW, auch mit sweeping; und</p> <p>b) Strom- oder Spannungsregelung besser als 0,1 % über einen Zeitraum von vier Stunden</p> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Stromversorgungsgeräte, erfasst in Unternummer 0B001j5 und Nummer 3A227.</p>	3A227
II.A3.002	<p>Massenspektrometer, soweit nicht in Nummer 3A233 oder Unternummer 0B002g erfasst, für die Messung von Ionen einer Atommasse grösser/gleich 200 amu (atomic mass units) mit einer Auflösung besser als 2 amu bei 200 amu oder grösser, und Ionenquellen hierfür wie folgt:</p> <p>a) induktiv gekoppelte Plasma-Massenspektrometer (ICP/MS);</p> <p>b) Glühentladungs-Massenspektrometer (GDMS);</p> <p>c) Thermoionisations-Massenspektrometer (TIMS);</p> <p>d) Elektronenstoss-Massenspektrometer mit einer Quellenkammer, hergestellt aus "Uranhexafluorid (UF6)-resistenten Werkstoffen", damit ausgekleidet oder plattiert;</p> <p>e) Molekularstrahl-Massenspektrometer mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <p>1. mit einer Quellenkammer, hergestellt aus rostfreiem Stahl oder Molybdän, damit ausgekleidet</p>	3A233

	oder plattiert, und mit einer Kühlfalle, die auf 193 K (-80 °C) oder weniger kühlen kann; oder 2. mit einer Quellenkammer, hergestellt aus "Uranhexafluorid (UF <sub>6</sub> )-resistenten Werkstoffen", damit ausgekleidet oder plattiert; f) Massenspektrometer, ausgestattet mit einer Mikrofluorierungs-Ionenquelle, konstruiert für Aktinide oder Aktinidenfluoride.	
II.A3.003	Spektrometer oder Diffraktometer, konstruiert für den indikativen Test oder die quantitative Analyse der Elementzusammensetzung von Metallen oder Legierungen ohne chemisches Aufschliessen des Materials	
II.A3.004	Frequenzumwandler oder Generatoren, die nicht nach Nummer 0B001 oder 3A225 verboten sind, mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile und entworfene Software hierfür: a) Mehrphasenausgang mit einer Leistung grösser/gleich 10 W; b) Betriebsfrequenz von 600 Hz oder mehr; und c) Frequenzstabilisierung besser (kleiner) als 0,2 %. <i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Frequenzumwandler werden auch als Konverter oder Inverter bezeichnet. <i>Anmerkungen:</i> 1. Nummer II.A3.004 erfasst nicht Frequenzumwandler, die mit Kommunikationsprotokollen oder Schnittstellen für spezifische Industriemaschinen (wie Werkzeugmaschinen, Spinnmaschinen, Leiterplattenmaschinen) ausgestattet sind, so dass die Frequenzumwandler bei Erfüllung der oben genannten Leistungsmerkmale nicht zu anderen Zwecken verwendet werden können. 2. Nummer II.A3.004 erfasst nicht für Fahrzeuge besonders konstruierte Frequenzumwandler mit einer zwischen Frequenzumwandler und Fahrzeugkontrollseinheit gegenseitig kommunizierten Kontrollsequenz.	3A225 0B001b13
<i>A6. Sensoren und Laser</i>		
II.A6.001	Stäbe aus Yttrium-Aluminium-Granat (YAG).	
II.A6.002	Optische Ausrüstung und Bestandteile, soweit nicht in Nummer 6A002 oder Unternummer 6A004b erfasst, wie folgt: Infraroptiken im Wellenlängenbereich grösser/gleich 9000 nm und kleiner/gleich 17000 nm und	6A002 6A004b

	Bestandteile hierfür, einschliesslich Bestandteilen aus Cadmiumtellurid (CdTe).	
II.A6.003	Wellenfrontkorrektursysteme für die Verwendung mit einem Laserstrahl mit einem Durchmesser grösser als 4 mm und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür, einschliesslich Steuersysteme und Phasenfront-Erkennungssysteme und "verformbare Spiegel" einschliesslich bimorphen Spiegeln. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Spiegel, erfasst in den Unternummern 6A004a, 6A005e und 6A005f.	6A003
II.A6.004	Argonionen-"Laser" mit einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser/gleich 5 W. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Argonionen-"Laser", erfasst in Unter Nummer 0B001g5, Nummer 6A005 und Unter Nummer 6A205a.	6A005a6 6A205a
II.A6.005	Halbleiter-"Laser" und Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt: a) einzelne Halbleiter-"Laser" mit einer jeweiligen Ausgangsleistung grösser als 200 mW, in Mengen grösser als 100; b) Halbleiter-"Laser"-Arrays mit einer Ausgangsleistung grösser als 20 W. <i>Anmerkungen:</i> 1. Halbleiter-"Laser" werden gewöhnlich als "Laser"-Dioden bezeichnet. 2. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "Laser", erfasst in den Unternummern 0B001g5, 0B001h6 und 6A005. 3. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht "Laser"-Dioden mit einer Wellenlänge im Bereich 1200 nm-2000 nm.	6A005b
II.A6.006	Abstimmbare Halbleiter-"Laser" und abstimmbare Halbleiter-"Laser"-Arrays mit einer Wellenlänge grösser/ gleich 9 µm und kleiner/gleich 17 µm sowie Stacks aus Halbleiter-"Lasern", die wenigstens ein abstimmbares Halbleiter-"Laser"-Array mit einer solchen Wellenlänge enthalten. <i>Anmerkungen:</i> 1. Halbleiter-"Laser" werden gewöhnlich als "Laser"-Dioden bezeichnet. 2. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Halbleiter-"Laser", erfasst in den Unternummern 0B001h6 und 6A005b.	6A005b
II.A6.007	"Abstimmbare" Festkörper-"Laser" und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt:	6A005c1

	<p>a) Titan-Saphir-Laser;  b) Alexandrit-Laser.  <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Titan-Saphir- und Alexandrit-Laser, erfasst in den Unternummern 0B001g5, 0B001h6 und 6A005c1.</p>	
II.A6.008	<p>Neodym-dotierte (andere als Glas-) "Laser" mit einer Ausgangswellenlänge grösser als 1000 nm und kleiner/gleich 1100 nm und einer Ausgangsenergie je Puls grösser als 10 J.  <i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Neodym-dotierte (andere als Glas-) "Laser", erfasst in Unternummer 6A005c2b.</p>	6A005c2
II.A6.009	<p>Akustooptische Bestandteile wie folgt:  a) Aufnahmeröhren und Halbleiter-Bildsensoren, die eine Bildwiederholungsfrequenz grösser/gleich 1 kHz erlauben;  b) die Bildwiederholungsfrequenz bestimmendes Zubehör;  c) Pockels-Zellen.</p>	6A203b4c
II.A6.010	<p>Strahlungsfeste Kameras oder Linsen hierfür, soweit nicht in Unternummer 6A203c erfasst, besonders konstruiert oder ausgelegt als unempfindlich gegen Strahlungsbelastungen grösser als <math>50 \times 10^3</math> Gy (Silizium) (<math>5 \times 10^6</math> Rad (Silizium)) ohne betriebsbedingten Qualitätsverlust.  <i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> Der Ausdruck Gy (Silizium) bezieht sich auf die in Joule pro Kilogramm ausgedrückte Energie, die von einer ionisierender Strahlung ausgesetzten Probe von nicht abgeschirmtem Silizium absorbiert wird.</p>	6A203c
II.A6.011	<p>Abstimmbare, gepulste Farbstoff-(Dye-) Laserverstärker und -Oszillatoren mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften:  1. einer Betriebswellenlänge grösser/gleich 300 nm und kleiner/gleich 800 nm;  2. einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser als 10 W und kleiner/gleich 30 W;  3. Pulsfrequenz grösser als 1 kHz; und  4. einer Pulsdauer kleiner als 100 ns.  <i>Anmerkungen:</i>  1. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht Single-Mode-Oszillatoren  2. Diese Nummer erfasst nicht abstimmbare, gepulste Farbstoff-(Dye-) Laserverstärker und -Oszillatoren, erfasst in den Unternummern 6A205c und 0B001g5 sowie in Nummer 6A005.</p>	6A205c

II.A6.012	<p>Gepulste CO<sub>2</sub> - "Laser" mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. einer Betriebswellenlänge grösser/gleich 9000 nm und kleiner/gleich 11 000 nm;</li><li>2. einer Pulsfrequenz grösser als 250 Hz;</li><li>3. einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser als 100 W und kleiner/gleich 500 W; und</li><li>4. einer Pulsdauer kleiner als 200 ns.</li></ol> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht gepulste CO<sub>2</sub> - Laserverstärker und -Oszillatoren, erfasst in den Unternummern 6A205d, 0B001h5 und 6A005d.</p>	6A205d
II.A6.013	<p>Kupferdampf- "Laser" mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Ausgangswellenlänge grösser/gleich 500 nm und kleiner/gleich 600 nm; und</li><li>2. einer mittleren Ausgangsleistung grösser/gleich 15 W.</li></ol>	6A005b
II.A6.014	<p>Gepulste CO - "Laser" mit allen folgenden Eigenschaften</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Ausgangswellenlänge grösser/gleich 5000 nm und kleiner/gleich 6000 nm;</li><li>2. Pulsfrequenz grösser als 250 Hz;</li><li>3. mittlere Ausgangsleistung grösser als 100 W; und</li><li>4. Pulsdauer kleiner als 200 ns.</li></ol> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Diese Nummer erfasst nicht industrielle Hochleistungs-CO-Laser (typischerweise 1-5 kW) für Anwendungen wie Schneiden und Schweißen, da es sich bei solchen Lasern um Dauerstrich-Laser oder um Laser handelt, deren Pulsdauer grösser ist als 200 ns.</p>	
II.A6.015	<p>"Vakuum-Druckmesser" mit elektrischem Antrieb und eine Messgenauigkeit von 5 % oder weniger (besser). "Vakuum-Druckmesser" umfasst Pirani-Sensoren, Penning-Sensoren und Kapazitätsmanometer</p>	0B001b
II.A6.016	<p>Mikroskope und zugehörige Ausrüstungen und Detektoren, wie folgt:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a) Rasterelektronenmikroskope;</li><li>b) Raster-Augur-Mikroskope;</li><li>c) Durchstrahlungs-Elektronenmikroskope;</li><li>d) Atomkraftmikroskope;</li><li>e) Rasterkraftmikroskope;</li><li>f) Ausrüstung und Detektoren, besonders konstruiert zur Verwendung mit den in II.A6.013 a bis e erfassten Mikroskopen, für den Einsatz in</li></ol>	6B

der Werkstoffanalyse unter Verwendung folgender Techniken:

1. Röntgenphotoelektronenspektroskopie (XPS);
2. energiedispersive Röntgenspektroskopie (EDX,EDS); oder
3. Elektronenspektroskopie für die chemische Analyse (ESCA).

*A7. Navigation und Luftfahrtelektronik*

- |           |  |                        |
|-----------|--|------------------------|
| II.A7.001 | <p>Trägheitsnavigationssysteme und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür wie folgt:</p> <p>I. Trägheitsnavigationssysteme, die für den Einsatz in "zivilen Luftfahrzeugen" von einer Zivilluftfahrtbehörde in einem Mitgliedstaat des Wassenaar-Arrangements zugelassen sind, und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile wie folgt:</p> <p>a) Trägheitsnavigationssysteme (INS) (kardanisch oder strapdown) und Trägheitsgeräte, konstruiert für Lageregelung, Lenkung oder Steuerung von "Luftfahrzeugen", (Über- oder Unterwasser-) Schiffen, Land- oder "Raumfahrzeugen", mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Navigationsfehler (trägheitsfrei) kleiner (besser)/gleich 0,8 nautische Meilen/h "Circular Error Probable" (CEP) nach normaler Ausrichtung; oder</li> <li>2. spezifiziert zum Betrieb bei linearen Beschleunigungswerten grösser als 10 g;</li> </ol> <p>b) Hybride Trägheitsnavigationssysteme mit einem integrierten weltweiten Satelliten-Navigationssystem (GNSS) oder "Datenbankgestützten Navigationssystem" ("DBRN") zur Lageregelung, Lenkung oder Steuerung, nach normaler Ausrichtung, mit einer Positionsgenauigkeit des INS, nach Ausfall des GNSS oder des "DBRN" von bis zu vier Minuten Dauer, von kleiner (besser) als 10 m "Circular Error Probable" (CEP);</p> <p>c) Trägheitsgeräte für Azimut, Kurs oder Nordweisung mit einer der folgenden Eigenschaften und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. konstruiert für eine Azimut-, Kurs- oder Nordweisungsgenauigkeit kleiner (besser)/gleich 6 Bogenminuten (rms) bei 45 Grad geografischer Breite; oder</li> <li>2. konstruiert für Nicht-Betriebs-Schockwerte (non- operating shock level) von grösser/gleich 900 g über eine Zeitdauer von grösser/gleich 1 ms.</li> </ol> <p><i>Anmerkung:</i> Die in den Unternummern I.a und I.b genannten Parameter müssen unter einer der</p> | <p>7A003<br/>7A103</p> |
|-----------|--|------------------------|

folgenden Umgebungsbedingungen eingehalten werden:

1. Zufallsverteilte Vibration (input random Vibration) mit einer Gesamtstärke von 7,7 g rms in der ersten halben Stunde und einer Gesamttestzeit von 1,5 Stunden in allen drei Achsen mit folgenden Schwingungseigenschaften:

a) spektrale Leistungsdichte (power spectral density, PSD) von 0,04 g<sup>2</sup>/Hz im Frequenzbereich 15 Hz bis 1000 Hz; und

b) spektrale Leistungsdichte von 0,04 g<sup>2</sup>/Hz bei 1000 Hz auf 0,01 g<sup>2</sup>/Hz bei 2000 Hz abfallend;

2. Roll- und Gierrate grösser/gleich +2,62 rad/s (150°/s); oder

3. Nationale Prüfbedingungen äquivalent den in den Unternummern 1 und 2 beschriebenen Bedingungen.

*Technische Anmerkungen.*

1. Unternummer I.b bezieht sich auf Systeme, in denen ein INS und andere unabhängige Hilfsnavigationseinrichtungen in eine Einheit integriert sind, um eine Leistungssteigerung zu erreichen.

2. "Circular Error Probable" (CEP) bezeichnet innerhalb einer kreisförmigen Normalverteilung den Radius des Kreises, der 50 % der einzelnen durchgeführten Messungen enthält, oder den Radius des Kreises, in dem eine 50 %-Wahrscheinlichkeit des Vorhandenseins besteht.

II. Theodolitensysteme mit eingebauten Trägheitsgeräten, die besonders konstruiert sind für zivile Überwachungszwecke und konstruiert für eine Azimut-, Kurs- oder Nordweisungsgenauigkeit kleiner (besser)/gleich 6 Bogenminuten (rms) bei 45 Grad geografischer Breite, und besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür.

III. Trägheitsgeräte oder sonstige Geräte, die in Nummer 7A001 oder 7A101 erfasste Beschleunigungsmesser enthalten, sofern diese Beschleunigungsmesser für Arbeiten an Bohrlöchern bestimmt und als MWD-(Measurement While Drilling-) Sensoren zur Messung während des Bohrvorgangs besonders konstruiert sind.

II.A7.002	Beschleunigungsmesser mit piezoelektrischem Keramikmesswandler, mit einer Empfindlichkeit von 1000 mV/g oder besser (höher)	7A001
-----------	---	-------

*A9. Luftfahrt, Raumfahrt und Antriebe*

II.A9.001	Sprengbolzen
-----------	--------------

II.A9.002	"Kraftmessdosen", geeignet zum Messen der Schubkraft von Raketenmotoren, mit einer Messkapazität von mehr als 30 kN. <i>Technische Anmerkung:</i> "Kraftmessdosen" bezeichnet Geräte und Wandler zum Messen von Spann- und Kompressionskraft. <i>Anmerkung:</i> Die Nummer II.A9.002 erfasst nicht Ausrüstung, Geräte oder Wandler, besonders konstruiert zum Wiegen von Fahrzeugen, z. B. Brückenwaagen.	9B117
II.A9.003	Gasturbinen zur Stromerzeugung, Bauteile und zugehörige Ausrüstung wie folgt: a) Gasturbinen besonders konstruiert zur Stromerzeugung mit einer Leistung von mehr als 200 MW; b) Schaufeln, Statoren, Brennkammern und Einspritzdüsen, besonders konstruiert für von Nummer II.A9.003.a erfasste Gasturbinen zur Stromerzeugung; c) Ausrüstung besonders konstruiert für die "Entwicklung" und "Herstellung" von von Nummer II.A9.003.a erfassten Gasturbinen zur Stromerzeugung.	9A001 9A002 9A003 9B001 9B003 9B004

### C. Sonstige Technologie und Software

Nummer der EU	Beschreibung	Referenznummer in Anhang 2 GKV
II.B.001	Technologie und Software, die für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der in diesem Anhang aufgeführten Güter erforderlich sind.	

## Anhang 3

(Art. 5 Abs. 2 bis 4)

### Güter, die zur internen Repression verwendet werden können

- 1 Bomben und Granaten, die nicht von Anhang 1 KMV und nicht von Anhang 3 GKV erfasst werden.
- 2 Fahrzeuge, ausgenommen für die Brandbekämpfung besonders konstruierte Fahrzeuge, wie folgt:
  - 2.1 mit einem Wasserwerfer ausgerüstete Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für die Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen;
  - 2.2 Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für die Abgabe von Stromstößen zur Abwehr von Angreifern;
  - 2.3 Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert oder geändert für die Beseitigung von Barrikaden;
  - 2.4 Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert für den Transport oder die Überstellung von Strafgefangenen und/oder inhaftierten Personen;
  - 2.5 Fahrzeuge und Anhänger, besonders konstruiert für die Errichtung mobiler Absperrungen;
  - 2.6 Bestandteile der in den Ziff. 2.1 bis 2.5 aufgeführten Fahrzeuge, besonders konstruiert für die Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen.
- 3 Explosivstoffe und dazugehörige Ausrüstung, die nicht von Anhang 1 KMV und nicht von Anhang 3 GKV erfasst werden, wie folgt:
  - 3.1 Geräte und Ausrüstung, besonders konstruiert zum Auslösen von Explosionen durch elektrische oder nichtelektrische Mittel, einschliesslich Zündvorrichtungen, Sprengkapseln, Zündern, Zündverstärkern, Sprengschnüren, sowie besonders konstruierte Bestandteile hierfür.

Ausgenommen sind Geräte und Ausrüstung, die in industriellen Produkten zur Anwendung kommen, zum Beispiel Anzünder für Airbags.
  - 3.2 Andere Explosivstoffe und dazugehörige Stoffe wie folgt:
    - a) Amatol;
    - b) Nitrocellulose (mit mehr als 12,5 % Stickstoff);

- c) Nitroglykol;
  - d) Pentaerythrittetranitrat (PETN);
  - e) Pikrylchlorid;
  - f) 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluol (TNT).
- 4 Schutzausrüstung, die weder von Nummer ML 13 Anhang 3 GKV erfasst noch besonders konstruiert ist für den Sport oder als Arbeitsschutz, wie folgt:
- 4.1 Körperpanzer mit ballistischem Schutz und/oder Stichschutz;
  - 4.2 Helme mit ballistischem Schutz und/oder Splitterschutz, Schutzhelme, Schutzschilde und ballistische Schutzschilde.
- 5 Andere Simulatoren als die von Nummer ML 14 Anhang 3 GKV erfassten, für das Training im Gebrauch von Feuerwaffen, und besonders entwickelte Software hierfür.
- 6 Andere Nachtsicht- und Wärmebildausrüstung sowie Bildverstärkerröhren als die von den Anhängen 3 und 5 GKV erfassten.
- 7 Bandstacheldraht.
- 8 Militärmesser, Kampfmesser und Bajonette mit einer Klingenslänge von mehr als 10 cm, die nicht von Ziff. 1 des Anhangs 5 GKV erfasst werden.
- 9 Güter, die für die Hinrichtung von Menschen konstruiert sind, wie folgt:
- 9.1 Galgen und Fallbeile;
  - 9.2 elektrische Stühle;
  - 9.3 hermetisch verschliessbare Kammern, zum Beispiel hergestellt aus Stahl oder Glas, konstruiert zur Hinrichtung von Menschen durch Verabreichung von tödlichen Gasen oder Substanzen;
  - 9.4 automatische Injektionssysteme, konstruiert zur Hinrichtung von Menschen durch Verabreichung einer letalen chemischen Substanz.
- 10 Elektroschock-Gürtel, konstruiert, um durch Abgabe von Elektroschocks mit einer Leerlaufspannung von mehr als 10 000 Volt auf Menschen Zwang auszuüben.
- 11 Güter, konstruiert zur Fesselung von Menschen, wie folgt:
- 11.1 Zwangsstühle und Fesselungsbretter. Nicht erfasst sind Stühle, die für behinderte Personen konstruiert sind.
  - 11.2 Fusseisen, Mehrpersonen-Fesseln, Fesseln und Einzelschellen oder Fesselarmbänder. Nicht erfasst sind Handschellen, deren Gesamtlänge einschliesslich Kette, gemessen im geschlossenen Zustand vom Aussenrand einer Schelle zum Aussenrand der anderen Schelle, zwischen

150 und 280 mm beträgt und die nicht verändert wurden, um körperliche Schmerzen oder Leiden zu verursachen.

11.3 Daumenschellen und Daumenschrauben, einschliesslich gezackter Daumenschellen.

12 Tragbare Elektroschockgeräte, einschliesslich Elektroschock-Schlagstöcken, Elektroschock-Schilden, Elektroschockern (Paralyser) und Elektroschock- Pfeilwaffen, die eine Leerlaufspannung von mehr als 10 000 Volt haben und die nicht von Ziff. 1 des Anhangs 5 GKV erfasst werden.

Nicht erfasst sind einzelne Elektroschockgeräte, wenn diese zum persönlichen Schutz mitgeführt werden.

13 Substanzen zur Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen oder zum Selbstschutz sowie dazugehörige tragbare Ausbringungs-ausrüstung, wie folgt:

13.1 Tragbare Geräte zur Bekämpfung von Ausschreitungen und Unruhen oder zum Selbstschutz durch Verabreichung oder Verbreitung einer handlungsunfähig machenden chemischen Substanz, die nicht von Ziff. 1 des Anhangs 5 GKV erfasst werden.

Nicht erfasst sind einzelne tragbare Geräte mit oder ohne chemische Substanz, wenn diese zum persönlichen Schutz mitgeführt werden;

13.2 Pelargonsäurevanillylamid (Nonivamid, PAVA) (CAS-Nr. 2444-46-4);

13.3 Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) (CAS-Nr. 8023-77-6).

14 Ausrüstung, besonders konstruiert für die Herstellung der in dieser Liste aufgeführten Güter.

15 Spezifische Technologie zur Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der in dieser Liste aufgeführten Güter.

## Anhang 4

(Art. 6 Abs. 1)

### Ausrüstung, Technologie oder Software zu Überwachungszwecken

#### 1. Ausrüstungen

- Ausrüstung für tiefe Paketinspektion
- Netzüberwachungsausrüstung einschliesslich Abhörmanagementausrüstung (IMS) und Intelligence-Ausrüstung für Datenverbindungs-vorrats-speicherung
- Funkfrequenz-Überwachungsausrüstung
- Ausrüstung zum Stören von Funknetzen und der Satellitenkommunikation
- Ausrüstung für die Ferneinbringung von Computerviren
- Sprechererkennungs- und Sprecherverarbeitungsausrüstung
- Ausrüstung zum Überwachen und Abhören von:

*IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity)*: Eindeutiger Identifizierungscode für jedes Mobilfunkgerät, der fest in der SIM-Karte integriert ist und die Identifizierung der SIM-Karte über GSM- und UMTS-Netze ermöglicht.

*MSISDN (Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number)*: Nummer zur eindeutigen Identifizierung eines GSM- oder UMTS-Netzteilnehmers. Dies ist die Telefonnummer, die der SIM-Karte eines Mobiltelefons zugeordnet ist und daher - genauso wie eine IMSI - die Identifizierung eines Mobilfunkteilnehmers ermöglicht, aber auch der Anrufvermittlung an den Teilnehmer dient.

*IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity)*: In der Regel eindeutige Nummer zur Identifizierung von GSM-, WCDMA- und IDEN-Mobiltelefonen sowie einiger Satellitentelefone. Die Nummer ist zumeist im Batteriefach des Telefons aufgedruckt. Die Überwachung (Abhören) kann mit Hilfe der IMEI-Nummer sowie der IMSI und MSISDN erfolgen.

*TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity)*: Kennung, die in der Regel zwischen dem Mobilfunkgerät und dem Netz übertragen wird.

- Taktische Ausrüstung zum Überwachen und Abhören von SMS (Short Message System), GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications),

GPS (Global Positioning System), GPRS (General Package Radio Service), UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System), CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), PSTN (Public Switch Telephone Networks)

- Ausrüstung zum Überwachen und Abhören von DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol), SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) und GTP (GPRS Tunneling Protocol)
  - Ausrüstung für die Mustererkennung und die Erstellung von Musterprofilen
  - Ferngesteuerte Forensikausrüstung
  - Ausrüstung für die semantische Verarbeitung
  - Entschlüsselungsausrüstung für WEP- und WPA-Schlüssel
  - Abhörausrüstung für geschützte und standardisierte Protokolle für die Sprachübermittlung über das Internet (VoIP)
2. Software für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der Ausrüstung nach Ziff. 1
3. Technologie für die Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung der Ausrüstung nach Ziff. 1

Ausrüstung, Technologie und Software, die unter diese Kategorien fällt, ist nur insoweit Gegenstand des vorliegenden Anhangs, als sie von der allgemeinen Beschreibung für "Systeme für das Abhören und die Überwachung des Internets, des Telefonverkehrs und der Satellitenkommunikation" erfasst wird.

Für die Zwecke dieses Anhangs bezeichnet "Überwachung" die Erfassung, Extrahierung, Entschlüsselung, Aufzeichnung, Verarbeitung, Analyse und Archivierung von Gesprächsinhalten oder Netzdaten.

#### 4. Ausnahmen

Ausgenommen von den Ziff. 1 bis 3 ist:

- a) Software, die dazu entwickelt ist, um vom Benutzer ohne umfangreiche Unterstützung durch den Lieferanten installiert zu werden, und die frei erhältlich ist und im Einzelhandel ohne Einschränkungen mittels einer der folgenden Geschäftspraktiken verkauft wird:
1. Barverkauf,
  2. Versandverkauf,
  3. Verkauf über elektronische Medien, oder
  4. Telefonverkauf; oder
- b) Software, die allgemein zugänglich ist.

**Anhang 5<sup>45</sup>**

(Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. a und Abs. 2 Bst. a, 11 Abs. 1 und 1a, 12 Abs. 1 Bst. b, 14a und 14b)

**Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (UNO-Liste)**

**Anmerkung**

Dieser Anhang entspricht der Liste der vom Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen bezeichneten natürlichen Personen, Unternehmen und Organisationen.<sup>46</sup>

Anhang 6<sup>47</sup>

(Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. b und Abs. 2 Bst. a und b, 11 Abs. 1 und 2 sowie 12 Abs. 1 Bst. b)

**Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (Beschluss 2010/413/GASP)**

A. Natürliche Personen

1. **Name:** Javad AL YASIN  
**Identifying information:** Function: Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact, also known as METFAZ.
2. **Name:** Davoud BABAEI  
**Justification:** The current head of security for the Ministry Of Defence Armed Forces Logistics' research institute the Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi. The IAEA have identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme over which Iran refuses to cooperate. As head of security, Babaei is responsible for preventing the disclosure of information, including to the IAEA.
3. Aufgehoben
4. **Sayed Shamsuddin BORBORUDI**  
(a.k.a. Seyed Shamseddin BORBORUDI) DOB: 21/9/1969 **Justification:** Former Deputy Head of UN designated Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, where he was subordinate to UN designated Feridun Abbasi Davani. Has been involved in the Iranian nuclear programme since at least 2002, including as the former head of procurement and logistics at AMAD, where he was responsible for using front companies such as Kimia Madan to procure equipment and material for Iran's nuclear weapons programme.
5. **Name:** Kamran DANESHJOO (a.k.a. DANESHJOU)  
**Identifying information:** Function: Professor at Iran University of Science and Technology  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Professor at Iran University of Science and Technology. Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology. As project manager of the 111th

section of the AMAD Plan, he provided support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

6. **Name:** IRGC Brigadier-General Javad DARVISH-VAND  
**Justification:** Former Deputy Minister of Defence and Inspector General of MODAFL.
7. **Name:** Ali FADAVI  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 13.3.1961  
POB: Ardestan, Iran  
**Function:** Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)  
**Rank:** Rear Admiral  
**Nationality:** Iranian  
**Gender:** male  
**Justification:** Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi is Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and was temporarily acting Commander of the IRGC. He is the former Commander of the IRGC Navy.
8. **Name:** IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi FARAHI  
**Justification:** Deputy Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Support since 2021. Previously Deputy Minister of Defence and Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, head of the Defence Industries and Aerospace Organizations of the Ministry of Defence, as well as commander of the Armed Forces Personnel Training Camp. Former head of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and former managing director of the EU-designated Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Member of the IRGC.
9. **Name:** Parviz FATAH  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 1961  
POB: Anzal, West Azerbaijan Province, Iran  
**Nationality:** Iranian  
**Gender:** male  
**Passport no.:** 6379886494  
**Justification:** Parviz Fatah is Head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order (EIKO) and a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  
EIKO is an economic conglomerate under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader. EIKO, together with two other organisations, is estimated to control more than half of the Iranian economy.  
Parviz Fatah is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran.
10. **Name:** Haeri Mojtaba  
**Justification:** Engineer; MODAFL Deputy for Industry. Supervisory role over AIO and DIO. **Relation:** Deputy at Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
11. **Name:** Ali HOSEYNITASH  
**Identifying information:** Rank: Brigadier-General  
**Nationality:** Iranian  
**Gender:** male  
**Justification:** Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Hoseynitash has been the Head of the Strategic Directorate of the Supreme National Security Council since his appointment in 2013.

The Supreme National Security Council shapes and coordinates the defence and security policies of Iran, including major decisions regarding Iran's nuclear programme.

Ali Hoseynitash is therefore involved in nuclear and ballistic missile activities and provides support to the Government of Iran.

12. **Name:** Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 20.9.1974  
POB: Iran  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
Associated entities: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG); MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic; Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi; STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.  
**Justification:** Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) front companies.
13. **Name:** Mohammad Ali JAFARI  
**Justification:** Former Commander of the IRGC. Currently head of the Hazrat Baqiatollah al-Azam Cultural and Social Headquarters.
14. **Name:** Ali KARIMIAN  
**Justification:** Iranian national supplying goods, mostly carbon fibre to EU-designated SHIG and SBIG.
15. **Name:** Majid KHANSARI  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 1972  
POB: Khomeini Shahr, Iran  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Majid Khansari plays an influential role in Iran's nuclear programme. He is the former CEO of Natanz nuclear site, as well as of EU-listed centrifuge manufacturer Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).  
As an expert in the field of nuclear management, he continues to share his opinion on Iran's nuclear programme and influence the national debate around that programme.  
Majid Khansari is therefore involved in Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile activities.
16. **Name:** Ebrahim MAHMUDZADEH  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 2.4.1955  
Function: Professor at Malek Ashtar University; Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication Company  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is a professor at EU-listed Malek Ashtar University, subordinate to EU-listed Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC), which supports Iran's Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) with research and development (R&D) services.  
Faculty members of Malek Ashtar University are involved in research regarding missiles and nuclear power and thereby provide research and development support to the Government of Iran.

Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is also Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication Company, which is partially controlled by the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.

17. **Name:** Mohammadi Mohammad  
**Justification:** Managing Director of MATSA. **Relation:** Managing director of MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company)
18. **Name:** Mohammadlu Beik  
**Justification:** Brigadier-General; MODAFL Deputy for Supplies and Logistics.  
**Relation:** Deputy for Supplies and Logistics of Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
19. **Name:** Mohammad Reza MOVASAGHNIA  
**Justification:** Deputy Minister for Industry and Chairman of IMIDRO, the Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and Renovation Organization, since August 2023. Former head of EU-designated Naval Defense Missile Industry Group, also known as Samen Al A'Emmeh Industries Group (SAIG), and Cruise Missile Industry Group.
20. Aufgehoben
21. Aufgehoben
22. **Name:** Mostafa Mohammad NAJJAR  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 2.12.1956  
POB: Tehran, Iran  
Rank: Brigadier-General  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Brigadier-General Mostafa Najjar has been a senior advisor to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces on Knowledge and Technology Industry since September 2013. He is the former Minister for the Interior (2009-2013) and former Minister of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) (2005-2009), responsible for all military programmes, including ballistic missiles programmes. Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
23. **Name:** Mohammad Reza NAQDI  
(a.k.a. Mohammad-Reza NAQDI; Mohammad Reza NAGDI; Gholamreza NAQDI)  
**Identifying information:** POB: Tehran, Iran  
Function: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Deputy Commander  
Rank: Brig. General  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Mohammad Reza Naqdi is a Deputy Commander and Brigadier General within the IRGC and is therefore a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
24. **Name:** Naseri Mohammad Sadegh  
**Justification:** Head of the Physics Research Institute (formerly known as the Institute of Applied Physics). **Relation:** Head of Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)

25. **Name:** Mohammad PAKPUR  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 1961  
Rank: Brigadier-General  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces.
26. Aufgehoben
27. **Name:** Hossein SALAMI  
(a.k.a. Hosein SALIMI; Hussain SALIMI; Hosain SALIMI; Husain SALIMI; Hossein SALIMI; Hossein SALEEMI; Hussain SALEEMI; Husain SALEEMI; Hosein SALEEMI)  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 1960  
POB: Isfahan, Iran  
Function: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)  
Rank: Maj. General  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
Passport No.: D08531177  
**Justification:** Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
28. **Name:** Rear Admiral Mohammad SHAFI'I RUDSARI (a.k.a. ROODSARI, Mohammad, Hossein, Shafiei; ROODSARI, Mohammad, Shafi'I; ROODSARI, Mohammad, Shafiei; RUDSARI, Mohammad, Hossein, Shafiei; RUDSARI, Mohammad, Shafi'I; RUDSARI, Mohammad, Shafiei)  
**Justification:** Former MODAFL Deputy for Coordination (see Part B, n°29).
29. **Name:** Shams Abolghassem Mozaffari  
**Justification:** Former head of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.
30. **Name:** Ali SHAMSHIRI  
**Identifying information:** Function: Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme Leader  
Rank: Brigadier-General  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Shamshiri is Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme Leader in his role as Commander in Chief. Furthermore, he has held senior roles in the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), as head of the Intelligence Protection Organisation of MODAFL.
31. **Name:** Abdollah SOLAT SANA (a.k.a. Solatsana Solat Sanna; Sowlat Senna; Sovlat Thana)  
**Justification:** Managing Director of the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan. This is the facility that produces the feed material (UF6) for the enrichment facilities at Natanz. On 27 August 2006, Solat Sana received a special award from President Ahmadinejad for his role.
32. **Name:** Hamid SOLTANI

**Identifying information:** Function: Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA)

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

**Justification:** Hamid Soltani is the Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA).

In this position, he has been involved in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

33. **Name:** Ahmad VAHIDI

**Identifying information:** DOB: 27.6.1958

POB: Shiraz, Iran

Rank: Brigadier-General

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

**Justification:** Brigadier-General Ahmad Vahidi has been a prominent member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) since 1979. He was appointed as Deputy Chief for Intelligence in 1981, played a role in organising the Ministry of Intelligence, became the first commander of the IRGC Quds Force in 1988 and was in charge of the IRGC Intelligence Unit. He further set up a number of IRGC garrisons that are responsible for organising terrorist activities. In 1997, he was transferred to the Ministry of Defense. He has been nominated as Defence Minister in 2009 and served in this post until 2013. He is still a high-ranking figure within the IRGC.

34. **Name:** Ali Ashraf NOURI

**Justification:** Head of the Basij Islamic Revolution Art Educational and Research Complex. Formerly IRGC Deputy Commander, IRGC Political Bureau Chief.

35. **Name:** Hojatoleslam Ali SAIDI  
(a.k.a. Hojjat- al-Eslam Ali Saidi or Saeedi)

**Justification:** Since March 2017, head of the ideological and political bureau of the Supreme Leader in his role as Commander-in-chief. Previously representative of the Supreme Leader to the IRGC.

36. **Name:** Zadeh Amir Ali Haji

**Good quality a.k.a.:** Hajizadeh Amir Ali **Justification:** IRGC Air Force Commander, Brigadier General. **Relation:** Commander of IRGC Air Force

37. Aufgehoben

38. Aufgehoben

39. Aufgehoben

40. Aufgehoben

41. Aufgehoben

42. Aufgehoben

43. Aufgehoben

44. Aufgehoben

45. Aufgehoben

46. Aufgehoben
47. Aufgehoben
48. Aufgehoben
49. Aufgehoben
50. Aufgehoben
51. Aufgehoben
52. Aufgehoben
53. Aufgehoben
54. **Name:** Reza AGHAZADEH  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 14.3.1949  
POB: Khoy, Islamic Republic of Iran  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Reza Aghazadeh is an Iranian national, member of the Expediency Discernment Council. He served as Head of the Atomic Energy Organization between 1997 and 2009. His positions have led him to be at the forefront of the development of Iran's nuclear programme. He is still consulted by his AEOI colleagues on nuclear issues. Reza Aghazadeh is therefore responsible for directly participating in Iran's nuclear programme and nuclear escalation.
55. **Name:** Dr Hoseyn (Hossein) FAQIHIAN  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 22.5.1952  
POB: Esfahan, Iran  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Dr. Hoseyn Faqihian contributed to the Iranian nuclear programme as Director-General of the Nuclear Fuel Production Company and Deputy Director of the AEOI.
56. **Name:** Said Esmail KHALILIPOUR  
(a.k.a.: LANGROUDI)  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 24.11.1945  
POB: Langroud  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Said Esmail Khalilipour is the former Deputy Head of AEOI. The AEOI oversees Iran's nuclear programme and is designated under UNSCR 1737 (2006). Therefore, Said Esmail Khalilipour is involved in Iran's nuclear proliferation activities.
57. **Name:** Ali Reza KHANCHI  
**Identifying information:** Address of NRC: AEOI-NRC P.O. Box: 11365-8486  
Tehran/ Iran;  
Fax: (+9821) 8021412  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Ali Reza Khanchi was the head of AEOI's Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) and is a scientist conducting research for the TNRC. The TNRC is involved in experiments on plutonium separation. He continues to cooperate with the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) as a scientist. Therefore, Khanchi is engaged in and providing support to Iran's nuclear proliferation activities.

58. **Name:** Ali Akbar SALEHI  
**Justification:** Former Minister for Foreign Affairs. Former Head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI). He continues to operate at the intersection of academics and politics and in recent public appearances he has defended and promoted the nuclear industry of Iran. He therefore provides support to the Government of Iran and is providing support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
59. **Name:** Engineer Naser RASTKHAH  
**Identifying information:** Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Former Deputy Head of the AEOI. The AEOI oversees Iran's nuclear programme and is designated under UNSCR 1737 (2006). Rastkhah is currently part of the board of directors of the Iranian Radiation Protection Society, a state institution affiliated with the AEOI, which oversees Iran's nuclear programme. Rastkhah is therefore engaged in and providing support for Iran's nuclear programme.
60. **Name:** Behzad SOLTANI  
**Identifying information:** Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Former Deputy Head of the AEOI. Soltani is currently involved in research activities relevant for the nuclear industry and is affiliated with government entities like the Iranian Chemical Society (ICS). Therefore, Behzad Soltani provides support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
61. **Name:** Mohammad Reza REZVANIANZADEH  
**Identifying information:** Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Mohammad Reza Rezvanianzadeh is affiliated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and to the government entity Geology and Mineral Exploration Organization of Iran. Therefore, he is associated with entities providing support to the Government of Iran.
62. **Name:** Mohammad Hossein Dajmar  
**Identifying information:** D.O.B: 19.2.1956  
POB: Tehran, Iran  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** As former Chairman and Managing Director of IRISL he is associated with IRISL. He is also the former Chairman of Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Co. (SSA), Safiran Payam Darya Shipping Co. (SAPID), and Hafiz Darya Shipping Co. (HDS), known IRISL affiliates.
63. **Name:** Naser Bateni  
**Identifying information:** DOB: 16.12.1962  
Nationality: Iranian  
Gender: male  
**Justification:** Naser Bateni was the managing director of the Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping GmbH (HTTS), a shipping company owned by IRISL Europe, which is in turn a company owned by IRISL. As a result, Mr Bateni is involved in providing services to IRISL.
64. **Name:** Gholam Hossein Golparvar

**Identifying information:** DOB: 23.1.1957

Nationality: Iranian

ID Card No 4207

Gender: male

**Justification:** Gholam Hossein Golparvar is an Iranian involved in the shipping industry. He is the former commercial manager of IRISL and acts as head of Sapid Shipping company which is owned and controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). Therefore, he provides essential services to IRISL.

**B. Unternehmen und Organisationen**

1. **Name:** Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO  
**Identifying information:** Address 1: AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, Iran  
Address 2: Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran  
Associated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)  
**Justification:** Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Iran's Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) in charge of overseeing Iran's ballistic missile programme. It supervises several subsidiaries tasked with the production or procurement of different components of the ballistic missile programme. The Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
2. **Name:** Aran Modern Devices (AMD)  
**Justification:** Affiliate of Modern Technologies FZC (MTFZC) network. **Relation:** Affiliated to Modern Technologies FZC (MTFZC)
3. **Name:** Aras Farayande  
**Address:** Unit 12, No 35 Kooshesh Street, Tehran **Justification:** Involved in procurement of materials for Iran Centrifuge Technology Company.
4. **Name:** Aria Nikan  
**Good quality a.k.a.:** Pergas Aria Movalled Ltd **Address:** Suite 1, 59 Azadi Ali North Sohrevardi Avenue, Tehran, 1576935561 **Justification:** Known to procure for designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) Commercial Department. They have made efforts to procure designated materials, including goods from the EU, which have applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
5. **Name:** Armed Forces Geographical Organisation  
**Justification:** A subsidiary of MODAFL assessed to provide geospatial data for the Ballistic Missile programme.
6. **Name:** Ashtian Tablo  
**Address:** Ashtian Tablo, No 67, Ghods Mirheydari St, Yoosefabad, Tehran **Justification:** A manufacturer of electrical equipment (switchgear) involved in the construction of the Fordow (Qom) facility, built without being declared to the IAEA.
7. **Name:** Bals Alman  
**Justification:** A manufacturer of electrical equipment (switchgear) involved in the ongoing construction of the Fordow (Qom) facility built without being declared to the IAEA.
8. Aufgehoben

9. Aufgehoben
10. **Name:** Bargh Azaraksh  
**Good quality a.k.a.:** Barghe Azerakhsh Sakht **Address:** No 599, Stage 3, Ata Al Malek Blvd, Emam Khomeini Street, Esfahan **Justification:** Company that has been contracted to work at the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow on the electricity and piping works. It was in charge of designing, procuring and installing electrical control equipment at Natanz in 2010.
11. **Name:** Electronic Components Industries (ECI)  
**Address:** Hossain Abad Avenue, Shiraz, Iran **Justification:** Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries. **Relation:** Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (including all branches and subsidiaries)
12. **Name:** ESNICO (Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation)  
**Identifying information:** No. 1, 37th Avenue, Asadabadi Street, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Procures industrial goods, specifically for the nuclear programme activities carried out by AEOI, Novin Energy and EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. ESNICO's Director is Haleh Bakhtiar.
13. **Name:** Etemad Amin Invest Co Mobin  
(a.k.a.: Etemad Amin Investment Company Mobin; Etemad-e Mobin; Etemad Amin Invest Company Mobin; Etemad Mobin Co.; Etemad Mobin Trust Co.; Etemade Mobin Company; Mobin Trust Consortium; Etemad-e Mobin Consortium)  
**Address:** Pasadaran Av. Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** A company owned or controlled by IRGC that contributes to financing the strategic interests of the regime.
14. **Name:** Eyvaz Technic (a.k.a. Azarsam Instrument Company)  
**Identifying information:** Address 1: No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran  
Address 2: Tehran Province, Tehran, Kooy-e-Mehrzaad, Kooy-e-Mehrzaad, M78Q+V2R, Iran  
**Associated entities:** Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)  
**Justification:** Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).
15. **Name:** Fajr Aviation Composite Industries  
**Address:** Mehrabad Airport, PO Box 13445-885, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** A subsidiary of the IAIO within MODAFL both designated by the EU which primarily produces composite materials for the aircraft industry. Fajr Aviation Composite Industries also produces drones, which are allegedly being used for regional destabilisation.
16. **Name:** Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company; Sherkat-e Ghanisazi-ye Uranium)  
**Identifying information:** Address: 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, Iran  
**Associated entities:** Kalaye Electric Company (KEC); Iran Centrifuge Technology Company  
**Justification:** Ghani Sazi Uranium Company has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company.

17. **Name:** Hirbod Co (a.k.a. HIRBOD Company)  
 Address 1: Hirbod Co - Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316, Iran  
**Identifying information:** Address 2 (factory): Tehran-Saveh Highway, km 80, Mamounieh Industrial Town, at the end of 8th Street, Asad Abadi Tehran, Iran  
 Date of registration: 1995  
 Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran  
 Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)  
**Justification:** Hirbod Co is one of the leading companies in the field of stainless steel products. It provides steel products, including within security and military apparatus, to many Iranian entities, in particular Arthesh, the Iranian army. Therefore, Hirbod Co is supporting the Government of Iran and provides support for the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems by Iran.
18. **Name:** Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)  
**Identifying information:** Associated entities: Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND); Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)  
**Justification:** The Institute of Applied Physics provides research and development for Iran's nuclear programme. It has project partnerships with the EU-listed Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), working to weaponise the nuclear programme, which is under the authority of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.  
 The Institute of Applied Physics is therefore involved in Iran's nuclear programme and in Iran's ballistic missile activities.
19. **Name:** Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI)  
**Justification:** A subsidiary of the IAIO within MODAFL. Manufactures, repairs, and conducts overhauls of airplanes and aircraft engines and procures aviation related parts often of US origin typically via foreign intermediaries. IACI and its subsidiaries have also been detected using a worldwide network of brokers seeking to procure aviation-related goods. **Relation:** Subsidiary of Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO)
20. **Name:** Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company  
**Good quality a.k.a.:a)** HESA **b)** HESA Trade Center **c)** HTC **d)** IAMCO **e)** IAMI **f)** Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company **g)** Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries **h)** Karkhanejate Sanaye Havapaymaie Iran **i)** Hava Peyma Sazi-e Iran **j)** Havapeyma Sazhran **k)** Havapeyma Sazi Iran, **l)** Hevapeimasazi **Address:a)** 28 km Esfahan - Tehran Freeway, Shahin Shahr, P.O.Box 83145-311, Esfahan, Iran **b)** No. 27 Ahahamat Ave., Vallie Asr Square, P.O.Box 14155-5568, Tehran, 15946, Iran **c)** P.O.Box 81465-935, Esfahan, Iran **d)** Shahih Shar Industrial Zone, Isfahan **e)** No. 107 Sepahbod Gharany Ave., P.O.Box 8140, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of; MODAFL. **Relation:** Owned or controlled by Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
21. **Name:** Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TSA; TESA; Farayand Technique; Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company)  
**Identifying information:** Address 1: 156 Golestan Street, Saradr-e Jangal, Tehran  
 Address 2: Khalij-e Fars Boulevard, Kilometre 10 of Atomic Energy Road, Rowshan Shahr, Third Moshtaq Street, Esfahan, Iran

Address 3: Yousef Abad District, No. 1, 37th Street, Tehran, Iran

**Justification:** Iran Centrifuge Technology Company manufactures uranium enrichment centrifuge parts, and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

22. **Name:** Iran Communications Industries (ICI)  
(a.k.a. Sanaye Mokhaberat Iran; Iran Communication Industries; Iran Communications Industries Group; Iran Communications Industries Co.)  
**Address:** PO Box 19295-4731, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Alternative address: PO Box 19575-131, 34 Apadana Avenue, Tehran, Iran; Alternative address: Shahid Langary Street, Nobonyad Square Ave, Pasdaran, Tehran  
**Justification:** Iran Communications Industries, a subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (listed by the EU), produces various items including communication systems, avionics, optics and electro-optics devices, micro-electronics, information technology, test and measurement, telecommunication security, electronic warfare, radar tube manufacture and refurbishment, and missile launchers. ICI procured sensitive material through Hoda Trading, its Hong Kong based subsidiary.
23. **Name:** Iran Electronics Industries and the following subsidiaries:  
**Identifying information:** P.O. Box 18575-365, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Wholly-owned subsidiary of MODAFL (and therefore a sister-organisation to AIO, AvIO and DIO). Its role is to manufacture electronic components for Iranian weapons systems. It is therefore an entity engaged in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
24. **Name:** Isfahan Optics  
**Identifying information:** P.O. Box 81465-313 Kaveh Ave., Isfahan, Iran  
P.O. Box 81465-117, Isfahan, Iran  
**Justification:** Owned, controlled by, or acts on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries, an entity engaged in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Isfahan Optics is also engaged in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
25. **Name:** Iranian Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO)  
**Address:**a) Ave. Sepahbod Gharani, P.O.Box 15815/1775, Tehran, Iran b) Ave. Sepahbod Gharani, P.O.Box 15815/3446, Tehran, Iran c) 107 Sepahbod Gharani Avenue, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** A MODAFL organisation responsible for planning and managing Iran's military aviation industry. **Relation:** Organisation of Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces Logistics
26. **Name:** Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA)  
**Identifying information:** Sadra Building No 3, Shafagh St., Poonak Khavari Blvd., Shahrak Ghods, P.O. Box 14669-56491, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Effectively controlled by EU-designated Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), which is designated for being an IRGC company. Provides support to the Government of Iran through its involvement in the Iranian energy sector including in the South Pars Gas field.
27. **Name:** Iran Pooya (a.k.a. Iran Pouya)  
**Justification:** A government owned company that operated the biggest extruder of aluminium in Iran and supplied material for use in the production of casings for the IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges. A major manufacturer of aluminium cylinders for centrifuges whose customers include the AEOI and EU-designated TESA.
28. **Name:** Javedan Mehr Toos

- Justification:** Engineering firm that procures for the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran which was designated under UNSCR 1737.
29. **Name:** Karanir (a.k.a. Karanir Sanat, Moaser; Tajhiz Sanat; Karanir Sanat Co; Moshever Sanat Moaser; TSI; Tajis Sanat; Tajhis Sanat Industries)  
**Identifying information:** Address 1: 1139/1 Unit 104 Gol Building, Gol Alley, North Side of Sae, Vali Asr Avenue. PO Box 19395-6439, Tehran, Iran  
 Address 2: Beheshti St., Sabonuchi St., Adaae Alley, No. 2, Unit 301, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Karanir has been involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
30. **Name:** Khala Afarin Pars (a.k.a. PISHRO KHALA AFARIN COMPANY; Vacuum Afarin, Pars Vacuum Company)  
**Identifying information:** Address 1: Unit 5, 2nd Floor, No 75, Mehran Afrand St, Sattarkhan St, Tehran.  
 Address 2: No. 94, 4th Floor, Unit 16, Bagherkhan St., Sattarkhan St., Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
31. **Name:** MAAA Synergy  
**Address:** Malaysia **Justification:** Involved in procurement of components for Iranian fighter planes.
32. **Name:** MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic  
**Identifying information:** Address: Istasyon MH, Sehitle cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, Türkiye  
 Associated individual: Milad Jafari  
**Justification:** Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.
33. **Name:** Marine Industries (a.k.a. Marine Industries Organisation (MIO), Marine Industries Group (MIG))  
**Identifying information:** Address: Pasdaran Ave., PO Box 19585/ 777, Tehran, Iran  
 Place of registration: Tehran, Iran  
 Date of registration: 1996  
 Principal place of business: Iran  
 Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)  
**Justification:** Marine Industries is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Iran's Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).  
 Marine Industries is involved in the maritime dimension of Iran's missile programme, including by building ships that can carry and launch offensive missiles. Marine Industries is therefore an entity involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
34. Aufgehoben
35. **Name:** MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) (a.k.a. Mohandesi Toseh Sanayeh Atomi (METSA))  
**Identifying information:** Address: 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran.  
 Registration no.: 2833278  
 National ID no.: 10103191030

Associated individuals: Mohammad Mohammadi (Managing Director)

Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)

**Justification:** MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) is an Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. It has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.

36. **Name:** Mechanic Industries Group  
**Good quality a.k.a.:** Mechanic Industries Organisation; Mechanical Industries Complex; Mechanical Industries Group; Sanaye Mechanic  
**Justification:** Took part in the production of components for the ballistics programme.
37. **Name:** Ministry of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics (a.k.a. Ministry Of Defense For Armed Forces Logistics; a.k.a. MODAFL; a.k.a. MODSAF)  
**Identifying information:** Address no. 1: Ferdowsi Avenue, Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Tehran, Iran  
 Address no. 2: PO Box 11365-8439, Iran  
 Address no. 3: Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran, Iran  
 Address no. 4: PO Box 11365-8439, Iran  
 Address no. 5: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran  
 Address no. 6: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran  
 Address no. 7: located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran  
 Address no. 8: PO Box 19315-189, Pasdaran Street, South Noubonyand Square, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** The Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics, which includes the MODLEX Export Center (also referred to as the Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX)), is responsible for Iran's defence research, development, manufacturing and export programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes.
38. **Name:** Mobin Sanjesh (a.k.a. Fakoor International Tehran Engineering Company (FITCO))  
**Identifying information:** Address: Entry 3, No 11, 12th Street, Miremad Alley, Abbas Abad, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Mobin Sanjesh directly participates in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It provides goods and services for magnetic systems which have a direct application in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle industry, for example calibration of mass spectrometers.
39. **Name:** Modern Technologies FZC (MTFZC)  
**Address:** P.O.Box 8032, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates **Justification:** Involved in procurement of components for Iranian nuclear programme.
40. **Name:** Multimat Iç ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi (a.k.a. MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TIC. PAZ. LTD. STL.; MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI; MULTIMAT IMPORT AND EXPORT; MULTIMAT LTD.; MULTIMAT TEHRAN; MULTIMAT TRADING COMPANY)  
**Identifying information:** Address: Guvendik Mahallesi 132/1 Sokak, Izmir, Türkiye  
 Place of registration: Izmir, Türkiye  
 Date of registration: 30.12.1996

Associated individual: Milad Jafari  
Associated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)  
**Justification:** Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.

41. Aufgehoben
42. Aufgehoben
43. **Name:** Noavaran Pooyamoj  
**Address:** No 15, Eighth Street, Pakistan Avenue, Shahid Beheshti Avenue, Tehran  
**Justification:** Involved in procurement of materials that are controlled and have direct application in the manufacture of centrifuges for Iran's uranium enrichment programme.
44. **Name:** Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI)  
(a.k.a. Parchin Chemical Factories Chemical Industries Group; PCF Chemical Industries Group; Parchin Chemical Factories; Parchin Chemical Industry Group; PCI Group; Parchin Chemical Ind (PCF); Parchin Chemical Factories; Para Chemical Industries; PCF; PCI; Parchin Military Base)  
**Identifying information:** Address no. 1: Khavaran Road Km 30-35, Parchin Special Road, Varamin, Parchin  
Address no. 2: Nobonyad Square, Tehran 15765-358  
Address no. 3: Parchin Forked Rd., 35th km. Khavaran Rd., Pakdasht, Tehran, Iran (Factory)  
Address no. 4: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, Iran (Head Office)  
Address no. 5: Pasdaran Square, P.O. Box 16765/358, Tehran, Iran  
Address no. 6: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., 3rd Floor, Sanam Bldg., P.O. Box 16765/358, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran  
Telephone no.: + 98 21 2258929; + 98 21 35243153; + 98 21 3130626  
Website: <http://icig.ir/>  
Registration no.: Cooperative Company Registration No 892  
Associated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI)  
**Justification:** Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI) produces ammunition, explosives and solid propellants for rockets and missiles. Parchin facilities were used for the production and testing of nuclear weapons. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.  
Parchin Chemical Industries is part of the Chemical Industries and Development of Material Group (CIDMG), which is a branch of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which falls under Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and is therefore owned by the Iranian Government. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran, and is controlled by and associated with entities providing support to the Government of Iran.
45. **Name:** Parto Sanat Co (a.k.a. Parto Sanaat Co.; Parto Sanat Company; Partosananat; Partosanat Co.; Partosanat PJSC; Yakan Parto; Bargh Va Electronic Partosanat)

**Identifying information:** Address: No. 2417 Valiasr St., corner of 14th St., PO Box 15178 43316, Tehran, Iran

**Justification:** Manufacturer of frequency changers and it is capable of developing and modifying imported foreign frequency changers in a way that makes them usable in gas centrifuge enrichment. It is deemed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities.

46. **Name:** Passive Defense Organization  
**Justification:** Responsible for the selection and construction of strategic facilities, including - according to Iranian statements - the uranium enrichment site at Fordow (Qom) built without being declared to the IAEA contrary to Iran's obligations (affirmed in a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors). Brigadier General Gholam-Reza Jalali, former IRGC is PDO's chairman.
47. **Name:** Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology)  
**Justification:** Paya Parto is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran's nuclear programme. It has close ties to the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), which runs Iran's Nuclear programme and supervises individual projects. Paya Parto is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
48. **Name:** Raad Iran  
(a.k.a. Raad Automation Company; Middle East Raad Automation; RAAD Automation Co.; Raad Iran Automation Co.; RAADIRAN; Middle East RAAD Automation Co.; Automasion RAAD Khavar Mianeh; Automation Raad Khavar Mianeh Nabbet Co)  
**Address:** Unit 1, No 35, Bouali Sina Sharghi, Chehel Sotoun Street, Fatemi Square, Tehran  
**Justification:** A company involved in procurement of inverters for Iran's prescribed enrichment programme. Raad Iran was established to produce and design controlling systems and provides the sale and installation of inverters and programmable Logic Controllers.
49. **Name:** Raka  
**Identifying information:** Associated entity: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)  
**Justification:** A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom).
50. **Name:** Research Centre for Explosion and Impact  
**Good quality a.k.a.:** METFAZ **Address:** 44, 180th Street West, Tehran, 16539-75751  
**Justification:** Subordinate to the designated Malek Ashtar University, it oversees activity linked to the Possible Military Dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme upon which Iran is not cooperating with the IAEA. **Relation:** Subordinate to Malek Ashtar University (E.29.I.9.)
51. **Name:** Saman Nasb Zayنده Rood  
**Good quality a.k.a.:** Saman Nasbzainde Rood **Address:** Unit 7, 3rd Floor Mehdi Building, Kahorz Blvd, Esfahan, Iran **Justification:** Construction contractor that has installed piping and associated support equipment at the uranium enrichment site at Natanz. It has dealt specifically with centrifuge piping.
52. **Name:** Saman Tose'e Asia (SATA)

**Identifying information:** Address: 4th Unit, 51 Sane'e St., N.W. of Jahan Kudak, Africa Blvd., Tehran, Iran 19699-35145

**Justification:** Engineering firm involved in supporting a range of large-scale industrial projects including Iran's uranium enrichment programme, including undeclared work at the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.

53. Aufgehoben
54. **Name:** Schiller Novin  
**Good quality a.k.a.:** Schiler Novin Co.; Schiller Novin Co.; Shiller Novin  
**Address:** Gheyariyeh Avenue - no 153 - 3rd Floor - PO BOX 17665/153 6 19389 Tehran  
**Justification:** Acting on behalf of Defense Industries Organisation (DIO).
55. **Name:** Sepanir Oil and Gas Energy Engineering Company (a.k.a. Sepah Nir; SEPANIR; SepanirCompany; Sepanir Oil & Gas Energy Eng. Co.; Sepanir Oil and Gas Energy Eng. Co SSK)  
**Identifying information:** Address No 1: No 216 (Former 319) Bahonar Avenue (Niavaran), Tehran, Iran  
Address No 2: P.O. Box 19575/657, Tehran, Iran  
Telephone no.: +98 21 22833960; +98 22 833960 (10 lines)  
Telefax no.: +98 2122 833970  
Website: [www.sepanir.com](http://www.sepanir.com)  
Type of entity: public company  
Place of registration: Iran  
Date of registration: 2006  
Principal place of business: Iran  
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)  
**Justification:** Sepanir Oil and Gas Energy Engineering Company is an oil and gas company and a subsidiary of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
56. **Name:** Shahid Ahmad Kazemi Industrial Group (SAKIG)  
**Justification:** Entity subordinate to Iran's Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). SAKIG develops and produces surface-to-air missiles systems for Iran's military. It maintains military, missile, and air defense projects and procures goods from Russia, Belarus, and North Korea.
57. **Name:** Shahid Beheshti University  
**Identifying information:** Address 1: Daneshju Blvd., Yaman St., Chamran Blvd., P.O. Box 19839-63113, Tehran, Iran  
Address 2: Shahid Shahriari Square, Evin, P.O. Box 19839-6311369411, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Shahid Beheshti University is a public entity which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Carries out scientific research relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.
58. **Name:** Shakhese Behbud Sanat  
**Justification:** Involved in the production of equipment and parts for the nuclear fuel cycle.
59. **Name:** Shiraz Electronics Industries

**Address:** Mirzaie Shirazi, P.O.Box 71365-1589, Shiraz, Iran **Justification:** Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries. **Relation:** Subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (including all branches and subsidiaries)

60. **Name:** State Purchasing Organisation (SPO, a.k.a. State Purchasing Office; State Purchasing Organization)  
**Justification:** The SPO appears to facilitate the import of whole weapons. It appears to be a subsidiary of MODAFL.
61. **Name:** STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S. (a.k.a. SSTP, Step Standard Technical Components Industry and Trading Corporation, Step Corporation, Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S., Step AS, Step Company, Step Standart Tek Par San Tic AS, Step Standart Teknyk, Parca San. Ve Tyc. A.S., STEP Standart Teknik Parca San. ve Tic. A.S., Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi, Step A.S., Step S.A., Step Istanbul, Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic A.S., Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Ticaret A.S., Standard Technical Component Industry and Trade Company, Step Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic As, Step Istanbul/Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Tic. A.S.)  
**Identifying information:** Address: 79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, Türkiye  
**Associated individual:** Milad Jafari  
**Associated entity:** Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)  
**Justification:** Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies.
62. **Name:** Sun Middle East FZ Company  
**Justification:** A company that procures sensitive goods for the Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company (SUREH). Sun Middle East uses intermediaries based outside of Iran to source goods SUREH requires. Sun Middle East provides these intermediaries with false end user details for when the goods are sent to Iran, thereby seeking to circumvent the relevant country's customs regime.
63. Aufgehoben
64. **Name:** TABA (Iran Cutting Tools Manufacturing company - Taba Towlid Abzar Boreshi Iran; a.k.a. Iran Centrifuge Technology Co.; Iran's Centrifuge Technology Company; Sherkate Technology Centrifuge Iran, TESA, TSA)  
**Address:** 12 Ferdowsi, Avenue Sakhiae, avenue 30 Tir (sud), nr 66 - Tehran  
**Justification:** Owned or controlled by EU-sanctioned TESA, Involved in manufacturing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
65. **Name:** Taghtiran (a.k.a. Taghtiran Kashan Company)  
**Identifying information:** Address: Unit 2, No. 3, 2nd Alley, Asad Abadi St., Vali-asr St., 14316 Tehran, Iran  
**Place of registration:** Tehran, Iran  
**Principal place of business:** Tehran, Iran  
**Associated entities:** Defense Industries Organization (DIO)  
**Justification:** Taghtiran manufactures stainless steel and carbon steel parts for various entities, including the security and defence industries, such as Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and nuclear facilities, for example, the uranium conversion facility.
66. **Name:** Tajhiz Sanat Shayan (TSS)

**Address:** Unit 7, No. 40, Yazdanpanah, Afriqa Blvd, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Involved in procurement of components for Iranian nuclear programme.

67. **Name:** Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President's Office (a.k.a. Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC); Presidential Center for Cooperation on Transformation and Progress)  
**Identifying information:** Place of registration: Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** The Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President's Office operates in the fields of research, biotechnology, nanotechnology, renewable energy and information technology.  
 Its operations go back to 2001 when it was charged with strategic planning and the coordination of Iran's developmental activities for nanotechnology. It is attached to and supervised by the President's Office. It acts as a hub in the field and serves as a coordinator and facilitator of connections and collaborations. It maintains connections with the international community, networks between country laboratories, funds Iranian scientists, and engages in teaching.  
 Under its alias, Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), it is furthermore part of an interdepartmental system consisting of CITC, the Iranian Ministry of Information and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) under the direct command of the Iranian President. Individuals associated with CITC, acting as Iranian official representatives abroad, also carried out secret functions of scientific and technical intelligence officers.  
 Responsible for Iran's technological advancement through relevant foreign procurement and training links. It provides support to the Government of Iran.
68. **Name:** Test Tafsir  
**Address:** No 11, Tawhid 6 Street, Moj Street, Darya Blvd, Shahrak Gharb, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Company produces and has supplied UF6 specific containers to the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/ Fordow.
69. **Name:** Tosse Silooha (a.k.a. Tosseh Jihad E Silo; Tosee Siloha)  
**Identifying information:** Address: NO.3. 50th st., Kalantari sq., Seyed Jamaleddin Asadabadi Ave. (Yousefabad), Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Tosse Silooha is a company involved in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is involved in fabricating components for nuclear power plants such as cooling tower plants, and industrial chimneys. The company is also supporting the Government of Iran.
70. Aufgehoben
71. **Name:** Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat; Yarestan Vacuumi; Zist Yar Sanat; Yar Sanat Co)  
**Identifying information:** Address 1: No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; Iran  
 Address 2: No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, Iran  
 Address 3: 15, Fatemi Eshragi Alley, Gerda Afrid Building, science and Technology Park, Tarbiat Modares University, S.S 2 - Development Center, 4th Floor, Tehran, Iran  
 Principal place of business: Iran  
 Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)  
**Justification:** Procurement company for EU-listed Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme, for example instruments for uranium enrichment.

72. **Name:** Yeganeh Energy Sazan Atrak Part (formerly known as Yasa Part) and the following subsidiaries:  
**Identifying information:** Address: Ground Floor - Building 0 - Maharat 3 Alley - Maharat Street - Bidak Industrial Area - Badranlu Rural District - Central District - Bojnord City - Northern Khorasan Province, Iran Postal Code: 9418156318  
Type of entity: Private joint-stock company  
Place of registration: Bojnord - North Khorasan Province, Iran  
Registration no.: 5219  
**Justification:** Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.
73. **Name:** Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)  
**Identifying information:** Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, Iran  
Address 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
74. **Name:** Arfeh Company  
**Identifying information:** Address: West Lavasani, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
75. Aufgehoben
76. **Name:** Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)  
**Justification:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
77. **Name:** Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Inransaffron Co.; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)  
**Justification:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
78. **Name:** Shetab G.  
**Justification:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
79. **Name:** Shetab Gaman  
**Justification:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
80. **Name:** Shetab Trading  
**Justification:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
81. **Name:** Y.A.S. Co. Ltd  
**Justification:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. **Relation:** Acting on behalf of Yasa Part (including all branches) and subsidiaries
82. **Name:** Tidewater (a.k.a. Tidewater Middle East Co; Tide Water Khavarmianeh)  
**Identifying information:** Postal address: No. 84, Vozara St., Tehran, Iran  
Type of entity: Public Joint Stock Company  
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran  
Registration no.: 12341  
Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Owned or controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

83. **Name:** Turbine Engineering Manufacturing (TEM)  
**Good quality a.k.a.:** T.E.M. Co. **Address:** Shishesh Mina Street, Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Used as a front company by designated Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI) for covert procurement activities.
84. **Name:** Rosmachin  
**Address:** Haftom Tir Square, South Mofte Avenue, Tour Line No; 3/1, P.O.Box 1584864813, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Front company of Sad Export Import Company. Involved in illicit arms transfer aboard M/V Monchgorsk. **Relation:** Front company of Sad Export Import Company (I.A.C.50.20.12.12.(2))
85. **Name:** Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)  
**Address:** Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Responsible for Iran's nuclear programme. Has operational control for Iran's ballistic missile programme. Has undertaken procurement attempts to support Iran's ballistic missiles and nuclear programmes.
86. **Name:** Ansar Bank  
**Good quality a.k.a.:**a) Ansar Finance and Credit Fund b) Ansar Financial and Credit Institute c) Ansa Institute d) Ansar al-Mojahedin No-Interest Loan Institute e) Ansar Saving and Interest Free-Loans Fund **Address:** No. 539, North Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran; Ansar Building, North Khaje Nasir Street, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Bonyad Taavon Sepah created Ansar Bank to provide financial and credit services to IRGC personnel. Initially, Ansar Bank operated as a credit union and transitioned into a fully fledged bank in mid 2009, upon receiving a licence from Iran's Central bank. Ansar Bank, formerly known as Ansar al Mojahedin, has been linked to the IRGC for over 20 years. IRGC members received their salaries through Ansar bank. In addition, Ansar bank provided special benefits to IRGC personnel, including reduced rates for home furnishings and free, or reduced-cost, health care.
87. **Name:** Bonyad Taavon Sepah (a.k.a. IRGC Cooperative Foundation; Bonyad-e Ta'avon-Sepah; Sepah Cooperative Foundation)  
**Identifying information:** Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran **Justification:** Bonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, was formed by the Commanders of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to structure the IRGC's investments and to provide the IRGC's permanent personnel with financial loans, mortgages, business loans, as well as with land and construction materials.  
It is controlled by the IRGC. Bonyad Taavon Sepah's Board of Trustees is composed of nine members, eight of whom are IRGC members. These officers include the IRGC's Commander in Chief, who is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the Supreme Leader's representative to the IRGC, the Basij commander, the IRGC Ground Forces commander, the IRGC Air Force commander, the IRGC Navy commander, the head of the IRGC Information Security Organisation, a senior IRGC officer from the Armed Forces General Staff and a senior IRGC officer from the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
88. **Name:** IRGC Air Force  
Operates Iran's inventory of short and medium range ballistic missiles.
89. **Name:** IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command  
**Justification:** The IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command is a specific element within the IRGC Air Force that has been working with EU-designated

SBIG, with the FATEH 110, short range ballistic missile as well as the Ashura medium range ballistic missile. This command appears to be the entity that actually has the operational control of the missiles.

90. **Name:** IRGC Qods Force  
**Identifying information:** Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force is responsible for operations outside Iran and is Tehran's principal foreign policy tool for special operations and support to terrorists and Islamic militants abroad. Hizballah used Qods Force-supplied rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 2006 conflict with Israel and benefited from Qods Force training on these systems, according to press reporting. According to a variety of reports, the Qods Force continues to re-supply and train Hizballah on advanced weaponry, anti-aircraft missiles, and long-range rockets. The Qods Force continues to provide limited lethal support, training, and funding to Taliban fighters in southern and western Afghanistan including small arms, ammunition, mortars, and short-range battlefield rockets.
91. **Name:** Mehr Bank  
(a.k.a. Mehr Finance and Credit Institute; Mehr Interest-Free Bank)  
**Address:** No 182, Shahid Tohid St, 4th Golsetan, Pasdaran Ave, Tehran 1666943, Iran  
**Justification:** Mehr Bank is controlled by Bonyad Taavon Sepah and the IRGC. Mehr Bank provides financial services to the IRGC. According to an open source interview with the then head of Bonyad Taavon Sepah, Parviz Fatah, Bonyad Taavon Sepah created Mehr Bank to serve the Basij (paramilitary arm of the IRGC).
92. **Name:** Naserin Vahid  
**Justification:** Naserin Vahid produces weapons parts on behalf of the IRGC. An IRGC front company. **Relation:** Front company of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
93. **Name:** Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company  
**Identifying information:** Postal address: Ziba Building, 10th Floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is owned by Behnam Sahriyari, who leads the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force Unit 190, which conducts arms smuggling operations. He uses his company as a front for IRGC weapons transfers. Therefore, Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is involved in the shipment of arms on behalf of the IRGC.
94. Aufgehoben
95. Aufgehoben
96. Aufgehoben
97. Aufgehoben
98. **Name:** Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL))  
**Identifying information:** Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,  
Telephone: 98 217 3912858

Fax: 98 217 7491206

Email: [mailto:ici@iust.ac.ir](mailto:mailto:ici@iust.ac.ir)

Website: <http://www.irancomposites.org>

Associated entities: Malek Ashtar University; Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA)

**Justification:** The Iran Composites Institute is a centre for research and development in the field of composite materials and structures.

It was established in cooperation with the Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST) and remains part of it. Through its research, IUST is involved in Iran's nuclear programme. It is linked to several Iranian academic institutions, including EU-listed Malek Ashtar University which is linked to the EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

In the past, Iran Composites Institute had been contracted to provide EU-listed Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.

Iran Composites Institute is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it.

99. **Name:** Jelvesazan Company  
**Identifying information:** 22 Bahman St., Bozorgmehr Ave, 84155666, Esfahan, Iran  
Tel: 98 0311 2658311 15  
Fax: 98 0311 2679097  
**Justification:** Jelvesazan Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2012, Jelvesazan intended to supply controlled vacuum pumps to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
100. **Name:** Iran Aluminium Company  
**Address:** Arak Road Km 5, Tehran Road, 38189-8116, Arak, Iran  
Tel: 98 861 4130430 Fax: 98 861 413023 Website: [www.iralco.net](http://www.iralco.net)  
**Justification:** The Iran Aluminium Company (aka IRALCO, Iranian Aluminium Company) is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of mid-2012 IRALCO had a contract to supply aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
101. **Name:** Simatec Development Company  
**Justification:** Simatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.
102. **Name:** Aluminat  
**Identifying information:** 1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory)  
2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran  
Tel: 98 212 2049216 / 22049928 / 22045237  
Fax: 98 21 22057127  
Website: [www.aluminat.com](http://www.aluminat.com)  
**Justification:** Aluminat has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. In early 2012, Aluminat had a contract to supply 6061-T6 aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
103. **Name:** Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND)

**Identifying information:** Address: Negarestan 3, off Pasdaran Street, Tehran, Iran  
Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran  
Associated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)  
**Justification:** The Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) directly supports Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The IAEA has identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran's nuclear programme. SPND was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi and is part of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) designated by the EU.

104. Aufgehoben

105. **Name:** Sharif University of Technology  
**Identifying information:** Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, Iran  
Tel. + 98 21 66 161  
Email: info@sharif.ir  
Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)  
**Justification:** Sharif University of Technology is a Tehran-based university and Iran's central repository for nuclear research.  
In the field of ballistic missile research and production, it cooperates with the EU-listed Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which oversees Iran's ballistic missile programme on behalf of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Furthermore, it cooperates with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and supports it, among other activities, in its procurement efforts.  
Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitute support to the Government of Iran.

106. Aufgehoben

107. Aufgehoben

108. Aufgehoben

109. Aufgehoben

110. Aufgehoben

111. Aufgehoben

112. Aufgehoben

113. Aufgehoben

114. Aufgehoben

115. Aufgehoben

116. Aufgehoben

117. Aufgehoben

118. Aufgehoben

119. Aufgehoben

120. Aufgehoben
121. Aufgehoben
122. Aufgehoben
123. Aufgehoben
124. Aufgehoben
125. Aufgehoben
126. Aufgehoben
127. Aufgehoben
128. Aufgehoben
129. Aufgehoben
130. Aufgehoben
131. Aufgehoben
132. Aufgehoben
133. Aufgehoben
134. Aufgehoben
135. Aufgehoben
136. Aufgehoben
137. Aufgehoben
138. Aufgehoben
139. Aufgehoben
140. Aufgehoben
141. Aufgehoben
142. Aufgehoben
143. Aufgehoben
144. Aufgehoben
145. Aufgehoben
146. Aufgehoben
147. Aufgehoben
148. Aufgehoben
149. Aufgehoben
150. Aufgehoben
151. Aufgehoben

152. Aufgehoben
153. Aufgehoben
154. **Name:** Azarab Industries  
**Identifying information:** Address: Head office: No.15, MollaSadra Ave., Vanak sq., Tehran (Postal Code: 1991913981), Iran; Factory: Sanaat Sq., Arak-Iran, Postal Code: 3818997873  
**Justification:** Azarab Industries is involved in the field of nuclear energy production and has close ties to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Furthermore, Azarab Industries is linked to Khatam-al Anbiya, an engineering company under the control of the IRGC. Therefore, Azarab Industries is engaged in and providing support to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
155. **Name:** Bank Mellat  
**Identifying information:** Address: Head Office Building, 327 Takeghani (Taleghani) Avenue, Tehran 15817, Iran; P.O. Box 11365-5964, Tehran 15817, Iran  
**Justification:** Bank Mellat provides financial support to the Government of Iran, notably by means of loans aimed at supporting unprofitable Government companies. The Iranian Government is also the largest shareholder of Bank Mellat. Therefore, Bank Mellat provides support to the Government of Iran.
156. **Name:** Bank Melli,  
Bank Melli Iran (including all branches) and subsidiaries  
**Identifying information:** Ferdowsi Avenue, PO Box 11365-171, Tehran, Iran  
Registration number: 60FC005874HRB10813  
**Justification:** Bank Melli is Iran's largest bank and is owned and controlled by the Government of Iran and provides services to the Ministry of Defense (MODAFL). Therefore, Bank Melli is controlled by and provides support to the Government of Iran.
157. **Name:** Arian Bank  
(a.k.a. Aryan Bank)  
**Identifying information:** Address: House 2, Street Number 13, Wazir Akbar Khan, Kabul, Afghanistan  
**Justification:** Arian Bank is an Afghan joint-venture between Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. Bank Melli is Iran's largest bank, owned and controlled by the Government of Iran and providing services to the Ministry of Defense (MODAFL). Bank Saderat is one of Iran's largest banks, the Government of Iran is one of its major shareholders. It provides financial support to entities close to the IRGC and to proxies of the Government of Iran. Therefore, Arian Bank is an entity owned and controlled by entities providing support to the Government of Iran.
158. **Name:** Assa Corporation  
**Identifying information:** Address: ASSA CORP, 650 (or 500) Fifth Avenue, New York, USA  
Tax ID No. 1368932 (United States)  
**Justification:** Assa Corporation is an entity owned by Assa Company Ltd, which is a shell company for the Iranian state-controlled Bank Melli, which is controlled by and provides support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, Assa Corporation is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

159. **Name:** Assa Company Ltd  
**Identifying information:** 6 Britannia Place, Bath Street, St Helier JE2 4SU, Jersey Channel Islands  
**Justification:** Assa Company Ltd is a shell company for the Iranian state-controlled Bank Melli, which is controlled by and provides support to the Government of Iran.  
Therefore, Assa Company Ltd is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
160. **Name:** Bank Kargoshaie  
(a.k.a. Bank Kargoshaee, a.k.a. Kargosai Bank, a.k.a. Kargosa'i Bank)  
**Identifying information:** Address: 587 Mohammadiye Square, Mowlavi St., Tehran 11986, Iran  
**Justification:** Bank Kargoshaie is a subsidiary of Bank Melli. Bank Kargoshaie provides financial services to both individuals and businesses. In turn, Bank Melli is Iran's largest bank which is owned and controlled by the Government of Iran and provides services to the Ministry of Defense (MODAFL). Therefore, Bank Kargoshaie is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
161. **Name:** Bank Melli Iran Investment Company (BMIIC)  
**Identifying information:** Address: No.2, Nader Alley, Vali-Asr Str., Tehran, Iran, P.O. Box 3898-15875  
Address: Bldg 2, Nader Alley after Beheshi Forked Road, P.O. Box 15875-3898, Tehran, Iran 15116  
Address: Rafiee Alley, Nader Alley, 2 After Serahi Shahid Beheshti, Vali E Asr Avenue, Tehran, Iran  
Registration Number: 89584  
**Justification:** Bank Melli Iran Investment Company is an Iranian investment bank. Bank Melli Iran Investment Company is owned and controlled by Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank, which is owned and controlled by and provides support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, Bank Melli Iran Investment Company is owned and controlled by an entity which supports the Government of Iran.
162. **Name:** Bank Melli Iran ZAO  
a.k.a. Mir Business Bank  
**Identifying information:** Address: Number 9/1, Ulitsa Mashkova, Moscow, 130064, Russia  
Address: Mashkova st. 9/1 Moscow 105062 Russia  
Fax: +7 (495) 9286286, (007495) 6286286  
EMail: mbbmos@mbbru.com  
Mellimos@BMIRU.com  
Mellimos@Rex400.ru  
Entity Web Site: [www.mbbbru.com](http://www.mbbbru.com)[www.bmiru.com](http://www.bmiru.com)  
**Justification:** Bank Melli Iran ZAO is an Iranian bank based in Russia. Bank Melli Iran ZAO is owned and controlled by Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank, which is owned and controlled by and provides support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, Bank Melli Iran ZAO is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
163. **Name:** Bank Melli Printing and Publishing Company  
a.k.a. BMPPC  
**Identifying information:** Address: 18th Km Karaj Special Road, 1398185611 Tehran, Iran, P.O. Box 37515-183

Address: Km 16 Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran

Address: P.O. Box 37515-183, Tehran, Iran

Registration Number: 382231

**Justification:** Bank Melli Printing and Publishing Company is an Iranian printing and publishing company. Bank Melli Printing and Publishing Company is owned and controlled by Bank Melli, which provides support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, Bank Melli Printing and Publishing Company is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

164. **Name:** Cement Investment and Development Company  
 a.k.a. CIDCO  
 a.k.a.: Cement Industry Investment and Development Company  
 a.k.a. CIDCO Cement Holding  
**Identifying information:** Address: No 20, West Nahid Blvd. Vali Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran, 1967757451  
 Address: No. 241, Mirdamad Street, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** The Cement Investment and Development Company is an Iranian company owned and controlled by Bank Melli Iran Investment Company (BMIIC). BMIIC is owned and controlled by Bank Melli, which, in turn, is owned and controlled by the Government of Iran and provides support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, the Cement Investment and Development Company is owned and controlled by an entity which provides support to the Government of Iran.
165. **Name:** First Persian Equity Fund  
**Identifying information:** Address: Walker House, 87 Mary Street, George Town, Grand Cayman, KY1-9002, Cayman Islands  
 Address: Clifton House, 7z5 Fort Street, P.O. Box 190, Grand Cayman, KY1-1104; Cayman Islands  
 Address: Rafi Alley, Vali Asr Avenue, Nader Alley, Tehran, 15116, Iran, P.O. Box 15875-3898  
**Justification:** The First Persian Equity Fund is an investment fund launched in 2007 by Bank Melli. Bank Melli is Iran's largest bank which is owned and controlled by the Government of Iran. Therefore, the First Persian Equity Fund is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
166. **Name:** Mazandaran Cement Company  
**Identifying information:** Address: 51 Africa Street, Shaheed Sattari Avenue, between Zafar & Mirdamad, 1968856911 Tehran, Iran  
 Registration number: IR40014GN  
 Date of registration: 1975  
**Justification:** Mazandaran Cement Company is an Iranian company controlled by Bank Melli and the Government of Iran. It serves as a vehicle for Bank Melli's interests in the cement industry. Therefore, Mazandaran Cement Company is controlled by the Government of Iran and by an entity which provides support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore, it provides support to the Government of Iran.
167. **Name:** Melli Bank plc  
**Identifying information:** Address: 98A Kensington High Street, W8 4SG London, United Kingdom  
 Registration number: GB04152338

**Justification:** Melli Bank PLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank Melli Iran, which is owned by the Government of Iran. Therefore, Melli Bank PLC is owned by an entity which provides support to the Government of Iran.

168. **Name:** Shemal Cement Company  
a.k.a: Siman Shomal  
a.k.a Shomal Cement Company  
**Identifying information:** Address: No 269 Dr Beheshti Ave. P.O. Box 15875/4571 Tehran - 15146, Iran  
Address: Dr Beheshti Ave No. 289, Tehran, 151446, Iran  
Address: 289 Shahid Baheshti Ave., P.O. Box 15146, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Shemal Cement Company is a cement company controlled by Bank Melli Iran, which is owned and controlled by the Government of Iran and provides support to it. Shemal Cement Company's main shareholder is the Cement Industries Investment and Development Company, which is majority-owned by the National Development Group Investment, whose main shareholder is Bank Melli Iran.  
Therefore, Shemal Cement Company is controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
169. **Name:** Bank Saderat  
**Identifying information:** Address: Bank Saderat Tower, 43 Somayeh Ave, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Bank Saderat is one of Iran's largest banks. The Government of Iran is one of its major shareholders.  
Bank Saderat provides financial support in the form of loans to entities close to the IRGC. It also allows the funnelling of funding to the Iranian Government's proxies in the region, which are responsible for destabilising activities.  
Therefore, Bank Saderat is supporting the Government of Iran.
170. **Name:** Sina Bank  
**Identifying information:** 187 Mothari Avenue, Tehran, Iran  
Registration number: IRFEB54525  
**Justification:** Sina Bank is controlled by the Islamic Revolution Mostazafan Foundation, a major Iranian parastatal entity controlled by the Supreme Leader Khomeini, and which has a controlling shareholding in Sina Bank. It provides financial services to the Mostazafan Foundation and its group of subsidiary units and companies. Accordingly, Sina Bank provides financial support to the Government of Iran through the Mostazafan Foundation.
171. **Name:** EDBI Exchange Company  
a.k.a. Export Development Exchange Broker Co.  
**Identifying information:** Address: No 20, 13th St., Vozara Ave., Tehran, Iran 1513753411, P.O. Box: 15875-6353  
Address: Tose'e Tower, corner of 15th St., Ahmad Qasir Ave.; Argentine Square, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** EDBI Exchange Company is a subsidiary of the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). It provides foreign exchange services to its customers. EDBI is a state-owned bank which provides support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, EDBI Exchange Company is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
172. **Name:** EDBI Stock Brokerage Company

**Identifying information:** Address: Tose'e Tower, corner of 15th St., Ahmad Qasir Ave.; Argentine Square, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** EDBI Stock Brokerage Company is a subsidiary of the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). It provides stock brokerage services to its customers. EDBI is a state-owned bank which provides support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, EDBI Stock Brokerage Company is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

173. **Name:** Banco Internacional De Desarrollo CA  
**Identifying information:** Address: Urb. El Rosal, Avenida Francesco de Miranda, Edificio Dozsa, Piso 8, Caracas C.P. 1060, Venezuela  
 Place of registration: Caracas, Venezuela  
 Date of registration: 2007 or 2008  
 Registration number: J294640109  
**Justification:** The Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BID) is a Venezuelan entity owned by Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), an Iranian entity whose objective is to provide support to the Iranian government. Therefore, BID is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
174. **Name:** Future Bank BSC  
**Identifying information:** Address: Block 304. City Centre Building. Building 199, Government Avenue, Road 383, Manama, Bahrain. PO Box 785  
 Business Registration Number: 54514-1 (Bahrain) expires 9.6.2009; Trade License No 13388 (Bahrain)  
**Justification:** Future Bank BSC is an Iranian bank based in Bahrain. Future Bank BSC was created as a joint-venture between Bank Saderat and Bank Melli, two of Iran's largest banks, which are owned and controlled by and providing support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, Future Bank BSC is owned and controlled by entities that provide support to the Government of Iran.
175. **Name:** Industrial Development & Renovation Organization  
 a.k.a. IDRO  
**Identifying information:** Address: 78/1 Atefi Street and Africa Avenue, Tehran, Iran  
 Address: P.O. Box 55958, Arbift Tower 1508, Dubai, United Arab Emirates  
 Address: P.O. Box 16820, Jebel Ali, Dubai, United Arab Emirates  
 Address: Vali e Asr Building, Vali Asr St, Jam e Jam Ave, Tehran, Iran  
 Address: P.O. Box 19395-1855, Tehran, Iran  
 Address: No.2 Vali-Asr Building, Vali-Asr Street, Jam-e-Jam Ave, Tehran, Iran  
 Date of registration: 1967  
**Justification:** The Industrial Development and Renovation Organisation is a government body responsible for acceleration of Iran's industrialisation. It is involved in the nuclear and missile programmes and provides support to the Iranian industrial sector. Therefore, the Industrial Development and Renovation Organisation is owned or controlled by and supports the Government of Iran.
176. **Name:** Kala Naft  
**Identifying information:** Kala Naft Tehran Trading Building, Sepahbod Gharani Street, Karim Khan Zand Avenue, 15988 Tehran, Iran  
 Registration number: IR0000047040  
**Justification:** Kala Naft is a Manufacturing, Support and Procurement Company and a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for

Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC.

Therefore, Kala Naft is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

177. **Name:** Machine Sazi Arak  
**Identifying information:** P.O. Box: 148, KM 4, Tehran Alley, 3818997888 Arak, Iran  
Registration number: IR30177GN  
Date of registration: 1967  
**Justification:** Machine Sazi Arak is an Iranian industrial machinery and equipment manufacturing company. It manufactures equipment for proliferation sensitive activities and lists the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) as well as MODAFL as its customers. It is also affiliated with IDRO that provides manufacturing support to the nuclear programme. Machine Sazi Arak was also involved in the construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor. It also supports oil and gas exploration activities overseen by the Ministry of Petroleum as well as NIOC and its subsidiaries. Therefore, Machine Sazi Arak is involved in the nuclear missile programme, and it provides support to the Government of Iran.
178. **Name:** Power Plants' Equipment Manufacturing Company  
a.k.a. Saakhte Tajhizate Niroogahi  
**Identifying information:** Address: No. 10, Jahanara Alley, after Hemmat Bridge, Abbaspour St. (previously called Tavanir), Tehran, Post Code 1435733161, Iran  
**Justification:** The Power Plants' Equipment Manufacturing Company (SATNA) is subordinate to AEOI and Novin Energy (both designated under UNSCR 1737). It is involved in the development of nuclear reactors. Therefore, Power Plants' Equipment Manufacturing Company provides support to Iran's nuclear-proliferation activities.
179. **Name:** Nuclear Power Production and Procurement Company (NPPD)  
**Identifying information:** No. 8, Tandis St., Africa Ave., Tehran (headquarter), Iran  
**Justification:** Nuclear Power Production & Development Company (NPPD) is a subsidiary of AEOI and involved in nuclear power plant development. Therefore, NPPD is engaged in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
180. **Name:** Iranian Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute  
a.k.a. Research Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology  
a.k.a. Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute  
**Identifying information:** AEOI, PO Box 14395-836, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** The Iranian Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute is affiliated on an official level with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which oversees the Iranian nuclear programme. Therefore, the Iranian Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute is involved in and supports Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.
181. **Name:** Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH)  
**Identifying information:** Address: Head Office: Depenau 2, D-20095 Hamburg; Kish branch, Sanaee Avenue, PO Box 79415/148, Kish Island 79415  
Address: Tehran branch, No. 1655/1, Valiasr Avenue, PO Box 19656 43 511, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH) is owned and controlled by the Iranian Government and the Bank of Industry and Mines. Therefore, the EIH is an entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

182. **Name:** EMKA Company  
**Identifying information:** Address: P.O. Box 14155-1339, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** EMKA Company is active in Iran's nuclear industry. EMKA Company is a subsidiary of TAMAS Company which is a specialised company for the production of raw materials and nuclear fuel in Iran. EMKA Company is specifically responsible for exploration, mining, and mineral processing operations within the nuclear fuel cycle. Therefore, EMKA Company is engaged in and providing support for Iran's nuclear-proliferation activities.
183. **Name:** Isfahan Nuclear Reactor Fuel Company  
a.k.a. Sureh Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company  
a.k.a. Nuclear Fuel Reactor Company; Sookht Atomi Reactorhaye Iran; Soukht Atomi Reactorha-ye Iran  
**Identifying information:** Head Office: 61 Shahid Abtahi St, Karegar e Shomali, Tehran, Iran  
Complex: Persian Gulf Boulevard, Km 20 SW Esfahan Road, Esfahan; Iran  
**Justification:** Previously known as Sureh Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company, it is subordinate to the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) consisting of the Uranium Conversion Facility, the Fuel Manufacturing Plant and the Zirconium Production Plant.  
Therefore, Isfahan Nuclear Reactor Fuel Company is involved in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
184. **Name:** Bonab Research Center (BRC)  
**Identifying information:** Address: Jade ye Tabriz (km 7), East Azerbaijan, Iran  
**Justification:** The Bonab Research Center is providing research for the design and manufacturing of nuclear components and equipment by Iranian organisations. Therefore, the Bonab Research Center is providing support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
185. **Name:** Uranium Processing Nuclear Fuel Production Company of Iran  
a.k.a. FATSA  
a.k.a. Uranium Processing and Nuclear Fuel Production Company of Iran  
a.k.a. Uranium Processing and Production Company Esfahan Nuclear Fuel  
a.k.a. Iran Uranium Processing and Nuclear Fuel Production Company  
**Identifying information:** Address: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, No. 1995, North Karegar St., West Shahid Seyyed Abbas Abtahi Street 20, Amirabad, Tehran, Iran.  
Date of registration: 11.7.2007  
Registration number: 300525  
**Justification:** Iran's Uranium Processing and Nuclear Fuel Production Company (FATSA) is active in uranium conversion and related elements, managing and supervising the construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of uranium conversion facilities and factories, fuel assembly production and related industries, and carrying out all relevant domestic and foreign transactions in this field, as well as importing or exporting converted fuel assembly materials and factory products. Therefore, it is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.  
Additionally, it is controlled by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran and provides support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the Government of Iran.  
Therefore, FATSA is engaged in and providing support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

Furthermore, it provides support to the Government of Iran.

186. **Name:** Central Bank of Iran  
(a.k.a. Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a.k.a. Bank Markazi Jom-houri Islami Iran)  
**Identifying information:** Address: 213 Ferdowsi Avenue, 11365 Tehran, Iran; Mirdamad Blvd, 144 - P.O. Box 15875/7177, Tehran, Iran; PO Box 15875/7177, 144 Mirdamad Blvd, Tehran, Iran  
P.O. Box: 15875 / 7177  
Place of registration: Iran  
Date of registration: 1960  
Registration number: 4296905415  
SWIFT/BIC: BMJIIRT1  
Web Site: <http://www.cbi.ir>  
Email: G.SecDepr@cbi.ir  
**Justification:** The Central Bank of Iran provides financial support to the IRGC, which is engaged in Iran's nuclear and missile programmes. The Central Bank of Iran therefore supports Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the Government of Iran.
187. **Name:** Tejarat Bank  
**Identifying information:** Address: Taleghani Br. 130, Taleghani Ave. P.O. Box: 11365 -5416, Tehran  
Phone: 88826690  
Fax: 8890028  
**Justification:** Tejarat Bank is an Iranian bank which provides support to Iran's industrial, energy and economic infrastructure, including in the petrochemical and energy sectors.  
Bank Tejarat has a prominent role in supporting Government projects led by the Ministry of Energy. It also provides financial support for the development of national petrochemical and oil extraction projects.  
It is partially owned and controlled by the Government of Iran, which chairs the Ordinary General Assembly of Tejarat Bank. Therefore, Tejarat Bank is providing support to the Government of Iran.
188. **Name:** Ministry of Energy  
**Identifying information:** Address: Tehran Province, Tehran, District 3, Kordestan Expy, QCF4+FRR, 19968 32611, Iran  
Address: Tehran, Vali Asr Street, the beginning of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani Highway (Niyaysh), Block 4 - Ministry of Energy Building, Postal code: 199683393, Iran  
**Justification:** The Ministry of Energy of Iran (MOE) is responsible for policy in the energy sector and for furthering cooperation with third countries. MOE owns or controls MAPNA Group, a key player in the Iranian energy, oil and gas business. In cooperation with the Ministry of Petroleum, MAPNA Group is involved in the exploration of gas and oil fields and therefore contributes to Iran's oil revenues. A significant part of these revenues is allocated to the Armed Forces and SPND. Through its link to MAPNA Group, the Ministry of Energy of Iran supports Iran's nuclear activities.
189. **Name:** Ministry of Petroleum  
**Identifying information:** Address: Taleghani Avenue, next to Hafez Bridge, Iran  
Registration number: IR0022770444

**Justification:** The Ministry of Petroleum of Iran is responsible for policy in the oil sector, which is a sector providing substantial funds for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Therefore, the Ministry of Petroleum is providing support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

190. **Name:** National Iranian Oil Company  
a.k.a. NIOC  
**Identifying information:** NIOC HQ, National Iranian Oil Company Hafez Crossing, Taleghani Avenue Tehran - Iran/First Central Building, Taleghan St., Tehran, Postal Code: 1593657919, P.O. Box 1863 and 2501, Iran  
Registration number: IR0000047087  
Date of registration: 6.12.1955  
**Justification:** The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. The Minister of Oil is Director of the NIOC Board and the Deputy Minister of Oil is the Managing Director of NIOC. Therefore, NIOC provides support to and is owned by the Government of Iran. Furthermore, it provides essential services to the IRGC.
191. **Name:** National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) PTE LTD  
**Identifying information:** 7 Temasek Boulevard #07-02, Suntec Tower One 038987, Singapore  
Registration Number: SG199004388C (Singapore)  
Date of registration: 5.9.1990 (Singapore)  
**Justification:** The National Iranian Oil Company PTE LTD is a subsidiary (100 %) of the state-owned and operated National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Therefore, the National Iranian Oil Company PTE LTD is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran. It also provides essential services to the IRGC.
192. **Name:** National Iranian Oil Company International Affairs Limited  
a.k.a. NIOC International Affairs Limited  
**Identifying information:** 24 Grosvenor Gardens, SW1W 0DH, London, United Kingdom  
Company Number: 02772297 (United Kingdom)  
**Justification:** The National Iranian Oil Company International Affairs Limited is a subsidiary (100 %) of the state-owned and operated National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Therefore, the National Iranian Oil Company International Affairs Limited is owned or controlled by an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore, it provides essential services to the IRGC.
193. **Name:** Iran Fuel Conservation Organization

a.k.a. IFCO

**Identifying information:** Address: No. 23 East Daneshvar St. North Shiraz  
St.Molasadra St.Vanak Sq. Tehran, Iran  
Tel.: (+98) 2188604760-6

**Justification:** Iran Fuel Conservation Organization is an Iranian entity working in the field of fuel consumption, and a subsidiary (100 %) of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran.

Therefore, Iran Fuel Conservation Organization is owned and controlled by an entity which provides support to the Government of Iran.

194. **Name:** Karoon Oil & Gas Production Company

**Identifying information:** Industrial Zone, Ahwaz, Khuzestan, Iran  
Registration number: IR915378759

Other associated entities (subsidiaries):

- Kala Naft
- Karoon Oil & Gas Production Company
- Khazar Expl & Prod Co (KEPCO)
- Masjed-soleyman Oil & Gas Company (MOGC)
- Maroun Oil & Gas Company
- Naftiran Intertrade Company (a.k.a. Naftiran Trade Company) (NICO)
- National Iranian Central Oilfield Company (ICOFC)
- National Iranian Oil Company International Affairs Limited
- Petroleum Engineering & Development Company
- Petropars International FZE (PPI FZE)
- Petropars Iran Company (PPI)
- Petropars Ltd
- Petropars Oilfield Services Company (POSCO)
- Petropars Resources Engineering LTD (PRDE)
- Petropars UK Limited
- South Zagros Oil & Gas Production Company

**Justification:** Karoon Oil & Gas Production Company is Iran's largest oil production company and a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC.

Therefore, Karoon Oil & Gas Production Company is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

195. **Name:** Petroleum Engineering & Development Company

a.k.a. PEDEC

**Identifying information:** No. 61 Shahid Kalantari St., Sepahbod Qarani Ave.,  
Tehran, Iran

Registration number: IR0000054377

Date of registration: 27.08.1980

**Justification:** The Petroleum Engineering & Development Company (PEDEC) is a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its development and engineering arm. NIOC is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. There-

fore, PEDEC is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

196. **Name:** North Drilling Company (NDC)  
**Identifying information:** Address: No. 2127 Valiasr St., Corner of Del Afrooz St., Tehran, Iran  
 Registration number: IR30068GN / 10101920830  
 Date of registration: 1999 (privatised 2009)  
**Justification:** North Drilling Company is a leading company in oil and gas drilling sector. It is a subsidiary of Sina Energy Holding which is a subsidiary of the Mostazafan Foundation. The Mostazafan Foundation is a major Iranian parastatal entity controlled by the Family of the Supreme Leader, the IRGC and the Government of Iran.  
 Furthermore, the North Drilling Company cooperated with the National Iranian South Oil Company and the National Iranian Oil Company.  
 Therefore, North Drilling Company provides support to the Government of Iran and is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran. Furthermore, it is associated with entities owned or controlled by and providing support to the Government of Iran.
197. **Name:** Khazar Expl & Prod Co  
 a.k.a. KEPCO  
**Identifying information:** No. 19 11th St. Khaled Eslamboli St., Tehran, Iran  
 Tel.: (+98) 2188722430  
**Justification:** Khazar Exploration and Production Company (KEPCO) is one of the five oil and gas production and exploration companies of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and therefore its subsidiary. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC.  
 Therefore, KEPCO is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
198. **Name:** National Iranian Drilling Company  
 a.k.a. NIDC  
**Identifying information:** Address: Airport Sq. Pasdaran Blvd., Ahwaz, Khuzestan, Iran  
 Registration number: IR0000368792  
**Justification:** The National Iranian Drilling Company (NIDC) is a subsidiary (100 %) of the state-owned and operated National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Therefore, NIDC is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore, it provides essential services to the IRGC.
199. **Name:** South Zagros Oil & Gas Production Company  
**Identifying information:** Address: Parvaneh St., Karimkhan Zand Blvd., Shiraz, Iran  
 Registration number: IR0052586382  
 Tel.: (+98) 7112138204

**Justification:** South Zagros Oil & Gas Production Company is an oil and gas production company, which is a subsidiary of National Iranian Central Oilfield Company (ICOFC), which is in turn a subsidiary of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Therefore, South Zagros Oil & Gas Production Company is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

200. **Name:** Maroun Oil & Gas Company  
a.k.a. Maroun Oil and Gas Operations  
a.k.a. Maround Oil and Gas Production Co.  
a.k.a. MOGPC  
**Identifying information:** Tehran, Iran  
Registration number: IR0052586388  
Date of registration: 2.12.1998  
**Justification:** Maroun Oil & Gas Company is a subsidiary of the National Iranian South Oil Company (NISOC), which is in turn a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Maroun Oil & Gas Company is responsible for the production, processing and transfer of oil, gas and condensates from larger oil fields. Oil production and sales play a crucial role in the financing of Iran's military as well as the IRGC. Therefore, Maroun Oil & Gas Company is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore, it provides essential services to the IRGC and supports the Government of Iran.
201. **Name:** Masjed-soleyman Oil & Gas Company (MOGC)  
**Identifying information:** Address: Khuzestan, Iran  
Registration number: IR915378790  
**Justification:** Masjed-soleyman Oil & Gas Company (MOGC) is a subsidiary (100 %) of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran.  
Therefore, MOGC is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
202. **Name:** Gachsaran Oil & Gas Company  
a.k.a. Gacharsan Oil Gas Co.  
**Identifying information:** Address: Gachsaran, Kohkiluye-va-Boyer, Ahmad, Iran  
Tel.: (+98) 7422222581  
**Justification:** Gachsaran Oil & Gas Company is managed via the National Iranian South Oil Company (NISOC), and it is a subsidiary (100 %) of the State-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). In turn, NIOC provides support to and is owned by the Government of Iran. Therefore, Gachsaran Oil & Gas Company is controlled by an entity providing support to and owned by the Government of Iran.
203. **Name:** Aghajari Oil & Gas Production Company (AOGPC)  
**Identifying information:** Address: Naft Blvd., Omidieh, Khuzestan, Iran  
Address: Khuzestan, Omidieh, Oil Boulevard, Iran

Website: aogpc.nisoc.ir

**Justification:** Aghajari Oil & Gas Production Company (AOGPC), also known as Aghajari Oil and Gas Exploitation Company, is an Iranian entity working in the field of energy and a subsidiary of the National Iranian South Oil Company (NISOC). NISOC is a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which provides support to and is owned by the Government of Iran. Therefore, AOGPC is controlled by an entity, which provides support to the Government of Iran.

204. **Name:** Arvandan Oil & Gas Company  
a.k.a. AOGC  
**Identifying information:** Address: Khamenei Ave., Khorramshahr, Iran  
Tel.: (+98) 6324214021  
**Justification:** Arvandan Oil & Gas Company is an Iranian oil and gas entity and subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). It operates major oil and gas fields in the West Karoun region. Its activities contribute to NIOC's national production goals.  
NIOC is a State-owned and operated energy company providing substantial financial resources and support to the Government of Iran.  
Therefore, Arvandan Oil & Gas company is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
205. **Name:** West Oil & Gas Production Company  
**Identifying information:** Address: No. 42 Zan Blvd, Naft Sq., Kermanshah, Iran  
Registration number: IR915378784  
**Justification:** West Oil & Gas Production Company is a subsidiary of Iranian Central Oil Fields Company, which is a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC is a State-owned and operated company that provides support to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC.  
Therefore, West Oil & Gas Production Company is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
206. **Name:** East Oil & Gas Production Company  
a.k.a. EOGPC  
**Identifying information:** Address: No. 18 Payam 6 St, Payam Ave, Sheshsad Dastga, Mashha, Iran  
Tel.: (+98) 5117633011  
**Justification:** East Oil & Gas Production Company (EOGPC) is a subsidiary of the Iranian Central Oil Fields Company (ICOFC) which in turn is a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources and support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, EOGPC is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
207. **Name:** Iranian Oil Terminals Company  
a.k.a. IOTC  
**Identifying information:** Address - No. 11 Hojjat Souri Street (7th Street), Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran  
Tel.: (+98) 2188732221  
**Justification:** Iranian Oil Terminals Company is an Iranian company, a subsidiary (100 %) of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil

Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources and support to the Government of Iran. It receives, stores, exports and imports crude oil, petroleum products and gas condensate, as well as providing services including marine services. It is an important supporter of the country's oil and gas production and exports, therefore it provides revenue to the Iranian government. Therefore, the Iranian Oil Terminals Company is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore, Iranian Oil Terminals Company itself provides support to the Government of Iran.

208. **Name:** Pars Special Economic Energy Zone  
a.k.a. PSEEZ  
**Identifying information:** Address: Pars Special Economic Energy Zone Org., Assaluyeh, Boushehr, Iran  
Address: Bushehr Province, Assaluyeh, Pars Special Economic Energy Zone Organization, P.O. Box: 7511946484, Iran  
Registration number: IR916378778  
**Justification:** Pars Special Economic Energy Zone (PSEEZ) is a subsidiary (100 %) of the State-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources and support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore, PSEEZ's Assaluyeh Port provides port operating services to IRISL. Therefore, PSEEZ is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore, it provides essential services to IRISL.
209. **Name:** Iran Liquefied Natural Gas Co.  
**Identifying information:** Address: No. 20, Alvand St, Argentina Sq, Tehran, 1514938111, Iran  
**Justification:** Iran Liquefied Natural Gas Co. is managing Iran LNG projects. It is a subsidiary of the National Iranian Gas Export Company, which is itself a subsidiary of the State-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources and support to the Government of Iran. The main shareholder of Iran Liquefied Natural Gas Co is the Government of Iran. Therefore, Iran Liquefied Natural Gas Co. is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
210. **Name:** Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO)  
a.k.a. Naftiran Trade Company  
a.k.a. NICO  
a.k.a. Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) Limited  
**Identifying information:** Address: 5th Floor, Petropars Building, No 35 Farhang Boulevard, Snadat Abad Avenue, Tehran, Iran  
Address: No. 35, Farhang Blvd (Erfan St Corner), Saadat Abad, Tehran, Iran  
Address: Level 5(I), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Complex, Jalan Merdeka, 87000 Federal Territory of Labuan, Malaysia  
Address: Suite 17, Burlington House, St. Saviours Road, St. Helier, Jersey, United Kingdom  
Registration number: IRL000000024809  
Tel. +98 21 22372486; +98 21 22374681; +98 21 22374678;  
Fax +98 21 22374678; +98 21 22372481  
Email: info@naftiran.com

**Justification:** Naftiran Intertrade Company is a subsidiary (100 %) of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Therefore, Naftiran Intertrade Company is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran. It also provides essential services to the IRGC.

211. **Name:** Naftiran Intertrade Company Srl  
**Identifying information:** Address: Avenue de la Tour-Haldimand, 6, 1009 Pully, Switzerland  
 Registration number: CH-550.1.031.089-0  
 VAT No: CHE-109.711.148  
 Tel: +41 21 3106565  
 Fax: +41 21 3106566/67/72  
 Email: nico.finance@naftiran.ch  
**Justification:** Naftiran Intertrade Company SRL (NICO SRL) is a subsidiary (100 %) of Naftiran Intertrade Company, which is in turn a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Therefore, NICO SRL is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore it provides essential services to the IRGC.
212. **Name:** Petroiran Development Company (PEDCO) Ltd (a.k.a. PetroIran; a.k.a. "PEDCO")  
**Identifying information:** Address: PEDCO, P.O. Box 2965, Al Bathaa Tower, 9th Floor, Apt. 905, Al Buhaira Corniche, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 15875-6731, Tehran, Iran; 41, 1st Floor, International House, The Parade, St. Helier JE2 3QQ, Jersey; No. 22, 7th Lane, Khalid Eslamboli Street, Shahid Beheshti Avenue, Tehran, Iran; No. 102, Next to Shahid Amir Soheil Tabrizian Alley, Shahid Dastgerdi (Ex Zafar) Street, Shariati Street, Tehran 19199/45111, Iran  
**Justification:** Petroiran Development Company Ltd. (PEDCO) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd (NICO), which is in turn a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which provides support to the Government of Iran. NIOC not only indirectly owns PEDCO, but also makes direct appointments to the company's leadership. PEDCO is a production and exploration company responsible for developing oil and gas fields. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Therefore, PEDCO is owned or controlled by an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran.
213. **Name:** Petropars Ltd. (a.k.a. Petropasr Limited; a.k.a. "PPL")  
**Identifying information:** Address: North Naft Street 10, Mirdawad Boulevard, Tehran, Iran  
 Registration number: IR0000102447  
**Justification:** Petropars Ltd (PPL) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd (NICO), which in turn is a 100 % subsidiary of the State-owned National Iranian Oil Company NIOC, which provides support to the

Government of Iran. Petropars Ltd (PPL) represents NIOC in certain deals with international partners and serves as its executive arm.  
Therefore, Petropars Ltd is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

214. **Name:** Petropars International FZE  
a.k.a. PPI FZE  
**Identifying information:** Address: P.O. Box 72146, Dubai, United Arab Emirates  
Address: Kish Address: 79 to 82 Plates, 6 Sanat Tree, Derakhte Sabs Tree, Kish Island, Iran  
Address: 3rd Floor, Petropars Limited, Farhang Blvd, Farhang Square, Sa'adat Abad, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Petropars International FZE is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petropars Ltd (PPL), which is in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd (NICO). NICO belongs to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which is a State-owned and operated entity providing support to the Government of Iran.  
Petropars Ltd (PPL) represents NIOC in certain deals with international partners and serves as its executive arm. Petropars International FZE provides transportation, logistics and commercial services in the Persian Gulf region.  
Therefore, Petropars International FZE is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
215. **Name:** Petropars UK Limited  
**Identifying information:** Address: 47 Queen Anne Street, London W1G 9JG, United Kingdom  
Address: 4 Dancastle Court, 14 Arcadia Avenue, London, N3 2JU  
Registration Number: 03503060 (United Kingdom)  
**Justification:** Petropars UK Ltd. is a subsidiary of Petropars Ltd (PPL). Petropars Ltd (PPL) is wholly owned by Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd (NICO), which belongs to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an Iranian State-owned company providing support to the Government of Iran. Therefore, Petropars UK Ltd is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
216. **Name:** National Iranian Gas Company  
a.k.a. NIGC  
**Identifying information:** Address: National Iranian Gas Company Building, South Aban Street, Karimkhan Boulevard, Tehran, Iran  
Address (2): P.O. Box 15875, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** The National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) is a state-owned and operated entity involved in the production and distribution of gas in the country as well as in the export of gas. The Minister of Oil is Chairman of NIGC's Board and the Deputy Oil Minister is Managing Director and Vice Chairman of NIGC. Therefore, NIGC provides support to the government of Iran.
217. **Name:** National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company  
a.k.a. NIORDC  
**Identifying information:** Address: 4 Varsho Street, Tehran 159866611, P.O. Box 15815/3499, Tehran, Iran  
Registration number: IR0000365670  
**Justification:** The National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC) is a subsidiary (100 %) of the state-owned and operated National

Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), responsible for engineering and building refineries, pipelines and communications networks. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Furthermore, the Minister of Petroleum is responsible for appointing NIORDC's CEO. Therefore, NIORDC is controlled by the Government of Iran and by NIOC, which provides support to and is owned by the Government of Iran.

218. **Name:** National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC)  
**Identifying information:** 35 East Shahid Atefi Street, Africa Ave., 19177 Tehran, P.O. Box: 19395-4833  
 Tel. +98 21 23801  
 Email: info@nitc-tankers.com; all offices worldwide  
**Justification:** The National Iranian Tanker Company provides financial support to the Government of Iran through its shareholders, including the Iranian State Retirement Fund. Moreover, NITC is one of the largest operators of crude oil carriers in the world and one of the main transporters of Iranian crude oil. Accordingly, NITC provides logistical support to the Government of Iran through the transport of Iranian oil. Iran's oil exports are a crucial source of revenue for its budget and military expenditures.  
 Therefore, the National Iranian Tanker Company provides support to the Government of Iran.
219. **Name:** Trade Capital Bank  
**Identifying information:** 220035 Belarus  
 Timiriازهva str. 65A  
 Tel: +375 (17) 3121012  
 Fax +375 (17) 3121008  
 Email: info@tcbank.by  
**Justification:** Trade Capital Bank is a subsidiary (99 %) of Tejarat Bank. Tejarat Bank is partially owned and controlled by the Government of Iran. Furthermore, through its subsidiaries, it is involved in the circumvention of restrictive measures, by providing services to front companies used by Iran. Therefore, Tejarat Bank is both supporting the Government of Iran and supporting designated entities in circumvention of restrictive measures.  
 Therefore, Trade Capital Bank is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
220. **Name:** Bank of Industry and Mine  
**Identifying information:** Address: Hafez Avenue, P.O. Box 11365/4978, Tehran, Iran  
 Address: PO Box 15875-4456, Firouzeh Tower, No 1655 Vali-Asr Ave after Chamran Crossroads, Tehran 1965643511, Iran  
 Address: No. 491, Opposite to Saman Building, past of Shahid Beheshti Crossroad, Imam Khomeyni St, Iran.  
 Phone: +98 21 22029811-19, 22029837  
 Fax: +98 21 22029894, 0451-7724202  
 Email: info@bim.ir  
**Justification:** The Bank of Industry and Mine is a state-owned bank working in the field of industry and mining in Iran. Therefore, the Bank of Industry and Mine is an entity owned and controlled by the Government of Iran.
221. **Name:** Cooperative Development Bank

a.k.a. Tose'e Ta'avon Bank

**Identifying information:** Address: Bozorgmehr Street, Block 271, P.O. Box 14155-6569, Tehran, Iran

Address: Mirdamad Blvd., Northeast Corner of Mirdamad Bridge, No. 271, Tehran No. 271, 4th Floor, Mirdamad Blvd, Northeast of Mirdamad Bridge, Tehran, Iran

**Justification:** The Cooperative Development Bank is an Iranian state-owned banking institution, providing support to the Government of Iran.

222. **Name:** National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company (NIOPDC)  
**Identifying information:** Address: No.1, Tehran, Iranshahr Ave. Shadab.St, P.O. Box: 79145/3184; Iran  
Tel: +98-21-77606030  
Registration number: 4000000128233  
Website: [www.niopdc.ir](http://www.niopdc.ir)  
**Justification:** The National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company (NIOPDC) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), which is in turn a wholly-owned subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. NIOPDC is tasked with the provision of fuel throughout the country. Therefore, NIOPDC is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore, it provides essential services to the IRGC.
223. **Name:** Iranian Oil Pipelines and Telecommunications Company (IOPTC)  
**Identifying information:** Address: No.194, Sepahbod Gharani Ave., Tehran, Iran  
Tel: +98-21-88801960 / +98-21-66152223  
Fax: +98-21-66154351  
Website: [www.ioptc.com](http://www.ioptc.com)  
**Justification:** The Iranian Oil Pipelines and Telecommunications Company (IOPTC) is a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), which is in turn controlled by the Government of Iran and by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an entity providing support and being controlled by the Government of Iran. Therefore, IOPTC is controlled by entities providing support to and being owned by the Government of Iran.
224. **Name:** National Iranian Oil Engineering and Construction Company (NIOEC)  
**Identifying information:** No.263, Ostad Nejatollahi Ave., Tehran, Iran  
Registration number: IR0000047088  
Date of registration 18.3.1992  
**Justification:** The National Iranian Oil Engineering and Construction Company (NIOEC) is a subsidiary (100 %) of the state-owned and operated National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and is responsible for engineering and building refineries, pipelines and communications networks. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Therefore, NIOEC is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran. Furthermore, it provides essential services to the IRGC.
225. **Name:** First Islamic Investment Bank (FIIB)

**Identifying information:** Address: Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan Complex, Jalan Merdeka Federal Territory of Labuan, Labuan 87000, Malaysia  
Address: 19A-31-3A, Level 31, Business Suite, Wisma UOA, No. 19 Jalan Pinang, Kuala Lumpur, 50450, Malaysia

Address: Menara Prima 17th floor Jalan Lingkar Mega Kuningan Blok 6.2 Jakarta 12950, Indonesia

Address: Branch: 19A-31-3A, Level 31 Business Suite, Wisma UOA, Jalan Pinang 50450, Kuala Lumpur, Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan, 50450, Malaysia

Address: Unit 13 (C), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan Complex, Jalan Merdeka, 87000 Federal Territory of Labuan, Labuan F.T, 87000, Malaysia

**Justification:** The First Islamic Investment Bank (FIIB) is a South-Asian bank part of Sorinet Group, owned by Iranian businessman Babak Zanjani. The FIIB's activities include various actions supporting the Government of Iran's policy of restrictive measures circumvention. Therefore, the FIIB is providing support to the Government of Iran.

226. **Name:** International Safe Oil

**Identifying information:** Address: Labuan Federal Territory, Malaysia

**Justification:** International Safe Oil (ISO) is selling Iranian oil in Malaysia. It is assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of international restrictive measures against Iran and is providing financial support to the government of Iran. It provides support, including financial support, to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and Nafitran Intertrade Company Ltd (NICO), both EU-listed entities.

International Safe Oil is therefore responsible for providing support to EU-listed entities and to the Government of Iran.

227. **Name:** Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers Ltd. (SCT)

(a.k.a.: SCT Bankers; SCT Bankers Kish Company (PJS); SCT Bankers Company Branch; Sorinet Commercial Trust)

**Identifying information:** Address: Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers, Sadaf Tower, 3rd Floor, Suite No. 301, Kish Island, Iran

Address: Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers, No.1808, 18th Floor, Grosvenor House Commercial Tower, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai, UAE, P.O. Box 31988

Address: Tehran branch: Reahi Aiiyey, First of Karaj, Maksous Road 9, Tehran, Iran. SWIFT codes: SCERIRTH KSH (Kish Island branch), SCTSAEA1 (Dubai branch), SCERIRTH (Tehran branch)

Address: Kish Banking Fin Activities Centre, No 42, 4th floor, VC25

Address: SCT Bankers Kish Company (PJS), Head Office, Kish Island, Sadaf Tower, 3rd floor, Suite 301, P.O. Box 87. Address: Sheykh Admad, Sheykh Zayed Road, 31988, Dubai, Port

Tel: 09347695504 (Kish Island branch) 09347695504/97-143257022-99 (Dubai branch) 09347695504 (Tehran branch)

Email: info@sctbankers.com zanjani@sctbankers.com

**Justification:** Sorinet Commercial Trust (SCT) participates in a network of "trust companies" and banks used by the Government of Iran to circumvent restrictive measures, notably allowing the sale of Iranian oil in the oil black market.

Therefore, Sorinet Commercial Trust provides support to the Government of Iran.

228. **Name:** HK Intertrade Company Ltd

a.k.a. HK Intertrade

**Identifying information:** Address: 21st Floor, Tai Yau Building, 181 Johnston Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong

**Justification:** HK Intertrade Company benefitted the Iranian government by being involved in a scheme that helped launder Iranian oil proceeds. HK Intertrade is also believed to be a front company for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

NIOC is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC.

Therefore, HK Intertrade Company Ltd provides support to the Government of Iran and is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

229. **Name:** Petro Suisse

**Identifying information:** Petro Suisse Avenue de la Tour- Haldimand 6, 1009 Pully, Switzerland

**Justification:** Petro Suisse is a company active in the Iranian oil and gas sector, led by officials of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). In turn, NIOC provides financial support to the Government of Iran. Petro Suisse is also associated with Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO) which is a subsidiary (100 %) of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Therefore, Petro Suisse is controlled by an entity providing financial support to the Government of Iran and it is associated with an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

230. **Name:** Petropars Iran Company  
a.k.a. PPI

**Identifying information:** Address: No. 9, Maaref Street, Farhang Blvd, Saadet Abad, Tehran, Iran.

Address: No. 33, Farhang Blvd, Sa'adat-Abad, Tehran, Iran  
Tel (+98) (21) 22372340

**Justification:** Petropars Iran Company (PPI) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petropars Ltd (PPL), which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd (NICO). NICO belongs to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC is a State-owned entity, which provides support to the Government of Iran.

Petropars Iran Company (PPI) is responsible for carrying out projects in petroleum, gas and petrochemical industries, and serving as an engineering, procurement, management and construction contractor on behalf of Petropars Ltd. Therefore, Petropars Iran Company is owned or controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

231. **Name:** Petropars Oilfield Services Company  
(aka: POSCO)

**Identifying information:** Address: Kish harbor, PPI Bldg,

**Justification:** Petropars Oilfield Services Company (POSCO) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petropars Iran, which is in turn a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petropars Ltd (PPL). PPL is wholly-owned by Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd (NICO), which belongs to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC is a State-owned company which provides support to the Government of Iran. POSCO is responsible for the management of drilling operations by Petropars Ltd and has also provided consultancy services to NIOC and NISOC.

Therefore, POSCO is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

232. **Name:** Petropars Resources Engineering Ltd  
**Identifying information:** Address: 4th Floor, No. 19, 5th St., Gandhi Ave., Tehran, 1517646113, Iran  
**Justification:** Petropars Resources Engineering Ltd (PRE) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petropars Iran, which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petropars Ltd (PPL). PPL is wholly owned by Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd (NICO), which belongs to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which is a State-owned company providing support to the Government of Iran. PRE is responsible for management and engineering services and providing human resources for oil and gas projects and associated needs in the areas of electricity, mechanics and instruments.  
 Therefore, PRE is owned and controlled by an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
233. **Name:** Post Bank of Iran  
 a.k.a. Post Bank Iran  
 a.k.a. Post Bank  
**Identifying information:** 237, Motahari Ave., Tehran, 1587618118, Iran  
 Registration number: IRFEB57517  
 Website: [www.postbank.ir](http://www.postbank.ir)  
**Justification:** Post Bank of Iran is an Iranian bank, which is majority-owned and controlled by the Government of Iran.  
 Therefore, Post Bank of Iran provides support to the Government of Iran.
234. **Name:** Iran Insurance Company  
 a.k.a. Bimeh Iran  
**Identifying information:** Address: No. 51, South Shiraz Street, South Brazil Street, Vanak Square, Tehran, Iran  
 Address: 21st Floor, City Tower 2 Opposite Future Museum Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai  
 Address: PO Box 2004, Dubai, UAE  
 Address: 2nd Floor, Al Awtad Building Near Al Maha Petrol Station, Watt Ayah PO Box 417, Postal Code 100, Muscat, Oman  
 Address: 2nd Floor, Gumran Butti Suweidi Al Dhahi Building Opposite Hamdan Center, Hamdan Street PO Box 3281, Abu Dhabi, UAE  
**Justification:** Iran Insurance Company is a public Iranian entity working in the field of insurance, wholly owned by the Iranian government. Iran Insurance Company holds a significant share of the national Iranian insurance market. It provides reinsurance services to companies in the oil and gas sector. Therefore, Iran Insurance Company is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.
235. **Name:** Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI)  
**Identifying information:** Address: Export Development Building, 21st floor, Tose'e tower, 15th st, Ahmad Qasir Ave, Tehran, Iran  
 Address: 15138-35711 next to the 15th Alley, Bokharest Street, Argentina Square, Tehran, Iran  
 Address: Tose'e Tower, corner of 15th St, Ahmad Qasir Ave., Argentine Square, Tehran, Iran  
 Address: No. 129, 21 's Khaled Eslamboli, No. 1 Building, Tehran, Iran; C.R. No. 86936

- Justification:** The Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) is a state-owned Iranian bank.  
Therefore, EDBI provides support to the Government of Iran.
236. **Name:** Persia International Bank Plc  
**Identifying information:** 6 Lothbury, London Post Code: EC2R 7HH, United Kingdom  
**Justification:** Persia International Bank PLC is an entity owned and controlled by Bank Mellat and Bank Tejarat.  
Tejarat Bank and Bank Mellat are partially owned and controlled by the Government of Iran. Furthermore, they provide financial support to the Government of Iran and entities controlled by the Government of Iran.  
Therefore, Persia International Bank is owned or controlled by entities providing support to the Government of Iran.
237. **Name:** Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction Co  
a.k.a. IOEC  
**Identifying information:** Address: 18 Shahid Dehghani Street, Qarani Street, Tehran 19395-5999, Iran  
Address: No.52 North Kheradmand Avenue (Corner of 6th Alley) Tehran, Iran  
Web: <http://www.ioec.com/>  
**Justification:** The Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction Company is a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC is a State-owned and operated entity providing substantial financial resources to the Government of Iran. NIOC holds the production, sale and export monopoly for Iranian oil. The revenue generated by NIOC's oil sales plays a significant role in funding Iran's military and the IRGC. Therefore, the Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction Company is owned or controlled by an entity which provides support to the Government of Iran.
238. **Name:** Bank Refah Kargaran  
(a.k.a. Bank Refah)  
**Identifying information:** Address: Moffettah No. 125, P.O. Box 15815-1866, Tehran, Iran  
Address: No.125 - Mofatteh Cross- Taleghani Ave. - Tehran, Iran  
Address: 40, North Shiraz Street, Mollasadra Ave., Vanak Sq., Tehran, Iran  
Address: No.186 - North Shiraz St - Mollasadra Ave - Vanak Sq - Tehran, 1991756783, Iran  
Address: Shahid Mofatteh Building, 125, Moffateh Crossroad, Talleghani Ave., Tehran, Iran  
Swift: REF AIRTH  
**Justification:** Bank Refah Kargaran is an Iranian bank with links to the Government of Iran. It cooperates with, among others, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), including by facilitating the purchase of weapons. It also cooperates with the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Health.  
Bank Refah Kargaran is owned by the Government of Iran.  
Thus, Bank Refah Kargaran is controlled by and providing support to the Government of Iran.
239. **Name:** Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping (HTTS) GmbH  
**Identifying information**

Postal address: Schottweg 7, 22087 Hamburg, Germany; Opp 7th Alley, Zarafshan St, Eivanak St, Qods Township; HTTS GmbH, Iran  
**Justification:** Hanseatic Trade Trust & Shipping GmbH (HTTS) is a Hamburg-based company owned by IRISL Europe, which is in turn a company owned by IRISL. HTTS plays a significant role in facilitating operations for Iran's state-owned shipping conglomerate, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). Therefore, HTTS is owned and controlled by IRISL and is providing essential services to IRISL, or to entities owned or controlled by it or acting on its behalf.

240. **Name:** IRITAL Shipping SRL  
**Identifying information**  
 Via Gerolamo Morone 6, 20121 Milan, Italy  
 Registration number: IT03329300101  
 Date of registration: 12.3.1992  
**Justification:** IRITAL Shipping SRL is owned and controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). It is involved in Iran's proliferation efforts by transporting components for its ballistic missile programme. Therefore, IRITAL Shipping SRL is owned by IRISL, and it is involved in Iran's nuclear proliferation's activities.
241. **Name:** E-Sail  
 a.k.a. E-Sail Shipping Company  
 a.k.a. Rice Shipping  
 a.k.a. Santex Lines Limited  
**Identifying information**  
 Address: Suite 1501, Shanghai Zhong Rong Plaza, 1088 Pudong South Road, Shanghai, China  
 Registration number: 1429927  
**Justification:** E-Sail, alias IRISL Shipping Company Limited, is a company acting on behalf of IRISL, and is active in transporting sensitive cargo linked to Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
242. **Name:** IRISL Maritime Training Institute  
**Identifying information**  
 No 115, Ghaem Magham Farahani St. P.O. Box 15896-53313, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** IRISL Maritime Training Institute is a leading maritime education institution and a subsidiary of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). Therefore, it is owned or controlled by IRISL.
243. **Name:** Kheibar Company  
 a.k.a. Khaybar Company  
**Identifying information**  
 Address: 16th Kilometre Old Karaj Road, 13861 Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Kheibar Company is a subsidiary of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). Kheibar Company provides spare parts for shipping vessels and supplies mining and construction machinery. Therefore, Kheibar Company is owned or controlled by IRISL.
244. **Name:** Good Luck Shipping Company  
**Identifying information**  
 Address: Office 206/207 Malik Saeed, Ahmad Ghabbash, Bur Dubai, Dubai, United Arab Emirates  
 Address: P.O. Box 5562, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Address: P.O. Box: 8486, Dubai, United Arab Emirates  
 Address: P.O. Box 8486, Office 206/207, Ahmad Ghubash Building, Oud Mehta, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates  
**Justification:** Good Luck Shipping company is a shipping company established in the UAE and acting on behalf of IRISL.

245. **Name:** Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)  
**Identifying information**  
 Address: Pasadaran Street/Shahid Lavasani, Asman Tower, No. 523, P.O. Box 1311-19395, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is a public shipping company, co-owned by the Government of Iran, that has been involved in the shipment of military-related cargo from Iran to several other countries. It supports IRGC naval operations by providing ships, which it also deploys for reconnaissance missions. IRISL is connected to Iran's proliferation efforts by transporting components for its ballistic missile programme. Therefore, IRISL provides support for Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Furthermore, it provides support to the Government of Iran.
246. **Name:** Hafiz Darya Shipping Lines (HDSL)  
 (a.k.a HDS Lines)  
**Identifying information**  
 Address: No. 60, Ehteshamiyeh Square, 7th Neyestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran  
 Business registration document # 5478431, issued March 2009  
 IMO number: 5878431; established in 2009  
**Justification:** HDSL acts as a shell company for IRISL. It has taken over as beneficial owner a number of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line's (IRISL) vessels. Accordingly, HDSL is acting on behalf of IRISL.
247. **Name:** Irano Misr Shipping Company  
 (a.k.a. Nefertiti Shipping)  
**Identifying information**  
 Address: 6, El Horeya Rd., El Attarein, Alexandria, Egypt  
 Address: Inside Damietta Port, New Damietta City, Damietta, Egypt  
 Address: 403, El NahdaSt., Port Said, Port Said, Egypt  
**Justification:** Irano MISR Shipping Company is a subsidiary of EU-listed IRISL in Egypt, providing services in Egyptian ports. Irano MISR Shipping Company is therefore an entity owned or controlled by IRISL.
248. **Name:** IRISL Europe GmbH (Hamburg)  
**Identifying information**  
 Address: Schottweg 5, 22087 Hamburg, Germany  
 Registration Number: HRB 81573  
**Justification:** IRISL Europe GmbH (Hamburg) is owned by IRISL.
249. **Name:** IRISL Marine Services and Engineering Company  
**Identifying information**  
 Address: No. 221, Northern Iranshahr St., Karimkhan Ave., Tehran, Iran  
 Address: Sarbandar Gas Station, PO Box 199, Bandar Imam Khomeini, Iran  
 Address: Karim Khan Zand Avenue (or: Karimkhan Avenue), Iran Shahr Shomai (or: Northern Iranshahr Street), No 221, Tehran, Iran

Address: Shahaid Rajae Port Road, Kilometer of 8, Before Tavanir Power Station, Bandar Abbas, Iran

**Justification:** IRISL Marine Services and Engineering Company is a subsidiary of and is controlled by IRISL.

250. **Name:** Safiran Payam Darya (SAPID) Shipping Company  
(a.k.a. Safiran Payam Darya Shipping Lines, a.k.a. SAPID Shipping Company;  
a.k.a. SAFID Shipping)  
**Identifying information**  
Asseman Tower, Pasdaran Street, Shahid Sayyade Shirazee Square, Tehran, Iran  
Registration number: IR0015973950  
Date of registration: 2009  
**Justification:** Safiran Payam Darya Shipping Company (Sapid Shipping Company) is an Iranian shipping company owned and controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), performing various services for the entity.
251. **Name:** Soroush Saramin Asatir (SSA)  
(a.k.a. Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Company, Rabbaran Omid Darya Ship Management Company, Sealeaders)  
**Identifying information**  
No 14 (alt. 5), Shabnam Alley, Fajr Street, Shahid Motahhari Avenue, PO Box 196365-1114, Tehran, Iran  
**Justification:** Soroush Saramin Asatir (SSA) operates and manages a number of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) vessels. Accordingly, it acts on behalf of IRISL and provides essential services to it.
252. **Name:** South Way Shipping Agency Co. Ltd  
a.k.a. South Shipping Line Iran  
a.k.a. Hoopad Darya Shipping Agent  
**Identifying information**  
Address: Qaem Magham Farahani St., Tehran, Iran  
Registration number: IR968053464  
**Justification:** South Way Shipping Agency Co. Ltd is co-owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and acts for IRISL in Iranian ports overseeing tasks such as loading and unloading. It is also co-owned by the Government of Iran.  
Therefore, South Way Shipping Agency Co. Ltd is an entity owned and controlled by IRISL and by the Government of Iran.
253. **Name:** Valfajr 8th Shipping Line  
(a.k.a. Valjafar 8th Shipping Line, Valfajr)  
**Identifying information**  
No 119, Corner Shabnam Alley, Shoa Square, Ghaem Magam Farahani, Tehran, Iran P.O. Box 15875/4155  
Abyar Alley, Corner of Shahid Azodi St. & Karim Khan Zand Ave., Tehran, Iran  
Shahid Azodi St., Karim Khan Zand Ave., Abiar Alley, PO Box 4155, Tehran, Iran  
Registration number: IR30813GN  
**Justification:** Valfajr 8th Shipping Line is owned and controlled by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL).

Anhang 6a<sup>48</sup>

(Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. c und Abs. 2 Bst. c, 9 Abs. 4, 11 Abs. 1 und 2 sowie 12 Bst. b)

Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (Beschluss (GASP) 2023/1532)

## A. Natürliche Personen

	Name	Angaben zur Identität	Gründe
1.	Hadi ZAHOURIAN	Position(s): Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Shakad Sanat Asmari POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: Male Passport number: 0055312047 (National ID) Associated entities: Shakad Sanat Asmari	Hadi Zahourian is Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Shakad Sanat Asmari. Shakad Sanat Asmari is an Iranian company that develops and manufactures components for the Shaged unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As the CEO of Shakad Sanat Asmari, Hadi Zahourian is therefore supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.
2.	Mohammad Shahab KHANIAN	Position(s): Deputy Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Shakad Sanat Asmari POB: Mashhad, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: Male Passport number: 0930588411 (National ID) Associated entities: Shakad Sanat Asmari	Mohammad Shahab Khanian is Deputy Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Shakad Sanat Asmari. Shakad Sanat Asmari is an Iranian company that develops and manufactures components for the Shaged unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As the Deputy CEO of Shakad Sanat Asmari, Mohammad Shahab Khanian is therefore supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.

3.	Ehsan Rahat VARNOS-FADRANI	<p>Position(s): Chief scientist of Shakad Sanat Asmari          DOB: 1983          POB: Bahman, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: Male          Associated entities: Shakad Sanat Asmari</p>	<p>Ehsan Rahat Varnosfadrani is the Chief scientist and former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Shakad Sanat Asmari. Shakad Sanat Asmari is an Iranian company that develops and manufactures components for the Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).          As the Chief scientist and former CEO of Shakad Sanat Asmari, Ehsan Rahat Varnosfadrani is therefore supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.</p>
4.	Rahmatollah HEIDARI a.k.a. Rehmatollah HEIDARI	<p>Position(s): Managing Director and member of the board of directors of Iran-based Baharestan Kish Company          DOB: 22.9.1985          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: Male          Associated entities: Baharestan Kish Company; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p>	<p>Rahmatollah Heidari is the Managing Director and a member of the board of directors of Baharestan Kish Company. Baharestan Kish Company manufactures unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).          As the Managing Director and a member of the board of directors of Baharestan Kish Company, Rahmatollah Heidari is therefore supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.</p>
5.	Nader Khoon SIAVASH	<p>Position(s): Director of Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)          DOB: 30.4.1963          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: Male          Passport number: 0028892753 (National ID)          Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Defence Industries</p>	<p>Nader Khoon Siavash is the Director of Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).          AIO is an organisation which reports to the Iranian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and is active in Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programme.          As Director of AIO, Nader Khoon Siavash is therefore supporting and</p>

		Organization (DIO); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)	involved in Iran's UAV programme.
6.	Ehsan IMANINEJAD a.k.a. Ehsan IMANIJAD	Position(s): Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Saad Sazeh Faraz Sharif DOB: 1982 POB: Shahrvivar, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: Male Associated entities: Saad Sazeh Faraz Sharif	Ehsan Imaninejad is Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Saad Sazeh Faraz Sharif. Saad Sazeh Faraz Sharif (a.k.a. Daria Fanavar Borhan Sharif) is an Iran- ian company that offers aerospace engineering ser- vices and manufactures parts of the Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As CEO of Saad Sazeh Faraz Sharif, Ehsan Imani- nejad is therefore sup- porting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.
7.	Mohammad-Reza Gharaei ASHTIANI	Position(s): Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces DOB: 1960 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani has been the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces since August 2024. He was the Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (August 2021-August 2024) and was responsible for the EU-listed Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). MODAFL is responsible for the planning, logistics and funding of Iran's Armed Forces. It is also a key player in Iran's defence industry with multiple conglomerates and subordinates active in research and development, maintenance and manufac- turing of military equip- ment, including the manu- facturing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). MODAFL is also involved in the set-up of a joint

			<p>plant for the production of UAVs and the sale of UAVs to Russia intended for use in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.</p> <p>In his function as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani coordinates and oversees the conventional army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is a close associate of the Supreme Leader of Iran. As he oversees the IRGC, this also includes the IRGC Aerospace Force, responsible for Iran's UAV program. He is thus in a supervising role for both the missile and the UAV program. In his role, he is also supporting Iranian military cooperation with Russia.</p> <p>As Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani is directly involved in Iran's UAV and missile programmes and is involved in transferring Iran's UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.</p>
8.	Gholam Ali RASHID a.k.a. Gholamali RASHID	<p>Position(s): IRGC commander of the Khatam al-Anbia Central Headquarters (KCHG)</p> <p>DOB: 1953</p> <p>POB: Dezful, Iran</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Associated entities: Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHG)</p>	<p>Gholam Ali Rashid has been the commander of the EU-listed Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHG) since June 2016.</p> <p>The KCHG is the central entity in the command chain of Iran's armed forces making operational military decisions, as well as coordinating between</p>

			<p>Iran's conventional army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which both procure and deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).</p> <p>The KCHG's mission is to oversee offensive and defensive operations, including through its regional and thematic headquarters such as the ones in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman, which report to the main headquarters. It is also responsible for planning and coordinating joint military operations, including drills.</p> <p>Gholam Ali Rashid has overseen UAV deployments and supervised UAV battlefield readiness in drills and exercises.</p> <p>Preceding IRGC and Artesh in the command chain, thereby overseeing all of Iran's armed forces, intelligence and EU-listed Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters is at the core of Iran's military forces and therefore involved in transferring UAVs to Russia and armed groups in the Middle East and Red Sea region.</p> <p>Gholam Ali Rashid is therefore involved in Iran's UAV programme and in transferring UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.</p>
--	--	--	--

9.	<p>Hossein Hatefi ARDA-KANI a.k.a. Hasan HASHEM; Hossein Hatafi ARDAKANI; Hossein Hatfi ARDA-KANI</p>	<p>Position(s): chairperson of the board of directors of Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC; procurement agent for the IRGC DOB: 21.09.1985 POB: Ardakan, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Passport number: U34290111 (Iran); 4449916581 (Iran) Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC SSJO); Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC Associated individuals: Mehdi Dehghani MOHAMMADABADI</p>	<p>Hossein Hatefi Ardakani serves as chairperson of the board of directors and is a shareholder of Iran-based and EU-listed Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC. Using a complex network of shell and foreign companies, including EU-listed Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC, Ardakani supports the IRGC SSJO's efforts in obtaining crucial goods for the UAV production. As chairperson of the board of Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC, he is responsible for leading the company's board, defining its strategic objectives and overseeing its business, hence he is involved in transferring Iran's UAVs to Russia. Hossein Hatefi Ardakani is therefore supporting Iran's UAV programme. He is also involved in transferring Iran's UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.</p>
10.	<p>Mehdi Dehghani MOHAMMADABADI</p>	<p>Position(s): CEO of Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC DOB: 23.09.1982 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Passport number: 4433172081 (Iran) Associated entities: Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC SSJO); Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC Associated individuals: Hossein Hatefi ARDA-KANI</p>	<p>Mehdi Dehghani Mohamadabadi serves as CEO, member of the board of directors, as well as a shareholder of the Iran-based and EU-listed Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC. Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC is a company involved in the supply of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) items to the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency</p>

			<p>Jihad Organisation (IRGC SSJO).</p> <p>As CEO, he is responsible for managing and steering the company. As a member of the board, he is involved in all significant decisions the company takes. Hence he is involved in transferring Iran's UAVs to Russia.</p> <p>Mehdi Dehghani Mohammadabadi is therefore involved in Iran's UAV programme. He is also involved in transferring Iran's UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.</p>
11.	<p>Ismail QAANI a.k.a. Esmā'il QANI; Esmā'il GHA'ANI; Esmā'il QA'ANI; Ismail Akbar QAANI</p>	<p>Position(s): Commander of the IRGC Qods Force DOB: 08.08.1957 POB: Mashad, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Passport number: D9003033; D9008347 Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); IRGC-Qods Force</p>	<p>Ismail Qaani is the Commander of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF).</p> <p>The IRGC-QF is responsible for orchestrating a network of regional militias that have aggressively expanded Iran's military influence across the Arab world in recent decades. Under Qaani's command, the IRGC-QF facilitates and supports unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and missile attacks by transferring Iranian weapons to militias in the Middle East and Red Sea region. Under Qaani's orders, the IRGC-QF enables and supports the drone and missile attacks by Houthis. Therefore, in his capacity as leader of the IRGC-QF, Ismail Qaani is involved in transferring Iran's missiles and UAVs to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security</p>

			in the Middle East and Red Sea region.
12.	Afshin Khaji FARD	<p>Position(s): Head of Iranian Aviations Industries Organisation (IAIO)          POB: Abadan, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          National ID no.: 1819457850          Associated entities: Iranian Aviations Industries Organisation (IAIO); Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)</p>	<p>Afshin Khaji Fard is the head of the EU-listed Iranian Aviations Industries Organisation (IAIO), a state-owned company under the authority of the EU-listed Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).          The IAIO is responsible for planning and managing Iran's military aviation industry, including developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).          In his capacity as head of the IAIO, Fard has publicly promoted Iran's UAV industry and frequently stated that the IAIO is actively involved in innovating Iran's UAVs.          Therefore, Afshin Khaji Fard is supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.</p>
13.	Behnam SHAHRIYARI	<p>Position(s): official in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Unit 190          DOB: 1968          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Passport number: D10007350; K47248790</p>	<p>Behnam Shahriyari is a prominent official of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Unit 190, involved in the logistical aspects of transferring weapons, including rockets and missiles, to Iranian-aligned armed groups in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.          Behnam Shahriyari is therefore involved in the transfer of missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.</p>

14.	Ali SHADMANI	<p>Position(s): deputy coordinator of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHG)          POB: Hamedan, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Associated entities: Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHG)</p>	<p>Ali Shadmani is the deputy coordinator of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHG) and thus associated with an EU-listed entity. The KCHG is the central entity in the command chain of Iran's armed forces, making operational military decisions and coordinating between Iran's conventional army (Artesh) and the IRGC, which both procure and deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The KCHG's mission is to oversee offensive and defensive operations, including through its regional and thematic headquarters, such as those in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, which report to the main headquarters. It is also responsible for planning and coordinating joint military operations, including drills. Preceding IRGC and Artesh in the command chain, thereby overseeing all of Iran's armed forces, intelligence and EU-listed Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, the KCHG is at the core of Iran's military forces and is involved in the development of Iran's UAV programme. As deputy coordinator of the KCHG, Shadmani has been actively promoting Iran's defence capabilities, including drones and missiles, on multiple occasions, including in Russia, in recent years.</p>
-----	--------------	---	---

			Therefore, Ali Shadmani is associated with an EU-listed entity involved in Iran's UAV and missile programme and is involved in transferring UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.
15.	Ali JAFARABADI	Position(s): commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Space Division DOB: 1975 POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Ali Jafarabadi is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Space Division. The IRGC Aerospace Force Space Division has operational control over several Iranian missile systems and is involved in the development and future launch of satellite carriers, which are essential for the development of long-range ballistic missile systems, which Iran continues to develop. Therefore, Ali Jafarabadi is involved in the development of the Iranian missile programme.
16.	Mehdi GOGERDCHIAN	Position(s): managing director of Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA) DOB: 14.8.1975 POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Passport number: 1286966558 (Iran)	Mehdi Gogerdchian is the managing director of EU-listed Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA). The company is controlled by the EU-listed Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO), a subsidiary of the EU-listed Iranian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which is responsible for planning and managing Iran's military aviation industry. HESA specialises in the development and manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),

			<p>especially Shahed drones, which are being used by Russia in its war against Ukraine.</p> <p>Mehdi Gogerdchian is therefore involved in Iran's UAV programme.</p>
17.	Seyed Hamzeh GHALANDARI	<p>Position(s): deputy defence minister of Iran          DOB: 16.7.1984          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Passport number: D10009455 (Iran)</p>	<p>Seyed Hamzeh Ghalandari is the deputy defence minister of Iran, with a focus on international affairs within the ministry. The EU-listed Iranian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) is responsible for the Iranian arms industry, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic missiles.</p> <p>In light of his high-level role as deputy defence minister, Seyed Hamzeh Ghalandari is involved in the development of Iran's UAV and missile programmes.</p>
18.	Reza Khosravi MOGHADDAM	<p>Position(s): Iranian military attaché in Russia          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male</p>	<p>Reza Khosravi Moghaddam is the military attaché of the Iranian embassy in Russia, representing and promoting his country's defence industry. He is responsible for bilateral relations in this field.</p> <p>In his function, Moghaddam is a forward element of the Iranian EU-listed Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). MODAFL is responsible for the Iranian arms industry, including the development and production of military weapons, such as unmanned aerial</p>

			<p>vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic missiles.</p> <p>In his role, Moghaddam actively promotes the defence industry of Iran, and in particular the arms trade between Iran and Russia, thereby promoting Iran's UAV and missile programmes.</p> <p>Iran has been supplying Russia with UAVs and ballistic missiles that are being deployed by Russia against Ukraine.</p> <p>Therefore, Reza Khosravi Moghaddam is involved in Iran's UAV and missile programme.</p>
19.	Seid Mir Ahmad NOOSHIN	<p>Position(s): director of the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO)</p> <p>DOB: 11.1.1966</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Passport number: G9311208</p>	<p>Seid Mir Ahmad Nooshin is the director of EU-listed Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). The AIO is an organisation which reports to the EU-listed Iranian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and plays a key role in Iran's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and ballistic missile programmes. The AIO oversees Iran's production of missiles, including by EU-listed entities Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) and Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG). Seid Mir Ahmad Nooshin is therefore involved in Iran's missile programme.</p>
20.	Mohammad Reza KHIABANI	<p>Position(s): Director of IRISL</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Associated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL); Islamic Revolutionary Guard</p>	<p>Mohammad Reza Khabani is the director of the EU-listed Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a major Iranian maritime carrier. For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL</p>

		<p>Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO)</p>	<p>or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO). The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran's UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran's missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region. The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry,</p>
--	--	---	---

			<p>combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran's UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, in his principal managerial position as director of IRISL, Mohammad Reza Khia-bani is involved in transferring Iran's UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN.</p>
--	--	--	---

## B. Unternehmen und Organisationen

	Name	Angaben zur Identität	Gründe
1.	Shakad Sanat Asmari	<p>Address: Haft-e Tir Sq, 378 Moftah Shomali St, third floor, Tehran, Iran, postal code 1588944546            Type of entity: Limited Liability Company            Place of registration: Tehran, Iran            Date of registration: 24.10.2016            Principal place of business: Iran            National ID: 14006189580            Registration number: 498744            Associated individuals: Hadi Zahourian (Chief Executive Officer);</p>	<p>Shakad Sanat Asmari is an Iranian company that develops and manufactures components for the Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is therefore supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.</p>

		Mohammad Shahab Khanian (Deputy Chief Executive Officer); Ehsan Rahat Varnosfadrani (Chief scientist and former Chief Executive Officer)	
2.	Baharestan Kish Company	<p>Address no. 1: Unit 17, Fifth Floor, Yas Building, Number 116, Sheikh Fazlollah Highway, Teimuri Blvd, before Sharif University Metro Station, Tehran, Iran;</p> <p>Address no. 2: Unit 18, Fifth Floor, Yas Building, Number 116, Sheikh Fazlollah Highway, Teimuri Blvd, before Sharif University Metro Station, Tehran, Iran;</p> <p>Address no. 3: Unit 19, Fifth Floor, Yas Building, Number 116, Sheikh Fazlollah Highway, Teimuri Blvd, before Sharif University Metro Station, Tehran 1459994450, Iran;</p> <p>Address no. 4: No 47, East 18th Street, Farhang Boulevard, Sa'adat Abad, Tehran 1997857976, Iran;</p> <p>Address no. 5: Unit 2, First Floor, EX35, Number 2, Exhibition Industrial Town, Kish Island 7941659854, Iran;</p> <p>Place of registration: Iran</p> <p>Date of registration: 2002</p> <p>Associated individuals: Rahmatollah Heidari (Managing Director and</p>	<p>Baharestan Kish Company manufactures unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).</p> <p>The company has also worked on Shahed UAV components, which were exported to Russia.</p> <p>Baharestan Kish Company has overseen various defense-related projects, which included the manufacturing of UAVs.</p> <p>It is therefore supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.</p>

		a member of the board of directors)	
3.	Saad Sazeh Faraz Sharif a.k.a. Daria Fanavar Borhan Sharif; Sadid Sazeh Parvaz Sharif	Address: Tehran Province - Tehran City - Central Sector - Tehran City - Shahrak Ansar Neighborhood - Tehran Karaj Highway - Chogan Street 9 - Plate 0 - Ground Floor Type of entity: Limited Liability Company Place of registration: Tehran, Iran Date of registration: 2017 Registration number: 534295 Principal place of business: Iran Associated individuals: Ehsan Imaninejad (Chief Executive Officer)	Saad Sazeh Faraz Sharif is an Iranian company that offers aerospace engineering services and manufactures parts of the Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is therefore supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.
4.	Sarmad Electronic Sepahan Company a.k.a. Sarmad Electronics; Sarmad Electronic Sepahan; Sarmad Electronics Co.	Address: Second Floor, No 309, Alley 28, South Abou Na'im Street, Jaber Ansari Street, Isfahan, Iran Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: 2014 Principal place of business: Iran	Sarmad Electronic Sepahan Company is an Iranian company that produces the specific components used in Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Those UAVs are deployed by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Servomotors and flowmotors in detached Iranian UAVs found on the Ukrainian battlefield have been traced back directly to Sarmad Electronic Sepahan Company. The company itself advertises its activities in Iran by claiming to be active in large sensitive industries in the country, including that of UAVs. It is therefore supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.
5.	Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS) a.k.a. Kimiar Parts Sibon	Address: 1st Street, 6th Side Street, No 81, Jey Industrial Park, Isfahan 8376100000, Iran; Place of registration: Iran	Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS) is an Iran-based company that has worked with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) to improve the force's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programme.

		Registration number: 10320661315 or 414950 or 47779.	KIPAS officials have conducted UAV flight tests for the IRGC-QF and have provided technical assistance for IRGC-QF UAVs transferred to Iraq for use in IRGC-QF operations. KIPAS has also procured valuable UAV components for onward use by the IRGC. It is therefore supporting and involved in Iran's UAV programme.
6.	Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHG) a.k.a. Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters; KACHQ	Type of entity: government entity Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Associated individuals: Gholam Ali RASHID (commander of KCHG)	The Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (KCHG) is the central entity in the command chain of Iran's armed forces making operational military decisions, as well as coordinating between Iran's conventional army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which both procure and deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The KCHG's mission is to oversee offensive and defensive operations, including through its regional and thematic headquarters such as the ones in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman, which report to the main headquarters. It is also responsible for planning and coordinating joint military operations, including drills. The KCHG is headed by the EU-listed IRGC commander Gholam Ali Rashid, who has overseen UAV deployments and supervised UAV battlefield readiness in drills and exercises. Preceding IRGC and Artesh in the command chain, thereby overseeing all of Iran's armed forces, intelligence and EU-listed Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters is at the core of Iran's military forces and therefore involved in transferring UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region. Furthermore, the KCHG is involved in Iran's UAV programme.

7.	<p>Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC a.k.a. Kavan Electronics; Kavan Electronic co. LTD; Kavan Electronic Company; Kavan Electronic Sadr Aria Engineering Limited Liability Company</p>	<p>Address: No 63, Unit 4, Shahrara, Patrice Lumumba St., Abshori Sharghi St., Tehran 144593491, Iran Type of entity: limited liability company (LLC) Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: 13.07.2016 Registration number: 495080 (Iran) National ID number: 14005997725 (Iran) Principal place of business: Iran Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC SSJO) Associated individuals: Hossein Hatefi ARDAKANI (Chairman of the Board of Directors); Mehdi Dehghani MOHAMMADABADI (CEO)</p>	<p>Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC is an Iran-based company procuring and selling servomotors and other components relevant for the manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC SSJO) The company's Chairman of the Board of Directors is the EU-listed Hossein Hatefi Ardakani, who oversees a transnational procurement network that spans the Middle East and East Asia, which caters for the production of UAVs overseen by the IRGC SSJO. Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC is therefore involved in Iran's UAV programme. It is also involved in transferring Iran's UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.</p>
8.	<p>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) a.k.a. Nirooy-e Daryaei-e Sepah; NEDSA</p>	<p>Type of entity: government entity Place of registration: Bandar Abbas, Iran Date of registration: 1981 Principal place of business: Iran Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p>	<p>The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) division and a missiles division. The IRGC Navy is equipped with Iranian UAVs and missiles and engages in asymmetrical warfare methods. The IRGC Navy has a Naval Academy in which it provides training on firing anti-ship missiles and operating UAVs. Iranian-backed militias and proxies are trained at the Naval Academy. The IRGC Navy is involved in facilitating the transport of Iranian arms, including Iranian UAVs and missiles. Those missiles and UAVs are deployed by armed groups like the</p>

			<p>Houthis and Hezbollah to undermine peace and security in the Middle East and Red Sea region.</p> <p>Therefore, the IRGC Navy is involved in Iran's UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran's missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.</p>
9.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC SSJO)	<p>Type of entity: government entity</p> <p>Place of registration: Iran</p> <p>Principal place of business: Iran</p> <p>Associated entities: Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC</p>	<p>The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC SSJO) is a research and development unit that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment.</p> <p>As part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC SSJO has been involved in research, development and procurement activities linked to the development of Iranian UAVs and missiles.</p> <p>The IRGC SSJO is therefore involved in Iran's UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.</p>
10.	Saha Airlines	<p>Address: Ayat Saeedi St., 65 meters from Fatah, Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Type of entity: government entity</p> <p>Place of registration: Tehran, Iran</p>	<p>Saha Airlines is an Iranian state airline, wholly owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force. It has been used repeatedly to transfer Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies to Russia, which have been used in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.</p> <p>Saha Airlines is therefore involved in transferring Iranian-made UAVs and related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.</p>
11.	Mahan Air	<p>Address: No 21 Mahan Air Tower - Azadegan Street, Karaj Highway, Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Post box 1481655761</p>	<p>Mahan Air is a private Iranian airline based in Tehran.</p> <p>It has been used repeatedly to transfer Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies to Russia, which have been used in</p>

		Place of registration: Tehran, Iran	Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Mahan Air is therefore involved in transferring Iranian-made UAVs and related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.
12.	Iran Air (a.k.a. the Airline of the Islamic Republic of Iran; Homa; Iran Air Cargo; Iran Air Ground Services; Iran Air Catering)	Address: Central Offices, Airport Boulevard, Tehran, Iran Type of entity: government entity Place of registration: Tehran, Iran	Iran Air is an Iranian state airline controlled by Iran's Ministry of Infrastructure, and therefore subordinate to the country's military-political leadership. It has been used repeatedly to transfer Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies to Russia, which have been used in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Iran Air is therefore involved in transferring Iranian-made UAVs and related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.
13.	Basamad Electronic Pouya Engineering Co. (a.k.a. Dynamic Electronic Frequency Engineering Limited Liability Company)	Address: No. 63 Unit 4, Shahrara, Patrice Lumumba St. Abshori St., Tehran, 144593491, Iran Type of entity: limited liability company Registration number: 466887 National ID number: 14004684489 Associated individuals: Hossein Hatefi Ardakani (CEO) Associated entities: Kavan Electronics Behrad LLC	Basamad Electronic Pouya Engineering Co. is an Iranian procurement firm. It is part of a procurement network overseen by EU-listed Hossein Hatefi Ardakani, Basamad Electronic Pouya Engineering Co.'s CEO and largest shareholder. Hossein Hatefi Ardakani is an Iranian businessman who is involved, through the procurement network he oversees, in the supply of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) items to the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC SSJO), which are then supplied to Russia to support Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Basamad Electronic Pouya Engineering Co. is therefore associated with a natural person involved in Iran's UAV programme and in transferring Iranian-made UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.

14.	Iran Alumina Company (IAC) (a.k.a. I.A.C.; Iran Alumina Co.)	Address 1: 100, Somayyeh St., Tehran, Iran (head office) Address 2: Kilometer 7 turnpike Sankhast, Jajarm, North Khorasan, Iran (factory) Principal place of business: Khorasan province, Iran	Iran Alumina Company (IAC) is Iran's sole producer of aluminium oxide (Al <sub>2</sub> O <sub>3</sub> ) or alumina powder, which is used in the fabrication of solid fuel propellant used to launch rockets and missiles. The facility operates on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in producing missile fuel from metal powder. IAC is a subsidiary of the state-owned mines and metal holding company Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and Renovation Organisation (IMIDRO), which is controlled by the Iranian Ministry of Industries and Mines. Therefore, Iran Alumina Company (IAC) is involved in Iran's missile programme.
15.	Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center (a.k.a. Shahid Movahed Industry; Shahid Mohaved Industries; SHIG Department 7500)	Address: c/o SHIG, Damavand Tehran Highway, PO Box 16595-159, Tehran, Iran Principal place of business: Tehran Province, Iran	Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG), an industrial group subordinate to the state-controlled EU-listed Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO), which supports Iran's liquid-propellant ballistic missile programme. The Center has been involved in the research, testing and manufacture of Iranian missiles. The Center is directly involved in missile development, including in the context of cooperation between Iran and the DPRK, from which it received specialist support for the development of long-range missiles. Therefore, Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center is involved in Iran's missile programme.
16.	Teyf Tadbir Engineering Company (a.k.a. Teyf Tadbir Arya Engineering Company; Teif Tadbir Arya; Teyf Tadbir Aria)	Address: Unit 10, No. 1, End of Bahar, Kardan Street, Patrice Street, Tehran 144596443, Iran Registration number: 427320 (Iran) Associated individuals: Hossein Hatefi Ardakani (CEO) Associated entities:	Teyf Tadbir Engineering Company is an Iranian procurement firm. Its CEO is EU-listed Hossein Hatefi Ardakani, an Iranian businessman who oversees a transnational procurement network for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components. He operates through his Tehran-based firms, including Teyf Tadbir Engineering Company and the EU-listed Kavan Electronics LLC.

		Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC SSJO)	Through his procurement network, Hossein Hatefi Ardakani is involved in the supply of UAV items to the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC SSJO). These items are used in Iran's Shahed-series UAVs, which Iran supplies to Russia to support Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Teyf Tadbir Engineering Company is therefore associated with natural and legal persons and entities involved in Iranian-made UAV programme and also involved in transferring Iran's UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.
17.	MG Flot LLC	Address: Apartment 1, ul Lenina, Akhty, 18D, 368730, Russia Type of entity: shipping company Registration number: IMO 6016988	MG Flot LLC is a Russian shipping company whose vessels are involved in shipping Iranian military-related commodities, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) components, to Russia. MG Flot LLC's vessels, including the cargo ship Rasul Gamzatov (IMO: 8861058; MMSI: 273157300), have been transporting Iranian-made weapons and ammunition, including UAV components, across the Caspian Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. Therefore, MG Flot LLC is involved in transferring Iran's UAVs or missiles or related technologies or components thereof to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.
18.	VTS Broker LLC	Address: Office 19, ul Dzerzhinskogo, 72B, Astrakhan, 414015, Russia Type of entity: shipping company Registration number: IMO 5122966	VTS Broker LLC is a Russian shipping company whose vessels are involved in shipping Iranian military-related commodities, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) components, to Russia. VTS Broker LLC's vessels, including the cargo ship Musa Jalil (IMO: 8846814; MMSI: 273353660), have been transporting Iranian-made weapons and ammunition, including UAV components, across the Caspian

			<p>Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine.</p> <p>Therefore, VTS Broker LLC is involved in transferring Iran's UAVs or missiles or related technologies or components thereof to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.</p>
19.	Arapax LLC	<p>Address: Apartment 6, ul Savushkina, 2, Astrakhan, 414056, Russia</p> <p>Type of entity: shipping company</p> <p>Registration number: IMO 6189893</p>	<p>Arapax LLC is a Russian shipping company whose vessels are involved in shipping Iranian military-related commodities, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) components, to Russia.</p> <p>Arapax LLC's vessels, including the cargo ship Begey (IMO: 8943210; MMSI: 273421560), have been transporting Iranian-made weapons and ammunition, including UAV components, across the Caspian Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine.</p> <p>Therefore, Arapax LLC is involved in transferring Iran's UAVs or missiles or related technologies or components thereof to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.</p>
20.	Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)	<p>Place of registration: Iran</p> <p>Associated individuals: Mohammad Reza Khia-bani (director)</p> <p>Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO)</p>	<p>Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is a major Iranian maritime carrier.</p> <p>For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).</p>

		<p>The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran's UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran's missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region. The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran's UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, IRISL is involved in transferring Iran's UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN.</p>
--	--	--

Anhang 7<sup>49</sup>

(Art. 8 Abs. 1 Bst. d und Abs. 2 Bst. a, 11 Abs. 1 und 2 sowie 12 Abs. 1 Bst. b)

Natürliche Personen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen und das Ein- und Durchreiseverbot richten, sowie Unternehmen und Organisationen, gegen die sich die Finanzsanktionen richten (Beschluss 2011/235/GASP)

## A. Natürliche Personen

	Name	Identifizierungsinformationen	Gründe
1.	AHMADI-MOQADDAM Esmail	POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1961 Gender: male	Director of the University and the Higher National Defence Research Institute since 20 September 2021. Former Senior Advisor for Security Affairs to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. Chief of Iran's National Police from 2005 until early 2015. Also Head of the Iranian Cyber Police (EU-listed) from January 2011 until early 2015. Forces under his command led brutal attacks on peaceful protests and a violent night-time attack on the dormitories of Tehran University on 15 June 2009. Former head of Iran's Headquarters in support of the Yemeni People.
2.	ALLAHKARAM Hossein	POB: Najafabad (Iran) DOB: 1945 Gender: male	Head of Ansar-e Hezbollah Coordination Council and former general in the IRGC.

			<p>He co-founded Ansare Hezbollah. This paramilitary force was responsible for extreme violence during crackdown against students and universities in 1999, 2002 and 2009. He maintains his senior role in an organisation which is ready to commit human rights violations against the public, including promoting aggression against women for their choice of clothing.</p>
3.	ARAGHI (ERAGHI) Abdollah	<p>Gender: male Title: Brigadier-General</p>	<p>Brigadier-General in the IRGC. Head of the Security Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Former Deputy Head of IRGC's Ground Forces. He had a direct and personal responsibility in the crackdown of protests all through the summer of 2009.</p>
4.	FAZLI Ali	<p>Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Rank: Brigadier-General Position: Commander of Imam Hossein University (a.k.a. Imam Hussein University)</p>	<p>Since May 2017, Commander of Imam Hossein University by order of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Chief Commander. Former Chief of the Imam Hossein Cadet College (2018-June 2020). Former Deputy Commander of the Basij (2009-2018). Former Head of the IRGC's Seyyed al-Shohada Corps, Tehran province (until February 2010). The Seyyed al-Shohada Corps is in charge of security in</p>

			Tehran province and played a key role in the brutal repression of protesters in 2009.
5.	JAFARI Mohammad-Ali (a.k.a. "Aziz Jafari")	POB: Yazd (Iran) DOB: 1.9.1957 Gender: male	Director of the Hazrat-e Baqiatollah Social and Cultural Base. Former Commander of the IRGC (September 2007 - April 2019). IRGC and the Sarollah Base commanded by General Mohammad-Ali (Aziz) Jafari have played a key role in illegally interfering with the 2009 Presidential Elections, arresting and detaining political activists, as well as clashing with protesters in the streets.
6.	KHALILI Ali	Gender: male	IRGC General, in a senior role within the Sarollah Base. He signed a letter sent to the Ministry of Health June 26, 2009 forbidding the submission of documents or medical records to anyone injured or hospitalized during post-elections events.
7.	MOTLAGH Bahram Hosseini	Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Rank: Brigadier-General Position: Member of the teaching staff of Imam Hossein University (Guardians of the Revolution) (a.k.a. Imam Hossein University) and Head of the planning and operations depart-	Member of the teaching staff of Imam Hossein University (Guardians of the Revolution) and Head of the planning and operations department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Former Head of the Army Command and General Staff College (DAFOOS). Former Head of the Seyyed al-Shohada Corps of the Islamic Revolutionary

		ment of the General Staff of the Armed Forces	Guard Corps, Tehran province. The Seyyed al-Shohada Corps played a key role in organising the repression of protests in 2009.
8.	NAQDI Mohammad-Reza	POB: Najaf (Iraq) DOB: Circa 1952 Gender: male Title: Brigadier-General	Deputy Coordinator of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Former Deputy Chief of the IRGC for cultural and social affairs. Former Commander of the Basij (2009-2016). As commander of the IRGC's Basij Forces, Naqdi was responsible for or complicit in Basij abuses occurring in late 2009, including the violent response to the December 2009 Ashura Day protests, which resulted in up to 15 deaths and the arrests of hundreds of protesters. Prior to his appointment as commander of the Basij in October 2009, Naqdi was the head of the intelligence unit of the Basij responsible for interrogating those arrested during the post-election crackdown.
9.	RADAN Ahmad-Reza	POB: Isfahan (Iran) DOB: 1963 Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Position: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)	Since January 2023, Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), also referred to as the Iranian national police. Former Head of the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Iranian LEF, a body linked to the LEF. Deputy Chief of the LEF from 2008

			until June 2014. In that position, Radan was responsible for beatings, murder, and arbitrary arrests and detentions of protesters that were committed by the police forces. As a former Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, he was in charge of training Iraqi "anti-terrorist" forces.
10.	RAJABZADEH Azizollah	Gender: male	Commander of the Urban Order Headquarters since 2014. Former Head of Tehran Disaster Mitigation Organisation (2010-2013). As Head of Tehran Police until January 2010, he was responsible for violent police attacks on protesters and students. As Commander of the Law Enforcement Forces in the Greater Tehran, he was the highest ranking accused in the case of abuses in Kahrizak Detention Centre in December 2009.
11.	SAJEDI-NIA Hossein	Gender: male	Police Operations Deputy Commander. Former head of Tehran Police, former Deputy Chief of Iran's National Police responsible for Police Operations. He is in charge of coordinating, for the Ministry of Interior, repression operations in the Iranian capital.

12.	TAEB Hossein	POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1963 Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Position: advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)	Since 2022, advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hossein Salami. Former Head of the IRGC intelligence organisation (October 2009 to June 2022). His responsibilities were expanded in May 2019 with the merging of the Office of the Deputy of Strategic Intelligence of the IRGC and the IRGC's Intelligence Organisation. Commander of the Basij until October 2009. Forces under his command participated in mass beatings, murders, detentions and tortures of peaceful protesters.
13.	SHARIATI Seyeed Hassan	Gender: male	Advisor and Member of the 28th Section of the Supreme Court. Head of Mashhad Judiciary until September 2014. Trials under his supervision have been conducted summarily and inside closed sessions, without adherence to basic rights of the accused, and with reliance on confessions extracted under pressure and torture. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.
14.	DORRI-NADJAFABADI Ghorban-Ali	POB: Najafabad (Iran) DOB: 3.12.1950	Member of the Assembly of Experts and representative of

		Gender: male	the Supreme Leader in Markazi ('Central') Province and Head of the Supreme Administrative Court. Prosecutor General of Iran until September 2009, as well as former Intelligence Minister under Khatami presidency. As Prosecutor General of Iran, he ordered and supervised the show trials following the first post-election protests, where the accused were denied their rights and access to an attorney.
15.	Aufgehoben		
16.	SOLTANI Hodjatoleslam Seyed Mohammad	Gender: male	Since 2018, Hodjatoleslam Seyed Mohammad Soltani serves as deputy prosecutor in the Revolutionary Prosecution Office, Mashhad. Head of the Organisation for Islamic Propaganda in the province of Khorasan-Razavi. Former Judge, Mashhad Revolutionary Court (2013-2019). Trials under his jurisdiction have been conducted summarily and inside closed session, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures. He is responsible for issuing heavy prison sentences to citizens of the Baha'is minority, due

			to their religious beliefs, through unfair trials with lack of due process, and the use of extrajudicial procedures.
17.	HEYDARIFAR Ali-Akbar	Gender: male	Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court. He participated in protesters trials. He was questioned by the judiciary about Kahrizak abuses. He was instrumental in issuing detention orders to consign detainees to Kahrizak Detention Centre in 2009. In November 2014, his role in the deaths of detainees was officially recognised by the Iranian authorities.
18.	JAFARI-DOLATABADI Abbas	POB: Yazd (Iran) DOB: 1953 Gender: male	Former advisor to the Supreme Disciplinary Court of judges (29 April 2019-at least 2020). Former Prosecutor General of Tehran (August 2009-April 2019). Abbas Jafari-Dolatabadi's office indicted a large number of protesters, including individuals who took part in the December 2009 Ashura Day protests. He ordered the closure of Karroubi's office in September 2009 and the arrest of several reformist politicians, and he banned two reformist political parties in June 2010. His office charged protesters with "Muha-rebeh", or "enmity against God", which

			carries the death penalty, and denied due process to those facing the death penalty. His office also targeted and arrested reformists, human rights activists and members of the media, as part of a broad crackdown on the political opposition. In October 2018, he announced to the media that four detained Iranian environmental activists were to be charged with "sowing corruption on earth", a charge which carries the death penalty.
19.	MOGHISSEH Mohammad (a.k.a. NASSERIAN)	Gender: male	Judge at the Supreme Court since November 2020. Former head of Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 28. Also considered responsible for condemnations of members of the Baha'i community. He has dealt with post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials of social and political activists and journalists, and several death sentences for protesters and social and political activists.
20.	MOHSENI-EJEI Gholam-Hossein	POB: Ejiyeh (Iran) DOB: circa 1956 Gender: male	Chief of Justice since July 2021. Member of the Expediency Council. Prosecutor General of Iran from September 2009 until 2014. Former Deputy Head of the Judiciary (2014 until July 2021)

			<p>and spokesperson of the Judiciary (2010-2019). Intelligence Minister from 2005 until 2009. While he was Intelligence Minister during the 2009 elections, intelligence agents under his command were responsible for the detention and torture of, and the extraction of false confessions under pressure from, hundreds of activists, journalists, dissidents and reformist politicians. In addition, political figures were coerced into making false confessions under unbearable interrogation, which included torture, abuse, blackmail and the threatening of family members. During the 2022/2023 protests, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei stated that there would be no leniency with protesters.</p>
21.	MORTAZAVI Said (a.k.a. MORTAZAVI Saeed)	<p>POB: Meybod, Yazd (Iran)          DOB: 1967          Gender: male</p>	<p>Head of the Welfare System from 2011 to 2013. Prosecutor General of Tehran until August 2009. As Prosecutor General of Tehran, he issued a blanket order used for the detention of hundreds of activists, journalists and students. In January 2010, a parliamentary investigation held him directly responsible for the detention of three prisoners who subsequently died in cus-</p>

			<p>today. He was suspended from office in August 2010 after an investigation by the Iranian judiciary into his role in the deaths of the three men detained on his orders following the election.</p> <p>In November 2014, his role in the deaths of detainees was officially recognised by the Iranian authorities. He was acquitted by an Iranian Court on 19 August 2015, on charges connected to the torture and deaths of three young men at the Kahrizak detention centre in 2009. Sentenced to prison in 2017 and released in September 2019. In August 2021, Iran's Supreme Court issued a ruling in full support of Said Mortazavi, overturning his earlier two-year jail sentence.</p>
22.	PIR-ABASSI Abbas	<p>Gender: male  Function: Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex; former magistrate of a criminal chamber; former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26</p>	<p>Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex. Former magistrate of a criminal chamber. Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters.</p>
23.	MORTAZAVI Amir	<p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Deputy head of the Unit for Social Affairs and Crime Prevention</p>

			<p>at the judiciary in the province of Khorasan-Razavi. Deputy Prosecutor of Mashhad until at least 2015. Trials under his prosecution have been conducted summarily and inside closed session, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse, death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.</p>
24.	SALAVATI Abdolghassem	Gender: male	<p>Judge of the Special Court for Financial Crimes, branch 4 since 2019. Former Head of Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 15. Committing Judge in the Tehran Tribunal. In charge of the post-election cases, he was the Judge presiding over the "show trials" in summer 2009, he condemned to death two monarchists that appeared in the show trials. He has sentenced more than a hundred political prisoners, human rights activists and demonstrators to lengthy prison sentences.</p> <p>In 2018, reports showed that he continued to hand down similar sentences without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.</p> <p>During the 2022 protests, Abdolghassem Salavati sentenced many protestors to</p>

			death including Mohammad Beroghani and Saman Seydi.
25.	SHARIFI Malek Adjar (aka: SHARIFI Malek Ajdar)	Gender: male	Judge at the Supreme Court, head of the 43rd section. Former Head of East Azerbaidjan Judiciary. He was responsible for Sakineh Mohammadi-Ash-tiani's trial.
26.	Aufgehoben		
27.	YASAGHI Ali-Akbar	Gender: male	Judge at the Supreme Court, head of the 13th section. Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Setad-e Dieh Foundation. Chief Judge, Mashhad Revolutionary Court (2001-2011). Trials under his jurisdiction have been conducted summarily and in closed sessions, without adherence to basic rights of the accused. As execution rulings were issued en masse (up to 550 between summer 2009 and summer 2011), death sentences were issued without proper observance of fair hearing procedures.
28.	BOZORGNIA Mostafa	Gender: male Function: Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison	Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison, known for being the place of imprisonment of the regime's political prisoners and for its particularly poor detention conditions. He unleashed on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners.

29.	ESMAILI Gholam-Hossein (a.k.a. ESMAILI Gholam Hossein)	Gender: male	Chief of Staff of Iranian President Raisi since August 2021. Judiciary spokesman from April 2019 until July 2021. Former head of the Tehran Judiciary. Former Head of Iran's Prisons Organisation. In this capacity, he was complicit in the massive detention of political protesters and covering up of abuses performed in the jailing system.
30.	SEDAQAT (a.k.a. Sedaghat) Farajollah	Gender: male	Assistant Secretary of the General Prison Administration in Tehran. Head of Evin's prison, Tehran until October 2010 during which time torture took place. He was warden, and threatened and exerted pressure on prisoners numerous times.
31.	ZANJIREI Mohammad-Ali	Gender: male	As Senior advisor to Head, and Deputy Head of Iran's Prisons Organisation, responsible for serious human rights violations against prisoners. Administered a system in which prisoners suffered abuse, torture and inhuman/degrading treatment and were accommodated in very poor living conditions.
32.	ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI Mahmoud	Gender: male	Member of Parliament from February 2020 to 2024 and Speaker of the Parliament's Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs who continues

to support the Iranian regime, including by justifying the abuses committed by the regime against the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement. Advisor to Iran's High Council for Human Rights until 2019. Former secretary of the High Council for Human Rights. Former Governor of Ilam Province. Former Political Director of the Interior Ministry. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups, he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties. In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mir-Hossein Mousavi - the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organisation. From 2009 onwards, he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, and has therefore denied the constitutional right to protest and caused many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention of the right to freedom of assembly. In 2009, he also denied the opposition a permit for a ceremony to

			mourn people killed in protests over the presidential elections.
33.	AKBARSHAHI Ali-Reza	Gender: male	Former Director-General of Iran's Drug Control Headquarters (a.k.a. Anti-Narcotics Headquarters). Former Commander of Tehran Police. Under his leadership, the police force was responsible for the use of extrajudicial force on suspects during arrest and pre-trial detention. The Tehran police were also implicated in raids on Tehran university dorms in June 2009 when, according to an Iranian Majlis commission, more than 100 students were injured by the police and Basiji. Until 2018, head of the railway police.
34.	AKHARIAN Hassan	Gender: male	Head of Ward 5 and in charge of solitary confinement in EU-listed Rajae Shahr Prison since 2015; formerly Keeper of Ward 1 of Rajae Shahr Prison, Karadj until July 2010. Several former detainees have denounced his use of torture, as well as orders he gave to prevent inmates receiving medical assistance. According to a transcript of one reported detainee in the Rajae Shahr Prison, wardens all beat him severely, with Akharian's full knowledge. There is also at least one

			reported case of ill treatment and the death of a detainee, Mohsen Beikvand, under Akharian's wardenship. Beikvand died in September 2010. Other prisoners claim credibly that he was killed on the instructions of Hassan Akharian.
35.	AVAEE Seyyed Ali-Reza (a.k.a. AVAEE Seyyed Alireza, AVAIE Alireza)	POB: Dezful (Iran) DOB: 20.5.1956 Gender: male	Minister of Justice until 25 August 2021. Former Director of the special investigations office. Deputy Minister of the Interior and Head of the Public Register until July 2016. Advisor to the Disciplinary Court for Judges in April 2014. Former President of the Tehran Judiciary. As President of the Tehran Judiciary, he has been responsible for human rights violations, arbitrary arrests, denials of prisoners' rights and a high number of executions.
36.	BANESHI Jaber	Gender: male	Head of Branch 22 of the Appeals Court of Shiraz from November 2011. Prosecutor of Shiraz until October 2011. Prosecutor during the Shiraz bombing case in 2008, which was used by the regime to sentence to death other unconnected persons. He has pursued capital charges and other severe penalties against minorities, such as to constitute, inter alia, a violation of

			their human rights to fair trial and freedom from arbitrary detention.
37.	Aufgehoben		
38.	GANJI Mostafa Barzegar	Gender: male	General Director of Inspection Supervision and Performance Evaluation of Courts since June 2020. Former Prosecutor General of Qom (2008-2017) and former Head of the Directorate-General for prisons. He was responsible for the arbitrary detention and maltreatment of dozens of offenders in Qom. He was complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to the excessive and increasing use of the death penalty and a sharp increase in executions in 2009/2010.
39.	HABIBI Mohammad Reza	Gender: male Function: Chief Justice of Isfahan; former Attorney General of Isfahan; former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan; former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd	Chief Justice of Isfahan, former Attorney General of Isfahan, former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan and former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. In his various roles in the judiciaries of Isfahan and Yazd, including in his current role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he has directly participated in and is responsible for the violation of citizens' rights, in particular the right to freedom of speech, the right to protest, the right to life, and the violation

			of the prohibition on torture. Mohammad Reza Habibi also played a direct role in the suppression and gross violation of the right to protest during the nationwide protests in January 2017 and November 2019. Therefore, in his role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
40.	Aufgehoben		
41.	JAVANI Yadollah	Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Rank: Brigadier-General	IRGC deputy commander for political affairs. Has made numerous attempts to suppress free speech and free discourse through his public statements supporting the arrest and punishment of protesters and dissenters. One of the first high-ranking officials to demand in 2009 the arrest of Moussavi, Karroubi and Khatami. Has supported the use of techniques that breach rights to a fair trial, including public confessions, and he has released the contents of interrogations before trial. Evidence also indicates that he has condoned the use of violence against protesters and as an integral member of the IRGC he is highly likely to have been aware of the use of harsh interrogation techniques to force confessions.

42.	JAZAYERI Massoud	Gender: male Title: Brigadier-General	Cultural advisor to the Joint Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces since April 2018. Within the joint military staff of Iran's Armed Forces, Brigadier-General Massoud Jazayeri was the Deputy Chief of Staff for cultural and media affairs (a.k.a. State Defence Publicity HQ). He actively collaborated in the repression of 2009 protests as Deputy Chief of Staff. He warned in a Kayhan interview that many protesters inside and outside Iran had been identified and would be dealt with at the right time. He has openly called for the suppression of foreign mass media outlets and the Iranian opposition. In 2010, he asked the government to pass tougher laws against Iranians who cooperate with foreign media sources.
43.	JOKAR Mohammad Saleh	POB: Yazd (Iran) DOB: 1957 Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Position: Member of Parliament for the province of Yazd and Chairman of the Internal Affairs Commission and Parliamentary Councils	Member of Parliament for the province of Yazd and Chairman of the Internal Affairs Commission and Parliamentary Councils. General of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and former Deputy for Parliamentary Affairs of the IRGC. From 2011 to 2016, Member of Parliament for the province of Yazd and Member of the Parliamentary Committee

			<p>for National Security and Foreign Policy. Former Commander of Student Basij Forces. In that role, he was actively involved in suppressing protests and indoctrinating children and young people with a view to continuing suppression of free speech and dissent. As a Member of the Parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy, he publicly supported the suppression of opposition to the government and its repressive policies. After the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, he played a central role in proposing amendments to the parliamentary election law designed to empower hardliners in parliamentary elections and shut down the demands of protestors.</p>
<p>44.</p>	<p>KAMALIAN Behrouz (a.k.a. Hackers Brain, Behrooz_Ice)</p>	<p>POB: Tehran (Iran)          DOB: 1983          Gender: male          Function: Head of the "Ashiyaneh" cyber group</p>	<p>Head of the "Ashiyaneh" cyber group linked with the Iranian regime. "Ashiyaneh" Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for intensive cyber-attacks on both domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. Kamalian's "Ashiyaneh" organisation's work has assisted the regime's crack-down against the opposition, which has involved numerous</p>

			serious human rights violations.
45.	KHALILOLLAHI Moussa (a.k.a. KHALILOLLAHI Mousa, ELAHI Mousa Khalil)	POB: Tabriz (Iran) DOB: 1963 Gender: male	Chief of Justice of East Azerbaijan province. Former prosecutor of Tabriz from 2010 to 2019. He was involved in Sakineh Mohammadi-Ash-tiani's case and is complicit in grave violations of the right to due process.
46.	MAHSOULI Sadeq (a.k.a. MAHSULI Sadeq)	POB: Oroumieh (Iran) DOB: 1959/1960 Gender: male Function: Secretary-General (and former Deputy Secretary-General) of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability)	Secretary-General of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) since 2021 and Deputy Secretary-General of the Paydari Front before 2021. The Paydari Front has long been active in state capture practices, infiltrating institutions and indoctrinating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the wake of the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement, launched in September 2022, the Paydari Front, under the leadership of Mahsouli, played a critical role in pushing through the draconian hijab and chastity laws. Mahsouli is a former advisor to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is also a former member of the Expediency Council and former Deputy Chief of the Perseverance Front. He was Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011

			and Minister of the Interior until August 2009. As Minister of the Interior, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plain-clothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli's control.
47.	MALEKI Mojtaba	Gender: male	Deputy head of the Ministry of Justice in the Khorasan Razavi province. Former prosecutor of Kermanshah. Has played a role in the high number of death sentences being passed in Iran, including prosecuting the cases of seven prisoners convicted of drug trafficking who were hanged on the same day on 3 January 2010 in Kermanshah's central prison.
48.	OMIDI Mehrdad (aka: Reza; OMIDI Reza)	Gender: male	Head of section VI of the police, investigation department. Former Head of the Intelligence Services within the Iranian Police. Former Head

			<p>of the Computer Crimes Unit of the Iranian Police. He was responsible for thousands of investigations and indictments of reformists and political opponents using the Internet. He was thus responsible for grave human rights violations in the repression of persons who speak out in defence of their legitimate rights, including freedom of expression during and after the 2009 Green Movement.</p>
49.	SALARKIA Mahmoud	<p>Gender: male Nationality: Iranian</p>	<p>Mahmoud Salarkia is currently working as a lawyer and continues to suppress individual rights of the Iranian citizens in defence of the regime's repressive policies. He figures on the list of lawyers competent under Article 48 of the Iranian criminal procedure code, on the basis of which the defendants of some political and security crimes are denied the choice of a lawyer during the interrogation and investigation stages by the prosecutor's office. Former Head of the Petrol and Transport Commission of the City of Tehran. Deputy to the Prosecutor-General of Tehran for Prison Affairs during the crackdown of 2009. In that position, he was directly responsible for many of the arrest war-</p>

			rants against innocent, peaceful protesters and activists. Many reports from human rights defenders show that virtually all those arrested were, on Salarkia's instruction, held incommunicado without access to their lawyer or families, and without charge, for varying lengths of time, often in conditions amounting to enforced disappearance. Often the families of those arrested were not notified of the arrest.
50.	KHODAEI SOURI Hojatollah	POB: Selseleh (Iran) DOB: 1964 Gender: male	Member of the National Security and Foreign policy Committee. Parliamentary deputy for Lorestan Province. Member of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign and Security Policy. Head of Evin prison until 2012. Torture was a common practice in Evin prison while Sourì was its head. In Ward 209, many activists were held for their peaceful activities in opposition to the ruling government.
51.	TALA Hossein (a.k.a. TALA Hosseyn)	POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1969 Gender: male	Mayor of Eslamshahr until 2020. Former Iranian MP. Former Governor-General ('Farmandar') of Tehran Province until September 2010, he was responsible for the intervention of police forces and therefore for

			the repression of demonstrations. He received a prize in December 2010 for his role in the post-election repression.
52.	TAMADDON Morteza (a.k.a. TAMADON Morteza)	POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan (Iran) DOB: 1959 Gender: male Function: Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology; former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council; former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province	Politician closely associated with former Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology. Former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as Governor and Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bore overall responsibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran Province, including cracking down on political protests since June 2009.
53.	ZEBHI Hossein	Gender: male	First Deputy Advisor to the Judiciary and Judge of the Supreme Court (head of Branch 41 of the Supreme Court, dealing in particular with security offences and drugs). Deputy to the Prosecutor-General of Iran (2007-2015). In this role, he was responsible for judicial cases brought after the post-election protests in 2009, which were conducted in contravention of human rights. Also in this role,

			he has condoned excessive punishments for drug offences.
54.	BAHRAMI Mohammad-Kazem	Gender: male	Head of the administrative justice court until April 2021. He was complicit in the repression of peaceful demonstrators in 2009 as head of the judiciary branch of the armed forces.
55.	HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz (a.k.a. Aziz Hajmohammadi, Noorollah Azizmohammadi)	POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 1948 Gender: male Function: Attorney in Tehran since 2020; former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court	Attorney in Tehran since 2020. Former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Working for the judiciary since 1971, he has been involved in several trials of demonstrators, including that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities. He has a track record of human rights violations, including the issuing of inhumane sentences, death sentences and prison sentences for political prisoners.
56.	BAGHERI Mohammad-Bagher	DOB: 1941 Gender: male Function: Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff	In 2019, Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri was appointed Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff, replacing Mohammad Javad Larijani in this position by a decree of Ebrahim Raisi. He was judge at the Supreme court between December 2015

			<p>and 2019. Former vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, approximately 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers of those executed being notified. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a high number of death sentences.</p>
57.	BAKHTIARI Seyyed Morteza	<p>POB: Mashhad (Iran)          DOB: 1952          Gender: male</p>	<p>President of the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (since July 2019). Former deputy custodian of Imam Reza shrine. Former Official of the Special Clerical Tribunal. Former Minister of Justice from 2009 to 2013. During his time as Minister of Justice, prison conditions within Iran fell well below accepted international standards, and there was widespread mistreatment of prisoners. In addition, he played a key role in threatening and harassing the Iranian diaspora by announcing the establishment of a</p>

			special court to deal specifically with Iranians who live outside the country. He also oversaw a sharp increase in the number of executions in Iran, including secret executions not announced by the government, and executions for drug-related offences.
58.	HOSSEINI Dr Seyyed Mohammad (a.k.a. HOSSEYNI Dr Seyyed Mohammad; Seyed, Sayyed and Sayyid)	POB: Rafsanjan, Kerman (Iran) DOB: 23.7.1961 Gender: male	Vice-president for parliamentary affairs under President Raisi since August 2021. Former advisor to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and spokesperson for YEKTA, a hard-line political faction. Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (2009-2013). Former Deputy Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). Former advisor to the Director of Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation (ICRO). Ex-IRGC, he was complicit in the repression of journalists.
59.	MOSLEHI Heydar (Aka: MOSLEHI Heidar; MOSLEHI Haidar)	POB: Isfahan (Iran) DOB: 1956 Gender: male	Representative of the Ideological-Political Bureau of the Commander in Chief of Iran's Armed Forces (since 2018). Former advisor of Supreme Jurisprudence in the IRGC. Head of the organisation for publications on the role of the clergy at war. Former Minister of Intelligence (2009-2013). Under his

			<p>leadership, the Ministry of Intelligence continued the practices of widespread arbitrary detention and persecution of protesters and dissidents. The Ministry of Intelligence runs Ward 209 of Evin Prison, where many activists have been held on account of their peaceful activities in opposition to the government in power. Interrogators from the Ministry of Intelligence have subjected prisoners in Ward 209 to beatings and mental and sexual abuse.</p>
60.	ZARGHAMI Ezzatollah	<p>POB: Dezful (Iran) DOB: 22.7.1959 Gender: male</p>	<p>Minister of Culture, Crafts and Tourism since 25 August 2021. Member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council and Cultural Revolution Council since 2014. Former Head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) until November 2014. Under his tenure at IRIB, He was responsible for all programming decisions. IRIB has broadcast forced confessions of detainees and a series of 'show trials' in August 2009 and December 2011. These constitute a clear violation of international provisions on fair trial and the right to due process.</p>

61.	TAGHIPOUR Reza	POB: Maragheh (Iran) DOB: 1957 Gender: male	<p>Member of the 11th Iranian parliament (Tehran constituency). Member of the Supreme Cyberspace Council. Former Member of the City Council of Teheran. Former Minister for Information and Communications (2009-2012).</p> <p>As Minister for Information, he was one of the top officials in charge of censorship and control of internet activities and also all types of communications (in particular mobile phones).</p> <p>During interrogations of political detainees, the interrogators make use of the detainees' personal data, mail and communications. On several occasions following the 2009 presidential election and during street demonstrations, mobile lines and text messaging were blocked, satellite TV channels were jammed and the internet locally suspended or at least slowed down.</p>
62.	KAZEMI Toraj	Gender: male	<p>Chief of the Greater Tehran division of the EU-designated Cyber Police until June 2020. In this capacity, he announced a campaign for the recruitment of government hackers in order to achieve better control of information on the internet and</p>

			attack 'dangerous' sites.
63.	LARIJANI Sadeq	POB: Najaf (Iraq) DOB: 1960 or August 1961 Gender: male	Head of the Expediency Council since 29 December 2018. Former member of the Guardian Council (until September 2021). Former Head of the Judiciary (2009-2019). The Head of the Judiciary is required to consent to and sign off every qisas (retribution), hodoud (crimes against God) and ta'zirat (crimes against the state) punishment. This includes sentences carrying the death penalty, floggings and amputations. In this regard, he has personally signed off numerous death penalty sentences, contravening international standards, including stoning, executions by suspension strangulation, execution of juveniles, and public executions such as those where prisoners have been hanged from bridges in front of crowds of thousands. Therefore, he has contributed to a high number of executions. He has also permitted corporal punishment sentences such as amputations and the dripping of acid into the eyes of the convicted. Since Sadeq Larijani took office, arbitrary arrests of political prisoners, human rights defenders

			and minorities have increased markedly. Sadeq Larijani also bears responsibility for systemic failures in the Iranian judicial process with respect to the right to a fair trial.
64.	MIRHEJAZI Ali Ashgar	DOB: 8 September 1946 POB: Isfahan Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Intelligence advisor to the Supreme Leader. Part of the Supreme Leader's inner circle, one of those responsible for planning the suppression of protests, which has been implemented since 2009, and associated with those responsible for suppressing the protests. He was also responsible for planning the suppression of public unrest in December 2017/2018 and November 2019.
65.	SAEEDI Ali	Gender: male	Head of the Supreme Leader's political ideology bureau. Former representative of the Supreme Leader for the Pasdaran (1995-2020) after spending his whole career within the institution of the military, and specifically in the Pasdaran intelligence service. This official role made him the key figure in the transmission of orders emanating from the Office of the Supreme Leader to the Pasdaran's repression apparatus.
66.	Aufgehoben		

67.	MORTAZAVI Seyyed Solat	<p>POB: Farsan, Tchar Mahal-o-Bakhtiari (South) - (Iran)          DOB: 1967          Gender: male</p>	<p>Since 19 October 2022 (acting) Minister of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Welfare. From September 2021 until October 2022, Vice-President for Executive Affairs of Iran and Head of the Presidential Office. Head of the real estate branch of the Mostazafan Foundation, which was directly run by Supreme Leader Khamenei from 16 September 2019 until September 2021. Until November 2019, Director of the Tehran branch of the Foundation Astan Qods Razavi. Former mayor of the second largest city of Iran, Mashhad, where public executions are regularly carried out. Former Deputy Interior Minister for Political Affairs, appointed in 2009. In that capacity, he was responsible for directing the repression of persons who spoke up in defence of their legitimate rights, including freedom of expression. Later appointed as Head of the Iranian Election Committee for the parliamentary elections in 2012 and for the presidential elections in 2013.</p>
68.	FARHADI Ali	<p>Gender: male          Function: Head of the Government Penal Organiza-</p>	<p>In 2024, Ali Farhadi was appointed by the Iranian Minister of Justice as head of the</p>

		tion; former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran; former prosecutor of Karaj	Government Penal Organization, which is an organization lacking impartiality and disrespecting citizens' rights. Former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Former prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty was handed down. There were a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor.
69.	REZVANMA-NESH Ali	Gender: male	Deputy prosecutor in the province of Karaj, region of Alborz in the period 2010-2016. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including involvement in the execution of a juvenile.
70.	RAMEZANI Gholamhossein	Gender: male	Since 2011 Chief of the Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence; from November 2009 to March 2011: Commander of Intelligence of the Pasdaran; from March 2008 to November 2009: Deputy Commander of Intelligence of the Pasdaran; from April 2006 to March 2008: Head of Protection and Intelligence of the Pasdaran. Involved in the suppression of freedom of expression, including by being asso-

			ciated with those responsible for the arrests of bloggers/journalists in 2004, and reported to have had a role in the suppression of the post-election protests in 2009.
71.	SADEGHI Mohamed	Gender: male	Colonel and Deputy of IRGC technical and cyber intelligence and in charge of the centre of analysis and fight against organised crime within the Pasdaran. Responsible for the arrests and torture of bloggers/journalists.
72.	JAFARI Reza	DOB: 1967 Gender: male	Former advisor to the Disciplinary Court for Judges (2012-2022). Member of the "Committee for Determining Criminal Web Content", a body responsible for the censorship of websites and social media. Former Head of special prosecution of cybercrime between 2007 and 2012. Was responsible for the repression of freedom of expression, including through the arrest, detention and prosecution of bloggers and journalists. Persons arrested on suspicion of cybercrime were mistreated and subjected to an unfair judicial process.
73.	RESHTE-AHMADI Bahram	Gender: male	Judge of an ordinary court of northern Tehran. Former Supervisor of Public Prosecution Office in Tehran. Deputy Head of the Office of Prison

			Affairs of Tehran Province. Former Deputy Prosecutor in Tehran until 2013. He ran Evin prosecution centre. Was responsible for the denial of rights, including visits and other prisoner's rights, to human rights defenders and political prisoners.
74.	RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf	Gender: male Function: Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons; former head of Evin Prison; former head of Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah	Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons since 2015. Former head of Evin Prison (2012-2015) and Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah. During his tenure, conditions in the prisons deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in Evin Prison in protest at the violation of their rights and their violent treatment by prison guards.
75.	KIASATI Morteza	Gender: male	Judge of branch 54 of the Revolutionary Court of Tehran and of the Ahwaz Revolutionary Court, Branch 4; imposed death sentences on four Arab political prisoners, Taha Heidarian, Abbas Heidarian, Abd al-Rahman Heidarian (three brothers) and Ali Sharifi. They were arrested, tortured and hanged without due process. These cases and the lack of due process were refe-

			renced in a report dated 13 September 2012 by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, the UN Secretary General's report on Iran of 22 August 2012.
76.	MOUSSAVI Seyed Mohammad Bagher (a.k.a. MOUSAVI Seyed Mohammed Baqir)	Gender: male	Ahwaz Revolutionary Court judge, Branch 2 (2011-2015), imposed death sentences on a number of people, including five Ahwazi Arabs, Mohammad Ali Amouri, Hashem Sha'bani Amouri, Hadi Rashedi, Seyed Jaber Alboshoka, Seyed Mokhtar Alboshoka, on 17 March 2012 for "activities against national security" and "enmity against God". The sentences were upheld by Iran's Supreme Court on 9 January 2013. The five were arrested without charge for over a year, tortured and sentenced without due process. Hadi Rashedi and Hashem Sha'bani Amouri were executed in 2014.
77.	Aufgehoben		
78.	JAFARI Asadollah	Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Position: Head of the Judicial Administration in Isfahan and Head of the Resistance Economy Headquarters	Head of the Judicial Administration in Isfahan and Head of the Resistance Economy Headquarters. Former Attorney General in Isfahan. In that position, he ordered violent reactions against protesters who took to the streets in November 2021 to protest against water

			<p>shortages. According to some reports, Asadollah Jafari has announced the formation of a special office to investigate the arrested protesters and he ordered the condemnation of some protesters involved in the 2022 protests. From 2017 to 2021, he held the position of Attorney General in North Khorasan province.</p> <p>As former Prosecutor of Mazandaran province (2006-2017), Jafari recommended the imposition of the death penalty in cases he prosecuted, which has resulted in many executions including public executions, and in circumstances where the imposition of the death penalty is contrary to international human rights, including by being disproportionate and excessive punishment. Jafari has also been responsible for illegal arrests and violations of the rights of Baha'i detainees from initial arrest to keeping them in solitary confinement in the Intelligence Detention Centre.</p>
79.	EMADI Hamid Reza (a.k.a. Hamidreza Emadi)	<p>POB: Hamedan (Iran)          DOB: circa 1973          Place of residence: Tehran          Place of work: Press TV HQ, Tehran</p>	<p>Former Press TV Newsroom Director.          Former Press TV Senior Producer.          Responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including</p>

		Gender: male	<p>journalists, political activists and persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process. Independent broadcast regulator OFCOM fined Press TV in the UK GBP 100 000 for broadcasting the forced confession of Iranian-Canadian journalist and filmmaker Maziar Bahari in 2011, which was filmed in prison whilst Bahari was under duress. NGOs have reported further instances of forced televised confessions by Press TV. Emadi is therefore associated with violating the right to due process and fair trial. In 2016, he underwent disciplinary proceedings for sexual harassment against his colleague Sheena Shirani, which led to his suspension from the service.</p>
80.	HAMLEBAR Rahim	Gender: male	<p>Judge of Branch 1 of Tabriz Revolutionary Court. Responsible for heavy sentences against Azeri ethnic minority and workers' rights activists, accusing them of spying, acts against national security, propaganda against the Iranian regime and insulting the leader of Iran. A high profile case involved 20 volunteer earthquake relief workers (following an</p>

			<p>earthquake in Iran in August 2012) to whom he gave prison sentences for their attempts to assist earthquake victims. The court found the workers guilty of "collaboration in assembly and collusion to commit crimes against national security."</p>
81.	MUSAVI-TABAR Seyyed Reza	<p>POB: Jahrom (Iran)          DOB: 1964          Gender: male          Nationality: Iranian          Position: Representative of the Disciplinary Prosecutor for Judges in Shiraz</p>	<p>Since 2014, Seyyed Reza Musavi-Tabar has been the representative of the Disciplinary Prosecutor for Judges in Shiraz. Former Head of the Revolutionary Prosecution of Shiraz. Responsible for illegal arrests and ill treatment of political activists, journalists, human rights defenders, Baha'is and prisoners of conscience, who were harassed, tortured, interrogated and denied access to lawyers and due process. Musavi-Tabar signed judicial orders in the notorious No 100 Detention Centre (a male prison), including an order to detain female Baha'i prisoner Raha Sabet for three years in solitary confinement.</p>
82.	KHORAMABADI Abdolsamad	<p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Deputy Director for Judicial Oversight (since 13 October 2018). Former head of the 'Commission to Determine the Instances of Criminal Content', a governmental organisation in</p>

			<p>charge of online censorship and cyber crime. Under his leadership, the Commission defined 'cyber crime' by a number of vague categories that criminalise creation and publication of content deemed inappropriate by the regime. He was responsible for repression and the blocking of numerous opposition sites, electronic newspapers, blogs, sites of human rights NGOs and of Google and Gmail since September 2012. He and the Commission actively contributed to the death in detention of the blogger Sattar Beheshti in November 2012. Thus the Commission he was heading is directly responsible for systemic violations of human rights, in particular by banning and filtering websites to the general public, and occasionally disabling internet access altogether.</p>
83.	SOLEIMANI Gholamreza	<p>POB: Farsan (Iran)          DOB: 1343 (Iranian Hijri calendar), 1964 or 1965 (Gregorian calendar)          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Position: Head of the Basij</p>	<p>Gholamreza Soleimani is the Head of the Basij Organisation. The Basij Organisation used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As Head of the Basij Organisa-</p>

		Organisation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)	tion, Gholamreza Sol-eimani bears responsibility for the violent suppression of the protests and serious human rights violations in Iran.
84.	SALAMI Hossein (a.k.a. SALAMI Hussain)	POB: Vaneshan, Golpayegan (Iran) DOB: 1339 (Iranian Hijri calendar) 1960 or 1961 (Gregorian calendar) Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Rank: Major General	Hossein Salami has been the Commander in Chief of the IRGC since April 2019, which includes the Basij militia, and is a member of the National Security Council. The IRGC's regular forces and the Basij militia used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As a member of the National Security Council, Hossein Salami took part in the sessions that resulted in the orders to use lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests. Hossein Salami therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.
85.	KARAMI Hassan	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Commander of the Special Units of the Iranian police force	Hassan Karami is the Commander of the Special Units of the Iranian police force. The Special Units used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other

			civilians in many cities across the country. As the Commander of the Special Units, which have caused the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians, Hassan Karami bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.
86.	PAKPOUR Mohammad (a.k.a. PAKPUR Mohammad)	POB: Arak (Iran) DOB: 1340 (Iranian Hijri calendar), 1961 (Gregorian calendar) Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutio- nary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Rank: Brigadier General	Mohammad Pakpour has been Commander in Chief of the IRGC Ground Forces since March 2010. The IRGC's Ground Forces used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As Commander in Chief of the IRGC's Ground Forces, which have used lethal force against unarmed protesters and other civilians, Mohammad Pakpour bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.
87.	ASHTARI Hossein	POB: Isfahan (a.k.a. Esfahan, Ispahan) Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Com- mander in Chief of the Iranian police force	Hossein Ashtari was Commander in Chief of the Iranian police force from March 2015 to January 2023 and is a member of the National Security Council. The police force includes the Emdad Units and the Special Units. Iran's ordinary police force,

			<p>the Emdad Units and the Special Units used lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests in Iran, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians in many cities across the country. As a member of the National Security Council, Ashtari took part in the sessions that resulted in the orders to use lethal force to suppress the November 2019 protests. Ashtari therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
88.	ZIAEI Gholamreza	<p>Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Position: Former Director of Evin Prison; former Director of other detention centres</p>	<p>Between July 2019 and June 2020, Gholamreza Ziaei was the Director of Evin Prison in Tehran. During his tenure, the already harsh conditions for detainees further deteriorated, including for Narguess Mohammadi. Female prisoners were denied phone contact with their children. Political prisoners were denied weekly visits by relatives, which were only allowed every two months. During the 2009 protests, Ziaei was in charge of the Kahrizak Detention Center, where at least five detainees, who had been arrested in connection with Tehran's 2009 mass street protests, died after being tortured. From 2017 to 2019, before taking</p>

			charge of Evin Prison, Ziaei was the Director of Rajae Shahr Prison in Karaj, west of Tehran, where there have been numerous protests by political prisoners against abuse and inhumane living conditions.
89.	SHAHVARPOUR Hassan	POB: Safi Abad, south of Dezful, Khuzestan (Iran) Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Passport number: 2001624001 (national ID number) Position: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander of Khuzestan province (Vali Asr Corps) Rank: Brigadier-General	Brigadier-General Hassan Shahvarpour has been the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Khuzestan province (Vali Asr Corps) since 2009. In 2023, Vali Asr Corps was awarded a certificate by the IRGC Commander-in-Chief for being the most successful Corps managing cyberspace. Hassan Shahvarpour is responsible for commanding the forces, which used machine guns against protesters and other civilians in the city of Mahshahr during the November 2019 protests. Under his command, 148 people were killed by the IRGC by heavy machine gun fire from armoured vehicles encircling fleeing protesters hiding in nearby marshes.
90.	VASEGHI Leyla (a.k.a. VASEQI Layla, VASEGHI Leila, VASEGHI Layla)	POB: Sari, Mazandaran Province (Iran) DOB: 1352 (Iranian Hijri calendar), 1972 or 1973 (Gregorian calendar)	As the governor of Shahr-e Qods and Head of the City Security Council from September 2019 until November 2021, Leyla Vaseghi ordered the police and other armed

		<p>Gender: female  Position: Former governor of Shahr-e Qods and Head of the City Security Council</p>	<p>forces to use lethal means during the November 2019 protests, causing the deaths of and injuries to unarmed protesters and other civilians. As the governor of Shahr-e Qods and Head of the City Security Council, Vaseghi bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran. In the context of the 2022/2023 protests, she is still remembered by Iranians as having one of the leading roles in violent repression, with a parallel made between her public words and the current repression.</p>
91.	<p>ROSTAMI CHESHMEH GACHI  Mohammed (a.k.a. ROSTAMI Mohammad)</p>	<p>POB: Kermanshah (Iran)  DOB: 1976 or 1977  Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  National ID No.: 111936 (Iran)  Identification No.: 13821 (Iran)  Position: Head of Iran's Morality Police</p>	<p>Mohammad Rostami Cheshmeh Gachi is the head of Iran's Morality Police. He was head of the Kermanshah Public Security Police from early 2014 until early 2019 and held senior positions in the Iranian intelligence police. The Morality Police is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, exces-</p>

			<p>sive violence and torture.</p> <p>On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an 'educational and orientation class'. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented. As head of Iran's Morality Police, Rostami is responsible for the Morality Police's actions. He therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
92.	RAHIMI Hossein	<p>POB: Dodhak village, Mahalat, Central province (Iran)          DOB: 1964          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Rank: Brigadier General          Position: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Tehran</p>	<p>Brigadier General Hossein Rahimi has been the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Tehran since 7 August 2017.</p> <p>The LEF's response to the September 2022 protests in Tehran was particularly harsh. The LEF's excessive use of violence to repress those protests resulted</p>

			in the deaths of multiple people. As head of the LEF in Tehran, Rahimi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
93.	ABDI Abbas	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Position: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Divandarreh	Colonel Abbas Abdi is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the district of Divandarreh. The LEF's response to the September 2022 protests in Divandarreh was particularly harsh. The LEF's excessive use of violence to repress those protests resulted in the deaths of multiple people. As head of the LEF in Divandarreh, Abdi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
94.	MIRZAEI Haj Ahmad (a.k.a. MIRZAEI Hajahmad; MIRZAYI Hajj Ahmad)	POB: Tehran (Iran) DOB: 9 February 1957 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Identification No.: 4268935215 (Iran) Rank: Colonel Position: Head of Iran's Morality Police in Tehran	Colonel Haj Ahmed Mirzaei has been the head of the Tehran branch of Iran's Morality Police since 2018. The Morality Police is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, exces-

		<p>sive violence and torture.</p> <p>On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an 'educational and orientation class'. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented. As head of the Morality Police in Tehran, Mirzaei is responsible for the Morality Police's actions in Tehran, including in its headquarters where Amini was beaten and mistreated. He therefore bears responsibility for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
95.	ZAREPOUR Issa	<p>POB: Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province (Iran)          DOB: 1980          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Position: Minister of</p> <p>Issa Zarepour has been the Iranian Minister of Information and Communications Technology since 25 August 2021. In his position, he played a key role in the Iranian government's decision to systematically violate the Iranian</p>

		<p>Information and Communications Technology</p>	<p>people's freedom of opinion and expression by imposing restrictions on internet access during the protests that followed the death of 22-year old Mahsa Amini on 16 September 2022. That action further diminished the already very limited space for civil society actors in Iran, including human rights defenders, to gather objective information and communicate, both amongst themselves and with the outside world. The internet blackout had negative consequences for the enjoyment of human rights in Iran, both directly (namely the impact on freedom of opinion and expression and availability of objective information) and indirectly (namely the increased chance of human rights violations not being documented thereby negatively impacting accountability for human rights violations). As Minister of Information and Communications Technology, Zarepour is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
<p>96.</p>	<p>SEPEHR Mohammad-Hossein</p>	<p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Commander of the Ira-</p>	<p>Mohammad-Hossein Sepehr is the Commander of the Central Training Base of the General Staff of the</p>

		nian Central Training Base of the General Staff of the Armed Forces	Armed Forces in Tehran. He is a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij Resistance Force (a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the IRGC with branches throughout Iran). Sepehr oversees anti-protest training for Iranian security forces and supports a repressive line towards protesters. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
97.	SAFARI Sayd Ali	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Position: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Saqqez	Colonel Sayd Ali Safari is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Saqqez. The LEF's response to the September 2022 protests in Saqqez was particularly harsh. The LEF's excessive use of violence to repress the protests resulted in the deaths of multiple people. As head of the LEF in Saqqez, Safari is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
98.	ADYANI Seyed Alireza (a.k.a. ADIANI Hojjat al-Islam Seyyed Alireza)	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Position: Head of the ideological-political office of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)	Seyed Alireza Adyani is the head of the ideological-political office of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). Adyani is responsible for defining and implementing rules of engagement for police

			<p>forces. He stated that the LEF needs to be 'practical' and 'effective' when dealing with adversaries and cheered the Morality Police for doing its job 'intensely'.</p> <p>The LEF has used massive brutality against protesters, including those protesting after Mahsa Amini's death. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
99.	AZADI Ali	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Second Brigadier General  Function: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Kurdistan</p>	<p>Second Brigadier General Ali Azadi has been the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Kurdistan since 2019.</p> <p>During the repression of the September 2022 protests, forces under his command in Kurdistan shot protesters and killed and injured multiple people.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
100.	SHALIKAR Mohammed Zaman	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Colonel  Function: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Babol, Mazandaran</p>	<p>Colonel Mohammed Zaman Shalika has been the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Babol, Mazandaran since 2021.</p> <p>During demonstrations following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, forces under his command shot, injured and killed protesters in Babol, Mazandaran.</p>

			He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
101.	HEIDARI Salman	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Bukan	Colonel Salman Heidari is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Bukan. The LEF's response to the September 2022 protests in Bukan was particularly harsh. The LEF's excessive use of violence to repress the protests resulted in the death of at least one child and in injuries to multiple people. As head of the LEF in Bukan, Heidari is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
102.	VAHIDI Ahmad	POB: Shiraz (Iran) DOB: 27.7.1958 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of Expediency Council; former Minister of Interior	Ahmad Vahidi was appointed member of the Expediency Council for a 5-year term on 22 September 2022. He was the Iranian Minister of Interior from 25 August 2021 until 2024. As such, he was responsible for Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). During his time in office, an unprecedented number of military and security officials were appointed to provincial governorships who continue to play key roles in coordinating crowd-control activities by police special forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic

			<p>Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Blatant and severe human rights violations by the LEF, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds have been seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Vahidi has also publicly advocated for a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
103.	ABNOUSH Salar	<p>DOB: 2.5.1962 POB: Hamedan, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Deputy Commander of the Basij Resistance Force</p>	<p>Salar Abnoush is the Deputy Commander of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed). The Basij is a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the IRGC with branches throughout Iran. It is charged with channelling popular support for the Iranian regime. The Basij is notorious for its recruitment of</p>

			<p>volunteers, many of them teenage children, and for human wave attacks during the Iran-Iraq war. After the contested 2009 Iranian presidential elections, the Basij brutally quashed protests and attacked student dormitories. The Basij has two missions: to provide defensive military training to protect the regime against foreign invasion, and to suppress domestic anti-regime activity through street violence and intimidation.</p> <p>The Basij is one of the forces ordered by the government to quell the September/October 2022 protests. It injured and killed several protesters. Sources indicate that Basij members under Salar Abnoush's command have committed serious human rights violations in Iran. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
104.	REZAEI Qasem (a.k.a. REZAEI Ghasem)	<p>DOB: 27.9.1961          POB: Abhar, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          National ID No: D10005996 (Iran)          Function: Deputy Commander of the Law Enforcement Forces of the</p>	<p>Qasem Rezaei is the Deputy Commander of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). He directly supervised acts of violence against detainees, including torture and beatings. He justified the actions of the security forces in the wake of the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters and called for continued</p>

		Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)	violence against protesters in May 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
105.	AMANOLLAHI Manouchehr (a.k.a. AMANOLLAHI BAHARVAND Manouchehr)	DOB: March 1965 or 1966 POB: Khorramabad, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Commander of the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in the province of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari	Manouchehr Amanollahi is the Commander of the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in the province of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari. During his tenure, the LEF suppressed protests in 2021 in the province in response to a lack of water, and in 2022 in response to food rationing. LEF units under Amanollahi's command used live ammunition against protestors when suppressing the protests, resulting in multiple deaths. As an advisor to LEF leadership, Amanollahi was also involved in the LEF's response to nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
106.	HEIDARI Kiyumars (a.k.a. HEYDARI Kiyumars, HEYDARI Amir Kyomarth)	DOB: 1964 POB: Kermanshah, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Function:	Brigadier-General Kiyumars Heidari is the Commander of the Iranian Army's Ground Forces and directly reports to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

		Commander of the Iranian Army Ground Forces	<p>He has publicly admitted to his and his force's involvement in the violent response to the November 2019 protests, which led to the death of hundreds of protesters. Blatant and severe human rights violations by the forces, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters - including children - have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters died and hundreds were seriously injured. Army Ground Forces, which are under the control of Heidari, have been involved in suppressing the protests and have killed at least one person. Heidari himself stated that his forces have been used to deal with the 2022 protests. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
107.	MAJID Vahid Mohammad Naser	<p>DOB: 15.8.1964 POB: Isfahan, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male National ID No: 3874409929 (Iran) Function: Head of the Iranian Cyber Police</p>	<p>Vahid Mohammad Naser Majid is head of the Iranian Cyber Police (EU-listed). The Iranian Cyber Police influences and restricts internet access in Iran and arbitrarily arrests people for expressing online criticism of the Iranian regime. The Cyber Police is engaged in a</p>

			nationwide series of arrests and prosecutions. It lends support to the Iranian regime in its violent response to nationwide protests against people who speak up in defence of their legitimate rights. In his function as Head of the Iranian Cyber Police, Vahid Mohammad Naser Majid is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
108.	NEJAT Hossein (a.k.a. ZIBAYINEJAD Mohammad-Hossein)	DOB: 1955 POB: Shiraz, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Function: Deputy Commander of Sarallah (a.k.a. Tharullah, Thar-Allah, Tharallah, Tharallollah)	Brigadier-General Hossein Nejat has been the Deputy Commander of Sarallah, an IRGC-linked, Tehran-based dedicated security apparatus of the Iranian state since 21 June 2020. Sarallah is essential to Tehran's security, as the headquarters is responsible for protecting the capital and governmental institutions against any threats such as coups or anti-government protests. Sarallah troops under the direct command of Nejat are tasked with quelling anti-government protests, including the violent suppressing of peaceful protests in 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
109.	MAROUFI Hossein	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	General Sardar Hossein Maroufi is the Deputy Head of Mobi-

		<p>Rank: General  Function:  Deputy Head of  Mobilisation of  the Islamic  Revolutionary  Guards Corps  (IRGC) in the  Sistan and  Baluchestan pro-  vince</p>	<p>lisation of the Islamic  Revolutionary Guards  Corps (IRGC) in the  Sistan and Baluchestan  province. As such, he is  a leading IRGC  member in this pro-  vince.  The Sistan and Balu-  chestan province has  seen some of the most  violent crackdowns by  Iranian security forces,  including IRGC forces,  during the 2022 protest  wave. On 30 Sep-  tember 2022, the pro-  vince capital Zahedan  witnessed "bloody  Friday", when security  forces opened fire on a  protest forming around  Friday prayer. It is  estimated that at least  70 protestors were shot  and killed. Since then,  violence against partici-  pants in later protests  has continued.  Sardar Hossein  Maroufi is among  those responsible for  the IRGC's violence  against protestors in  Sistan and Baluchestan  province, in particular  around "bloody  Friday".  He is therefore respon-  sible for serious human  rights violations in  Iran.</p>
110.	ABSALAN Parviz	<p>Nationality:  Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: General  Function:  Deputy Head of  the IRGC in  Sistan and</p>	<p>General Parviz  Absalan is the Deputy  Head of the IRGC in  Sistan and Baluchestan  province. The IRGC is  a central element of the  Iranian security forces  in that province, where</p>

		Baluchestan province	<p>it is also called the "Salman army".</p> <p>The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province have been using brutal violence against peaceful protesters in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children.</p> <p>As Deputy Head of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province, Parviz Absalan is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
111.	SHAFABI Ahmad (a.k.a. SHAFAI Ahmad)	<p>DOB: 21.5.1968</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Rank: Brigadier General</p> <p>Function: commander and public relations officer of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province</p>	<p>Brigadier General Ahmad Shafahi is a commander of the IRGC in Sistan and Baluchestan province, and is responsible for public relations. The IRGC is a central element of the Iranian security forces in that province, where it is also called the "Salman army".</p> <p>The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province have been using brutal violence against peaceful protesters in the round of protests in the autumn of 2022, including against children.</p> <p>As commander of the IRGC in the Sistan and Baluchestan Province, Sardar Ahmed Shafahi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>

112.	KOCHZAEI Ebrahim (a.k.a. KOCHZAI Ebrahim, KOUCHAK-ZAEI Ebrahim)	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Colonel  Function: former Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Chabahar in Sistan and Baluchestan province</p>	<p>Colonel Ebrahim Kochzaei was the Head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Chabahar in Sistan and Baluchestan province until 3 December 2022. The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province, including in Chabahar, used brutal violence against peaceful protestors in the protests in autumn 2022, including against children. Kochzaei is also named as the perpetrator of the rape in September 2022 of a 15-year old girl who was held in police custody in Chabahar. Ebrahim Kochzaei is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
113.	TAHERI Ahmad	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Brigadier-General  Function: advisor to the Head of the Iranian Law Enforcement Forces (LEF); former Head of the Iranian LEF in Sistan and Baluchestan province</p>	<p>Brigadier-General Ahmed Taheri has been the advisor to the Head of the Iranian Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) (EU-listed Brigadier-General Radan) since autumn 2023. He was Head of the Iranian LEF in the Sistan and Baluchestan province during the 2022/2023 protests. The security forces in Sistan and Baluchestan province used brutal violence against peaceful protestors in the protests in autumn 2022, including against children.</p>

			As Head of the Iranian LEF in Sistan and Baluchestan province, Ahmed Taheri is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
114.	HOSSEINI Seyed Sadegh	DOB: 1963 or 1964 POB: Dehloran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: General Function: head of the IRGC in Kurdistan province	General Seyed Sadegh Hosseini is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Kurdistan province. Kurdistan province has seen severe violence by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, against the 2022 protest wave. Moreover, the IRGC uses Kurdistan province as a base to conduct military operations against Iraqi Kurdistan, which led to the death of more than a dozen non-combatants. Seyed Sadegh Hosseini is among those responsible for the IRGC violence against protestors in Kurdistan province. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
115.	RAJABPOUR Sereng Hossein	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: commander of the Beit al-Maqdis force (IRGC in Kurdistan) in the city of Sanandaj	Colonel Sereng Hossein Rajabpour is the commander of the Beit al-Maqdis force (IRGC in Kurdistan) in the city of Sanandaj in the province of Kurdistan. Kurdistan province has seen severe violence by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, against the 2022 protest wave, especially in the city of Sanandaj.

			Sereng Hossein Rajabpour is among those responsible for the violence against protesters in Kurdistan province. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
116.	ASL Gholamhossein Mohammadi	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: head of the IRGC in Ardabil province	Gholamhossein Mohammadi Asl is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Ardabil province - a province with an Azeri ethnic minority. Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, committed serious human rights violations in Ardabil province during the 2022 protests. Reports show that an Iranian schoolgirl named Asra Panahi was beaten to death by security forces for refusing to sing the pro-regime anthem. Gholamhossein Mohammadi Asl is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
117.	ABDI Shakar	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: deputy head of the IRGC in Ardabil province	Colonel Shakar Abdi is the deputy head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Ardabil province - a province with an Azeri ethnic minority. Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, committed serious human rights violations in Ardabil province during the 2022 protests. Reports show that an Iranian school-

			girl named Asra Panahi was beaten to death by security forces for refusing to sing the pro-regime anthem. Shakar Abdi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
118.	HASSANZADEH Hasan	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: head of the IRGC in Tehran province	Brigadier General Hasan Hassanzadeh is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Tehran province. Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, committed serious human rights violations in Tehran province during the 2022 protests. Hasan Hassanzadeh is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
119.	AGHAEI Morteza Mir (a.k.a. MIRAGHAEI Morteza)	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: head of the Basij in the city of Sanandaj	Colonel Morteza Mir Aghaei is the head of the Basij in the city of Sanandaj in the province of Kurdistan. Iranian security forces, including the IRGC and its Basij, committed serious human rights violations in Sanandaj during the 2022 protests. Morteza Mir Aghaei is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
120.	MOHAMMADIAN Abbas-Ali	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Police commander of Greater Tehran;	Abbas-Ali Mohammadian has been the police commander of Greater Tehran since January 2023. He is the former head of Iran's

		<p>former head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province</p>	<p>Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province, a position he held from 2017 to 2023.</p> <p>Alborz (Karaj) is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence. Security forces have frequently shot directly at peaceful protestors, leading to many deaths, including of children.</p> <p>As police commander of Greater Tehran, he is responsible for implementing policies violating women's rights.</p> <p>As former head of the LEF in Alborz (Karaj) province and current police commander of Greater Tehran, Abbas-Ali Mohammadian is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
121.	JAHANBAKHSR Rahim	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Brigadier-General  Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in West Azerbaijan province</p>	<p>Brigadier-General Rahim Jahanbakhsh is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in West Azerbaijan province.</p> <p>West Azerbaijan is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human</p>

			rights violations in Iran.
122.	SHEIKHNEJAD Hassan	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Urumeh (a.k.a. Ouroumieh), the capital of West Azerbaijan province.	Colonel Hassan Sheikhnjad is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Urumeh, the capital of West Azerbaijan province. In Urumeh, Iranian security forces committed serious human rights violations during the 2022 protests. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
123.	SAADATI Mahmoud	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province	Colonel Mahmoud Saadati is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province. In Zahedan, Iranian security forces committed serious human rights violations during the 2022 protests. Mahmoud Saadati is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
124.	MIRZAI Morteza	POB: Khorram Abad, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier-General Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Mazandaran province.	Brigadier-General Morteza Mirzai is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Mazandaran province. In Mazandaran province, Iranian security forces committed serious human rights violations during the 2022 protests. Morteza Mirzai is therefore responsible for

			serious human rights violations in Iran.
125.	MALIKI Azizullah	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: General Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Gilan province	General Azizullah Maliki is the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Gilan province. In 2022, Azizullah Maliki directed the violent crackdown against the protests in Gilan province. He was vocal in the media, vehemently defending the violent reaction of the security forces to the protests in September and October 2022. As head of the LEF in Gilan province, Azizullah Maliki is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
126.	MORADI Ali-Reza	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Sanandaj	Ali-Reza Moradi has been the head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the city of Sanandaj in Kurdistan province since December 2018. In that position, Ali-Reza Moradi reports to the general staff of the armed forces in Iran, directly under the authority of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moradi has been responsible for the mass arrest of protesters and ordered the use of lethal weapons against unarmed protesters during the November 2019 nationwide protests in Sanandaj, which resulted in the

			<p>death of at least two protesters.</p> <p>Blatant and severe human rights violations by the police forces in Sanandaj, such as the indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters -including children, have been documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started mid-September 2022.</p> <p>Moradi has also publicly advocated a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations. Since the beginning of the 2022 demonstrations, police forces have arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists.</p> <p>Ali-Reza Moradi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
127.	RAFIEI Enayatollah	<p>DOB: 1970</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Rank: Captain</p> <p>Function: commander of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini</p>	<p>Captain Enayatollah Rafiei is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). He is the commander of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.</p> <p>On 13 September 2022, Rafiei and three other members of his squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a</p>

		<p>hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented.</p> <p>As commander of the squad, Captain Enayatollah Rafiei is responsible for Amini's death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
128.	KHOSHNAMEVAND Ali	<p>DOB: 1995          POB: Khoshnamvand, (Khushnamvand) in the Kouhdasht district of Lorestan province in western Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Rank: Sergeant          Function: Member of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini</p> <p>Sergeant Ali Khoshnamvand is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). He is one of the officers in the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini.</p> <p>On 13 September 2022, Khoshnamvand and three other members of a squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an "educational and orientation</p>

			<p>class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented. As one of the officers who arrested Amini, Sergeant Ali Khoshnamvand is responsible for Amini's death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
129.	GHORBAN-HOSSEINI Fatemeh	<p>DOB: 1995          POB: Teheran, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: female          Function: Member of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini</p>	<p>Fatemeh Ghorban-Hosseini is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). She is one of the officers in the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini. On 13 September 2022, Ghorban-Hosseini and three other members of a squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody,</p>

			<p>which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has been widely documented. As one of the officers who arrested Amini, Fatemeh Ghorban-Hosseini is responsible for Amini's death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
130.	SAFARI Parastou	<p>DOB: 1986          POB: Kermanshah, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: female          Function: Member of the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini</p>	<p>Parastou Safari is a member of the Morality Police (EU-listed), an Islamic religious police that is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). She is one of the officers in the squad that arrested Mahsa Amini. On 13 September 2022, Safari and three other members of a squad arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an "educational and orientation class". According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to this incident and has</p>

			<p>been widely documented.</p> <p>As one of the officers who arrested Amini, Parastou Safari is responsible for Amini's death and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
131.	JEBELLI Peyman	<p>DOB: 25.1.1967          POB: Tehran, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Function: Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)</p>	<p>Peyman Jebelli is the Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which is notorious for being a regime mouth-piece.</p> <p>IRIB severely restricts and denies the free flow of information to the Iranian people. Furthermore, IRIB is actively involved in organising and broadcasting forced "confessions" of regime critics, obtained through intimidation and severe violence. These "confessions" are often aired following public protests, or prior to an execution as a means of reducing public backlash. As Director of IRIB, Jebelli is responsible for IRIB's actions and news content.</p> <p>Whereas several high-profile state broadcasting personnel have resigned recently and disavowed the Iranian regime's violent response to the 2022 protests, Jebelli continues to act in his position. His appointment as director of Iran's main official news source was authorised by</p>

			Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and indicates ideological proximity to the regime. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
132.	REZVANI Ali (a.k.a REZWANI Ali)	DOB: 1984 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reporter and news anchor/presenter on political and security affairs	Ali Rezvani is a reporter for Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and news anchor/presenter on IRIB's nightly 20.30 news programme. IRIB is a state-controlled Iranian media organisation and tasked with spreading government information. IRIB's nightly 20.30 news broadcast, which airs on Channel 2, is the country's leading news programme and considered to be IRIB's primary platform for implementing the agendas of security forces, including the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Documented cases show that the 20.30 news airs forced confessions. In his capacity as IRIB reporter, Ali Rezvani participates in interrogations leading to forced confessions, thereby directly engaging in and facilitating serious human rights violations. In his capacity as news anchor of the 20.30 news, Rezvani promotes the Ira-

			<p>nian security forces' agenda, which condones serious human rights violations such as torture and arbitrary arrests and detention. Rezvani also peddles propaganda against critics in order to intimidate them and to justify and encourage their ill-treatment, thereby violating their right to free expression.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
133.	ZABIHPOUR Ameneh Sadat	<p>DOB: 7.8.1984 POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: female Function: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reporter and head of the foreign Persian-language media group at IRIB Passport no: 09324611</p>	<p>Ameneh Sadat Zabihpour is the head of the foreign Persian-language media group at IRIB, which is notorious for being a regime mouthpiece. IRIB severely restricts and denies the free flow of information to the Iranian people. Furthermore, IRIB is actively involved in organising and broadcasting forced "confessions" of regime critics, obtained through intimidation and severe violence. These "confessions" are often aired following public protests, or prior to an execution as a means of reducing public backlash.</p> <p>Whereas several high-profile state broadcasting personnel have resigned recently and disavowed the Iranian regime's violent response to the 2022 pro-</p>

			<p>tests, Zabihpour continues to act in her position. She has interrogated critics of the regime and produced forced confession videos.</p> <p>She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
134.	KHATAMI Seyyed Ahmad	<p>DOB: 8.5.1960          POB: Semnan, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Function: Friday-prayer imam, member of the Assembly of Experts for the Leadership</p>	<p>Seyyed Ahmad Khatami is a hard-line cleric and an influential Friday-prayer imam in Tehran. Khatami is also a member of the Assembly of Experts for the Leadership, an Iranian entity that is itself implicated in human rights violations for its neglect in upholding constitutional provisions.</p> <p>As a cleric close to the state authorities and with a large audience, he leverages his position to verbally attack and incite violence against protesters. He not only defends the repressive actions of the security forces of Iran but has also on several occasions urged for even harsher treatment of protesters, including the death sentence.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
135.	MIRAHMADI Seyyed Majid	<p>POB: Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male</p>	<p>Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mirahmadi is head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters - a posi-</p>

		<p>Rank: Brigadier General                  Function: Head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters; former Deputy Minister of Interior of Iran</p>	<p>tion traditionally held by members of the security forces. He was Iran's Deputy Minister of Interior until 2024, responsible for overseeing Iran's security and police forces, actors that are involved in serious human rights violations in Iran. Iran's security and police forces are violently clamping down on protests, shooting directly at peaceful protesters and arbitrarily arresting people with total disregard for their human rights. In his statements, Mirahmadi refers to the protests as riots that have to end, and criminalises and threatens those participating in peaceful protests. He is also personally whitewashing the serious human rights violations committed by forces under his authority, for example, by claiming that 16-year-old protester Nika Shakrami committed suicide. Reports indicate that it is very likely that she died at the hands of security forces. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
136.	MOUSAVI Sayyed Abdolrahim	<p>DOB: 1959/1960                  POB: Qom, Iran                  Nationality: Iranian                  Gender: male</p>	<p>Major General Sayyed Abdolrahim Mousavi is the Commander-in-Chief of Iran's Army. In this capacity, he bears responsibility for</p>

		<p>Rank: Major General  Function: Commander-in-chief of the Iranian Army</p>	<p>the Iranian Army's involvement in the regime's violent response to the 2022 protests.  On several occasions, Mousavi described the protests in Iran as riots organised and planned by the enemies of Iran, thereby framing the protests as a national security threat. He used threatening language directed at participants in the protest movement. He also praised the Iranian security forces' violent response to protesters, describing it as an effective way to neutralise Iran's enemies. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
137.	BORMAHANI Mohsen (a.k.a. BARMAHANI Mohsen)	<p>DOB: 24.5.1979  POB: Neishabur, Iran  Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Passport no: A54062245 (Iran), expires 12.7.2026  National ID no: 1063893488 (Iran)  Function: Deputy Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)</p>	<p>Mohsen Bormahani is the Deputy Director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which acts as a regime mouthpiece. In his position, Bormahani holds responsibility for IRIB content. IRIB severely restricts and denies the free flow of information to the Iranian people. Furthermore, IRIB is actively involved in organising and broadcasting forced "confessions" of regime critics, obtained through intimidation and severe violence. These "confessions" are often aired following public protests, or prior to an</p>

			<p>execution as a means of reducing public backlash.</p> <p>Whereas several high-profile state broadcasting personnel have resigned recently and disavowed the Iranian regime's violent response to the 2022 protests in Iran, Bormahani continues to act in his position as Deputy Director and in recent statements has defended the regime. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
138.	JOKAR Morteza (a.k.a. JOWKAR Morteza)	<p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: deputy head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Sistan and Baluchestan province</p>	<p>Colonel Morteza Jokar is the deputy head of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Sistan and Baluchestan province.</p> <p>In this function, he is responsible for directing the violent crackdown on civilian protesters in Sistan and Baluchestan province following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022. Forces under his command are responsible for firing live ammunition at protesters during the 30 September 2022 massacre in Zahedan and the 4 November 2022 massacre in Khash, in which dozens of people were killed and wounded. Other violent crackdowns on protests in other provincial cities (Saravan, Chabahar, Iranshahr, Rask,</p>

			<p>Sarbaz and others) also took place under his control during the autumn of 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
139.	SOURI Majid	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Second Brigadier-General  Function: Head of Rahian-e Noor and Tourism Organization; former Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) in Lorestan province</p>	<p>Majid Sourì is a Second Brigadier-General of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He was the Deputy Commander of the IRGC in Lorestan province. Since December 2022, he is Head of the Rahian-e Noor and Tourism Organization, affiliated with the IRGC and Basij. He is responsible for the security forces' violent repression of protests in 2022, especially in the city of Khorramabad, where people gathered to mourn the death of Nika Shakrami, an Iranian teenager who disappeared soon after Mahsa Amini's death. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
140.	KARIMI Mohsen	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Brigadier-General  Function: Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces;</p>	<p>Since May 2024, Brigadier-General Mohsen Karimi is the Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces. He is the former commander of the IRGC in Markazi province, also known as the Ruhollah</p>

		former Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Markazi province	<p>Corps. The Ruhollah Corps is a military unit of the IRGC with its headquarters located in Arak and is responsible for commanding and controlling all units of the IRGC and Basij located in Markazi province.</p> <p>He is responsible for the security forces' violent repression of protests in 2022, which led to the death of 19-year-old Mehrshad Shahidi in an IRGC detention centre in Arak.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
141.	HEYDARNIA Alireza	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Brigadier-General  Function: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Alborz province</p>	<p>Brigadier-General Alireza Heydarnia is Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Alborz province, also known as the Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps.</p> <p>The IRGC is responsible for the violent repression of protesters, in particular in the city of Karaj, Alborz, in 2022. In that city, security forces cracked down on protesters on the occasion of rallies to honour the victims of the protests on the 40th day after their death. On 17 October 2022, security forces in Karaj abducted from hospital and repeatedly raped Armita Abbasi, a 20-year-old girl.</p>

			Alireza Heydarnia is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
142.	GARSHASBI Amanollah	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Sistan and Baluchestan province	Brigadier General Amanollah Garshasbi is the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Sistan and Baluchestan province. The Salaman provincial corps is under his command. Sistan and Baluchestan province have seen some of the most violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the province capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday", when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer. It is estimated that at least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against participants in protests has continued. Garshasbi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
143.	REYHANI Bahman	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps	Brigadier General Bahman Reyhani is the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the West of Iran, responsible for Kermanshah province. The Hazrat Nabi

		(IRGC) in the West of Iran, responsible for Kermanshah province.	<p>Akram provincial corps is under his command.</p> <p>Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. Reyhani is among those responsible for the IRGC violence against protestors in Kermanshah province.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
144.	SHAHSAVARI Habib	<p>DOB: 1963/1964</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Rank: Brigadier General</p> <p>Function: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Shohada provincial corps in West Azerbaijan province</p>	<p>Brigadier General Habib Shahsavari is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Shohada ground troops corps for the province of West Azerbaijan. IRGC troops under his command conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, from 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in the West Azerbaijan towns of Piranshahr, Mahabad and Bukan. IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations. According to NGO estimates, IRGC operations in the towns of Mahabad and Bukan killed four and 12 people respectively.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human</p>

			rights violations in Iran.
145.	ABDOLLAHPOUR Mohammad	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds provincial corps in Gilan province	Brigadier General Mohammad Abdollahpour is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds provincial corps in Gilan province. Gilan province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including by IRGC forces under Abdollahpour's command, during the 2022 protests. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
146.	MOSLEMI Siavash	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Karbala provincial corps in Mazandaran province	Brigadier General Siavash Moslemi has been the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Karbala provincial corps in Mazandaran province since June 2020. In 2022, IRGC troops under his command conducted operations against protesters and in those operations used disproportionate force. As commander of the troops engaged, Moslemi is among those responsible for violence against protesters. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
147.	ZULQADR Ahmad	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Brigadier General Ahmad Zulqadr has been the commander of

		<p>Rank: Brigadier General  Function: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Seyyed al-Shohada provincial corps in Tehran province</p>	<p>the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Seyyed al-Shohada provincial corps in Tehran province since November 2020. He is also the deputy commander of the IRGC corps in Tehran city.  According to media reports, Zulqadr was chosen for the post especially because of his expertise in suppressing protests. In 2022, repression against protesters in Tehran was particularly violent.  As commander of IRGC troops engaged in said violence against protesters, he is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
148.	KASHKOULI Morteza	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Brigadier General  Function: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Hazrat Abulfazl provincial corps in Lorestan province</p>	<p>Brigadier General Morteza Kashkouli is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Hazrat Abulfazl provincial corps in Lorestan province.  In 2022, IRGC troops under his command conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, operations were conducted in the town of Khorramabad in Lorestan.  IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations, using live ammunition against protesters.  As commander of those IRGC forces,</p>

			Kashkouli is among those responsible for said violence. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
149.	BAYAT Isa	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Colonel Function: Commander of the 364th Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) brigade (Shahid Nasirzadeh) in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan province	Colonel Isa Bayat has been the commander of the 364th Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) brigade (Shahid Nasirzadeh) in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan province, since June 2022. In 2022, IRGC troops under his command conducted military operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, from 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in Mahabad, using disproportionate force and leading to the killing of four people. As commander of an IRGC unit conducting said operations, Bayat is responsible for violence against protesters. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
150.	ASANLOO Mohammad Taghi	POB: Zanjan province, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps	Brigadier General Mohammad Taghi Asanloo is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Hamzeh Seyed Al-Shohada regional headquarters in Northwest Iran, responsible for the provinces of Kor-

		<p>(IRGC) Hamzeh Seyed Al-Shohada regional headquarters in Northwest Iran</p>	<p>destan and West Azerbaijan. Hamzeh Seyed Al-Shohada headquarters has the specific mission of suppressing unrest in the Kurdish regions in Northwest Iran. In 2022, under Asanloo's command, IRGC troops in this area conducted military operations against protesters in the Kurdish region of Iran. In particular, from 15 November 2022, IRGC troops under Asanloo's command conducted such operations against protesters in the towns of Piranshahr, Mahabad and Bukan. IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations. According to NGO estimates, IRGC operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions have led to the killing of 42 people since 15 November 2022. As commander of IRGC troops in the region, Asanloo is responsible for violence against protesters conducted by his troops. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
151.	SAJJADI Seyed Hamid Hazaveh	<p>DOB: 21.3.1969          POB: Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Function: Member of the Supreme</p>	<p>Hamid Sajjadi has been a member of the Supreme Council of Sports since 22 August 2023. He was Iran's Minister of Sports and Youth between 15</p>

		<p>Council of Sports; former Iranian Minister of Sports and Youth</p>	<p>August 2021 and August 2023. He is responsible for pressuring Iran's athletes into silence and for preventing them from speaking out internationally against repression in Iran. He was personally involved in the case of Elnaz Rekabi, an Iranian climber who competed without a hijab at the Asian Championship rock-climbing competition in Seoul in the autumn of 2022. After her competition, Rekabi was tricked into entering the Iranian embassy building in Seoul, where her passport and mobile phone were confiscated on the orders of the authorities in Tehran. Upon her likely forced arrival in Tehran, she was interrogated by two of Iran's political and sports institutions and met with Sajjadi. In that meeting she was coerced into making a statement apologising for competing without a hijab and was threatened with the confiscation of family land. In December 2022, it became clear that Elnaz Rekabi's family home in Zanjan had been demolished. Hamid Sajjadi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
152.	GOLPAYEGANI Seyyed Mohammed Saleh Hashemi	DOB: 1967 POB: Iran	Seyyed Mohammed Saleh Hashemi Gol-

		<p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Head of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil (Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) Associated entities: Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil (Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice), Morality Police</p>	<p>payegani has been the head of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil (also known as the Office or Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) since 25 August 2021. The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil is a government institution which is responsible for determining and enforcing excessively strict behavioural models in society. In 2022, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil was instrumental in setting new and stricter morality codes for women that are in clear violation of their human rights. Additionally, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil plays a central role in setting up the monitoring and often brutal sanctioning of women and men who do not respect these codes. These strict codes are subsequently brutally enforced by the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (and specifically its Morality Police). As the head of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil, Seyyed Mohammed Saleh Hashemi Gol-</p>
--	--	--	---

			payegani is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
153.	ASGARI Hassan (a.k.a. ASKARI Hassan)	POB: Bijar, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: governor of Sanandaj, Kurdistan province Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)	Hassan Asgari is the governor of the city of Sanandaj in Iran's Kurdistan province and a former Commander of the local Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces. As governor of Sanandaj, he is responsible for the violent and brutal response in that city to the protests following the death of the young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in September 2022. When a 16-year-old protester was reportedly killed by security forces in Sanandaj, Asgari and other officials stated that she died of a drug overdose, potentially by suicide. Providing false alternative causes of death for protesters killed by security forces is a common tactic used by Iranian officials to evade accountability for their human rights abuses. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
154.	KHIABANI Hossein Modarres	DOB: March 1968/1969 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: former governor of Sistan and	Hossein Modarres Khiabani was the governor of Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan province from September 2021 to December 2022 and was responsible for overseeing Iran's Law

		Baluchestan province	<p>Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the province. During his time as governor, the LEF and other security forces cracked down on various protests and used excessive violence against protesters. There is wide evidence of the use of disproportionate force that led to the killing of at least 66 people in the city of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province on 30 September 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
155.	KOUSHA Esmail Zarei (a.k.a. KOSHA Ismail)	<p>DOB: 1978 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: governor of Kurdistan province</p>	<p>Esmail Zarei Kousha is the governor of Iran's Kurdistan province and responsible for overseeing Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in the province. As such, he is responsible for the brutal response and excessive use of violence by the LEF and security forces to the protests held in Kurdistan following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in September 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
156.	KOWSARI Mohammad Esmail	<p>DOB: 3.5.1955 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male</p>	<p>Mohammad Esmail Kowsari has been a member of the Iranian Parliament ("MP") since 2020. He is a hard-line lawmaker</p>

		<p>Rank: Brigadier General  Function: member of the Iranian Parliament</p>	<p>and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) member. Before becoming an MP, Kowsari was the commander of the IRGC's Sarallah headquarters in Tehran from 2017 to 2020. During the 2022/2023 protests, he has repeatedly threatened security forces with consequences if they do not fulfil their duty and crack down on protests. He has also called for more military action against peaceful protests. As an MP, he has urged the Iranian judiciary to sentence protestors to death. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
157.	<p>MIRSALIM Mostafa (a.k.a. MIR-SALIM Mostafa; MIR-SALIM Sayyid Mostafa Agha)</p>	<p>DOB: 9.6.1947  POB: Tehran, Iran  Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Passport no: Q5956077 (Iran)  Function: member of the Iranian Parliament</p>	<p>Mostafa Mirsalim is a member of the Iranian Parliament. During the 2022/2023 protests, he has been particularly vocal in his support for the death penalty for arrested protesters, using the parliament as a platform to vehemently promote and call for their executions. He has called for protestors to be executed in a matter of days after their arrest. He also frequently attacks the free press and is in favour of restricting social media. He is therefore responsible for serious human</p>

			rights violations in Iran.
158.	NAGHDALI Mohammad Taghi	DOB: 6.6.1972 POB: Khomein- hahr- Isfahan, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: member of the Iranian Parliament	Mohammad Taghi Naghdali is a member of the Iranian Parliament and member of the Parliament's legal commission. During the 2022/2023 protests, he has been particularly vocal in his support for the death penalty for arrested protesters, using the parliament as a platform to vehemently promote and call for their executions. He also frequently attacks the free press and is involved in drafting laws to restrict the free flow of information. He is therefore responsible for serious human right violations in Iran.
159.	GHAZANFARABADI Mousa	DOB: 1966 POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: member of the Iranian Parliament; head of the Parliament's legal and judicial commission	Mousa Ghazanfarabadi is a member of the Iranian Parliament and the head of the Parliament's legal and judicial commission. As such, he is responsible for the judicial and legal review of the proposed ministerial plans in Parliament, the review and approval of plans related to criminal law as well as investigating the performance of the country's officials and managers from a judicial and legal point of view. He has not condemned the serious human rights violations of Iranian officials during

			<p>the 2022/2023 protests. On the contrary, he has personally stated that women who violate hijab rules should be deprived of social rights and has argued for the use of force when dealing with them. He is also whitewashing the crimes committed by Iranian forces by defending the government's version of events surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini. He is therefore responsible for serious human right violations in Iran.</p>
160.	NOROOZI Ahmad (a.k.a. NOROUZI Ahmad; NEWROUZI Ahmad; NAWROUZI Ahmad)	<p>DOB: 1988 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) World Service; CEO of Press TV Associated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB); Press TV</p>	<p>Ahmad Noroozi is the head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) World Service and the CEO of Press TV, the main pro-government English language channel that oversees IRIB's foreign-language outlets. IRIB is the Iranian state-run media corporation and has broadcast hundreds of forced confessions by Iranian, dual-national and international detainees in Iran. IRIB and its subsidiaries act as a critical tool in the Iranian government's mass suppression and censorship campaign against its own people. IRIB has produced and recently broadcast interviews of individuals being forced to confess that their relatives were not killed by</p>

			<p>Iranian authorities during nationwide protests but died due to accidental, unrelated causes.</p> <p>Press TV is responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists and persons belonging to the Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process.</p> <p>In his capacity as head of IRIB and as CEO of Press TV, Ahmad Noroozi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
161.	POURANVARI Youssef (a.k.a. POURANVARI Youssuf)	<p>DOB: 26.5.1983          POB: Tehran, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          National ID no: 0492699836 (Iran)          Function: director of the Programs and Scheduling Department at the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) foreign-language flagship channel          Associated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)</p>	<p>Youssef Pouranvari is the director of the Programs and Scheduling Department at the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) foreign-language flagship channel. As the Government of Iran's state-run media conglomerate, IRIB has a monopoly on television and radio services in Iran and plays a central role in restricting the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and impeding the free flow of information in Iran through censorship activities. IRIB produces, sponsors, and spreads government propaganda both in Iran and internatio-</p>

nally. Furthermore, IRIB regularly broadcasts false and baseless accusations against Iranian citizens, dual nationals, and foreigners, and uses falsified news to misinform and falsely incriminate perceived enemies of the regime. IRIB also cooperates extensively with security and intelligence agencies, including Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to obtain and publicly disseminate forced confessions from Iranians, dual-nationals and foreign detainees. Testimonies and other evidence point to the use of torture, both physical and psychological; threats against family members; and degrading treatment to extract forced confessions. Since 2009, IRIB programmes have broadcast hundreds of forced confessions as well as defamatory content against hundreds more. IRIB uses forced confessions in particular to frame dual nationals and foreigners as spies, demonise human rights activists, and legitimise repression against religious minority groups such as the Baha'i community.

In his capacity as director of the Programs and Scheduling

			<p>Department at the IRIB foreign-language flagship channel, Youssef Pouranvari contributes to the repression of peaceful demonstrators, journalists, human rights defenders, students or other persons who speak up in defence of their legitimate rights. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
162.	KADEM Ahmad	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Brigadier General  Function: head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) regional headquarters Karbala</p>	<p>Brigadier General Ahmad Kadem is the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Operational Base (regional headquarters) Karbala, which commands IRGC troops in the provinces of Khuzestan, Lorestan and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad. During the 2022 protests, IRGC troops under his command conducted operations against protesters, in particular in the Khuzestan and Lorestan regions, including in the towns of Khorramabad (Lorestan) and Izeh (Khusestan). IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations, using live ammunition against protesters. As overall commander of the IRGC troops in these regions, Kadem is responsible for violence against protesters</p>

			conducted by those troops. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
163.	AZIMI Mohammad Nazar (a.k.a. AZIMI Mohammadnazar)	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters Najaf Al-Ashraf	Brigadier General Mohammad Nazar Azimi is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters Najaf Al-Ashraf, which commands IRGC troops in the provinces of Kermanshah, Hamedan and Ilam. During the 2022 protests, Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC. As commander of the regional IRGC headquarters for the IRGC troops engaged in this region, he is responsible for the IRGC violence against protestors in Kermanshah province. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
164.	Aufgehoben		
165.	MOEIN Moslem	DOB: 22.9.1985 POB: Eslamabad, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male National ID no: 3341588477 (Iran) Address: Part 7, Block 25, Ground Floor, 16th Street, Sarvestan Street,	Moslem Moein is a senior official in the EU-listed Basij Resistance Force (Basij), the infamous volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with branches throughout Iran.

		<p>Chaghmirza Phase 2 Shahid Mehrabi, Kermanshah, Iran Function: head of the Basji Resistance Force (Basij) Cyberspace Headquarters</p>	<p>The Basij has played a key role in the regime's deadly crackdown on the protests that have swept the country since September 2022. As chief of the Basij Cyberspace Headquarters, Moein oversees efforts to control and censor Iranians' online activities. He has spoken publicly about the Basij's priority of monitoring Iranians' use of the internet. Additionally, Moein has advocated for the development of Iran's national intranet, which could allow the regime to disconnect Iran from the global internet. The Iranian government continues to filter and block the free flow of information in Iran. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
166.	KARAMI Mohammad	<p>DOB: 27.1.1966 POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Passport no: K50849392 (Iran), expires 23.9.2024 Function: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters Quds for Sistan and Baluchestan</p>	<p>Brigadier General Mohammad Karami is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) headquarters Quds, which commands IRGC troops in Sistan and Baluchestan province and Kerman province. Sistan and Baluchestan province has seen some of the most violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the</p>

		<p>province and Kerman province</p>	<p>provincial capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday", when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer, using live ammunition. At least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against participants in later protests has continued. As commander of the regional IRGC headquarters for the IRGC troops engaged in this region, Karami is responsible for the IRGC's violence against protestors in Sistan and Baluchestan province, in particular around "bloody Friday". He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
167.	JAVIDAN Ali Akbar	<p>DOB: 21.3.1967          POB: Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Function: commander of the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in Kermanshah province</p>	<p>Ali Akbar Javidan has been the commander of the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in Kermanshah province since June 2019. In this capacity, he is responsible for ordering the violent reaction of the LEF to the 2022 protests in Kermanshah. He is also responsible for ensuring the LEF's strict implementation of morality policies that severely violate human rights, including through the active repression of women who do not comply with headscarf</p>

			<p>codes. He is also responsible for the LEF's arrests of women during the July 2022 protests. He is responsible for violence, discrimination, cruel and degrading behaviour, and arbitrary detention of women.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
168.	AZARPENDAR Abbas	<p>POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co; regional manager in Iran for Tiandy Technologies</p>	<p>Abbas Azarpendar is the CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co, which is a key intermediary in Iran, providing some of the most advanced surveillance equipment to the Iranian government.</p> <p>During the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody in mid-September 2022, Radis Vira Tejarat Co's equipment has been used by the Iranian security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Basij and the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), to brutally suppress the nationwide protests, leading to the torture or death of at least 516 protestors, including at least 70 children.</p> <p>Azarpendar is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>

169.	ESMAEILI Mohammad Mehdi	<p>DOB: 1975          POB: Kabudarahang, Hamedan, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Function: Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance          Associated entity: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance;          Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p>	<p>Mohammad Mehdi Esmaeili is the Iranian Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Under his authority, the Ministry has threatened artists/musicians who do not follow the government line with travel and work bans. He has personally and publicly threatened filmmakers who had published a statement asking the security forces to show restraint against peaceful protesters with arrest and work bans. An important number of artists and journalists have been arrested under trumped up charges since he became Minister, indicating that the repressive threats were followed by repressive acts. Esmaeili also works on curtailing freedom of expression even further by currently pushing a bill through Parliament that will criminalise the sharing of any information deemed critical of the regime or any reporting deemed critical of the regime. Under Mohammad Mehdi Esmaeili's authority and with his stated approval, numerous Iranian artists, musicians, filmmakers and journalists were threatened, arrested and prosecuted on trumped up charges and their freedom of expression</p>
------	-------------------------	--	--

			<p>was further significantly curtailed. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
170.	NOURI Yousef	<p>DOB: 1961 POB: Ilam, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Minister of Education Associated entities: Ministry of Education Iran; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p>	<p>Yousef Nouri has been Iran's Minister of Education since November 2021. Under his responsibility, Iranian students' education is continuously aligned to the government's opinions and Ayatollah Chamenei's teachings. In September and October 2022, security forces were seen taking Iranian school pupils into custody for allegedly being involved in anti-Hijab-protests. As Education Minister, Nouri is responsible for the detention of students in correctional facilities. Nouri confirmed that some school students had already been arrested. He said they were sent to "psychological institutions" which hold students to "reform and re-educate" them to prevent "anti-social" behaviour. He added that students could only return to school after being "reformed." By being responsible for students' arbitrary detention in order to reverse anti-government opinions, Nouri violates the basic human right to education by which education shall be directed to</p>

			<p>the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
171.	<p>KARIMI Farzin (a.k.a. KARIMI MAZALGHAN-CHAY Farzin)</p>	<p>DOB: 07.12.1992 POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male ID number: 0440273961 Function: Member of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder of Ravin Academy</p>	<p>Farzin Karimi is a member of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS. The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents. Farzin Karimi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
172.	<p>MOSTAFAVI Seyed Mojtaba (a.k.a. MORTAZAVI, Mojtaba; MOSTAF, Mojtaba)</p>	<p>DOB: 2.4.1987 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male National ID: No 0080467741 (Iran) Function: Member of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder and CEO of Ravin Academy</p>	<p>Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is a member of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder and CEO of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS. The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating</p>

			<p>internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents.</p> <p>Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
173.	ESMAELI Vali	<p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: head of the parliament's Social Commission</p>	<p>Vali Esmaeli is a lawmaker and hardliner, as well as head of the Iranian parliament's Social Commission. He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". Esmaeli called protestors "foreign agents" and justified human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a member of the Iranian parliament, Esmaeli has supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the nationwide protests in 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
174.	NADERI Ahmad	<p>Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of the Iranian Par-</p>	<p>Ahmad Naderi is a lawmaker and hardliner, as well as a member of the Iranian parliament's presi-</p>

		liament's presidium	<p>dium/board of directors.</p> <p>He is one of the 227 members of parliament (MP) who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God".</p> <p>Reading out a statement of 233 MPs in the public session of the parliament on 2 October 2022, he praised and supported the performance of the security and law enforcement forces in suppressing the protesters. As a member of the Iranian parliament, Naderi has supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the nationwide protests in 2022.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
175.	ELAHIAN Zohreh	<p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: female</p> <p>Function: Member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament</p>	<p>Zohreh Elahian is a lawmaker and hardliner, as well as a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian parliament.</p> <p>She is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors</p>

			and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". As a member of the Iranian parliament, Elahian supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the 2022 nationwide protests in Iran. She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
176.	FARAHANI Ahmad Amirabadi	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of the Iranian parliament's presidium	Amirabadi Farahani is a lawmaker and hard-liner, as well as a member of the Iranian parliament's presidium/board of directors. He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". As a member of the Iranian parliament, Farahani has supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the nationwide protests in 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
177.	DELKHOSH-ABATARI Seyyed Kazem	POB: Someh, Iran Nationality:	Seyyed Kazem Delkhosh-Abatari is

		Iranian Gender: male Function: Spokesman of the Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Iranian parliament	the spokesman of the Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Iranian parliament. During the 2022/2023 protests, he helped develop a plan to prosecute journalists and media outlets that publish news not conforming to the official narrative of the Islamic Republic. The repression of journalists in Iran has intensified since the early days of the 2022 protests as nearly 70 journalists have been arrested so far. As the spokesman of the Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Iranian Parliament, Delkhosh-Abatari has been involved in suppressing the media and journalists following the eruption of protests across Iran in 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
178.	JALALI Hossein	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of parliament	Hossein Jalali is a lawmaker and hardliner, as well as a member of the Iranian parliament. He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a letter praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". He personally confirmed the existence of the respective

			<p>letter and has reaffirmed its demands. As a member of the Iranian parliament, Jalali has personally called for the execution of protestors. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
179.	MOUSAVI Seyyed Nezamoldin (a.k.a MOUSAVI Nezam)	<p>POB: Khorramabad, Iran  Gender: male  Function: Spokesman of the Iranian Parliament's board of directors</p>	<p>Seyyed Nezamoldin Mousavi is the spokesman of the Iranian Parliament's presidium/board of directors. During the 2022/2023 protests, he held a meeting with judicial authorities and legislators with the aim of accelerating the execution of the sentences handed down to arrested protesters. As the spokesman of the Iranian parliament's presidium/board of directors, Mousavi has urged the judiciary to speed up trials and accelerate the executions of sentences handed down to protesters, thereby defying their right to a fair trial and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. Mousavi is also one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to</p>

			<p>death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". He called protestors "foreign agents" and justified human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mousavi has supported the killing, detention, and torture of people during the nationwide protests in 2022.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
180.	NESARI Habibollah Jan	<p>POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University; former deputy in charge of training and education for the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)</p>	<p>Brigadier General Habibollah Jan Nesari has been the commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University since the end of 2023. He is the former deputy in charge of training and education for the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), a position he held from 2019 to 2023).</p> <p>Between 2016 and 30 December 2019, he served as a deputy commander of the Special Units of the LEF. In his capacity as deputy commander, he was responsible for supervising the forces in using lethal and non-lethal weapons during the nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He was</p>

		<p>found guilty of crimes against humanity by the International People's Tribunal on Iran's Atrocities for his role in the crackdown on protesters in his capacity as deputy commander. As part of the security forces, the police forces are found to have designed and implemented a plan to commit crimes against humanity as well as murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence in order to quell the protests and conceal the crimes committed during the November 2019 protests.</p> <p>As deputy commander in charge of training and education for the LEF and as commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University, Nesari has been personally responsible for the human rights violations carried out by the LEF. The LEF, which he has trained, took part in the violent crackdown on protestors during the protests that erupted in September 2022, including by the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
--	--	---

181.	BABAEI Hassan	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Head of the State Organization for Registration of Deeds and Properties	Hassan Babaei is the is the Head of the State Organization for Registration of Deeds and Properties and a senior figure in the Iranian judiciary. In this functions, Hassan Babaei is responsible for numerous violations of the right to fair trial during the 2022/2023 protests in Iran. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
182.	GHANNAD Qazi (a.k.a. QANAD Qazi)	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Revolutionary Court prosecutor and judge	Qazi Ghannad is a Revolutionary Court prosecutor and judge. During the 2022/2023 protests, he violated the right to fair trial and sentenced protesters to death who were later executed by the Iranian regime. As prosecutor, he handed down the death sentence in the case of Majid Rahnvard in 2022. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
183.	MANSOURI Seyed Hadi	POB: Mashhad, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: head of the fourth branch of the Revolutionary Court of Mashhad	Seyed Hadi Mansouri has been a judge and head of the fourth branch of the Revolutionary Court of Mashhad since December 2017. During the 2022/2023 protests, he participated in the campaign of death sentences pronounced against protesters, thereby also

			violating their right to a fair trial. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
184.	HOSSEINI Hojjat al-Eslam Hossein	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Head of the Judiciary for the Kurdistan province	Hojjat al-Eslam Hossein Hosseini is the Head of the Judiciary in the Kurdistan region. During the 2022/2023 protests, he participated in the repression of the demonstrations and is responsible for implementing grave human rights violations in the repression of peaceful demonstrators. He is complicit in implementing those violations, including torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
185.	JABARI Mohammad	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Prosecutor of Kurdistan province	Mohammad Jabari is the prosecutor for the Kurdistan province. In this function, he is responsible for several human rights violations since the 2019 protests, including death sentences and repression of demonstrations. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
186.	MOSTAFAVINIA Hojjat al-Eslam Ali (a.k.a. MOSTAFAVI (Hojjatoleslam) Ali)	POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Hojjat-al-Eslam Ali Mostafavinia is a cleric and the Chief Prosecutor for Sistan and Baluchestan province.

		<p>Function: cleric; General Prosecutor of Sistan and Baluchestan province Address: Zahedan</p>	<p>He previously served as a prosecutor in Sistan and Baluchestan, as well as in South Khorasan. In his capacity, he was in charge of prosecuting demonstrators who were arbitrarily detained during the Zahedan protests, which took place in October 2022 and were bloodily repressed by police forces causing deaths and casualties. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
187.	SHAMSABAD Mehdi (a.k.a. SHAMSABAD Mahdi)	<p>POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Prosecutor of Sistan and Baluchestan province</p>	<p>Mehdi Shamsabad is the prosecutor of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province. In this capacity, he is responsible for serious human rights violations during the 2022/2023 protests, including death sentences and repression of demonstrations, and issuing degrading punishment including death penalty by flogging. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
188.	HARIKANDI Hossein Fazeli	<p>POB: Babol, Mazandaran province Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: general prosecutor of Alborz province</p>	<p>Hossein Fazeli Harikandi is the general prosecutor of Alborz province. In this function, he responsible for condemning several hundreds of demonstrators to the crime of "corruption on earth" during the</p>

			<p>2022/2023 protests, putting them at risk of death penalty.</p> <p>He also corroborated the government's thesis of the death of M. Sarina Ismailzadeh in 2022. She died as a result of police violence. However, the state issued a statement saying she committed suicide and therefore did not die as a result of the violent repression of demonstrations in the Alborz province. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
189.	MADADI Hassan	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Function: acting prosecutor in Alborz province</p>	<p>Hassan Madadi has been the acting prosecutor in Alborz province since at least 2020.</p> <p>In this capacity, he is responsible for several serious human rights violations, most notably that of the denial of the right to a fair trial during the 2022/2023 protests. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
190.	TAGHANAKI Soghra Khodadadi	<p>DOB: 27.03.1971  Nationality: Iranian  Gender: female  Function: Director of Qarchak Women's Prison  Passport number: B50799950 (Iran) (individual)  Address:</p>	<p>Soghra Khodadadi Taghanaki is the director/warden in the Qarchak Women's Prison.</p> <p>The prison is known for inhumane detention conditions, including poor health and sanitary conditions, refusal of medical care, food</p>

		Varamin, Tehran, Iran	shortages, excessive use of force against prisoners, torture, sexual assault and extrajudicial killings. Qarchak prison is one of the main places where women arrested during the peaceful 2022/2023 protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran's Morality Police are being held. Soghra Khodadadi Taghanaki is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
191.	PASANDIDEH Heidar	POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: warden of Sanandaj prison	Heidar Pasandideh has been the warden of Sanandaj Central Prison in the Kurdistan province of Iran since 2020. Under his administration, prisoners have been arbitrarily executed in Sanandaj Central Prison. As a warden, he has overseen and therefore bears responsibility for the detention and torture of prisoners arrested during 2022/2023 protests following the death of Mahsa Amini. Therefore he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
192.	PIRI Morteza	DOB: 05.07.1977 POB: Zabol, Sistan and Baluchestan province, Iran Nationality:	Morteza Piri is the warden of Zahedan Central Prison in the province of Sistan and Baluchestan.

		<p>Iranian  Gender: male  Function: warden  of Zahedan Central Prison  ID number:  4072307122  Address: Zahedan,  Iran</p>	<p>The prison is known for inhumane detention conditions, including poor health and sanitary conditions, refusal of medical care, excessive use of force against prisoners and extrajudicial killings. Under his administration, Zahedan Prison has conducted numerous executions with a disproportionate number of them targeting Iran's Baluchi minority. In his capacity, he has been involved in the crackdown of 2022/2023 protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran's Morality Police. Morteza Piri is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
193.	AZIZI Allah-Karam	<p>Nationality:  Iranian  Gender: male  Function: head of  the Rajai Shahr  Prison  Address:  Moazzen Blvd,  Gohardasht,  Karaj City,  Alborz Province,  Iran  Associated entities:  Rajai Shahr  Prison</p>	<p>Allah-Karam Azizi is the head of EU-listed Rajae Shahr Prison (a.k.a. Rajai Shahr Prison, Rajaishahr, Raja'i Shahr, Reja'i Shahr, Rajayi Shahr, Gorhardasht Prison, Gohar Dasht Prison) in Iran.  In his position, he is responsible for committing serious human rights violations in Iran, namely torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as well as mistreatment and torture of prisoners.  He is therefore responsible for serious human</p>

			rights violations in Iran.
194.	KHOSRAVI Mohammad Hossein	<p>DOB: 23.09.1974          POB: Birjand,          South Khorasan          province, Iran          Nationality:          Iranian          Gender: male          Function:          Director-General          of Sistan and          Baluchestan Pro-          vince Prisons,          Former Warden of          Zahedan Central          Prison          ID number:          0653027761          Address: Sistan          and Baluchestan          Province, Iran</p>	<p>As Director-General of          Sistan and Baluche-          stanProvince Prisons,          Mohammad Hossein          Khosravi oversees pri-          sons in the province of          Sistan and Baluchestan.          Prisons in the pro-          vince, including          Zahedan Central          Prison are known for          inhumane detention          conditions, including          poor health and sani-          tary conditions, refusal          of medical care, exces-          sive use of force against          prisoners and extraju-          dicial killings. Under          his administration,          Zahedan prison alone          has conducted          numerous executions          with a disproportio-          nate number of them          targeting Iran's Baluchi          minority and has been          involved in the crack-          down of 2022/2023          protests following the          death of 22-year-old          Mahsa Amini in the          custody of Iran's          Morality Police.          Mohammad Hossein          Khosravi is therefore          responsible for serious          human rights viola-          tions in Iran.</p>
195.	CHEHARMAHALI Ali	<p>Nationality:          Iranian          Gender: male          Function: director          general of          Alborz prisons          Address: Alvand          Building, Below          Mader Square,</p>	<p>Ali Cheharmahali is          the director general of          prisons in the province          of Alborz and former          Director of EU-listed          Evin Prison.          In his position, he is          responsible for com-          mitting serious human</p>

		Karaj, Mehravila, Iran	rights violations in Iran including torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during the 2022/2023 protests. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
196.	FADAVI Ali	DOB: 1961 POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)	Ali Fadavi is the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations. In his role, Fadavi is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC. Therefore, Ali Fadavi is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
197.	SHARIF Ramezan	POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center; former IRGC spokesman	Ramezan Sharif has been the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center since July 2024. He is a former spokesman of the IRGC. The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore

			<p>responsible for serious human rights violations.</p> <p>In his role, Sharif is covering up and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC. Therefore, Ramezan Sharif is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
198.	JOMEIRI Fathollah	<p>POB: Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Brigadier General Function: Head of Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Security Unit of the IRGC</p>	<p>Brigadier General Fathollah Jomeiri is the head of the Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also called the Security Unit of the IRGC.</p> <p>This unit is responsible for protecting vital infrastructure and key areas of the country, such as regime VIPs, but above all protecting the regime.</p> <p>The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.</p> <p>In his role, Jomeiri is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.</p> <p>Therefore, Fathollah Jomeiri is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>

199.	KAAMFAR Behdad	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: prosecutor at the Karaj Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office	Behdad Kaamfar is a prosecutor at the Karaj Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office which prosecutes cases in the Karaj Revolutionary Court. In that function, he is responsible for exercising repression against protesters through severe penalties, including the death penalty. The Iranian judicial authorities in particular use the criminal charge of "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God" which allows for the death penalty for opposing state organs and that is frequently used for repression against protesters. In particular, Kaamfar represented the prosecution in a case in November/December 2022, in which a number of protesters were convicted ostensibly of attacks against the Basij. In that trial, Kaamfar led the prosecution to a number of death penalties for "Muharebeh", in particular against Mohammad Mehdi Karimi, Amid Mehdi Shokrollahi, Reza Aria Farzaneh Gharehassanlou, Hamid Gharehassanlou, Ali Moazzami Goudarzi and Hossein Mehdi Mohammadi. In leading such prosecutions and employing such criminal offences contrary to principles
------	----------------	--	---

			of justice, and thus causing the death of individuals opposing the Iranian states, Behdad Kaamfar is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
200.	FATHI Murad	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Director of prisons for the province of West Azerbaijan	Murad Fathi has been the Director of prisons of West Azerbaijan province since 22 November 2022. He has previously held the same position in Kordestan province. In prisons under his control, cases of torture of prisoners have taken place during the 2022/2023 protests, leading in some instances to the death of detainees from torture and/or lack of medical care. Those detained and tortured include protesters arrested in both those provinces. In participating in the repression of protesters and overseeing torture in prison facilities under his command, in some cases leading to the death of prisoners, Murad Fathi is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
201.	KHOSROU PANAH Abdol Hossein a.k.a. KHOSROW PANAH Abdul Hossein; KHOSROPANAH Abdolhossein	DOB: 21.3.1966 POB: Dezful, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: chairman and secretary of the Supreme Council of Cultural	Abdol Hossein Khosrou Panah is a conservative cleric and has been the chairman and secretary of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution since January 2023. The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution

		<p>Revolution Associated entity: Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution</p>	<p>promoted several projects undermining the freedom of girls and women, setting limits on their clothing and education. Its laws have also discriminated minorities, such as the Baha'i. It is a vehicle for promoting the current regime's policies and Islamist opinions. As chairman and secretary of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, Khosrou Panah is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
202.	ALAM-AL HODA Ahmad	<p>DOB: 31.8.1944 POB: Mashhad, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Friday imam of Mashhad and representative of Khorasan Razavi province in the Assembly of Experts</p>	<p>Ahmad Alam-Al Hoda is the Friday imam of Mashhad and representative of Khorasan Razavi province in the Assembly of Experts. In his speeches and in the media, he participates in the propagation of hate against women, demonstrators and religious minorities. Alam-Al Hoda is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
203.	RASTINEH Ahmad	<p>DOB: 1980 POB: province of Bakhtiari, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of Parliament and spokesman for the Parliament's cultural commission.</p>	<p>Ahmad Rastineh is a Member of the Iranian Parliament (Madjles) and its spokesman for the cultural commission. The cultural commission has a supervisory position to control and supervise the institutions in charge of 'spreading the culture of chastity and hijab'.</p>

			<p>Rastineh promotes a hard-line version of the Islamic revolution's cultural principles, particularly concerning women, and the wearing of the veil/hijab. During the 2022/2023 protests in Iran, he called for an affirmation of the law imposing the veil on Iranian women. He also supported the government's control over the internet and internet-cuts.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
204.	KHAN MOHAMMADI Hodjatole-slam Ali	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Function: spokesman of the Headquarters of the Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil</p>	<p>Hodjatoleslam Ali Khan Mohammadi is the spokesman of the EU-listed Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil.</p> <p>In 2022 and 2023, in his position as spokesman of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil, he qualified the non-wearing of the hijab as a crime and promoted a hard-line version of the Islamic revolution's cultural principles, particularly concerning women, and the wearing of the veil/hijab. Acting in his position, he expressed his support for and contributed to legitimising the repression of anti-hijab activists, undermining women and girls' rights and freedoms.</p>

			He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
205.	AKBARI Mohammad Sadegh	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: chief justice of Mazandaran province	Mohammad Sadegh Akbari is the chief justice of Mazandaran province. In this position, he is responsible for handing down death sentences in unfair trials (absence of lawyers, coerced confessions) and for the torturing of convicts. During the 2022/2023 protests, he was responsible for shutting down shops that did not respect the hijab laws and for sentencing to death a 35-year old mentally ill protester who allegedly burned the Quran. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
206.	BARATI Morteza a.k.a. BARATI Qazi	DOB: 30.11.1962 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: presiding judge of branch 1 of the Revolutionary Courts of Isfahan	Morteza Barati is the presiding judge of branch 1 of the Revolutionary Courts of Isfahan. In January 2023, he sentenced to death by hanging at least three protestors, denying them the right to a fair trial. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
207.	AL HOSSEINI Musa Asif a.k.a AL-HOSSEINI Asef	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: head judge of branch 1 of the Revolutio-	Musa Asif Al Hosseini is the head judge of branch 1 of the Revolutionary Courts of Karaj, Alborz province.

		nary Courts of Karaj, Alborz province	Trials under his supervision have been conducted summarily, without adherence to basic rights of the accused and with reliance on confessions extracted under pressure and torture. During the 2022/2023 protests, he presided over the trials of protestors and issued several death sentences, two of which were carried out against Mohammed Karami and Mohammed Hoss-eini. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
208.	JALILI Vahid	DOB: 1973 Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: chief for cultural affairs and policy evolution at Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)	Vahid Jalili is the chief for cultural affairs and policy evolution at the EU-listed Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). During the 2022/2023 protests, IRIB broadcasted forced confessions from foreign hostages. Due to his senior position at IRIB, Jalili is directly involved in undermining the human rights of foreign hostages and in their inhuman treatment. He is also responsible for sharing propaganda confessions supporting the regime. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

209.	NOBAVEH VATAN Bijan	<p>DOB: 1959/1960          POB: Tehran, Iran          Nationality:          Iranian          Gender: male          Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament</p>	<p>Bijan Nobaveh Vatan is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as the First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament. He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God".</p> <p>Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.</p> <p>As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Nobaveh Vatan supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
210.	YAZDIKHAH Ali	<p>Nationality:          Iranian</p>	<p>Ali Yazdikhah is an Iranian lawmaker and</p>

		<p>Gender: male  Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; Member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament</p>	<p>hardliner as well as a member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament. He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God".  Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.  As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Yazdikhah supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.  He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
211.	ALIBABAEI Mehdi (a.k.a. ALI BABAEI Mehdi, BABAEI Ali Mehdi)	<p>Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Rank: Major</p>	<p>Major Mehdi Alibabaei is the provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom. He</p>

		<p>Function: provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom</p>	<p>directs IRGC and Basij forces in the city of Qom.</p> <p>Following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, some of the most intense protests have been seen in the city of Qom. Security forces, including the IRGC and the Basij militia were deployed to violently crack down on these protests. Since March 2023, the IRGC and Basij militia have also been instructed to enforce the mandatory hijab law by new methods of oppression. Alibabaei revealed a new scheme to deploy members of the Basij militia in each Qom neighbourhood to enforce the hijab law. The new scheme includes installing programs such as "Be a famous leader in our neighbourhood", ordering IRGC/Basij forces to conduct neighbourhood patrols, the use of intelligence, intimidation, and enforcing accountability of regular citizens (for example by appealing to the responsibility of building and residence managers for "badly veiled" residents). This scheme represents a new level of denunciation and information gathering by the general population to oppress women. Under the command of Alibabaei, the local</p>
--	--	---	---

			<p>IRGC and Basij forces in Qom are ordered to enforce certain selected laws, by means and methods that intimidate citizens and violate their fundamental rights.</p> <p>As provincial deputy of the IRGC in Qom, Major Mehdi Alibabaei is responsible for the acts of oppression committed by the local IRGC and Basij forces and their violations of the rights of freedom of expression and privacy.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
212.	<p>NOUROUZI Ali Asghar (a.k.a. NOROUZI Ali Asghar)</p>	<p>DOB: 11.11.1962 POB: Dashtestan, Bushehr province, Iran Address: Unit 29, 5th Floor, Talaieh Block- B1, Elahiyeh Complex 1, Number 0, Alley 2-Shahid Sajjad Rushanai, Rabbaninejad Street, Zein Aldin Municipality, Qom 3739144673, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Passport no: Y53914915 (Iran) expires 11.5.2026 Iranian national ID no: 4591967573 Function: chairman of the</p>	<p>Ali Asghar Nourouzi is the chairman of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.</p> <p>The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.</p> <p>The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression.</p>

		<p>board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation  Associated individuals: Seyyed Aminollah; Emami Tabatabai; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi  Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/ Bonyad Taavon Sepah  IRGC</p>	<p>As chairman of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ali Asghar Nourouzi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
213.	<p>TABATABAI Seyyed Amin Ala Emami  (a.k.a. TABATBAYI Aminallah Imami)</p>	<p>DOB: 26.8.1963  POB: Meybod, Iran  Address: Tehran, Iran  Nationality: Iranian  Gender: male  Iranian national  ID no: 4489260229  Function: vice-chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation; managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation  Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi;</p>	<p>Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is the vice-chairman of the board of directors as well as the managing director of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.  The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the</p>

		Ahmad Karimi Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/ Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC	regime's brutal repression. As vice-chairman of the board of directors and managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
214.	ALAODDINI Yahya (a.k.a. ALA'ODDINI Yahya; ALA-EDDINI Yahya)	DOB: 21.5.1965 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Passport no: K47201906 (Iran) expires 19.10.2023 Iranian national ID no: 0036732958 Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi;; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/	Yahya Alaoddini is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation. The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression. As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Yahya

		Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC	Alaoddini is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
215.	BABAMORADI Jamal Ali	DOB: 24.5.1960 POB: Tehran, Iran Address: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Iranian national ID no: 0036824240 Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Ahmad Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/ Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC	Jamal Ali Babamoradi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation. The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression. As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Jamal Ali Babamoradi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.

			He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
216.	KARIMI Ahmad Hasan	<p>DOB: 11.12.1962          POB: Qom, Iran          Address: Tehran, Iran          Nationality: Iranian          Gender: male          Iranian national          ID no: 0382947983          Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation          Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai; Jamal Ali Babamoradi          Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/          Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC</p>	<p>Ahmad Hasan Karimi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation. The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression. As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ahmad Hasan Karimi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
217.	ADINEHVAND Salman	Function: Commander of the Tehran Police	Salman Adinehvand has been the Commander of the Tehran

		Relief Unit of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) Nationality: Iranian DOB: 20 May 1980 POB: Tehran, Iran Gender: male	Police Relief Unit of Iran's LEF, the primary security organisation in charge of crowd control and protest suppression, since January 2021. Adinehvand's unit was directly responsible for the violent suppression of protests in Tehran in September and October 2022, during which dozens of protestors were killed by security forces using live ammunition. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
218.	AGHAMIRI Seyyed Mohammad Amin	Function: secretary of Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) Nationality: Iranian DOB: 21 September 1986 POB: Iran Gender: male	Seyyed Mohammad Amin Aghamiri is the secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace of Iran (SCC), the centralised authority for policy-making in the realm of cyberspace. The SCC is responsible for Iran's blockage of popular online news and communications platforms and has also used digital technology to spy on and harass journalists and regime dissidents. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
219.	NIKVARZ Mohsen	POB: Iran Gender: male Nationality: Iranian Function: Head of the Judicial Protection and Infor-	Mohsen Nikvarz has been the head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor's Office in

		<p>mation Department of the Prosecutor's Office in Kerman Province; former Public Prosecutor of Sirjan</p>	<p>Kerman Province since January 2024. As the Public Prosecutor of Sirjan, Mohsen Nikvarz was responsible for several arbitrary arrests of lawyers and for securing death sentences in Sirjan during the 2019 protests. In 2023, he was promoted to Head of the Center for Protection and Intelligence of the Judiciary of Kerman province. In the context of the protests that erupted in September 2022, Nikvarz was involved in the Maryam Arvin case, prosecuting her for her activities as a defence lawyer for protesters. Following her arrest, for which Nikvarz carries personal responsibility, Maryam Arvin was brutally tortured in prison. Mohsen Nikvarz is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
220.	MORADI Nader	<p>Function: Deputy Supervisor of Public Spaces of the Public Security Police  Military rank: Colonel  Nationality: Iranian  POB: Iran  Gender: male</p>	<p>In his current function as Deputy Supervisor of Public Spaces of the Public Security Police, Colonel Nader Moradi is responsible for the enforcement of hijab laws. Those laws have been used by the Iranian authorities to crack down on peaceful protesters. Moradi is responsible for the persecution and arrest of women for non-compliance with</p>

			<p>hijab rules. He is also responsible for the closure of businesses, restaurants and other public spaces in relation to non-enforcement of hijab rules, signing the letters informing them of their closure.</p> <p>During the protests that started in September 2022 and lasted for many months, Moradi was also responsible for the persecution and arrest of shop owners who closed their businesses and were planning on striking in protest of the death of Mahsa Amini.</p> <p>Moradi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
221.	<p>MONTAZER AL-MAHDI Saeed (a.k.a MONTAZER AL-MAHDI Said)</p>	<p>Function: police spokesman  Military rank: Brigadier General  Nationality: Iranian  DOB: 8 November 1971  POB: Tehran, Iran  Gender: male</p>	<p>Saeed Montazer Al-Mahdi is the spokesman of the Iranian police (EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) of Iran).</p> <p>In April 2023, he announced the current strict enforcement of hijab laws, which have been used by the Iranian authorities to crack down on peaceful protesters.</p> <p>Acting in his function, he defends and promotes the repressive actions of the police.</p> <p>His intimidating statements on monitoring, the closure of businesses and other public spaces, and the warning texts that are</p>

			<p>being sent by the authorities have a very significant repressive impact. Furthermore, in his role as police spokesperson, he has repeatedly downplayed the widely reported schoolgirl poisonings, by claiming that the "majority" were "not real", thereby denying the victims protection through the police and undermining their right to safety. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
222.	<p>Seyyed Mohammad MOUSVIAN a.k.a. Seyed Mohammad MOUSAVIYAN</p>	<p>Function: Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor, Isfahan (Isfahan Province) Nationality: Iranian Gender: Male</p>	<p>Mousvian is the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Isfahan Province, Iran. As such he is responsible for the trials against the protestors Saleh Mirhashmi, Majid Kazemi and Saeid Yaqoubi, who have since been sentenced to death and subsequently been executed in May 2023. Mousvian further issued the indictment against Iranian music artist Toomaj Salehi on charges of "corruption on earth" for his participation in anti-government protests and public activism against the Iranian government in October 2022, who has since been held in Dastgerd Prison under cruel conditions while awaiting his trial. In November 2022, state media published a</p>

			video showing a blindfolded Salehi confessing to his alleged crimes and apologizing for his words. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
223.	Ali Zare NOURI	Function: Deputy Judge of and advisor to the Provincial Criminal Court, Isfahan Nationality: Iranian Gender: Male	Nouri is the Deputy Judge of and advisor to the Provincial Criminal Court of Isfahan Province, Iran. As such he is responsible for the trials against the protestors Saleh Mirhashmi, Majid Kazemi and Saeid Yaqoubi, who have since been sentenced to death and subsequently been executed in May 2023. In a video published by Iranian state media, Nouri can be seen questioning the three defendants in court. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
224.	Seyyed Nader SAFAVI MIRMAHALLEH a.k.a Seyed Nader SAFAVI MIRMAHALLEH a.k.a Nader SAFAVI	Function: Governor and head of Rezvanshahr Security Council in Gilan Province Nationality: Iranian Gender: Male Address: Rezvanshahr, Gilan Province	Seyyed Nader Safavi Mirmahalleh is the governor and head of Rezvanshahr Security Council in Gilan Province. As such, he is responsible for ordering officers to open fire on protesters during Iran's 2022-2023 nationwide protests, which resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, including to children. He is therefore responsible for serious human

			rights violations in Iran.
225.	Seyyed Khalil SAFAVI a.k.a Seyed Khalil SAFAVI	Function: Police Commander Rezvanshahr, Gilan Province Nationality: Iranian Gender: Male Address: Rezvanshahr, Gilan Province	Seyyed Khalil Safavi is the Police Commander of Rezvanshahr in Gilan Province and held this position also at the time of the protest. As such, he is responsible for police officers in Rezvanshahr opening fire on protesters during protests in the city that took place in late September 2022, which resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, including to children. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
226.	Seyyed Abbas HOSSEINI	Function: Governor, Amol (Mazandaran Province) Nationality: Iranian Gender: Male	In January 2022, Hossieni was appointed as governor of the city of Amol, Mazandaran Province. As such, he is responsible for the killing of at least two young Iranian protesters, Ghazaleh Chalabi and Erfan Rezaei, who were both killed in September 2022 by government forces in the city of Amol. Further, security forces in Amol have continued to harass peaceful protesters and families of the deceased. In June 2023, Hosseini was replaced as Governor of Amol, but was appointed Special Governor of the city of Amol. In his new position, Hosseini still has an active role as

			government representative. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
227.	Mojtaba FADA	Function: IRGC Commander in Isfahan Province (Second Brigadier General) and member of the provincial security council Nationality: Iranian Date of birth: 21 March 1963 Place of birth: Harsin, Iran Gender: Male Passport number: F49973222 expires 27 August 2024 (issued by Iran)	Fada is the commander of IRGC forces in Isfahan province and currently serves as a member of the Provincial Security Council. As such, he oversaw the actions of IRGC troops and other security forces in response to anti-government protests in fall of 2022, which resulted in the death of several protesters, including that of 18-year-old Mahsa Mougouyi. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
228.	Rashid KABOUDVANDI a.k.a Rashid KABUDONDI	Function: Commander of the Imam Hossein Guards Corps of Karaj, Alborz Province Gender: Male	Kaboudvandi is since May 2022 the commander of the Imam Hossein Guards Corps of Karaj, Alborz Province. As such he is responsible for the detention and killing of Mohammad Reza Ghorbani and the detention and rape of Amrita Abbassi by the Karaj security forces. Blatant and severe human rights violations by police forces have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started mid-September 2022.

			He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
229.	PARVAR Gholamhossein Gheib	Function: Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Imam Ali Central Security Headquarters Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Gholamhossein Gheib Parvar is the Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Imam Ali Central Security Headquarters. In this capacity at the Imam Ali Central Security Headquarters, which was formed with the aim of suppressing popular protests, he was responsible for killing and suppressing protesters during the November 2019 nationwide protests. In his previous function, as head of the Basij Organisation, he was responsible for the killing and brutal suppression of protesters by forces under his command during the nationwide protests in Iran from December 2017 to January 2018. Gholamhossein Gheib Parvar is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
230.	SHAHRESTANI Hassan Mofakhami (a.k.a. MOFAKHAMI-SHAHRESTANI Hassan; MOFAKHAMIS-HAHRESRANI Hassan)	Function: Police Commander of Mazandaran Province Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Hassan Mofakhami Shahrestani is the police commander of the Mazandaran Province. He has a long track record of functions related to violently suppressing peaceful protests. In June 2023, he explicitly ordered people to

			break the neck of anyone seeking to defy hijab norms. Hassan Mofakhami Shahrestani is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
231.	HABIBI Roham Bakhsh (a.k.a. HABIBI Roham-Bakhsh; HABIBI Rohambakhsh)	Function: Police Commander of Fars Province Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Roham Bakhsh Habibi is the police commander of the Fars Province and has a track record related to violently suppressing peaceful protests. As police commander of the Fars province, he is responsible for the mass arrest of protesters and ordering the use of deadly weapons against unarmed protesters in this province during the nationwide protests of November 2019. It is reported that forces under his command in the Fars Province violently suppressed protests in November 2019 and killed people. Roham Bakhsh Habibi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
232.	TAHAMI Seyyed Javad (a.k.a. TAHAMI Seyed Javad)	Function: Prison Official of Fardis prison/Kachui Prison Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Seyyed Javad Tahami is the head of Kachui Prison, also known as Fardis Prison, and, in this capacity, he oversees all activities within the prison. Kachui prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary and is frequently used to detain political prisoners and

			house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Furthermore, the evidence confirms that executions have occurred within the penitentiary. Seyyed Javad Tahami is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
233.	HOWZAN Abbasali	Function: Judge of branch 36 of the Court of Appeal of Tehran Province Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Abbasali Howzan is a judge of branch 36 of the Court of Appeal of Tehran Province. In this capacity, he upheld on appeal the convictions of numerous political opponents (including those connected to the "Women, Life, Freedom" protests), activists, women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws and people from religious minorities, in particular the Baha'i community. In several of those cases, convictions were based on forced confessions obtained under torture and were a result of procedures conducted in violation of fair trial guarantees. Therefore, Abbasali Howzan is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
234.	FARZADI Hedayatollah	Function: Head of Evin Prison POB: Basht, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male	Hedayatollah Farzadi is the Head of EU-listed Evin Prison. He is directly responsible for severe violations of political priso-

			<p>ners' human rights, in particular for restricting their communication and visitation rights and for arbitrarily ordering solitary confinement. He is also responsible for the deterioration of detention conditions of political prisoners. Furthermore, EU-listed Evin Prison is a detention centre where political prisoners and hostages have been held, and where severe human rights abuses, including torture, denied communication rights, and obstructed access to medical care, have repeatedly taken place over the past years.</p> <p>As a result, through his involvement in the administration of EU-listed Evin Prison, Hedayatollah Farzadi is himself responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran and is associated with an EU-listed entity responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
235.	NEMATİ Mehdi	<p>Function: Head of the Fars Prisons Protection and Intelligence Department                      Nationality: Iranian                      Gender: male</p>	<p>Mehdi Nemati has been the Head of the Fars Prisons Protection and Intelligence Department since 2018. The Fars Prisons Protection and Intelligence Department is responsible for the administration of EU-listed Shiraz Central Prison, where human rights are systemically violated</p>

			<p>and where numerous opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been executed. Several hostages from European countries have been unlawfully detained in this prison, where their access to a fair trial has been denied and where they have experienced severe violations of their most basic rights. Furthermore, this prison is participating in the repression of ethnic and religious minorities in southern Iran (including Arabs, Kurds, Baluchs, semi-nomadic tribes and Baha'is) through almost systematic executions. The Shiraz Central Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. Through his role in the administration of the EU-listed Shiraz Central Prison, which is involved in the violations of detainees' human rights, Mehdi Nemati is associated with an entity responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
236.	ZAREH Kamran	<p>Function: Judge at the Shiraz Court of Appeal Nationality: Iranian Gender: male</p>	<p>Kamran Zareh is Judge at the Shiraz Court of Appeal. In his role, he has systematically handed down severe sentences to peaceful dissidents, thus implementing the Islamic Republic of</p>

			<p>Iran's campaign of repression against political opponents. Furthermore, the Shiraz Court of Appeal has been implicated in numerous human rights violations, particularly concerning the prosecution of political dissidents and individuals from minority communities (in particular the Baha'i community). Through his involvement within this court, Kamran Zareh is therefore responsible for and associated with an entity responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
237.	SADATI Sayyed Mahmood	<p>Function: Judge at Shiraz Revolutionary Court Nationality: Iranian Gender: male</p>	<p>Sayyed Sadati is a Judge at EU-listed Shiraz Revolutionary Court. In his role, he is responsible for serious human rights violations, in particular forced confessions, violations of fair trial guarantees and execution of death sentences, against activists, political dissidents and individuals from minority communities (in particular the Baha'i community). Furthermore, he has systematically handed down severe sentences to peaceful dissidents, thus implementing the Islamic Republic of Iran's campaign of repression against political opponents.</p>

			<p>Additionally, the EU-listed Shiraz Revolutionary Court is implicated in numerous human rights violations.</p> <p>Therefore, through his involvement within the Shiraz Revolutionary Court, Sayyed Sadati is responsible for and associated with an entity responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
238.	SALEHI Ali	<p>Function: Public Prosecutor of Tehran</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p>	<p>Ali Salehi is the Public Prosecutor of Tehran. In his role, he participated in the prosecution of several women for refusing to comply with the mandatory hijab law, students and protesters. He also participated in the issuance of death sentences to prisoners and the implementation of those sentences as well as authorising the use of torture practices against prisoners. Therefore, Ali Salehi is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
239.	KHOSRAVANI Mohammad	<p>Function: Special Prosecutor of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court</p> <p>DOB: 16.9.1980</p> <p>POB: Shiraz, Iran</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>National ID No: 2296246941 (Iran)</p> <p>Birth certificate No: 1565</p>	<p>Mohammad Khosravi is the Special Prosecutor of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court. In this capacity, he has been responsible for and implicated in numerous human rights violations. These cases concern political dissidents, members of minority groups and several other individuals. He has directly</p>

		Birth certificate serial No: 225889221	coerced and pressured detainees, violated defendants' rights and overseen arbitrary arrests. Partly as a consequence of his actions, the Shiraz Revolutionary Court has gained a notoriety for unjust sentences and human rights violations. Mohammad Khosravi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
--	--	---	--

## B. Unternehmen und Organisationen

	Name	Identifizierungsinformation
1.	Cyber Police	<p>Location: Tehran (Iran)  Website: <a href="http://www.cyberpolice.ir">http://www.cyberpolice.ir</a></p> <p>The Iranian Cyber Police, founded in January 2011, is a unit of the Islamic Republic of Iran Police, headed by Vahid Majid. From the time of its inception until early 2015 it was headed by Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam (listed). Ahmadi-Moqaddam underlined that the Cyber Police would take on anti-revolutionary and dissident groups who used internet-based social networks in 2009 to trigger protests against the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In January 2012, the Cyber Police issued new guidelines for internet cafés, requiring users to provide personal information that would be kept by café owners for six months, as well as a record of the websites they visited. The rules also require café owners to install closed-circuit television cameras and maintain the recordings for six months. These new rules may create a logbook that authorities can use to track down activists or whoever is deemed a threat to national security. In June 2012, Iranian media reported that the Cyber Police would be launching a crackdown on virtual private networks (VPNs). On 30 October 2012, the Cyber Police arrested the blogger Sattar Beheshti without a warrant for 'actions against national security on social networks and Facebook'. Beheshti had criticised the Iranian government in his blog. Beheshti was found dead in his prison cell on 3 November 2012, and is believed to have been tortured to death by the Cyber Police authorities. The Cyber Police is responsible for many arrests</p>

		of Telegram Group Administrators in connection with the nationwide protests of November 2019.
2.	Evin Prison	<p>Address: Tehran Province, Tehran, District 2, Dasht-e Behesht (Iran)</p> <p>Evin Prison is a detention centre where political prisoners have been held and severe human rights abuses, including torture, have repeatedly taken place over the past years and decades.</p> <p>November 2019 protesters were, and at least to some extent still are, detained in Evin Prison as political prisoners. Prisoners in Evin Prison are being deprived of basic procedural rights, and are sometimes held in solitary confinement or overcrowded cells with poor hygienic conditions. There are detailed reports of physical and psychological torture. Detainees are denied contact with family and lawyers as well as adequate health treatment.</p> <p>In the context of the 2022/2023 protests, cases of torture are still being reported. The cause of the fire that led to several deaths and injuries in October 2022 has not been made public and the prison refuses any international inquiries. In the context of the fire, it also became clear that the prison uses internationally condemned landmines to prevent prison escapes. Several third-state nationals have been arbitrarily detained in Evin Prison.</p>
3.	Fashafouyeh Prison (a.k.a. Greater Tehran Central Penitentiary, Hasanabad-e Qom Prison, Greater Tehran Prison)	<p>Address: Tehran Province, Hasanabad, Bijin Industrial Zone, Tehran, Qom Old Road (Iran)</p> <p>Telephone: +98 21 5625 8050</p> <p>Fashafouyeh Prison is a detention centre designated originally to detain offenders of drug-related crimes, recently also holding political prisoners and, in some cases, forcing them to share cells with drug addicts. The living and hygienic conditions are very poor, lacking basic needs like clean drinking water.</p> <p>During the November 2019 protests, several protesters were detained in Fashafouyeh Prison, including minors. Reports indicate that November 2019 protesters were subjected to torture and inhumane treatment at Fashafouyeh Prison, for example by deliberately wounding them with boiling water and through denial of medical treatment. According to an Amnesty International report on the crackdown of the November 2019 protests, children as young as 15 have been detained alongside adults in Fashafouyeh Prison. Three November 2019 protesters who are currently being held in Fashafouyeh Prison were sentenced to death by a court in Tehran.</p> <p>Since the beginning of the 2022/2023 protests, it has been reported that 3 000 persons were transferred to Fashafouyeh prison and that 835 are currently still there. Several cases of torture and forced confessions have been reported.</p>

4.	Rajae Shahr Prison (a.k.a. Rajai Shahr Prison, Rajaishahr, Raja'i Shahr, Reja'i Shahr, Rajayi Shahr, Gorhardasht Prison, Gohar Dasht Prison)	<p>Address: Alborz Province, Karaj, Gohardasht, Moazzen Blvd (Iran) Telephone: +98 26 3448 9826</p> <p>Rajae Shahr Prison has been known for the deprivation of human rights, including severe physical and psychological torture of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience as well as mass executions without fair trial, ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.</p> <p>Hundreds of detainees, including children, were severely mistreated in Rajae Shahr Prison in the aftermath of the November 2019 protests. There are credible reports about numerous cases of torture and other forms of cruel punishment, including cases involving minors.</p> <p>Since the beginning of the 2022/2023 protests, numerous opponents have been arbitrarily jailed there in conditions that some inmate journalists have described as dangerous and hardly liveable.</p>
5.	Iran's Morality Police (a.k.a. Gasht-e-Ershad; Islamic Guidance Patrol; Guidance Patrols)	<p>Address: Vozara Street, corner of 25th Street, District 6, Tehran (Iran)</p> <p>The Morality Police is part of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and is a special police unit which enforces the strict dress rules for women, including compulsory wearing of a headscarf. The Morality Police has used unlawful force against women for not complying with Iranian hijab laws, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, excessive violence and torture.</p> <p>On 13 September 2022, the Morality Police arbitrarily arrested 22-year old Mahsa Amini in Tehran, allegedly for wearing a hijab improperly. She was subsequently taken to the Morality Police's headquarters for an 'educational and orientation class'. According to reliable reports and witnesses, she was brutally beaten and mistreated in custody, which led to her hospitalisation and to her death on 16 September 2022. The Morality Police's abusive behaviour is not confined to that incident and has been widely documented.</p> <p>The Morality Police is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
6.	Basij Resistance Force (a.k.a. Basij-e Mostazafan)	<p>The Basij Resistance Force is a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with branches throughout Iran.</p> <p>The security forces' response to the September 2022 protests in Iran was particularly harsh, resulting in the deaths of multiple people. The Basij Resistance Force was one of the forces ordered by the government to quell those protests. It injured and killed several protesters.</p> <p>The Basij Resistance Force is directly responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
7.	Cyber Defence Command of the Islamic Revolutio-	<p>Address: Tehran (Iran) Telephone: +98 26 3448 9826</p>

	nary Guard Corps (CDC)	The Cyber Defence Command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (CDC) monitors websites, e-mails and online activities of individuals deemed to be political opponents. During the September 2022 protests in Iran, the CDC took an active role in the Iranian government's repressive policies, including by identifying and arresting protesters. The CDC is directly responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
8.	Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA)	Address: Tehran (Iran) The Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) is a uniformed police force. The LEF's blatant and severe human rights violations, such as the indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds were seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. The LEF is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
9.	The Basij Cooperative Foundation (a.k.a. Bonyad-eh Ta'avon-eh Basij)	Address: Tehran, Iran Type of entity: Foundation/Corporation Network Other associated entities: IRGC, Basij Resistance Force The Basij Cooperative Foundation (BCF) is one of the affiliates of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed). The BCF was established in 1996 and its mission includes promoting and supporting the Basij. The activities of the BCF include the funding of the Basij Resistance Force (EU-listed). Therefore, the BCF is associated with the Basij Resistance Force, an entity responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
10.	Press TV	Address: 4 East 2nd St., Farhang Blvd., Saadat Abad, 19977-66411 Tehran, Iran Telephone number: Tel. +98 21 230 66 660 Email: Presstv@presstv.ir Type of entity: State Television Broadcaster Press TV is responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists, persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process. Therefore, Press TV is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
11.	Aufgehoben	

12.	Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)	<p>Address: Jamejam Street, Valiasr Avenue, 19395- 3333 Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Type of entity: state-owned broadcasting company</p> <p>Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p> <p>Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is a state-owned broadcasting company notorious for being a regime mouth-piece.</p> <p>IRIB is responsible for producing and broadcasting the forced confessions of detainees, including journalists, political activists, and persons belonging to Kurdish and Arab minorities, thereby violating internationally recognised rights to a fair trial and due process.</p> <p>IRIB is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
13.	Ravin Academy	<p>Place of registration: Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Date of registration: 2019</p> <p>Registration number: 49135</p> <p>Principal place of business: Second Floor, No. 36, Naqdi Street, North Sohrevardi Street, Shahid Ghandi-Niloufar Neighborhood, Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Ravin Academy is an Iran-based cyber security company which provides cyber security education and training in both defensive and offensive fields as well as hacker training.</p> <p>In addition, Ravin Academy operates on behalf of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and supports them in recruiting hackers.</p> <p>Hackers trained at the Ravin Academy have been involved in directly disrupting the communication of those protesting against the Iranian regime, thereby repressing the protests.</p> <p>Therefore, Ravin Academy is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
14.	Samane Gostar Sahab Pardaz Private Limited Company (a.k.a Sahab Pardaz)	<p>Place of registration: Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Principal place of business: Tehran, No. 22, Khorramshahr Street Tehran, North Shohvardi Street, Korramshahr Street, Number 24, Floor 1</p> <p>Samane Gostar Sahab Pardaz Private Limited Company is an Iran-based company providing social-media filtering services.</p> <p>It is engaged in censorship and surveillance activities for the Government of Iran, including during the 2022 protests, that prohibit, limit or penalise the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit access to print or broadcast media.</p> <p>Samane Gostar Sahab Pardaz Private Limited Company is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>

15.	<p>Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) (a.k.a. Communication Regulation Authority (CRA))</p>	<p>Place of registration: Tehran, Iran Associated entity: Iranian Ministry for Information and Communications Technology (ICT) The Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) is under the authority of the Iranian Ministry for Information and Communications Technology (ICT). The CRA enforces the Iranian government's requirements to filter internet content through a spyware called SIAM. During the 2022 protests, the CRA used its control of internet access and mobile phones to track protestors and create a detailed picture of dissidents' and protesters' activities for the authorities to use at their will. The CRA is therefore responsible for supporting the repression of peaceful demonstrators, journalists, human rights defenders, students or other persons who speak up in defence of their legitimate rights. The CRA is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
16.	<p>Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil (a.k.a. Office for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil; Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice; Setad-PV)</p>	<p>Type of entity: government institution Place of registration: Iran Principal place of business: Iran Associated individuals: GOLPAYEGANI Seyyed Mohammed Saleh Hashemi, head of the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil Other associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil is a government institution, responsible for determining and enforcing excessively strict behavioural models in society. In 2022, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil was instrumental in setting new and stricter morality codes for women that are in clear violation of their human rights. Additionally, the Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil plays a central role in setting up the monitoring and often brutal sanctioning of women and men who do not respect these codes. These strict codes are subsequently brutally enforced by the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (and specifically its Morality Police). The Headquarters for Enjoining Right and Forbidding Evil is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
17.	<p>Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company</p>	<p>Address: Shahrak-e-Jafar Abad-e-Jangal Rd, Naseriyeh, Tehran, Iran; Number 16, Kolezar alley, Farsian Street, Shahid Rezaiee Street, Azadegan Autobahn, Tehran, Iran; Number 16, Gholshan 14, Golestan Boulevard, Negarestan Boulevard, Sham Abad, Tehran, Iran Type of entity: private company Place of registration: Iran</p>

		<p>Date of registration: 2010  National ID no: 103201991293 (Iran)  Business registration no: 369541 (Iran)  Principal place of business: Iran  Associated individuals: Mohammad Zandi Aliabadi, chairman of the Board of directors;  Hossein Zandi Aliabadi, Vice chairman of the Board of directors;  Fatemeh Haghshenas, CEO  Other associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)  Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company is an Iranian company manufacturing and importing security equipment for Iranian security forces.  Its equipment is used by Iranian security forces to violently suppress peaceful protests, including the protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in 2022, leading to the torture or death of at least 516 protestors, including at least 70 children.  Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
18.	Iranian Special Police Forces (a.k.a. NOPO; Iran's Counter-Terror Special Forces; Niroo-ye Vizhe Pasdar-e Velayat; Supreme Leader's Guardian Special Forces; Provincial Special Forces; Special Counter-Terrorism Force)	<p>Address: Iran  Type of entity: police force  Place of registration: Iran  Principal place of activity: Iran  Associated individuals: Mohsen Ebrahimi (Commander)  Other associated entities: Iran's Special Unit Forces, Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)  The Iranian Special Police Forces (NOPO) are a subdivision of Iran's Special Unit Forces and the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF). NOPO is a highly trained, specialised unit often called upon to dissolve protests.  During the 2022 protests following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, NOPO used excessive violence and lethal force against unarmed protestors, including women and children, e.g. by firing automatic weapons at protestors.  The Iranian Special Police Forces (NOPO) are therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
19.	Radis Vira Tejarat Co	<p>Address: Tehran, Pasdaran St., West Gilan St., No. 5, Unit 1, Corner of Mohed Dou Alley  Type of entity: physical security provider, private enterprise  Principal place of business: Iran  Associated individuals: Abbas Azarpendar, CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co and regional manager in Iran for Tiandy Technologies  Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (customers), Pars Ertebat Afzar Co (distributor)</p>

		<p>Radis Vira Tejarat Co is the Iranian representative of the company Tiandy Technologies. The close ties between the companies are illustrated by the fact that the CEO of Radis Vira Tejarat Co, Abbas Azarpendar, is also regional manager in Iran for Tiandy Technologies. Radis Vira Tejarat Co is a key intermediary in Iran providing some of the most advanced surveillance equipment to the Iranian government. During the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody in mid-September 2022, its equipment has been used by the Iranian security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its Basij and the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), to brutally suppress the nationwide protests, leading to the torture or death of at least 516 protestors, including at least 70 children.</p> <p>Radis Vira Tejarat Co is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
20.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Shohada in West Azerbaijan	<p>Address: West Azerbaijan, Iran  Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit  Place of registration: West Azerbaijan, Iran  Principal place of activity: Iran  Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p> <p>The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Shohada operates in the province of West-Azerbaijan. EU-listed Brigadier General Habib Shahsavari is the commander of this entity.</p> <p>During the 2022 protests, the IRGC Regional Corps Shohada conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, commencing 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in the West Azerbaijan towns of Piranshahr, Mahabad and Bukan. IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations. IRGC operations in the towns of Mahabad and Bukan have killed at least four and 12 people, respectively, since 15 November 2022.</p> <p>The IRGC Regional Corps Shohada is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
21.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Nabi Akram in Kermanshah	<p>Address: Kermanshah, Iran  Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit  Place of registration: Kermanshah, Iran  Principal place of activity: Iran  Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p> <p>The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Nabi Akram operates in the province of Kermanshah.</p>

		<p>EU-listed Brigadier General Bahman Reyhani is the commander of this entity.</p> <p>During the 2022 protests, Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC.</p> <p>The IRGC Regional Corps Hazrat Nabi Akram is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
22.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Quds in Gilan	<p>Address: Gilan, Iran</p> <p>Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit</p> <p>Place of registration: Gilan, Iran</p> <p>Principal place of activity: Iran</p> <p>Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p> <p>The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Quds operates in the province of Gilan.</p> <p>EU-listed Brigadier General Mohammad Abdollahpour is the commander of this entity.</p> <p>During the 2022 protests, Gilan province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC.</p> <p>The IRGC Regional Corps Quds is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
23.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Karbala in Mazandaran	<p>Address: Mazandaran, Iran</p> <p>Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit</p> <p>Place of registration: Mazandaran, Iran</p> <p>Principal place of activity: Iran</p> <p>Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p> <p>The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Karbala operates in the province of Mazandaran.</p> <p>EU-listed Brigadier General Siavash Moslemi is the commander of this entity.</p> <p>During the 2022 protests, the entity conducted operations against protesters in Mazandaran province. In those operations, it used disproportionate force and violence against protesters.</p> <p>The IRGC Regional Corps Karbala is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
24.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Seyyed al-Shohada in Tehran province	<p>Address: Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit</p> <p>Place of registration: Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Principal place of activity: Iran</p> <p>Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p> <p>The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Seyyed al-Shohada operates in the province of Tehran.</p> <p>EU-listed Brigadier General Ahmad Zulqadr is the commander of this entity.</p>

		<p>During the 2022 protests, the violent repression of protests in Tehran province by Iranian security forces, including by the IRGC, has been particularly strong and excessive. The IRGC Regional Corps Seyyed al-Shohada is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
25.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Karbala	<p>Address: Southwest Iran (provinces of Khuzestan, Lorestan, and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad)  Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit  Principal place of activity: Iran  Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)  The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Operational Base (regional headquarters) Karbala operates in Southwest Iran, covering the provinces of Khuzestan, Lorestan, and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad.  EU-listed Brigadier General Ahmad Kadem is the commander of this entity.  During the 2022 protests, the entity conducted operations against protesters, in particular in the provinces of Khuzestan and Lorestan, including in the town of Khorramabad in Lorestan. During those operations, IRGC troops used disproportionate force, using live ammunition against protesters. The IRGC Operational Base Karbala is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
26.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Quds	<p>Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit  Principal place of activity: Iran  Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)  Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base Quds is the IRGC's regional headquarters in the southeast of Iran and oversees Kerman province and Sistan and Baluchestan province.  EU-listed Brigadier General Mohammad Karami is the commander of this entity.  Sistan and Baluchestan province has seen some of the most violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the provincial capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday", when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer, using live ammunition. At least 70 protestors were shot and killed. Since then, violence against participants in later protests has continued.  The IRGC Operational Base Quds is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
27.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base	<p>Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit  Principal place of activity: Iran</p>

	Najaf-e-Ashraf	<p>Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p> <p>The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Operational Base (regional headquarters) Najaf-e-Ashraf oversees the provinces of Kermanshah, Hamedan and Ilam. EU-listed Brigadier General Mohammad Nazar Azimi is the commander of this entity.</p> <p>During the 2022 protests, Kermanshah province has seen violent crackdowns by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC.</p> <p>The IRGC Operational Base Najaf-e-Ashraf is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
28.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Valiasr in Khuzestan	<p>Address: Khuzestan, Iran</p> <p>Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit</p> <p>Place of registration: Khuzestan, Iran</p> <p>Principal place of activity: Iran</p> <p>Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p> <p>The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Valiasr operates in the province of Khuzestan. EU-listed Brigadier General Hassan Shahvarpour is the commander of this entity.</p> <p>The IRGC Regional Corps Valiasr is responsible for massacres of protesters in Khuzestan in November 2020. In addition, in the course of the 2022 protests in Iran, it has conducted operations against protesters in particular in the town of Izeh. IRGC troops have used disproportionate force in these operations, leading to the killing of protesters.</p> <p>The IRGC Regional Corps Valiasr is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
29.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Abufazl in Lorestan	<p>Address: Lorestan, Iran</p> <p>Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit</p> <p>Place of registration: Lorestan, Iran</p> <p>Principal place of activity: Iran</p> <p>Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)</p> <p>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Hazrat Abufazl operates in the province of Lorestan. During the 2022 protests, it conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, operations were conducted in the town of Khorramabad in Lorestan. IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations, using live ammunition against protesters.</p> <p>The IRGC Regional Corps Hazrat Abufazl is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
30.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional	<p>Address: Kurdistan, Iran</p> <p>Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit</p>

	Corps Beit-al-Moqadas in Kurdistan	<p>Place of registration: Kurdistan, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Beit-al-Moqadas operates in the province of Kurdistan. EU-listed Brigadier General Sadegh Hosseini is the commander of this entity. During the 2022 protests, this entity conducted operations against protesters in the Kurdish regions of Iran. In particular, commencing 15 November 2022, such operations were conducted against protesters in the Kurdistan towns and West Azerbaijan towns of Sanandaj, Kamyaran and Saqqez. IRGC troops used disproportionate force in these operations. IRGC operations in the towns of Sanandaj, Kamyaran and Saqqez have killed at least seven, two and two people, respectively, since 15 November 2022. The IRGC Regional Corps Beit-al-Moqadas is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
31.	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Salaman in Sistan and Baluchestan	<p>Address: Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran Type of entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military unit Place of registration: Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran Principal place of activity: Iran Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regional Corps Salaman oversees the province of Sistan and Baluchestan. EU-listed Brigadier General Amanollah Garshasbi is the commander of this entity. Sistan and Baluchestan has seen some of the most violent crackdown by Iranian security forces, including the IRGC, during the 2022 protests. On 30 September 2022, the provincial capital Zahedan witnessed "bloody Friday", when security forces opened fire on a protest forming in Zahedan around Friday prayer, using live ammunition. At least 70 protesters were shot and killed. Since then, violence against protesters has continued. The IRGC Regional Corps Salaman is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
32.	Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Cooperation Foundation (a.k.a. NAJA Cooperation Foundation)	<p>Address: Marzadaran Blvd, Teheran, Tehran, Iran Type of entity: Cooperation Foundation associated with the Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic Associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA) Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Cooperation Foundation is an economic collaborative controlled by the EU-listed LEF (also known as NAJA) and</p>

		<p>is active in Iran's energy, construction, services, technology, and banking industries.</p> <p>The LEF Cooperation Foundation is an important financing arm of the LEF, consists de facto of a financial holding that provides and channels funds and is used to circumvent sanctions. Additionally the Cooperation Foundation with its subsidiaries is one of the few suppliers exclusively involved in manufacturing and importing equipment that is used to suppress protests in Iran.</p> <p>The LEF Cooperation Foundation therefore provides financial resources and equipment for repression to the LEF which uses the support to commit serious human rights violations. The LEF Cooperation Foundation is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
33.	Police Science and Social Studies Institute	<p>Place of registration: Tehran, Iran Address: QCC3+HPP District 3, Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran</p> <p>Type of entity: Institute associated with the Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic (LEF)</p> <p>Associated entities: Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (a.k.a. NAJA; FARAJA)</p> <p>The Police Science and Social Studies Institute, affiliated with the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) (also known as NAJA) produces "anti-riot drones" that are used by law enforcement forces in suppressing peaceful protesters. Additionally, the institute promotes and conducts research on the use of drones for police forces. The Police Science and Social Studies Institute is associated to the Law Enforcement Forces of Iran and provides equipment that is used to commit serious human rights violations. It is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
34.	Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution	<p>Associated individual: KHOSROU PANAH Abdol Hossein (chairman and secretary)</p> <p>The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution is a regime policy body responsible for preparing and formulating strategic policies and plans in the fields of science, education, religion and research.</p> <p>It promoted several projects undermining the freedom of girls and women, setting limits on their clothing and education. Its decisions have also discriminated against minorities, such as the Baha'i. It is a vehicle for promoting the current regime's policies.</p> <p>The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
35.	Ariantel	<p>Address: Ariantel Head Office, No 15, 15th alley, South Gandhi Street, Tehran, Iran Website: <a href="http://www.ariantel.ir">http://www.ariantel.ir</a></p> <p>Type of entity: private company</p>

		<p>Ariantel has actively sought, and makes use of, cyberware products used to monitor, geolocate and intercept calls and other mobile communications activities of its users at the request of the Iranian Government. This information has subsequently been used to quash and disrupt protests and to identify, target and arrest peaceful protesters and activists. Therefore, Ariantel is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
36.	<p>Student Basij Organisation (SBO) (a.k.a Student and Talabeh Basij)</p>	<p>Type of entity: branch of the Basij Organisation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: November 1989 Associated individuals: Issa Zarepour Other associated entities: IRGC; IRGC Basij Organisation The Student Basij Organisation (SBO) is a branch within the Basij Organisation that acts as the IRGC's violent enforcers on university campuses. The SBO consists of the youngest and most radical members of the Basij, who were particularly active in making university campuses where students staged protests some of the main theatres of repression in autumn 2022. During raids on a number of university campuses, including at Sharif University, Shahid Beheshti University and Amirkabir University security forces, including the SBO, used live ammunition and opened fire on students. This, alongside multiple reports of student abductions and torture linked to these raids, confirms that the SBO is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
37.	<p>IRGC Cooperative Foundation (a.k.a IRGC Cooperation Bonyad; Bonyad Taavon Sepah; Bonyad-e Ta'avone; Sepah Cooperative Foundation)</p>	<p>Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran Type of entity: foundation Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: 1989 Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Seyyed Amin Ala; Emami Tabatabai; Ahmad Hasan Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini Other associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The IRGC has been at the forefront of the crackdown on protests in Iran since September 2022, which according to independent sources has resulted in over 520 deaths, including the deaths of over 70 minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and is thus responsible for financing the regime's brutal repression. It is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>
38.	<p>Tasnim Cultural Institution Organization</p>	<p>Type of entity: Media outlet Place of registration: Iran Date of registration: June 30, 2012</p>

	(a.k.a. Tasnim News Agency)	Tasnim News agency is the largest Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) affiliated media outlet and serves as a propaganda machine for the Iranian regime whose coverage frequently reflects hard-line Iranian views. The news outlet is responsible for publishing false confessions by protesters on its website and social media accounts as well as for posting pictures of protestors on social media and asking readers to help identify them. Tasnim News is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
39.	Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC)	The Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) is responsible for restricting access to the internet for the Iranian population in order to prevent or oppress protests and limit access to open and free information, thereby violating the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The SCC is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
40.	Sanandaj Central Prison	Type of entity: Prison Place of registration: Kordestan, north-western Iran Sanandaj Central Prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that multiple executions have occurred within the penitentiary. Sanandaj Central Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
41.	Zahedan Prison	Zahedan Prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that mass executions have occurred within the penitentiary. Zahedan Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
42.	Isfahan Central Prison (a.k.a. Dastgerd Prison; Prison of Isfahan; Esfahan Prison; Isfahan Prison)	Type of entity: Prison Place of registration: Isfahan, Iran Isfahan Central Prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that multiple executions have occurred within the penitentiary. Isfahan Central Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.

43.	Kachui Prison (a.k.a. Kachouii Prison; Kechoui Prison; Kachuyi Prison; Fardis Prison)	Kachui prison is an institution controlled by the Prison Division of the Judiciary that is frequently used to detain political prisoners and house them in inadequate conditions which violate their human rights. Further, the evidence confirms that executions have occurred within the penitentiary. Kachui Prison is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
44.	Shiraz Central Prison (a.k.a. Adel Abad Prison)	<p>Type of entity: Prison  Place of registration: Shiraz, Fars province, Iran  Shiraz Central Prison, Adel Abad, located in Shiraz, Fars province, Iran, is a prison in which detainees' human rights are systemically violated and where numerous opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been executed, including based on collective punishment.</p> <p>Several hostages from European countries have been unlawfully detained in this prison, where their access to a fair trial has been denied and where they have experienced severe violations of their most basic rights.</p> <p>Furthermore, this prison is participating in the repression of ethnic and religious minorities in southern Iran (including Arabs, Kurds, Baluchs, semi-nomadic tribes and Baha'is) through almost systematic executions.</p>
45.	1st branch of the Revolutionary Court of Shiraz	<p>Type of entity: Prison  Place of registration: Shiraz, Fars province, Iran  The 1st branch of the Revolutionary Court of Shiraz, located in Fars province, Iran, has been implicated in numerous human rights violations, in particular concerning the unjust trials and executions of political dissidents and persecution of individuals from minority communities (in particular the Baha'i community).</p> <p>These actions underscore the court's role in perpetuating systemic human rights violations, utilising the judiciary as a tool for political repression and suppression of political dissent and minority communities in Iran.</p>

## Anhang 8<sup>50</sup>

(Art. 8b Abs. 1)

### Häfen und Schleusen, die Transaktionsverboten unterliegen

1. Amirabad Port, Iran
2. Anzali Port, Iran

- 1 Der Text dieser Resolutionen ist unter [www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0) in englischer Sprache abrufbar.

---
- 2 Ingress abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).

---
- 3 Art. 1 Sachüberschrift abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 454](#).

---
- 4 Art. 1 Abs. 2 eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 454](#).

---
- 5 Art. 3a eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 376](#).

---
- 6 Art. 3a Sachüberschrift abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 261](#).

---
- 7 Art. 3a Abs. 1 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 261](#).

---
- 8 Der Text des Gemeinsamen umfassenden Aktionsplans ist in Anhang A der UN-Resolution 2231 (2015) enthalten.

---
- 9 Art. 4 Abs. 3 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 206](#).

---
- 10 Art. 4 Abs. 3 Einleitungssatz abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 376](#).

---
- 11 Die Richtlinien der Gruppe der Nuklearlieferländer sind im Internet unter folgender Adresse einsehbar: [www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org](http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org) > Richtlinien.

---
- 12 Art. 4 Abs. 4 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 206](#).

---
- 13 Art. 4 Abs. 5 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 206](#).

---
- 14 Art. 4 Abs. 6 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 206](#).

---
- 15 Art. 4 Abs. 7 eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 206](#).

---
- 16 Art. 4 Abs. 8 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 376](#).

---
- 17 Art. 5 Abs. 6 Einleitungssatz abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 206](#).

---
- 18 Art. 5 Abs. 7 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 376](#).

---
- 19 Art. 6 Abs. 4 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 376](#).

---
- 20 Überschrift vor Art. 8 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 198](#).

---
- 21 Art. 8 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 261](#).

---
- 22 Art. 8 Abs. 1 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).

---
- 23 Art. 8 Abs. 2 Bst. a abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).

---
- 24 Art. 8 Abs. 3a eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 454](#).

---
- 25 Art. 8 Abs. 3b eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 454](#).

---
- 26 Art. 8 Abs. 4 Bst. c aufgehoben durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).

---
- 27 Art. 8 Abs. 5a eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).

---
- 28 Art. 8a eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 261](#).

---

- 
- [29](#) Art. 8a Abs. 1 Einleitungssatz abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [30](#) Verordnung (EU) 2018/1139 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 4. Juli 2018 zur Festlegung gemeinsamer Vorschriften für die Zivilluftfahrt und zur Errichtung einer Agentur der Europäischen Union für Flugsicherheit sowie zur Änderung der Verordnungen (EG) Nr. 2111/2005, (EG) Nr. 1008/2008, (EU) Nr. 996/2010, (EU) Nr. 376/2014 und der Richtlinien 2014/30/EU und 2014/53/EU des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates, und zur Aufhebung der Verordnungen (EG) Nr. 552/2004 und (EG) Nr. 216/2008 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates und der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 3922/91 des Rates ([ABL. L 212 vom 22.8.2018, S. 1](#))
- 
- [31](#) Art. 8a Abs. 3 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [32](#) Art. 8b eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 261](#).
- 
- [33](#) Art. 9 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 454](#).
- 
- [34](#) Art. 11 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 261](#).
- 
- [35](#) Art. 11 Abs. 1 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [36](#) Art. 11 Abs. 1a eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [37](#) Art. 12 Abs. 1 Bst. b abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [38](#) Art. 12 Abs. 2 eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 454](#).
- 
- [39](#) Art. 14 Abs. 1 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 454](#).
- 
- [40](#) Art. 14a abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [41](#) Art. 14b abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [42](#) Art. 15a eingefügt durch [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 376](#).
- 
- [43](#) Anhang 1 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 376](#).
- 
- [44](#) Anhang 1a abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 108](#).
- 
- [45](#) Anhang 5 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [46](#) Die Liste ist im Internet unter folgender Adresse abrufbar: <https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=iran>.
- 
- [47](#) Anhang 6 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 24](#), [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 70](#), [LGBL. 2016. Nr. 179](#), [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 369](#), [LGBL. 2017 Nr. 14](#), [LGBL. 2019 Nr. 154](#), [LGBL. 2020 Nr. 209](#), [LGBL. 2020 Nr. 353](#), [LGBL. 2021 Nr. 250](#), [LGBL. 2022 Nr. 201](#), [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 183](#), [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 391](#), [LGBL. 2024 Nr. 314](#), [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 261](#), [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 360](#), [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 454](#) und [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [48](#) Anhang 6a abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 471](#), [LGBL. 2024 Nr. 234](#), [LGBL. 2024 Nr. 251](#), [LGBL. 2024 Nr. 290](#), [LGBL. 2024 Nr. 356](#), [LGBL. 2024 Nr. 414](#), [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 261](#), [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 360](#) und [LGBL. 2025 Nr. 490](#).
- 
- [49](#) Anhang 7 abgeändert durch [LGBL. 2016 Nr. 141](#), [LGBL. 2017 Nr. 109](#), [LGBL. 2018 Nr. 76](#), [LGBL. 2019 Nr. 92](#), [LGBL. 2020 Nr. 146](#), [LGBL. 2021 Nr. 137](#), [LGBL. 2022 Nr. 127](#), [LGBL. 2022 Nr. 286](#), [LGBL. 2022 Nr. 323](#), [LGBL. 2022 Nr. 394](#), [LGBL. 2023 Nr. 26](#),

---

[LGBL 2023 Nr. 69](#), [LGBL 2023 Nr. 121](#), [LGBL 2023 Nr. 132](#), [LGBL 2023 Nr. 183](#),  
[LGBL 2023 Nr. 205](#), [LGBL 2023 Nr. 255](#), [LGBL 2023 Nr. 366](#), [LGBL 2024 Nr. 151](#),  
[LGBL 2025 Nr. 108](#), [LGBL 2025 Nr. 261](#), [LGBL 2025 Nr. 268](#), [LGBL 2025 Nr. 454](#) und  
[LGBL 2025 Nr. 490](#).

---

[50](#) Anhang 8 eingefügt durch [LGBL 2025 Nr. 261](#).